THE POLICE HAVE BEGUN AGAIN to put in force the law against betting houses, and the result has been several convictions by Mr. Vaughan on Tuesday last for this offence. There has also been discussion of the subject in the daily papers, the usual references to Tattersall's, and the display in many cases of much ignorance of law. Betting, it must always be remembered, is not illegal here as in some states of America. Bets cannot be enforced as contracts (8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 18), but to make or to pay a bet or any number of bets is no offence against the law. Although betting is not illegal, betting houses are rendered illegal by 16 & 17 Vict. c. 109, the preamble to which recites that harm has been done" by the opening of betting houses, and the receiving of money in advance by the owners or occupiers of such houses on their promises to pay money on events of horseraces," &c. The statute then enacts, by section 1, that no house, office, &c., &c., shall be opened, used, &c., &c., for the purpose of the owner, occupier, &c., &c., or any person using the same, or any agent of such persons "betting with persons resorting thereto." The statute then renders owners, occupiers, &c., &c., of such houses liable to penalties. This section governs the whole Act. No house that does not fall within its provisions is illegal as a betting house, no matter how much betting goes on there. It is also to be noticed that " persons resorting " to such houses, as distinguished from the owners, occupiers, or persons using the same, or their agents, are not liable to any penalty at all. Simply to go to such houses and bet there with the owners, &c., is, therefore, no offence.

The law on this point is clear enough, although it seems to be but little understood, and we fear that the decision of Mr. Vaughan as reported in the Times of last Wednesday will not throw much light on the subject. The charge in that case was against a number of persons for using certain premises known as the "Knightsbridge Exchange" as a betting house, and there was also a charge against the occupier of the premises. It seems that a “Knightsbridge Exchange" was a betting club

which used to hold its meetings at an address in Brompton. There was an annual subscription and election of members. The evidence as stated in the newspaper report is very vague, but we assume (although we are not sure that we are right in doing so) that the occupier of these premises or his agents, or persons by his permission or with his knowledge, and other persons using these premises betted with the members of the club who resorted to the place, and that money was deposited there by the members who made such bets. The betting of the members, therefore, was not confined to simple betting with one another.

On these facts Mr. Vaughan convicted the defendants, and there can be no doubt that they had infringed the statute if they occupied or used the premises for the purpose "of betting with persons rescrting thereto." Serjeant Ballantine, for the defendants, referred to Tattersall's, and said that the "Knightsbridge Exchange was a betting club like Tattersall's, and that if the one was illegal the other must be also. Mr. Vaughan is reported to have said that "the Knightsbridge Exchange was an association of persons that there were

upwards of 2,000 members, and there appeared to be no limit to the number. The subscription oi five shillings a-year was so trifling, and the manner in which a member was said to be elected so formal that he had no hesitation in deciding that the Knightsbridge Exchange' was a betting-house within the meaning of the Act." It is clear that this ratio decidendi is wrong, although the decision is very likely right. Whether or not there was any bona fide club in existence, and whether the defendants were members of such club or not, and whether the subscription of the club was high or low, the entrance easy or difficult, has nothing to do with the case. The question was was the house opened, used, &c., for the purpose of the defendants as owners, occupiers, or persons using the house

betting with persons resorting thereto?" This is the only question, and it is to be regretted that it should appear that there is any other ground for the magistrate's decision.

The suggestion thrown out by Serjeant Ballantine in argument, that Tattersall's is an illegal association, deserves notice, as there is so much misapprehension on the point. If, as we believe is the case, the members of Tattersall's simply bet there with one another, and there is no owner, occupier, &c., of, or persons using, the premises, with whom they bet, the establishment is not within 16 & 17 Vict. c. 109, and is therefore legal. If the betting is not confined to the members amongst themselves, but is transacted with any owner, occupier, &c., the establishment is illegal. The law is clear, and the only question that can be raised is as to the facts of the case. Whether or not the law ought to be in this state is an entirely different question, and one well worthy of the consideration of the Legislature. The administrators of the law, however, have only to deal with 16 & 17 Vict. c. 109, and betting that does not come within that statute is not illegal.

WILL A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS issue at the instance of a person in confinement in India? This important question has been recently raised before the High Court of Calcutta under the following circumstances:-Ameer Khan, a Mahomedan merchant in Calcutta, was on the 10th of July, 1869, arrested at his own house, and carried to Gya, 289 miles from Calcutta, where he was imprisoned in the common gaol. Two days later, Hashmahad Khan, another Mahomedan merchant, was arrested and taken to Patna, 396 miles from Calcutta. On the 1st of August, 1870, motions were made in the High Court of Calcutta, before Mr. Justice Norman, for writs of habeas corpus on behalf of both Ameer Khan and Hashmahad Khan, and a rule nisi was granted on both sides. On the 10th of August, the AdvocateGeneral and other counsel showed cause against the rules, and Mr. Chisholm Anstey and other counsel supported them. The arguments occupied six days, and judgment was reserved. On the 29th of August Mr. Justice Norman delivered a long and lucid judgment." He decided that no writ of habeas corpus ought to issue, and therefore discharged the rule in both cases. As the matter is one of importance, and one which will in all probability ultimately come before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, we propose briefly to mention the grounds on which Mr. Justice Norman rested his decision. In the first place he stated that the Habeas Corpus Act has been (except as to certain parts thereof) introduced into India, and that the Supreme Court had therefore, in cases which he quoted, issued writs of ha as corpus. This being so, the jurisdiction of the High Court (in which are now vested the powers of the Supreme Court) to issue such writs is unquestionable; and this is important, because by 25 Vict. c. 20 a writ of habeas corpus cannot issue from an English court into a colony or foreign possession of the Crown where there are courts of justice having authority to issue such writs. Therefore, an English writ of habeas corpus could not now be issued to India as it could have been before 1862.

