CHAP. XXI. 1781. Lord Digby was feveral days detained at New York, before arrangements were made for the embarkation of the troops to reinforce lord Cornwallis, and for the failing of the mighty naval armament for the Chefapeake. In the mean time, fir Henry Clinton bufied himself in writing letters full of fpecious promifes, as if artfully defigned to buoy up the hopes of lord Cornwallis, by ftrong affurances that no time fhould be loft in fending forward a force fuflicient for his relief. He informed him, that a fleet under the command of lord Digby, who had recently arrived at New York, would fail for the Chesapeake by the fifth of October; that himself was nearly ready to embark with a large body of troops; and in the most sanguine terms, exhorted his lordfhip to endeavour to keep his opponents in play, and to hold out against every difcouragement, until he fhould receive the needful affiftance, which another British fleet, and the addition of a body of troops headed by himfelf, would fecure, These flattering affurances and preffing entreaties from the commander in chief, induced lord Cornwallis to evade a general action. It was his opinion, that when the combined troops arrived, he could only attempt the defence of York-Town. He was pofted there by general Clinton's exprefs orders, contrary to his own judgment. He had always (as has been before obferved) thought this an ineligible fituation, 1781. and far from being long defenfible, without CHAP. XXI. much larger reinforcements both by land and sea, than he had reason to expect would arrive seasonably. His fituation had been for fome time truly diftreffing. Embarraffed between his own opinion and the orders of his fuperior in command, flattered by the promise of timely relief, and that in fuch force as to enable him to cope with the united armies of France and America, he thought it his duty to wait the refult, and not fuffer himself to be impelled by contingent circumstances, to risk his army beyond the probability of fuccefs. This prevented any advance to action, at the fame time that it forbid his endeavouring to retreat from Virginia, until too late, when he had only to wait fufpended be tween hope and fear, the uncertain chances of war. He acknowledged afterwards, that had he seasonably retired toward Carolina, though the attempt would have been difficult, he might have faved his army from their impending fate. Though the courage and the inclination of lord Cornwallis might prompt him in his prefent circumstances, to lead out his troops and hazard an engagement in the open field, yet his judgment or his prudence could not juftify the risk, while he had the fmalleft hopes, that a few VOL. III. CHAP. XXI. 1781. days might place him in a fituation to combat on more equal terms. His deftiny often marked by difappointment, he had at the fame time much reason to despair of a fuccefsful termination of the campaign, even if the forces from New York fhould arrive in feafon. Yet, he obferved to fir Henry Clinton, that "if he had no 66 hopes of relief, he should rather risk a general "action, than attempt to defend his half-finifh"ed works. But, as you fay Digby is hourly expected, and promise every exertion to affift me, I do not think myself juftified in putting "the fate of the war on fo defperate an at"tempt." The British commander was fully apprifed of the difficulties that would attend his armament under exifting circumftances, even if the troops from New York fhould arrive before his fate was decided. The mouth of the river was blocked up by a very large French fleet; the American army in high health and fpirits, ftrengthened by daily recruits, led on by Wafhington, in whom they had the highest confidence, in conjunction with a fine army of Gallicans, headed by the count de Rochambeau, an officer of courage, experience, and ability, were making rapid advances. On the twenty-eighth of September they had left Williamsburgh, and on the fixth of October they opened their trenches before York-Town. 1781. His lordship determined however, notwith- CHAP. XXI. ftanding the choice of difficulties that preffed upon him, to make the beft poffible defence. His army was worn down by ficknefs and fatigue, but there was no want of refolution or valor; his officers were intrepid, and his men brave. They acquitted themselves with fpirit; and kept their ground from the fixth to the fixteenth of October; when they became convinced, that the abilities and the experience of the count de Rochambeau, the cool equanimity of general Washington, and the vigor and valor of their officers and troops, rendered the united army irrefiftible in the prefent fituation of their opponents. Lord Cornwallis had now only to choose between an immediate furrender or an effort to efcape, and fave a part of his army by flight. He contemplated either a retreat fouthward, or an endeavour to force his way through the ftates between Virginia and New York, to join general Clinton. But, equally hazardous, he determined on the laft expedient. For this purpose, he with the utmoft fecrecy, paffed in the night of the fixteenth, the greatest part of his army from York-Town to Gloucefter, leaving only a detachment behind to capitulate for the town's people, the fick, and the wounded. But fortune did not favor the enterprife. It is true the boats had an cafy paffage, but at the CHAP. XXL 1781. critical moment of landing his men, his lordship obferved, that "the weather fuddenly changed from moderate and calm, to a vio"lent ftorm of rain and wind, that carried the "boats down the river, with many of the troops "who had not time to difembark. It was foon 66 evident, that the intended paffage was im"practicable; and the abfence of the boats ren"dered it equally impoffible to bring back the troops that had paffed, which I had ordered "about two in the morning." Here the ferious mind will naturally reflect, how often the providential interference of the elements defeat what appears to be the most judicious defign of the fhort-fighted creature, man. The ftate of lord Cornwallis's mind at this time, the infurmountable difficulties of his fituation previous to his furrender, and the fubfequent confequences, may be feen at large in his letter to fir Henry Clinton, dated October twenty-firft, one thoufand feven hundred and eighty-one.t In this letter he details the circumftances of his difappointment, in the laft mode adopted for the fafety of his army. It has been obferved, that his troops were difperfed by the storm *Lord Cornwallis to general Clinton. Appendix, Note No. I. |