Statement of the Case. the creditors and the debtors, caused judgments to be entered upon said notes in the Superior Court of Cook County, Illinois, in favor of the creditors for the amounts of principal and interest and attorneys' fees, the attorneys' fees amounting in all the cases to the sum of $3564.04. Immediately after the entry of such judgments executions were issued thereon to the sheriff of Cook County, who levied upon the stock of merchandise of said firm of Heidweyer & Stieglitz, being all the tangible property of which they were possessed, and of the value of $125,000. Of this merchandise about $8500 was replevied from the sheriff before the sale, and the remainder sold at great sacrifice, producing only $65,537.38, which sum applied upon the executions, leaving a small balance due upon most of them. The only property of value which the said Heidweyer & Stieglitz, on October 15, possessed other than the stock of merchandise, were certain bills receivable, of the value of about $18,000, and certain accounts receivable, of the value of about $6000. It is charged "that as a part of the same scheme of preference said Heidweyer & Stieglitz assigned and delivered said bills and accounts receivable to the defendant Simon Florsheim in trust to collect the same for the benefit of said judgment creditors as to the amounts remaining unpaid on their aforesaid judgments, and for the benefit of himself as to a claim of thirteen hundred dollars due. to him by said Norbert Stieglitz individually, the surplus, if any, to be returned to said Heidweyer & Stieglitz; so that, out of said accounts and bills receivable so assigned and out of said replevied goods subsequently surrendered or paid for, said defendant's judgment creditors as aforesaid have received the amounts of their judgments and interest and said attor neys' fees in full. Said defendant, Simon Florsheim, has received payment in full of his claim against the defendant. Norbert Stieglitz, as aforesaid, and the entire scheme originally devised by and between said Heidweyer & Stieglitz and said judgment creditors has been successfully accomplished, and all the property of said defendants, Heidweyer & Stieg litz, has been appropriated to prefer said creditors to the exclusion of all others." And that all these "judgment notes, Statement of the Case. judgments entered thereon, executions issued, levies and sales thereunder, transfers, assignments, and other dispositions of all their property, . are in effect but one instrument and one transaction, and, taken together, constitute a general assignment for the benefit of creditors," and "were all entered into and consummated in pursuance of a conspiracy between the parties thereto to defraud the other creditors of said Heidweyer & Stieglitz." It is further charged "that while it is true that all the transactions aforesaid constitute an assignment for the benefit of creditors, yet said assignment is fraudulent and void as to creditors, in this, that said judgment notes were purposely given for sums greater than was due the payees thereof respectively at the time they were so given; that the sum provided in said judgment notes for attorneys' fees, being thirty-five hundred and sixty-four dollars, and which was included in said judgments confessed and thereafter collected thereon, was so inserted in said instruments with actual intent to hinder, delay, and defraud the creditors of said Heidweyer & Stieglitz, and actually has defrauded them, whereby said notes, judgments, and everything that was done under them became wholly fraudulent and void as to the creditors of said Heidweyer & Stieglitz, and in that all of said transactions constituting such assignment were conceived and executed from beginning to end with the sole and only purpose of defrauding the law and defrauding all the creditors not intended to be protected thereby, including your orators." The amendment was intended to cover the objection of laches, and its allegations in respect thereto are as follows: "And your orators further represent that at the time of the several transactions herein before mentioned they were and ever since have been residents of the city of New York, and that the judgment creditors aforesaid, who were defendants to this bill, were and now are residents of the city of Chicago; that immediately after the entry of the judgments aforesaid, your orators caused an investigation to be made as to the genuineness of the indebtedness represented by said judgments and the good faith of the judgment creditors in having them Statement of the Case. entered and enforced in the manner set forth herein; that it was upon such investigation given out, represented, and stated to your orators by each of said judgment creditors, defendants herein, that their said judgments were for full value and were entered aggressively by them for the sole purpose of realizing the moneys due them respectively, and that they did so without the knowledge, privity, or procurement of the debtors themselves, and said debtors then stated that they had still a large amount of property remaining in their hands in the form of book accounts and bills receivable, applicable to the payment of their other debts, and that they proposed to convert the same and apply the proceeds thereof to such payment as soon as possible. 