ible that it would court its own destruction? The greater its issues, the greater the guarantees it would give for good conduct. Should it be alleged that such a Bank might become the instrument of oppression, by exacting excessive rates on its loans, it may be replied that exorbitant charges would greatly reduce its operations and profits. It would be as much for its advantage to make loans as it would be for that of the public to borrow. It would, like merchants, from a wise self-interest, always adopt a broad and liberal policy. The most effectual mode by which the latter increase their operations and profits is an equitable rule of conduct toward their customers. None so fully appreciate the fact that the highest material result from the highest moral conditions. The Bank would be governed by merchants, and by their methods and rules. With all its power, the Bank of England was never charged with demanding exorbitant rates with a view to profit. No similar charge was ever made against the Bank of France, the sole issuer of notes in that kingdom. But a monopoly of issue in such a country as the United States is impossible. If it were possible, as the borrower would always receive the value of his loan, the only oppression could come from being compelled to make payment according to its terms. The assumption of oppression arises from the idea that Banks, in making loans, do not part with capital, but demand it in their payment. It is from such an assumption that the prejudice against Banks and bankers has chiefly arisen. As in making their loans they lend coin or its equivalent in merchandise, they will take nothing in exchange that does not represent coin or its equivalent in merchandise. They will discount no bills the means for the payment of which are not provided before their creation. The victims of a "moneyed monopoly are borrowers of small local capitalists, not issuers, who may and often do oppress their debtors. Banks always steer clear of such borrowers as these. They not only cannot oppress, advancing as they do capital equalling the nominal amount of their loans, but they are the most lenient of all lenders, for the reason that the failure of their customers may so disturb public confidence as to imperil their own condition; and that their managers, who are usually merchants, have always a deep sympathy in the misfortunes of their fellows, and always

stand ready to do what they properly can for their relief. Monopoly or oppression, therefore, either by national or local institutions, is the last thing to be feared. The assertion of Jackson, Benton, Hill and others, that the Banks and bankers of the country were in league against its liberties and welfare, was the natural expression of the hatred cherished by ignorant, jealous, and vindictive natures against those of whose superiority they were painfully conscious, and in whose overthrow they found some compensation for their wounded vanity. It is to be hoped that the era of such men is for ever passed; and that the subject of a National Bank can now be discussed as a financial, not as a political or personal, question. Virginia very earnestly and very naturally opposed the old Bank, for the reason that the grounds upon which it was created might serve as a precedent for an attack upon her cherished institution, to which, while it existed, she was prepared to sacrifice every other consideration. The question involved in the creation of the Bank - the powers of the central government

brought on the war of the Rebellion, in which her territory was devastated by contending armies, her cities sacked and burned, her domain dismembered, her great institution wholly overthrown, and her "Ancient Dominion" reduced, from the proud pre-eminence it had so long enjoyed, to the rank of a second-class State. For doctrines alike subversive of all welfare and order, she wholly turned her back upon the teachings and example of Washington; to which not only she, but the nation, must return, if they would establish on this continent an empire worthy the opportunity. Virginia, stripped, as she is, not only of wealth but of means for acquiring it at all commensurate with her resources, will welcome an institution which is to supply the place of the banking capital so indispensable to her welfare, and so ruthlessly swept away. What is true of Virginia is true of the whole South. One hundred years have elapsed since we were a nation, and that section of the country has hardly taken the first step toward the promotion of her real welfare. Up to the outbreak of the Rebellion, every step she took was directly opposed to it. She is only beginning to enter upon a period in which her policy is to be in harmony with her highest interests. To this end she will, as fast as possible, seek to rid herself not only of the precedents, but of the memories, of the past.

The object of this work, however, is not so much to prescribe methods for the future, as to state the laws of money in a manner so plain that every person of ordinary intelligence may act understandingly in reference to any measure that may be proposed, to show the beneficent influence of Banks; that those entrusted with their management are the most zealous upholders of a free and upright government; that there can never be a monopoly of capital, so long as it is the product of industry and trade; and that merchants and manufacturers may safely be left to the guidance of an enlightened selfinterest, with the certainty that the manner in which their ends are sought will always be in harmony with the public good. When such a degree of intelligence is reached, it may safely be left to the people to decide upon the methods or institutions they will summon to their aid.

APPENDIX.

THE QUESTION OF A DOUBLE STANDARD.

THE principles established in the preceding pages afford an easy solution of the question of a double standard.

As all currencies circulate only at their value, the cost of the standard to be adopted, whether of gold or silver, will always be the same. Should it be decided to establish one of gold, such silver as the country or government may become possessed of is to be converted, at its cost and value, into gold. The silver will always be convertible into gold at its value as currency. If silver is to be the standard, then the gold that is to come into possession of the country or the government is to be exchanged, at its value as currency, for a corresponding value of silver. The only question to be considered, therefore, is the relative convenience of the two standards:

First Gold will be the most convenient standard, as its value, in ratio to its weight, is at least sixteen times greater than that of silver.

Second As the greater number of commercial countries have adopted gold as the standard, and as the tendency of all is in the same direction, the United States must follow. As nearly all exports of coin from this country are made to England, -to London, as the clearing-house of the world;-as the English standard is gold, and as all shipments of silver, as money, to that country, must be monetized in it,—that is, converted into gold before it can be used, all foreign nations have practically, for us, adopted the gold standard. Gold, therefore, is the standard indispensable for us to adopt in our foreign commerce; if so, its adoption is equally indispensable in our domestic commerce.

Third: The adoption of a double standard will end in a single one, unless the cost and value of the two metals remain permanently uniform. There is no probability that they will remain uniform. The value of silver, from the excess of its production

over that of gold, has largely fallen within a few years. The tendency is still in the same direction. Should it, as well as gold, be made a standard at the present value of each, and should it fall in value, the effect would be to drive the more valuable standard out of the market, precisely as the legal-tender notes drove out metallic money, leaving the country with but one standard, and that, as far as regards other nations, a debased one.

So far as this country is concerned, therefore, the question is no longer an open one. There being no difference in the cost of the standards, whether gold or silver, the most convenient should be the one adopted. Gold is the most convenient, in domestic as well as in foreign commerce. It is the only one in which foreign debts and balances can be paid. By adopting gold as the sole standard, in all sums exceeding, say one hundred dollars, our reserves will always be in that form in which they will discharge our balances by direct exchange, and place our industries and trade on an equality with those of other nations. Otherwise we shall have to convert our standard, depreciated, for the reason that it is exceptional, into that common to other nations with which we come in contact, upon their own soil, at their own terms, and often greatly to our injury. No possible advantage, but great disadvantage must result from the use of silver as a standard. This being demonstrable, the question, as already remarked, is not even open for discussion.

It is to be borne in mind that in commercial countries the standard of value is no longer the instrument by which exchanges are effected, symbols in great measure taking its place. In England, the currency, including deposits, equals nearly $3,000,000,000, against which the reserves held the standard of value- do not exceed $200,000,000. Upon resumption in this country, the proportion of reserves the standard of value- - will be about the same to the currency issued. Whatever the standard adopted, exchanges will not be made by its use, but at its value, through the instrumentality of symbols. The amount required will not perceptibly affect the price or value of the vast mass which forms the stock of the world.