gress from ever exercising the power exerted by | Constitution, and the powers actually granted those avowedly war measures. In a large majority of the States represented in the Thirty-Seventh Congress, 1861-1863, the question of the constitutionality of the legal tender clauses of the Acts of 1862 and 1863 had arisen in various cases of private contract, and had been passed upon in many instances after much deliberation and research, by the Judges of the courts of last resort. And in only two States, New Jersey and Kentucky, were final decisions rendered adverse to the validity of the legal tender provisions of the Acts. Martin v. Martin, 20 N. J. Eq., 421; Griswold v. Hepburn, 2 Duvall (Ky.), 26. This unanimity of decision in the state courts will be found on an examination of the reported cases to have been due in part to a proper reserve and hesitation in passing upon constitutional questions as to which the federal judicia ry was the ultimate arbiter, in any other way than to sustain, if possible, the authority of Congress. But it was also very largely due to the sentiment that the denial to Congress of the power in question under such circumstances as those in which it had actually been exercised, would be fraught with more danger than to uphold and sanction it. George v. Concord, 45 N. H., 434; Carpenter v. Bank, 39 Vt., 46; Essex Co. v. Pacific Mills, 14 Allen, 389; Metrop. Bk. v. Van Dyck, 27 N. Y., 400; Legal Tender Cases, 52 Pa. St., &; Thayer v. Hedges, 23 Ind., 141; Van Husen v. Kanouse, 13 Mich., 303; Breitenbach v. Turner, 18 Wis., 140; O'Neil v. McKewn, 1 S. C., 147; Wills v. Allison, 4 Heisk., 385; Breen v. Dewey, 16 Minn., 136; Hintrager v. Bates, 18 Iowa, 174; Riddelsbarger v. McDaniel, 38 Mo., 138, 458; Cox v. Smith, 1 Nev., 171; Lick v. Faulkner,25 Cal., 404. In the space of a single decade, the expedient of providing funds for the prosecution of a Civil War, declared by this court to be the greatest known in the history of the human race, by making the notes of the United States a legal tender, an expedient reluctantly resorted to by the Legislative Department as a temporary expedient, and reluctantly assented to by the Executive Department, and repeatedly declared by it to be no longer permissible as a permanent system, has been twice subjected to the scrutiny of the Judicial Department, at first condemned by five voices of its Supreme Bench, and then upheld by an equal but not greater number of voices from the same supreme bench, resulting in this and nothing more; that the legal tender provisions of the Acts of 1862 and 1863, as they stand on the statute-book in those Acts, are adjudged to have been a valid exercise of a power conferred on Congress by the Constitution, necessary under the circumstances in which it was exercised. It cannot escape the observation of any candid student of the history of this subject, that the opponents of the power of Congress to give a legal tender quality to the treasury notes have been at all times united and consistent in their grounds of opposition. Starting with the undisputed proposition as laid down by this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Story, Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat., 326, that: "The Government, then, of the United States can claim no powers which are not granted to it by the must be such as are expressly given, or given by necessary implication, they have maintained: That the power to make anything except gold and silver a legal tender for the payment of debts, prohibited by the Constitution of the United States, is not granted by express terms to Congress, and in the light of history contemporaneous with the adoption of the Constitution, was not intended to be granted; That if it exists it must, therefore, be derived and spelled out as a power implied in or deducible from some of the express powers actually granted to Congress; That it cannot reasonably be so derived, because it is not to be deduced from the express power to coin money and regulate the value thereof, a paper currency being itself a contradiction of the term "money," and cannot, by logic or by regulation of law, any more than by magic, be turned into money. Nor from the express power to "borrow money," because this power gives no authority to any debtor, citizen or Sovereign, to change the standards of value or to give greater currency to promises to pay by declaring their enforced substitution as money between third persons not concerned in the act of borrowing. Nor from the grant of power to declare war, to raise and support armies and navies, because the wants of the government in any particular department cannot be made the measure of its powers where those powers are restricted by constitutional limits. Nor can it be derived from the general grant of power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into effect the other powers vested in Congress by the Constitution, because the exercise of this particular power was not a means necessary or appropriate to the execution of any of the powers expressly delegated, because it never inhered in the