66 Relying upon which statements and believing the same to be true, your orators refrained for a considerable time to take legal measures to collect the large indebtedness due them in the belief also that the transactions as to said judgments were bona fide and having no knowledge or information of any fact tending to show that they constituted, constructively, an assignment for the equal benefit of all creditors. "A long time afterwards and within, to wit, less than one month from the time of bringing this suit, your orators for the first time learned not only that said judgments covered and took all the tangible property of said Heidweyer & Stieglitz, but that the entry thereof was procured by them for the express purpose of preferring said judgment creditors, and that at the same time they transferred all their remaining property to a trustee for the benefit of creditors, as heretofore in this bill alleged, thereby creating an assignment, as herein alleged." The relief sought for was as follows: "That the several judgment notes, judgments confessed theron, executions, levies, and sales thereunder, transfer of bills and accounts receivable, and all other transactions had and done by and between said Heidweyer & Stieglitz and said preferred creditors and herein before referred to be adjudged to constitute a voluntary assignment for the benefit of the creditors of said Heidweyer & Stieglitz with preferences; that the preferences be declared void; that said preferred creditors be held chargeable and be Argument for Appellants. charged and decreed to account jointly and severally as assignees and trustees for all the property which has come to their hands or possession or to the hands or possession of any of them by virtue of any of the transactions related herein; that said assignees and trustee be removed and a receiver appointed, to whom they shall be decreed to account for the same at its true market value and not for the amount they may have realized out of it; that the fund so to be realized, if it shall appear to the court that said assignment is not altogether void, shall be distributed ratably among your orators and all the creditors of said debtors under the direction of the court, excluding from the distribution, however, and postponing the creditors guilty of the frauds aforesaid until all others are fully paid; but if it shall appear to the court, by reason of the frauds alleged, that said assignment is altogether fraudulent and void as to creditors, then that said fund be paid in satisfaction of the judg ment or your orators and of all other creditors who may be entitled, and that the complainants may have such other and further relief as may be just." Mr. Daniel K. Tenney, Mr. Edward O. Brown, and Mr. Charles E. Pope for appellants. Mr. Sydney Richmond Tuber for Schnabel Brothers, appellants. I. None of the objections raised by the special demurrers warranted the dismissal of the bill. a. Appellants were not guilty of laches. Kilbourn v. Sunderland, 130 U. S. 505; Meader v. Norton, 11 Wall. 442; Michoud v. Girod, 4 How. 503; Sheldon v. Keokuk Packet Co., 8 Fed. Rep. 769; Le Gendre v. Byrnes, 44 N. J. Eq. 372; Radcliff v. Rowley, 2 Barb. Ch. 23; Waterman v. Sprague Mfg. Co., 55 Connecticut, 554. b. The Circuit Court had jurisdiction. Gorrell v. Dickson, 26 Fed. Rep. 454; Putnam v. New Albany, 4 Bissell, 365; Ogilvie v. Knox Insurance Co., 22 How. 380; 2 Black, 539; Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334; Shields v. Thomas, 18 How. 253; Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582. c. There was no defect of parties. Ogilvie v. Knox Ins. Co., Argument for Appellants. 22 How. 380; Horn v. Lockhart, 17 Wall. 570; Hotel Co. v. Wade, 97 U. S. 13. II. The bill was improperly dismissed under the general clause of the demurrer. a. The bill shows fraud sufficient to invoke and compel equitable relief. Pickett v. Pipkin, 64 Alabama, 520; Thomas v. Beck, 39 Connecticut, 241; Preston v. Spaulding, 120 Illinois, 208; Farwell v. Nilsson, 133 Illinois, 45; Hulse v. Mershon, 125 Illinois, 52. b. The several instruments and transactions described in the bill constitute in effect a general assignment with preferences, which is consequently void, as being in contravention of the Illinois statute relating to voluntary assignments. White v. Cotzhausen, 129 U. S. 329, 337, 338, 341, 342. III. The construction of that statute by the Supreme Court of Illinois, in Farwell v. Nilsson, supra, is not conclusive, because that case is distinguishable from the suit at bar. Farwell v. Cohen, 138 Illinois, 216; Weber v. Mick, 131 Illinois, 520; Ilanchett v. Waterbury, 115 Illinois, 220; Preston v. Spaulding, 120 Illinois, 208; Hoine Natl. Bank v. Sanchez, 131, Illinois, 330; Hanford Oil Co. v. First Natl. Bank, 126 Illinois, 584; Hide and Leather Natl. Bank v. Rehm, 126 Illinois, 461; Hanford v. Prouty, 133 Illinois, 339. IV. The construction now placed upon that statute by the Supreme Court of Illinois is not the established law of that State. Farwell v. Nilsson, 133 Illinois, 45; Bucher v. Cheshire Railroad, 125 U. S. 555; Scipio v. Wright, 101 U. S. 665; Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Palmes, 109 U. S. 244; Preston v. Spaulding, 120 Illinois, 208; Hide and Leather National Bank v. Rehm, 126 Illinois, 461; Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175; Pease v. Peck, 18 How. 595; Farwell v. Cohen, 138 Illinois, 216. Even if this court feel bound to adopt the general construction by the Illinois Supreme Court of the Illinois statute applied to instruments of assignment, they are under no obligation to accept the inference that the Illinois court draws as to whether the particular instruments before this court are or are not such "instruments of assignment." Schroeder v. Walsh, |