But come; let us fee what makes this gentleman laugh, and what makes him angry. At Dr. Prieftley he does not prefume either to laugh or be angry; and he is in the right, as he declares (though he need not have fworn to it) that " upon his life" he does not understand him. But, though he has a little complaifance for the knight, he has none for his supposed 'fquire, whom he yet understands much lefs.

"I beg leave, fays he, to turn afide, for a few minutes, to a gentleman, who, in the London Review of September laft, made his pearance in quality of your Squire or Sancho Panza, and whofe curious epiftle may therefore be confidered as containing a full delineation of his master's fentiment. You will not, I truft, from that ludicrous idea at all infer that, I mean to compare your Reverence to a knight errant; far be fuch an indecent thought from me; bat I will add, and I defign it for a ferious compliment, that your late atchievement in fo boldly affailing and utterly difcomfiting the three Scottish tyrants, and refcuing from their iron hands the beautiful damfel, they had ravished and confined, was a work, not to be paralleled in the annals of the knight of the woeful figure.

"As your friend profeffes to enter upon his enquiry" on the grounds of phyfical experiment and obfervation," I will endeavour to follow him through all his curious researches. Never, I believe, was nazuralift fo unnaturally engaged!-I allow then, in reply to his first queftion, that therefore I entertain the notion that man is compofed of two fubftances, fo eflentially different as body and fpirit, because I fee him capable of acting in a voluntary manner, of which mode of action inanimate bodies I judge to be incapable: the action of fuch bodies I alfo judge to be a mere mechanical effect. He then afks, from whence animation and the power of volition are derived? And, not pleased 'with the common idea, of their fpringing from an annexed fubitance, of a nature totally different from matter, refolves the knot, by asking another question; whether the most inanimate and unorganized bodies are altogether fo inert and patfive, as that by proper organization they may not be capable of acquiring the power of volition, i. e. the power of being affected by motives not merely mechanical? That is, in other words, whether matter, in a difunited and unorganized state, totally divetted of all animation and power of volition, but barely capable of action and re-action, may not, by the mere juxta-pofition of parts, rife into life, and begin to act from the influence of moral motives? I will anfwer for it, no metamorphofis of Ovid, of men and women into trees and rocks, or even of dragon's teeth into men, was half fo wondrous and incredible; though the laft example bears fome refemblance to it. He endeavours to illuftrate this ftrange tranfmutation by adding, "that before the invention of clocks and watches, or other machines, it must have appeared as incredible that bits of brafs or steel could ever, by any combination, be brought to indicate the hours, &c. as it is now to us, that morfels of aliment can acquire by organization the power of volun tary motion. The first was effected: why may not then the second?-I blufh to repeat fuch puerilities."

Modeft creature! Do but hear him.

"Doce

"Does he not reflect that, in the first cafe, a peculiar combination of parts is alone fufficient; but in the second, that the morfels of aliment, besides a new arrangement, muft alfo conjure up new powers of feeling, of thought, and of volition, whereof, as he allows, no feeds are to be found in their unorganized difhabille. For the future where will be the difficulty in conceiving, that fomething may in a like manner arife from nothing? It is not therefore merely because we do not understand how fuch a power can be conferred, by bare appofition, on matter that we recur to an imperceptible adjunct to explain the faculty of volition, as your metaphyfical friend feems fhrewdly to fancy, but chiefly, becaufe the fole fuppofition of fuch a mysterious change is marked with the broad characters of palpable abfurdity."

It has been remarked, by a fhrewd obferver of mankind, that, as the greateft ftrumpet cries whore firft, the abfurdest people in the world are the first to exclaim at the absurdities of

others.

"Thus all looks yellow to the jaundiced eye,"

and the reafon is plain; to an abfurd comprehenfion, truth itself muft appear an abfurdity. The ignorance and incapacity of this man, however, are contemptible: he talks of organization as if it were nothing more than the juxta pofition or bare appofition of parts. Where did he get that idea? Is he fo puerile as not to know that organization confifts in the confiftent motion of conftituent parts? and that mere juxta-pofition of parts cannot always be called a combination, much lefs an organization? If a watch does not go, however truly its parts are put together, it is a mere affemblage of brafs and steel; it has not the effential property of a watch. In like manner, if the circulation of the fluids in an animal body be stopped, its vital effence is gone.-The comparison I made between them was merely analogous; but, though an animal be a more complicated machine, it is by means equally neceffary and natural, if I may not fay mechanical, that the animal body is kept alive by motion, and its wafte repaired by aliment, as that a watch or clock is enabled to inform us of the time of day by motion.

