ART. I.-1. Report of the Commission appointed to consider the Defences of the United Kingdom. Presented to Parliament. 1860.

2. Report of the Committee appointed to inquire into the Construction, Condition, and Cost, of the Fortifications erected under 30 and 31 Vict., and previous Statutes. Presented to Parliament. 1869. 3. Our Iron-Clad Ships; their Qualities, Performance, and Cost. By E. J. Reed, Chief Constructor of the Navy. 1869

So late as Midsummer last, no nation of Europe was more prosperous than France, and none so proud of her assumed headship over all her neighbours. While whatever faults may be alleged against the late Empire, it cannot, at least, be doubted that it raised the material prosperity of the country to a pitch unsurpassed in any period of her existence, and with a rapidity unequalled during any period of her history. The immense extension of railroads, and of internal means of communication, had opened up districts hitherto practically inaccessible to the markets of the world, and led to a diffusion of wealth and an improvement in agriculture which are almost incredible, considering the shortness of the time in which they were developed. Her cities had been beautified and almost rebuilt, her harbours enlarged, and her manufactures and commerce extended far beyond what the most sanguine would have dared to anticipate twenty years ago.

Besides all this, the immense military prestige which France had acquired from the wars of the first Napoleon was fairly sustained in the Crimean and Italian campaigns, and few doubted that she was still justified in considering herself the first military power

of the Continent, and able to dictate to the rest of Europe. If the rulers of Germany believed in or knew of the superiority they have since evinced, they alone were aware of a fact which even their own countrymen scarcely dared to hope for, and the rest of Europe hardly suspected; while, certainly, no Frenchman ever dreamed of such a thing as even remotely possible. The fighting in the Danish campaign had not impressed the bystanders strongly in favour of the Prussian military system, and though the world was startled by her astounding success at Sadowa, opinions were divided as to whether it was owing more to her own prowess or to the blunders or weakness of her adversary. Yet when Germany rose in July last to repel a threatened invasion of her soil, the most famous marshals of France were out-generalled in every move. Her armies were hopelessly beaten in every encounter, and the unparalleled disaster at Sedan, and the capitulation of Metz, consigned practically the whole of her regular armies to captivity. Since these events, the invaders have made themselves masters of nearly a third of her provinces, have marched triumphantly to the gates of the capital, and now hold it in an iron grasp, from which there seems little or no chance of escape.

The great social' débâcle' which followed the abdication of the Emperor was, perhaps, even more dreadful to contemplate than the military disasters. The only Government in France was a Government of despair in the hands of self-elected men, to whom no nation would deliberately confide its destinies. The great cities were practically governed by mobs, who, if not in actual possession of the power, would, it was felt, certainly be so directly the dread of the invader was re

moved; and nowhere, either in the cities or | in the provinces, does there even now seem to be a nucleus of strength out of which a stable Government can be developed when peace is concluded, and the country is again left with power to control its own destinies. It is, perhaps, not too much to assert that History affords no such example of a great and long-established nation so unexpectedly and so suddenly hurled, at the period of its greatest prosperity, into such an abyss of helplessness and ruin.

In the presence of such stupendous events as these, it is no wonder that Englishmen ask each other whether such a catastrophe may not happen to us as that which has befallen our nearest neighbour. Are we living in a fool's paradise? or are we prepared to resist any invasion that may be attempted on our shores? Would society with us fall as suddenly and completely to pieces, if we were invaded, as it has done in France? The last question is more easily answered than the first, and as it hardly comes within the scope of this article, it may as well be dismissed at once. We are a self-governing people, and at present with well recognized gradations of society, and our social organisation would most probably bear any strain that is likely to be applied to it. But our commercial system is as unstable as a house of cards, and would crumble to dust if touched by the spear of an invader. Even without this, if our naval supremacy were gone, and our ports blockaded for any length of time, the consequences would be frightful to contemplate. If our factories were deprived of their supplies of cotton and of wool, and of the thousand and one articles which the Continent and our colonies supply for their support, if our trade with India and the East were intercepted, and we were cut off, even for a short time, from intercourse by sea with the rest of the world, multitudes of men would be thrown out of employ, and they, with the still greater multitudes dependent on them and their earnings, would be left to perish from want and starvation. As a rule, the wage classes have no capital and no reserves to meet such a crisis, and the capital accumulated in the hands of their employers, against which they are waging an internecine war, is far from being sufficient to tide over so immense a cessation of employment as an invasion or blockade would give rise to. Even if we came victorious out of a death grapple on or around these shores, it would take years, long years, to replace the capital lost in the struggle; and, if beaten, it is difficult to conceive any combination of circumstances which would enable us to hope that our

children now in the cradle might live to see England again as prosperous as she now is, and occupying the same important position among the great nations of the earth.