delegated sovereignty of the Federal government, and because the doctrine of resulting powers to be exercised at will would turn the Government from one of limited power to one of unlimited power, lodged in a single department, in respect to a vital element of the national existence. To all this, the opponents of the power added the admitted evils of a paper currency with a legal tender attribute, the intrinsic bad faith and the attendant impairment of the obligation of public and private contracts resulting from its creation, and an absolute denial of the fact that the legal tender attribute was ever an imperative necessity. Such are the main positions taken against the power of Congress by all the opponents of legal tender treasury notes as contained in the arguments of counsel in the reports, state and federal, in the debates of Congress, in the works of jurists and in the discussions of publicists. On the other hand, no concurring and consentaneous answer has been given by those statesmen, publicists, jurists or judges, who have upheld, in discussion or judicial decision, the existence of the power and the right of Congress to exercise it, except on the ground and upon the plea of necessity. Reduced to their final terms, all the arguments in support of the power come to this: that the extreme needs of a constitutional government may require extreme measures for its preservation; that the power of self-preserva The resumption Act, passed Jan. 14, 1875, required all the United States legal tender notes outstanding Jan. 1, 1879, to be redeemed in coin, on presentation on and after that date. It repealed all provisions of law inconsistent with its own provisions. tion and self-perpetuation must be commensu- | issue of such notes, after redemption, as a cirrate with such needs; and that where all the culating medium, without the quality of legal powers of the government are given by a writ- tender. ten Constitution, this power must, if not expressly written on its face, be necessarily intended by what is there written, and that, either as an incident to some enumerated power or as a resultant from the aggregate of all the powers granted, and as a necessary means appropriate to carry into effect those which are enumerated, this power must have been intended, if the framers of the Constitution meant that the government they formed should have in it the means of protection against all emergencies, and was to live and not die. And in view of the greatness of the peril and the sore extremity of the country, when the power was resorted to as a supreme need, the duly constituted judicial authority has declared, without the absolute concurrence of its members in any one ground for the declaration, that the legal tender clauses of the Acts of 1862 and 1863, as therein expressed, are part of the law of the land. II. The course of Congressional legislation, since the decision of the Legal Tender Cases, culminating in the Act of May 31, 1878, which compels a post-redemption issue of the so-called legal tender notes, raises for the first time the question of the power of Congress to direct the issue of United States notes as currency, with the quality of legal tender, in time of peace and in the absence of any public exigency. On January 1, 1879, the resumption of specie payments began, and all the United States notes then and since presented for redemption in coin, in the manner provided by the resumption Act, have been paid. The amount of the public debt outstanding January 1, 1879, represented by the legal tender notes, was $346,681,016. Under the construction given by the Treasury Department to section 3579 of the Revised Statutes, coupled with the Act of May 31,1878, all the United States notes returned into the Treasury, as worn and mutilated notes, as well as those redeemed in coin, are treated in the report of the Treasurer of the United States as redeemed, and during each year since the passage of the Act of May 31, 1878, there have been issued and paid out by the Treasury Department, the precise amount in United States notes, which have been so redeemed, but not in notes of the same denominations. This is done without any question of exigency or public interest, or the exercise of any discretion on the part of the Treasury Department or any of its officers, who are expressly prohibited from exercising any such discretion. Such a course can only be sustained by holding that Congress has the power to direct the re-issue of redeemed treasury notes, as well as worn or mutilated notes, or those returned and not redeemed, and to continue their legal tender quality, without reference to any public exigency, at its own will and pleasure. III. The Act of May 31, 1878, taken in connection with the unrepealed provisions of the resumption Act requiring the redemption in coin, on and after Jan. 1, 1879, of all of the United States legal tender notes then outstanding, can be upheld as a constitutional exercise of power only by construing it to require a new The only provisions of law relating to the United States legal tender notes which were in force Jan. 