"With pleasure, continues this letter-writer, I accompany your difciple in his next remove, and applaud his philofophy, as long as he is fatisfied with afferting that, matter is not that inert, paffive fomething, poffeffed of nothing but of length, breadth, and thickness, as generally reprefented. Matter, in all its parts, I allow to be as active, as he can poffibly defire. I will even go farther, and affert that, if matter is not active, it is nothing; for a fubftance, purely paffive, would be at beft a useless and unneceffary lump in the creation. Thus far then we both agree."

Indeed we do not. I conceive matter, though not that inert, paffive thing it is conceived to be by the Newtonians, to have no other principle of action in itself than is neceffary to its reaction;

VUL. V

I

action; being totally inactive, if it were totally at reft.—But now we come to the laughter

"When fpeaking of the oppofition caufed by two bodies meeting in adverfe directions, he fays, "fuch an oppofition may not improperly be called a mechanical species of perception," or, "that two inanimate or unorganized bodies, in collition, perceive the prefence or force of each other;" I defy the callous fibres of the moft gloomy metaphyfi, cian not to diffolve in laughter."

Why don't you laugh? gentlemen. Are critics more gloomy than metaphyficians? or do you fee nothing to laugh at? Proceed then.

"It is, however, unkind barely to allow them this curious fpecies of perception, and at the fame time refufe them all irritability, or powers of feeling pain or pleature: but this, he adds, is owing to the want of a nervous fyllem, in confequence of which," they can neither fee, bear, fmeil, nor tafle each other." Still as he continues to resolve their perceptier powers into a fpecies of univerfal touch (by the bye there can be no touch without irritability), who can tell, how far they may be fwayed by pailions in the various modes of percuffion from various bodies? By a hard and uncouth blow they may be roused into all the horrors of rige, or be foftened into the charins of love by the gende prehure of fome fair hand."

Now, I perceive you fmile, and well you may, at fuch a mifconception of my meaning. Surely I diftinguished fufficiently between animal fenfation and mere material refiftance, by calling the latter a mechanical fpecies of perception. He will not cavil at my saying that two equal balls of lead, meeting each other with equal velocity in oppofite directions, receive a mutual impreffion from their reciprocal refiftance. Where then is the impropriety of faying they perceive the refiftance from which it must be allowed they actually receive a permanent impreffion. But lead, he will fay, is not irritable, and by the bye there can be no touch without irritability." And fo the faid leaden balls, notwithstanding they might be beat flat by their percuffion, did not touch one another.-Rifum teneatis!-Ha! ha! ha! ---Oh ho! you do laugh now. The difcuffion of this point, however, is not a laughing matter: and yet ferioufly it is mighty fimple. The error lies in the general fuppofition, that perception is the direct and fimple effect of the impreffions made by external objects on the organs of fenfe. But this is not true: there neither is nor can be perception without reflection. It is not fufficient that the vibration of the nerves, the animal fpirits, or whatever it be that in this cafe affects the brain, communicates to the fenforium the impreffion received by the external object; it is neceffary that fuch vibration or affection be repelled at the fenforium, and returned back to the extremity of the nerve first receiving

the

the impreffion from the object: for it is in fact there, and not in the brain, that we perceive fuch objects, or feel the fenfation of pain or pleasure they excite. Hence it is, that in a profound reverie or trance, when the faculties and powers of reflection are not exerted, nothing is perceived or felt.

This letter-writing philofopher proceeds to take me to task about animation: about which he feems to know as little as about organization.

"What he means [meaning me] to prove from the example of fome infects, living and moving after the lofs of their heads, I cannot pretend to fay: the whole paffage is fo obfcure and defultory, it has quite exhaufted my patience."

Now he begins to be angry. But it is natural enough for a man to lose his temper, when he has loft his understanding. He does not comprehend what I mean by the example of infects living and moving after the lofs of their heads. Where is the difficulty, when he himself has here given us an inftance, that a literary grub may live, move, and write a pamphlet, without a head?