That these sentiments are shared more or less distinctly by thoughtful men in this country, is evident from the excited discussions which took place in Parliament at the end of the Session, before the paramount interest of the grouse had diverted the attention of our Legislature from national objects,

and is even more evident from the tone of the press since that time. It is almost impossible to take up any review, magazine, or newspaper, without finding in it some article either criticising the actions of the War Office or Admiralty, or offering some suggestion for the reorganisation of our military or naval forces, or some wail of despondency over our helpless condition.

Under these circumstances it can hardly be deemed out of place or uncalled for, if we attempt to describe, without entering into details, the exact position of our means of defence, and try to estimate as nearly as possible their value as compared with the power of attack possessed by any foreign nation, or by any combination of foreign nations. likely to be brought against us.

The defect most generally apparent in those estimates of our defensive means, which have hitherto appeared, has arisen from their authors regarding the question too exclusively from a naval or from a military point of view. It may turn out that we ought to rely wholly on our insular position for our protection, or it may be that we cannot consider ourselves safe unless we have land forces equal to cope with any that an enemy may be able to throw on our shores; but it is at least clear that no reasoning will carry conviction which does not take into account both sides of the question, and fairly estimate the value of both modes of defence, either separately or collectively. At the same time, there is no greater danger than would arise from any half-measures applied to both of these branches, or from fancying that if the navy is nearly sufficient for our defence, and the army is also nearly sufficient, that therefore we are safe. In the case of a Continental nation, with an enemy having a common boundary, the problem is much easier. It is only necessary to count the number of men each party can put into the field in a given time, and to estimate the relative value of their equipments, and the strength of their fortresses or positions. It is a simple sum of arithmetic, and the only uncertain quantity in the proposition is the relative morale of the troops, including in

this category the skill of the commanders. In like manner, if we had a regular army more than half the strength required by itself to defend our shores, and had a militia or force of volunteers which by themselves were likewise more than half the strength sufficient, the two together would be all we could require. But a fleet which is nearly but not quite sufficient for the task, and land forces which are similarly situated, are very far, when taken together, from being a sufficient defence: for the evident reason that they cannot act together, but must be taken in succession. If our fleet is overmatched and unable to keep the seas, the army cannot assist it: it is only when this happens that the defensive army comes into play, and then it is only because the fleet is unable to afford the army any assistance in keeping the enemy from landing on our shores. The problem of national defence thus divides itself into two separate and distinct propositions, which it is indispensable should be examined separately in order that their value may be correctly estimated. Of the two the naval is the first to be examined and the most important, as in our insular position we have a natural means of defence possessed by no other nation.

In order to estimate how far our navy is equal to the defence of our shores, it is necessary to compare it with that of some other nation, and for this purpose it is only that of France which possesses the requisite elements for a comparison. Avowedly, the French navy was designed and built for the purpose of holding that of England in check, and, if necessary, disputing with her the empire of the seas. It is also certain that there have been periods during the last ten years when France could have put a larger number of iron-clad vessels in the Channel than we could have opposed to them, and that had a war between the two nations then broken out, our navy might have been overmatched. At the present moment, however, it probably may be assumed that our ironelad navy is at least equal to that of France, or of any other Power taken singly. This, of course, has been, and will be disputed, and, if we look merely to the number of vessels and the number of guns they mount, our superiority is not so evident as it should be; but, looking at the calibre and character of our artillery, and the thickness and quality of the armour of our ships, it seems fair to admit that our navy is equal to theirs. To put the proposition as clearly as possible: if all the English iron-clad fleet were in commission, and mustered in the harbours of Portsmouth and Plymouth, and that of France in Cherbourg and Brest, and they

were to meet in the Channel for a fair fight, we probably should have no reason to fear the result. If, however, the French could bribe Spain, for instance, by an offer of assisting her to recover Gibraltar or by any other means, to join their fleet with her seven iron-clads, it might go hard with us and our fleet be overpowered.