But if the High Court of Calcutta can issue writs of habeas corpus, why did Mr. Justice Norman discharge the rule in the case of Ameer Khan? Because there exists in India an Act of the Legislative Council which is equivalent to a perpetual suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act as regards persons arrested by the Government. By Regulation III. of 1818 of the Code of Bengal (and there are similar regulations in the Codes of Madras and Bombay), after reciting that "the security of the British dominions from foreign hostility and from internal com motion occasionally render it necessary to place under personal restraint individuals against whom there may not be sufficient ground to institute any judicial proceeding, or where such proceeding may not be adapted to the nature of the case, or may for other reason be unadvisable or improper, a warrant of commitment of any such individual is authorised to be issued by the GovernorGeneral in Council. This Regulation is confirmed by Act III. of 1858 of the Legislative Council of India, which enacts that the provisions of Regulation III. of 1818 shall be in force within the local limits of the Supreme Court of Calcutta. This, says Mr. Justice Norman, "applies to all persons within the local limits, whether European British subjects, or persons living within the local limits under the protection of and subject to English law." The joint effect then of the Regulation and the Act is that the Habeas Corpus Act is perpetually suspended in India as regards persons arrested by the Government. It was argued on behalf of Ameer Khan that the Regulation and the Act were alike void as being ultra vires of the Indian Legislature. This is an important question. The Act 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 85, which created and gave legislative powers to the GovernorGeneral in Council, expressly provided that the GovernorGeneral in Council should not have power to make

* Vide Report of the Proceedings, by C. C. Macrae, barrister-at-law.-"Englishman" Press, Calcutta, 1870.

any laws or regulations affecting the prerogatives of the Crown or the authority of Parliament, or any part of the unwritten laws or constitution of the United Kingdom whereon may depend the allegiance of any person to the Crown. It was argued then that the Regulation and Act are void as being contrary to the unwritten law of the United Kingdom. This objection was overruled by Mr. Justice Norman, who held that the Regulation and Act were not ultra vires, and consequently not void.

THE PRESENT RULE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, under which a neutral power is not required to restrain, or held responsible for, a traffic in contraband carried on by her own subjects, is rendered so clear by Wheaton and Kent (vide, 14 S. J. 945), and others, that it is impossible to render it any clearer. The writer of a letter in yesterday's Time s cites one or two German writers on the matter, and among them Dr. Bluntschli, of Heidelberg, from whose "Modern International Law" he takes (inter alia) the following passage:

"He who conveys contraband of war to a belligerent exposes himself to the risk of capture. But he only injures the war interests of the one party, and comes, so far, under its rights of war. The neutral state has no occasion on its side also to hinder the furnishing of contraband of war."

Now Dr. Bluntschli was an unfortunate writer to cite upon the point, because, though undoubtedly an able writer, he happens to be one of those who cannot always resist the temptation of laying down the law, not as it is, but as he thinks it ought to be; and if the corres pondent of the Times had gone on to the next section (766), he would have found in the note (we take the original) these words:

"Man durf dem neutralen State nicht zumuthen, dasz er die Verschickung von Waffen im einzelnen und Kleinen verhindere. Anders verhält es sich mit der

zusendung im Grossen. Darin liegt durchweg eine thatsächliche Förderung einer Kriegspartei und meistens auch eine kriegerische Beihülfe. Insofern hat der neutrale Stat, um seine Nichtbetheiligung am Kriege auszer Zweifel zu stellen, ein Interesse, und soweit die absicht der Kriegshülfe mindestens wahrscheinlich ist, die Pflicht, der Ausführung solcher Sendung entgegenzutreten."

That is to say, that if the trade become so wholesale as to be a serious thing to either belligerent, the neutral should stop it. Such a proposition as this is utterly unwarranted by any precedent or authority; and it is difficult to imagine a vaguer rule or one which could be more utterly impracticable. It is not too much to say that with such a rule it would be in the power of any belligerent to draw any neutral into a casus belli within a fortnight. Happily there is no such rule, and it is to be hoped there never will be. It is only by preserving clear, sharp definitions in these matters that confusion and misunderstanding can be avoided.

WE HAVE REPORTED during the last few weeks several cases in the Court of Bankruptcy in which the learned registrars, following the decision of Lord Justice James in Ex parte Dimond, Re Williams (18 W. R. 1123), have refused to restrain proceedings in bankruptcy by a creditor, simply upon the ground that the debtor has presented a petition for liquidation by arrangement. These decisions are perfectly sound, and cannot be too generally known.

The intention of the Bankruptcy Act is quite clear. It gives to the general body of creditors assembled at a meeting duly convened, the right to elect between liquidation by arrangement and bankruptcy; and after the meeting has been held and has decided in favour of liquidation, any proceeding by a creditor, whether at law or in bankruptcy, may very properly be stayed. But the presentation of a petition for liquidation is the act of the debtor alone, with which the creditors have nothing to do; and to stay bankruptcy proceedings simply because