"At length," continues this headlefs philofopher," he [that is 1] reverts to the old marvellous story, that from the mere combination of elements, fimply refifting and inconfcious, may arife "the faculties of fenfation, perception, reflexion, and will, the teft of all the others." "It was not therefore without reafon, adds he, that Hobbes and fome others have imputed an imperfect fenfe or perception to particles of unorganized matter." What fay you to this again, Doctor? Will you allow perception, where no vibratory motion can be rafed?-The mere citation of fuch bizarre conceits is an ample refutation of them."

This citation anfwering the purpofe of refutation, is like juxta-pofition anfwering that of organization-This writer has, indeed, a happy knack of putting the quid pro quo. For juft now, he says, I begin (as he ought to do) to blufh.-It is not true, however, as he fays, that it is for the firft time: for [ have blufhed for him more than once already. But why does he fuppofe me to blufh? Why truly becaufe I faid,

"They (Hobbes and his affociates) went too far, indeed, in calling it (the imperfect fenfe) a confcicufnefs; as confcioufnefs implies a fpecies of felf-knowledge, that is obtainable only by a comparison between the percipient body and the body perceived; which is not to be obtained by the faculty of fimple perception, but only from reflexion, or the faculty of comparing different perceptions with each other, of which it is not pretended inanimate corpufcles are capable. At the fame time it does by no means follow, that a combination of fuch corpufcles may not form a confcious and intelligent compound."

And what answer does our philofopher give to this?-He cries Braviffimo! An unanswerable argument; which he vouchfafes, however, to illuftrate thus:

"For my part now, I own, I cannot fee wherein Mr. Hobbes is reprehenfible: for, where there is perception, there certainly is confciI 2

oufnefs; otherwife it becomes perception unperceived. But whatever he may ettablish with regard to the inconsciousness of his individual elements; he fhould not forget, that in collifion or contact (and in the prefent fyftem of univerfal gravitation it is very difficult for a body not to be in contact fomewhere or other), according to his own philofophy, all bodies must be strictly conscious. This affection, indeed, he maintains, is only attainable by a comparison between the percipient body and the body perceived; but he has juft before determined, "that two inanimate or unorganized bodies, in collifion, perceive the prefence or force of each other." If this mutual perception is not enough, on which to ground a fair comparifon; why, fuch bodies must be ftupid indeed!"

And yet not half fo ftupid as this pretender to philofophy, if his ftupidity be not affected, and his perverfion of my meaning wilful. But I fear, gentlemen, to tire your patience; and shall therefore cite but one paffage more.

"He [meaning me] is ftill refolved to push on his phyfical refearches: he adds; "The abfurdity of fuppofing a fimple unorganized being capable of thinking is flagrant; if it thinks, it must neceffarily have previoufly acquired an idea, or object of thought. It cannot think about nothing, and ideas are to be acquired only by means of the organs of fenfe." Never, I believe, was fuch flagrant nonfenfe uttered by a man, who hath the fmalleft pretenfion to the name of a philotopher! By what metaphyfician was it ever afferted, that the foul of man may think, independently of all corporeal concurrence? In its prefent fate of union, it hath organs fufficient for every species of thought: viewed as a difiinct or infulated fubilance, it is gifted with powers of acting, but their exertion is dependent of the body. In' this light the philofopher contemplates the human foul."

Might not I return the complement of flagrant nonfenfe here? He asks what metaphyfician ever afferted the foul of man may think independent of the body. I will tell him; hundreds, and in particular his favourite Genevan philofopher Mr. Eonnet; who fays, the foul is a fubftance which thinks, though united to a fubftance which is unthinking. I am miftaken alfo, if Voltaire does not fomewhere fay, that the ideas in the mind of an unborn infant fhould be clearer than ever afterwards, because its mental operations would be less interrupted by external sensations.

If the foul cannot think without the concurrence of the body, how can it be with any propriety called a thinking fubftance? On the diffolution of the body, it muft, alfo, in such case ceafe to think.-By what metaphyfician, who looks upon the foul to be of a nature effentially different from the body, is this afferted? Or rather let me afk of what confequence it is, whether any metaphyfician ever efpoused either notion? The motto of the philofopher should be, Nullius jurare in verbo Magiftri.

I am, Gentlemen, &c."

Cha les