pliant, are not dutiable as rugs under Schedule K of the act of March 3, 1883, c. 121, 22 Stat. 488, 508. Seeberger v. Schleringer, 581.
6. The commercial designation of an article is not a matter of which courts can take judicial notice, but is a fact, to be proved by evidence, like any other fact. Ib.
7. In case of special findings of fact by the court, no exception is neces- sary in order to raise the question whether the facts found support the judgment. Ib.
8. Shell-covered opera glasses, composed of shell, metal, and glass, were dutiable under the act of March 3, 1883, c. 121, 22 Stat. 488, as manu- factures composed in part of metal, under Schedule C. Ib.
9. Anchovy paste and bloater paste, made of anchovies or bloaters ground up fine and spiced, used as food or as an appetizer, in sandwiches or with a cracker, and not used as a condiment, nor known in trade or commerce as sauces, may be found by a jury to come within the descrip- tion of "fish prepared or preserved," and not within the description of sauces of all kinds,” in the tariff act of 1883. Bogle v. Magone, 623. 10. By sections 2931 and 3011 of the Revised Statutes, as amended by the act of February 27, 1877, c. 69, if at the first port of entry, not being one of the ports at which the statutes authorize goods to be im- ported and shipped through without appraisement, goods imported by sea are entered for warehousing and immediate transportation by the same vessel to another port and are transported accordingly, and the duties thereon are assessed by the collector at the first port, and again by the collector at the second port and paid by the importers to the second collector to obtain possession of the goods, no part of the duties can be recovered back in an action by them against him, unless due protest is made within ten days after the decision of the first collector as to the rate and amount of duties. Saltonstall v. Russell, 628. 11. An action cannot be maintained against a collector of customs, either at common law or under the statutes of the United States, to recover duties alleged to have been illegally exacted, in 1892, upon an impor- tation of merchandise, appraised according to law, no reappraisement being asked for, and the duties being assessed upon the valuation so arrived at. Schoenfeld v. Hendricks, 691.
12. A Circuit Court of the United States is without jurisdiction to hear and determine a suit against a collector raising such issues. Ib.
See PATENT FOR INVENTION, 10, 11.
See CONDITION SUBSEQUENT; RAILROAD, 4.
DEPARTMENTAL REGULATIONS.
See EVIDENCE, 1;
PUBLIC LAND, 5.
DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5.
1. In an action of ejectment, in a Federal court, the legal title prevails. Miller v. Courtnay, 172.
2. The legal title to the premises in dispute passed to the grantor of the defendant by sale under execution and the sheriff's deed, and was not divested by the subsequent decree set forth in the statement of facts. Ib.
1. The court being unable, in any view that it can take of the evidence, to reconcile the conflicting testimony of the witnesses respectively examined in behalf of the parties, holds that the evidence fails to show that the complainant is entitled to the relief prayed for. Gumaer v. Colorado Oil Co., 88.
2. A garnishee, who occupies the double position of debtor to the princi- pal defendant in a definite or ascertained amount, and also that of a creditor of such principal debtor by way of unliquidated damages arising out of the breach of a contract in existence when the garnish- ment proceedings were instituted, can, after an order at law subject- ing the defined indebtedness to the payment of the garnishor, invoke the aid of a court of equity to restrain the garnisheeing creditor from enforcing the payment of the amount due until the unliquidated damages can be ascertained, and set off against such indebtedness, on the ground that the principal debtor is insolvent and a non-resident of the State in which the garnishee resides, and in which the garnish- ment proceedings are had. North Chicago Rolling Mill Co. v. St. Louis Ore & Steel Co., 596.
3. Equity will entertain jurisdiction and afford relief against the collec- tion of a judgment where there is a meritorious, equitable defence thereto, which could not have been set up at law, or which the party was, without fault or negligence, prevented from interposing. Ib. 4. The adjustment of demands by counter-claim or set-off rather than by independent suit is favored and encouraged by the law, to avoid cir- cuity of action and injustice. Ib.
5. The insolvency of the party against whom a set-off is claimed is a suffi- cient ground for equitable interference; and in Illinois and some other States the non-residence of the party against whom the set-off is asserted, is also held to be sufficient ground therefor. Ib.
6. It is settled in England, where the law differs in no material respect from that of Illinois, that a garnishee order does not effect a transfer
of the debt to the garnishor, or create the relation of creditor and debtor between him and the garnishee. Ib.
7. It is a recognized principle that the rights of the garnishor do not rise above or extend beyond those of his debtor; that the garnishee shall not, by operation of the proceedings against him, be placed in any worse condition than he would have been in had the principal debtor's claim been enforced against him directly; that the liability, legal and equitable, of the garnishee to the principal debtor is a measure of his liability to the attaching creditor, who takes his place. Ib.
