Statement of the Case.

divorce conferred no privilege she could use and provided no benefits whatever which she could have accepted."

She further denied that she and Israel went away from the place where they were living to some place unknown or remote therefrom, or were married secretly in due form of law in the lifetime of John Arthur, or that she had ever admitted or confessed that she had been duly or at all married to Israel after the rendition of the pretended decrees and in the lifetime of Arthur, as averred in the answer.

On June 8, 1891, the case came on for trial in the county court, and the following appears in the bill of exceptions:

66

Thereupon on behalf of the petitioner it was stipulated and admitted by the respondent that the decrees set up in the respondent's amended and supplemental answer were rendered as therein alleged, and that the same are and were void when rendered, and that the only question now being tried is as to whether the plaintiff is estopped by her conduct as alleged in said answer to dispute or contest the validity of said decrees or whether she has ratified them by her conduct."

The testimony introduced on both sides is then set forth. The county court found in favor of defendant, and gave judgment, June 23, 1891, 'with costs, "that the petitioner, Abbie A. Israel, of right ought to be and is estopped to aver or claim that she is the widow or heir of the said John Arthur, deceased, or the distributee of his estate. Wherefore it is considered, adjudged, and decreed by the court that the petition of the said petitioner be and the same is hereby denied and dismissed." The cause was taken by writ of error to the Supreme Court of Colorado, and on June 17, 1893, that court rendered its judgment, affirming the judgment of the county court. The court reviewed the evidence, and held that the proof was sufficient to warrant the trial court in finding that plaintiff in error had actually contracted and consummated the marriage between herself and the second husband before the death of the first, and that the substance of the issue formed upon the amended complaint was proved; and the ruling in Arthur v. Israel, 15 Colorado, 147, that the amended answer was sufficient in law to debar or estop petitioner

Opinion of the Court.

from claiming any property rights as the widow of John Arthur, deceased, was reaffirmed. Israel v. Arthur, 18 Colorado, 158. A petition for rehearing was filed and overruled, and thereupon a writ of error was allowed to this court, which defendant in error moved to dismiss.

Mr. George A. King for the motion.

Mr. Westbrook S. Decker and Mr. T. J. O'Donnell opposing.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after stating the facts, delivered the opinion of the court.

It is not sufficient for the maintenance of our jurisdiction to review the judgments of state courts, that a right, title, privilege, or immunity under the Constitution of the United States may have been claimed, but such right, title, privilege, or immunity must have been denied. Assuming that plaintiff in error, by her replication of January 27, 1891, duly set up a right of protection under the Constitution, yet if she were debarred from asserting property rights in the estate of John Arthur, as his widow, then that right was not denied for want of the subject-matter to be protected.

The Supreme Court of Colorado ruled in Arthur v. Israel, 15 Colorado, 147, that public policy required "that, so far as may be consistent with fundamental principles of law, one who has attempted to profit by a supposed divorce, and has exercised the resulting privilege of remarriage, shall not, for the mere purpose of obtaining property, be permitted to repudiate his election;" and that "when, therefore, the wife, without cause, deserts her husband and home, and for years lives in adultery with another man, and afterwards, upon learning that a divorce has been obtained by her deserted husband, causes a marriage ceremony with her paramour to be solemnized, and continuously lives and cohabits with him as his wife, she may not, upon the subsequent decease of her abandoned husband, take advantage of the fact that the divorce decree is void for want of proper service of process, and successfully assert against other heirs her right under the

Opinion of the Court.

statute of descents and distribution to deceased's estate as his widow." And on the subsequent writ of error it sustained the judgment of the county court against plaintiff in error upon the facts.

With the conclusion on the facts we have nothing to do, and the conclusions of law were conclusions in matters of local and general law which suggest no Federal question:

By stipulation of record plaintiff in error admitted at the trial that, the invalidity of the divorce decrees being conceded, the only question to be tried was whether she was "estopped by her conduct as alleged in said answer to dispute or contest the validity of said decrees, or whether she has ratified them by her conduct."