14, 1875, were sections 3571, 3579, 3582 and 3588 of the Revised Statutes. All previous laws had been repealed. The Revised Statutes contain and express the whole statute law of the United States as it was on December 31, 1873. U. S. v. Bowen, 100 U. S., 508 (XXV., 631); Arthur v. Dodge, 101 U. S., 34 (XXV., 948); Vietor v. Arthur, 104 U. S., 498 (XXVI., 633). The provisions of the resumption Act applied to the same United States legal tender notes to which the above cited sections of the Revised Statutes applied. It directed the same notes to be redeemed in coin. The redemption in coin of these notes contemplated the extinguishment of the debt. The Act of May 31, 1878, is the sole warrant for their subsequent use. Without its authority, the Treasury Department could not lawfully have used them in any transaction. It may well be construed as authorizing a circulation of United States notes, without the quality of legal tender, because this quality is not essential or necessary to the notes as a circulating medium. IV. If the Act of May 31, 1878, was intended to direct the keeping in circulation of the United States notes therein described, with the legal tender quality, it was to that extent unconstitu tional and void and should be so declared by this court. To emit bills of credit as currency and with the quality of legal tender, in time of peace and in the absence of any apparent public exigency, is not within any of the express powers delegated to Congress by the Constitution, nor is it within any of the powers which can be properly implied, or which necessarily result from those which are expressly granted. These propositions, if not res judicata, are just and necessary inferences from the decisions of this court. It is not now proposed to renew the general argument against the power of Congress, ever or under any circumstances, to make United States notes a legal tender. The opinions of the majority of the court, as reported in Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wail., 603 (75 U. S., XIX., 513), and of the minority as reported in the Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall., 457 (79 U. S., XX., 287), are full, although not now authoritative, expositions of the views of those who deny the existence of the power. Accepting, as final, the result by which the view for which they contended was silenced, we place the present argument upon a ground which that result fully supports and necessarily implies, to wit: that the Constitution vests no power in Congress, either by express grant or as the result of any one or of all the powers which it confers, to create at will and in the absence of any national exigency, a legal tender paper currency, to exist for an indefinite period, and to be an enforced substitute for coin in the payment of public and private debts. The question here is not simply as to the exercise of a power conceded to exist, but as to the existence of the power itself at the time of its attempted exercise. And whenever the power sought to be exercised depends, or must be predicated, upon a given state of facts, the existence of the power is a judicial question to be determined upon the facts. See, generally, Waring v. Clarke, 5 How.,441, and comments of Chief Justice Taney, in 12 How., 456; The Genesee Chief, 12 How., 443; The Belfast, 7 Wall., 624 (74 U. S., XIX., 266); Jackson v. The Magnolia, 20 How., 296 (61 U. S., XV., 909); Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 11 Wall., 1 (78 U. S., XX., 90); The Lottawanna, 20 Wall., 201 (87 U. S., XXII., 259); Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall., 36 (83 U. S., XXI., 394); Granger Cases, Munn v. Ill., 94 U. S., 113 (XXIV., 77); Miller v. U. S., 11 Wall., 268 (78 U. S., XX., 135); Tyler v. Defrees, 11 Wall., 331 (78 U. S., XX., 161); Strauder v. West Va., 100 U. S., 303 (XXV., 664); Va. v. Rives, 100 U. S., 313 (XXV., 667); Ex parte Va., 100 U. S., 339 (XXV., 676); Neal v. Del., 103 U. S., 370 XXVI., 567). In the absence of public exigency, legal tender legislation is not a means appropriate to any legitimate end of government. the rules of sound economy and seal up the vol. umes which contain the judicial interpretation of the Constitution. What we claim is, that, by virtue of the resumption Act, all the outstanding legal tender notes are promises to pay the sum specified therein in coin, that they may circulate as money on the credit of the government, and thus, in all transactions be a legal tender by common consent, in all parts of the country, but must always be convertible into coin on demand, at the will and pleasure of the holder, and not at the will and pleasure of Congress. If this view shall be sustained, it will apply to the operations of the Treasury Department the sound rule existing before the war, and it will not deprive Congress of the power of resorting, in time of public exigency, to any expedient necessary for the maintenance of the government. It has never been possible to divorce the question of the constitutional power to coin the public credit into money, and make it an instrument of