See ASSIGNMEnt for Benefit of Creditors, 2.
1. A railroad company which derives its title to its road from a foreclosure of a mortgage, given before the commencement of a suit by stock- holders to enjoin the collection of taxes upon the property so sold and conveyed, does not occupy a relation to the plaintiffs in that suit, which entitles it to file a bill of revivor, or to invoke the decree in the suit as an estoppel. Keokuk & Western Railroad Co. v. Scotland County, 318.
2. The purchaser under a mortgage is not entitled to the benefit of an estoppel under a decree obtained in a suit begun after the execution of the mortgage. Ib.
1. Wherever, by the express language of any act of Congress, power is entrusted to either of the principal departments of government to pre- scribe rules and regulations for the transaction of business in which the public is interested, and in respect to which they have a right to participate, and by which they are to be controlled, the rules and reg- ulations prescribed in pursuance of such authority become a mass of that body of public records of which the courts take judicial notice. Caha v. United States, 211.
2. In an action by the personal representative of a deceased person whose death has been caused by the wrongful act or omission of the defend- ant, evidence as to the income of the deceased previous to his death is admissible. Louisville & St. Louis Railroad Co. v. Clarke, 230.
EX POST FACTO LAW.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6.
An action cannot be maintained against the United States by a District Attorney to recover for services rendered and expenses incurred in prosecuting for fines, penalties, and forfeitures, under Rev. Stat.
§§ 838 and 3085, for violations of the Customs laws or the Internal Revenue laws, unless the Secretary of the Treasury first determines what sum he deems just and reasonable therefor. United States v. Bashaw, 436.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1, 2.
GARNISHEE PROCESS.
See EQUITY, 2, 6, 7.
A guardian of a minor, to whom a policy of life insurance on the tontine dividend plan is payable, is authorized, after the completion of the tontine dividend period, and upon receiving its actual surrender value, to discharge the policy, without any order of court; notwithstanding the provisions of the statutes of Mississippi, authorizing him to obtain an order of court for the sale of personal property, or for the sale or compromise of claims. Maclay v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 499.
In States whose laws permit illegitimate children, recognized by the father in his lifetime, to inherit from him, such children are "heirs" within the meaning of Rev. Stat. § 2269, which provides that when a party entitled to claim the benefit of the preemption laws of the United States dies before consummating his claim, his executor or adminis- trator may do so, and the entry in such case shall be made in favor of his heirs, and the patent, when issued, inure to them as if their names had been specially mentioned. Hutchinson Investment Co. v. Caldwell, 65.
INDICTMENT.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 3.
INSOLVENCY.
See BANK, 2; EQUITY. 5.
INSOLVENT DEBTOR.
See ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS.
JUDICIAL NOTICE.
See EVIDENCE, 1;
PUBLIC LAND, 5.
A. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. 1. This court has jurisdiction to review by writ of error a judgment of the highest court of the State of Oregon, deciding that a donation land claim under the act of Congress of September 27, 1850, c. 76, of land bounded by tide water, passed no title or right below high water mark, as against a subsequent grant from the State. Shively v. Bowlby, 1.
2. In a suit in a Circuit Court by a water company, to which a municipal government has granted the exclusive right to supply it and its inhab- itants with water for fifteen years, against the municipality to prevent it from establishing or maintaining other water works within the limits of the municipality until after the expiration of said period, it did not appear affirmatively that it was contemplated that the other works complained of were to go into operation until after the expira- tion of that period; and as it did not appear from the record that there was over $5000 in controversy, held, that this court had no juris- diction. El Paso Water Co. v. El Paso, 157.
3. The decision by the highest court of a State, that the conveyance by a
corporation existing under the laws of the State (and acting in this respect under a statute of the State) to an individual, his heirs, execu- tors, administrators, and assigns, of "all the property of said company, consisting of the charter and its amendments and franchises," and other enumerated property, and "all the property, goods, and chattels of said company of whatsoever nature or description," passed to him only a life estate in the franchises of the corporation, and that these did not pass to his heirs, presents no question of a Federal nature, but only one as to the extent of an authority given by statute to a cor- poration to dispose of its franchises. Snell v. Chicago, 191.
4. If, at the hearing of a bill in equity to redeem land worth more than $5000 from incumbrances, the only controversy is as to less than that amount of incumbrances, no appeal lies to this court. Carne v. Russ, 250.
5. When the Supreme Court of a State fails to give proper effect to a
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