That question was determined against her, and the judgment rested solely on the ground that she could not under the facts be allowed, as to John Arthur's personal estate, to assert the property rights conferred by law upon a widow. To review that judgment would be to overhaul the application by a state court of principles of public policy and of estoppel, which it is not within our province to do. This was so held in Marrow v. Brinkley, 129 U. S. 178, and in effect in many other cases. Adams' County v. Burlington & Missouri Railroad, 112 U. S. 123; Chouteau v. Gibson, 111 U. S. 200; Beaupré v. Noyes, 138 U. S. 397.

In Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U. S. 361, it was ruled that a decision by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts that a creditor of an insolvent debtor who proved his debt in insolvency proceedings under the state statutes and accepted the benefits thereof, thereby waived any right he might otherwise have had to object to the validity of the insolvency statutes as impairing the obligation of contracts, presented no Federal question for review. And it has been often held, at least in actions at law, that this court has no jurisdiction to revise the decision of the highest court of a State upon a pure question of fact, although a Federal question might arise if the question of fact were decided in a particular way. Dower v. Richards, 151 U. S. 658, and cases cited.

Writ of error dismissed.

Statement of the Case.

MICHIGAN v. FLINT AND PÈRE MARQUETTE RAILROAD COMPANY.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN.

No. 913. Submitted January 29, 1894.- Decided March 12, 1894.

The decision of the highest court of a State, in a suit brought by the State to establish its title to lands within the State, claimed and occupied by a railroad company, that the State was estopped by its acts, conduct, silence, and acquiescence from setting up such claim, presents no Federal question for revision by this court.

MOTION to dismiss. This was a bill of information filed on behalf of the State of Michigan in the Ingham Circuit Court, December 13, 1887, against the Flint and Père Marquette Railroad Company and others, claiming title to certain lands under and by virtue of the grant by act of Congress of September 28, 1850, c. 84, commonly known as the swamp land grant. 9 Stat. 519.

The claims of the respective parties appear in the pleadings, which were in substance as follows:

The bill alleged that the grant transferred to the several States named, and among others the State of Michigan, the whole of the swamp and overflowed lands therein made unfit for cultivation and remaining unsold on the 20th of September, 1850, and that it was the duty of the Secretary of the Interior to make lists and plats of the land, and, at the request of the governor of the State, to issue patents; that the effect of the grant was to vest title in the State, and that the State afterwards asserted title to all the land, and that such title was recognized by the United States. It was further averred that on or about November 21, 1850, certain instructions were prepared relative to the designation and description of said swamp lands by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, of which a copy was sent to the surveyor-general and another copy to the governor, by which the surveyor-general was instructed to make out lists and to regard the field-notes on

Statement of the Case.

file in his office as the basis thereof, if the State was willing to adopt them, and if not, and the State furnished him with satisfactory evidence that any lands were of the character embraced by the grant, to so report them; that the surveyorgeneral transmitted a copy of his instructions to the governor and desired information whether the state authorities would accept the field-notes or conclude to have a survey "to determine the boundaries of the swamp and overflowed lands."

It was further alleged that the governor suggested delay, and that on January 3, 1851, the surveyor-general gave his opinion that the field-notes would show a greater amount of swamp lands than an actual resurvey.

The bill then stated that the survey spoken of indicated the sections or subdivision of sections of government lands which were of a swampy character, and that pursuant to the propositions and suggestions aforesaid the legislature of Michigan passed an act, approved June 28, 1851, adopting the notes of the surveyor on file in the office of the surveyor-general, as the basis upon which the State accepted the lands, and that such legislation was well known to the Land Department in Washington, and understood to be the basis agreed upon for the adjustment of the lands granted by said grant.

66

That this proposition and these acceptances by the State operated and had the legal effect to perfect in the State of Michigan full, complete, and absolute title to all the lands shown by the surveyor-general's minutes to be swamp and overflowed lands, and all subdivisions of land the greater part of which appeared by said minutes to be of a swampy

nature."

It was further averred that the surveyor-general thereupon proceeded to prepare plats, and designate upon said plats the lands of a swampy nature and character which came within the grant; that the maps and plats are now on file in the office of the Michigan land commissioner, and are the identification of the swamp lands granted to the State of Michigan by the said act, and "which this informant submits are effective and binding both upon the United States and all persons claiming from them, as well as the State of Michigan;" that the action