Even apart from such a contingency as this, is it wise to trust our national existence to a mere equality in so untried a field as a fight between iron-clad ships at sea? We have actually no experience of this class of warfare, for the fight at Lissa was such a bungling affair, and the navies engaged of so mixed a class, that it is impossible to draw any satisfactory conclusion from such a battle. We do not yet know whether the concentrated broadside of a two-decker like the 'Solferino' may not be more destructive than the side-piercing fire of the guns of such ships as the 'Hercules' and 'Monarch.' Far more important, however, than this, is our want of experience as to the effect which ramming may have on the result of future naval battles. If the experience of Lissa is of any value, it is all-important; and the fleet that first sees several of its ships sent to the bottom in this summary manner may be seized with a panic and expose itself to a disastrous defeat. It may be argued that this is quite as likely to happen to the attacking party as to ourselves: this may be true, but the result would be widely different. If we defeated the French or any attacking navy, we should merely have secured our first line of defence, and prevented the nation which possessed that fleet from doing us further injury. If we, on the other hand, were defeated, our principal line is forced; the Channel is bridged over, and our enemy, whoever he may be, may at leisure land his forces, under the protection of his fleet, on any part of our shores he may select. Victory with us is merely parrying a blow, without enabling us to follow it up so as vitally to injure our enemy. Defeat to us is destruction of our most important defence, and exposes our most vital parts to the attacks of the enemy.

The

Whatever opinion may be formed of the relative merits of the fighting qualities of the two fleets, there is one point on which the French at the present moment possess an incontestable superiority over us. accommodation for repairing and refitting ships in their dockyards has long been completed, and is more extensive than any which we now possess; and with, perhaps, the exception of Cherbourg, all her naval arsenals and stations are so fortified as to be free from any danger of attack. At the same

time it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that a fleet which can rely on the indispensable adjunct of sufficient and well fortified dockyards and arsenals is, ceteris paribus, nearly twice as strong as one which has no such secure base of operations. We have been at infinite pains to fix the armour-plates securely to the sides of the vessels; but it is one of the unsolved questions of this noble mode of warfare how a damaged plate is to be removed and its place supplied by a new one, or, in fact, how, after even a successful action, an iron-plated fleet is to be refitted and in what time it would again be fit to go to sea. With wooden vessels, using only solid shot in action, the problem was easy and simple in the extreme. A damaged plank is easily repaired or refitted; but a pierced or cracked armour-plate can only be replaced in dock with the most elaborate mechanical appliances, and after every action this must be done to some, probably to a greater extent than is now anticipated. The Naval authorities seem to have been for some time aware of our deficiencies in these respects, inasmuch as long ago they commenced very important extensions at Chatham. Owing, however, to the necessity of doing the work cheaply, convict labour was principally employed, and the labour has consequently been years in hand. From a hint in Col. Clarke's last Report, it seems just to have been discovered that the foundation for the locks to give access to the new basins will certainly be much more difficult than was anticipated. There is, in fact, no knowing when they may be completed, though one of the basins, it is stated, may be ready before long. If the Admiralty could afford to engage the services of some professional engineers who had experience in such works, this difficulty might be got over; but in the hands of a military officer to whom the work is necessarily new and unfamiliar, it is impossible to calculate what the locks may cost and when they will be finished.

In like manner most extensive additions are being made to Portsmouth Dockyard, and as no engineering difficulties are expected there, the works may be complete as anticipated in September, 1873.* Meanwhile, however, we have sold Deptford and Woolwich Dockyards, which, though not suited for the accommodation of the larger class of iron-clads used as ocean cruizers, are admirably adapted for gun-boats and the smaller fry of the fleet, which are at least as

*Col. Clarke's Memoranda explanatory of Vote 11, presented to Parliament 18th March, 1870.

important for national defence as their more unwieldy sisters. So far, therefore, from our Dockyards being extended to meet the growing wants of the navy it is probably true that now and for some time to come we are worse off in this respect than we have been for many years past.

The defences of our Dockyards against an attack by sea are, however, in even a more backward and unsatisfactory state than these extensions, and with less excuse, inasmuch as they were commenced earlier, and, with proper energy, might have been completed long ago.

**

When the results of the Crimean war had forced on the minds even of the Peace Party that the millennium had not yet arrived, certain works were commenced for the protection of our Naval establishments, but on so small a scale, that in 1859 a Royal Commission was established to investigate the whole subject. After a most exhaustive inquiry they reported in the following year that ten millions (10,350,0007.) were required for new works and to complete those already ordered and in progress, and one million ought in addition to be expended in floating defences to supplement those erected in the sea and on the coasts. Moderate as this sum must now appear, considering the objects to be attained, it was deemed too large to ask a British Parliament to grant, and it was consequently, in deference to the wishes of some members of the Cabinet, reduced at two successive stages, first to 8,720,000l., and afterwards to 6,180,000l. by the omission of whole groups of works and the reduction in extent of others; † and at last, in spite of very strenuous opposition, Government got leave to raise this last amount by terminable annuities. In 1862 the sum was increased to 6,860,000l., and in 1867 to 6,995,000l. As even this increase failed to meet the growing requirements of the case, a new Commission was issued, on Sir J. Pakington's requisition, of military and naval officers, and one civilian, none of whom, however, had been members of the previous commission. After a long investigation, they reported most favourably of the works executed under the loan, and ended in recommending a total expenditure of 7,951,4377. as indispensably necessary to complete the works. This sum was, however, again reduced, by the omission of some works, to 7,460,000l., and the unexpended balance. (1,510,000l.) being voted by the Act of 1869,

The single fortress of New Georgisk (Modlin) has cost Russia 100,000,000 Fls., or as nearly as may be the same amount.