discharging debts, from the history of legal tender paper and its consequences. Nor is it possible now. peated decisions of this court, we now find it domesticated among us as an integral part of our national economy, under legislation which, unless arrested by this court, will warrant its perpetual continuance as a part of the ordinary administration of the government. Facts have nowhere shown themselves to be more stubborn than in this discussion. The strange anomaly is presented, that where the mischiefs of the existing legal tender currency are established beyond contradiction by the voice of history, the teachings of experience, the While, as to all express and enumerated pow-recorded testimony of its authors, and the reers vested in Congress by the Constitution, it has been often held that it is the province of Congress to judge as to the extent to which they are to be exercised Wheeling Bridge Case, 18 How., 421 (59 U. S., XV., 435); The Clinton Bridge, 10 Wall., 454 (77 U. S., XIX., 969); S. C. v. Ga., 93 U. S., 12 (XXIII., 784); Gilman v. Phila., 3 Wall., 713 (70 U. S., XVIII., 96), the rule is otherwise where the power is not given by express terms, but is claimed to be implied as a necessary and proper means to some legitimate end within the scope of the Constitution. The question whether the end is legitimate and within the purview of the Constitution, and whether the means are appropriate and not prohibited by but consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, is a judicial question to be determined by this court, and has been so determined whenever occasion required, from the case of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137, to the present day. This is necessarily involved in the often quoted and universally accepted dictum of Chief Justice Marshall, in McCulloch v. Md., 4Wheat., 421. "Let the end be legitimate; let it be within the scope of the Constitution; and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional." The end proposed is the establishment and maintenance of a permanent currency, based on the credit of the government. The means to the end is the issue of treasury notes, convertible into coin, during the pleasure of Congress, but practically irredeemable, because always to be kept in circulation as a legal tender. If this is an appropriate means to a legitimate end, we must unlearn all the lessons of the past, reverse 110 U.S. U. S., Book 28. It is matter of undisputed fact, that as to the legal tender quality, no public exigency required or justified the passage of the Act of May 31, 1878. It is equally plain that as to the legal tender quality, in the absence of a public exigency, no aid is derived to the Act of May 31, 1878, from any of the powers granted by the Constitution to Congress. It cannot be claimed, as to the legal tender quality, that the prohibition to retire the United States notes when redeemed, and the direction to issue them after redemption, irrespective of any need of the government, was a legitimate exercise of the power to borrow money. The use of the legal tender element was wholly unnecessary as a means of borrowing, as already shown and, in fact, the whole public debt was provided for by the funding measures, and the resumption Act had explicitly directed that portion of it, which was represented by the legal tender notes to be redeemed in coin. The legal tender quality was, therefore, not required as an incident or aid of the borrowing power. The credit of the government was a sufficient guaranty for the debt. The terms of the Act are wholly inconsistent with its interpretation as an exercise of the borrowing power; but if it is to be interpreted as authorizing the Treasury Department to borrow an amount equivalent to the redeemed notes, then such new loan was a peace measure, and the legal tender quality must be eliminated as not available or within the power of Congress, in the absence of any pretext of a justifying exigency. As an exigency created the power, so it limited the duration of the power. To attempt its exercise long after the exigency had ended, after the war which called it into being had ceased to exist, save in history and recollection, and after all the extraordinary and exigent methods of government, civil and military, which marked its dark and blood-stained days had been succeeded by the calm and order of established peace, is, we humbly submit, in excess of any power reposed by the Constitution in Congress. er. As the Constitution was framed; as it stands; as it has been construed, it grants no such powWe venture to affirm that if ever engrafted on the organic law, it must be by way of amendment, through the suffrages of the Nation, and not by a concession extorted from its Supreme Court. Messrs. Thomas H. Talbot, James McKeen and B. F. Butler, for defendant in error. Mr. Justice Gray delivered the opinion of the court: Julliard, a citizen of New York, brought an action against Greenman, a citizen of Connecticut, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, alleging that the plaintiff sold and delivered to the defendant, at his