See Col. Jervois's Report, presented to Parliament February 20, 1867.

the loan was closed. Each time the vote was brought forward in fear and trembling, and had it not been that the money was voted in a lump at first and authorised to be raised as a loan, there is no doubt that the works would have been abandoned long ago. Indeed, so strong was the opposition in 1862, that to avoid a defeat, Lord Palmerston was obliged to promise that the sea defences should not be proceeded with till Parliament had again an opportunity of reconsidering the question. The consequence of this was that the contracts entered into for the foundations of the forts at Spithead and elsewhere had to be abandoned, the plant removed and the staging left to rot; thus causing not only a delay of fifteen months, but considerable additional expense when the works were resumed in the following year. The opposition to the vote in this instance came from a clique of naval men of whom the most prominent was the late Captain Cowper Coles. They had persuaded themselves that every shilling spent on the forts was an abstraction from the moneys that ought to be devoted to naval purposes. They argued that the defence of the Dockyards ought to be entrusted solely to the Navy, and consequently if there were no forts there must be more ships built, and more sailors employed, and the money which the engineers were spending for the good of soldiers would be devoted to the increase of that service, which, rightly enough, they considered the mainstay of our defence. It was in vain to point out to them that secure Dockyards and arsenals were as indispensable parts of a fleet as steam-engines or sails -that defence by ships was infinitely more expensive and more uncertain than defence by forts, and that to condemn the British Navy to be chained to the Channel for the purpose of defending its own stores was assigning to it a far more ignoble rôle than it had hitherto performed, and amounted virtually to our resigning the empire of the seas to any navy which had no such domestic cares, and could rove where it pleased. Had the Opposition directed their attacks against the land defences of the Dockyards there would have been more excuse for their action, and the injury caused would have been very much less; for the landworks could be erected much more easily and quickly, and besides the probability of their coming into play was comparatively remote. It is a serious operation for an enemy to throw even a small body of troops on shore, with guns and means to bombard or burn a dockyard; while, on the other hand, no operation is more likely than that on the outbreak of war a dash should be made at our Dock

yards. According to modern practice, it is probable that the declaration of war will not reach London till the squadron destined for this purpose is mustered at Cherbourg or Brest, and lying with its steam up and ready to start, and it is as likely the time will be chosen when our fleet is absent on a cruise, or at all events when a very inferior force is available for defence. Under such circumstances, until the forts in the sea are completed and armed, there is nothing to prevent a hostile fleet taking up a position at Spithead, and throwing shells and combustibles into the town and dockyard till the whole are reduced to ashes. Forty-eight hours should suffice for this, and having accomplished it, the attacking fleet may return home probably without the loss of a man or the starting of an armour-plate. In like manner, when the war broke out in July last, there was not a gun mounted on either shore of the Thames capable of piercing an armour-plate, and any single protected vessel might have steamed up to Woolwich and laid it in ruins, and returned uninjured. When the works now erecting below Gravesend are completed and armed, the state of affairs will be different; but it is impossible to guess how long a time may elapse before they are ready. Meanwhile the approach to the Capital by sea is left to the protection of the old rattle-trap of a fort at Tilbury, which is pretty much in the same state as it was at the end of the last war. This was felt to be so essentially the case, that some years ago a sum of 50,000l. was put into the estimates to be applied to fitting Tilbury and the battery opposite for the reception of a few guns of a modern pattern; but the attitude of the Parliamentary opposition to this extravagance was so terrible, that the Minister's heart failed him, and he did not then dare to press it, though subsequently sums were smuggled through Parliament sufficient to put a few embrasures in a position to receive the modern class of artillery. Notwithstanding this, nothing can well be more painfully inadequate for their purpose than the present state of the Thames defences.

If we are flattering ourselves with the idea that we are safe, because the French fleet have been able to accomplish so little in the North Sea and the Baltic since July last, it would be well to study carefully the different circumstances of the two cases before coming to the conclusion that this experience may apply to us also. From the Helder northwards, the shores of Germany and Denmark are covered by long, low, shelving sand-banks, extending a considerable distance seaward. At all times the navigation among them is difficult, even with the assistance of skilful