special instance and request, one hundred bales of cotton, of the value and for the agreed price of $5122.90; and that the defendant agreed to pay that sum in cash on the delivery of the cotton, and had not paid the same or any part thereof, except that he had paid the sum of $22.90 on account, and was now justly indebted to the plaintiff therefor in the sum of $5,100; and demanding judgment for this sum with interest and costs. The plaintiff demurred to the answer, upon the grounds that the defense, consisting of new matter, was insufficient in law upon its face, and that the facts stated in the answer did not constitute any defense to the cause of action alleged. The Circuit Court overruled the demurrer and gave judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiff sued out this writ of error. The amount which the plaintiff seeks to recover and which, if the tender pleaded is insufficient in law, he is entitled to recover is $5,100. There can, therefore, be no doubt of the jurisdiction of this court to revise the judg ment of the Circuit Court. Act of February 16, 1875, ch. 77, sec. 3; 18 Stat. at L., 315. The notes of the United States, tendered in payment of the defendant's debt to the plaintiff, were originally issued under the Acts of Congress of February 25, 1862, ch. 33, July 11, 1862, ch. 142, and March 3, 1863, ch. 73, passed during the war of the rebellion, and enacting that these notes should "be lawful money and a legal tender in payment of all debts, public and private, within the United States", except for duties on imports and interest on the public debt. 12 Stat. at L., 345, 532, 709. The provisions of the earlier Acts of Congress, so far as it is necessary, for the understanding of the recent statutes, to quote them, are re-enacted in the following provisions of the Revised Statutes: "Sec. 3579. When any United States notes are returned to the Treasury, they may be reissued, from time to time, as the exigencies of the public interest may require. Sec. 3580. When any United States notes returned to the Treasury are so mutilated or otherwise injured as to be unfit for use, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to replace the same with others of the same character and amounts. Sec. 3581. Mutilated United States notes, when replaced according to law, and all other notes which by law are required to be taken up and not re-issued, when taken up shall be destroyed in such manner and under such regulations as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe. Sec. 3582. The authority given to the Secretary of the Treasury to make any reduction of the currency, by retiring and canceling United States notes, is suspended." "Sec. 3588. United States notes shall be lawful money and a legal tender in payment of all debts, public and private, within the United States, except for duties on imports and interest on the public debt." The defendant in his answer admitted the citizenship of the parties, the purchase and delivery of the cotton, and the agreement to pay therefor, as alleged; and averred that, after the delivery of the cotton, he offered and tendered to the plaintiff, in full payment, $22.50 in gold coin of the United States, forty cents in silver coin of the United States, and two United States notes, one of the denomination of $5,000, and the other of the denomination of $100, of the description known as United States legal tender notes, purporting by recital thereon to be legal tender, at their respective face values, for all debts, public and private, except duties on imports and interest on the public debt, and which, after having been presented for payment, and redeemed and paid in gold coin, since January 1, 1879, at the United States sub-treasury in New York, had been re-issued and kept in circulation under and in pursuance of the Act of Congress of May 31, 1878, ch. 146; that at the time of offering and tendering these notes and coin to the plaintiff, the sum of $5122.90 was the entire amount due and owing in payment for the cotton, but the plaintiff declined to receive the notes in payment of $5,100 thereof; and that the defendant had ever since remained and still was ready and willing to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $5,100 in these notes, and brought|L., 296. these notes into court, ready to be paid to the plaintiff, if he would accept them. The Act of January 14, 1875, ch. 15, "To provide for the resumption of specie payments, enacted that on and after January 1, 1879, "The Secretary of the Treasury shall redeem in coin the United States legal tender notes then outstanding, on their presentation for redemption at the office of the Assistant Treasurer of the United States in the City of New York, in sums of not less than $50," and authorized him to use for that purpose any surplus revenues in the Treasury and the proceeds of the sales of certain bonds of the United States. 18 Stat. at The Act of May 31, 1878, ch. which the notes in question were 146, under re-issued, is entitled "An Act to Forbid the Further Retire-, tution established a National Government, with ment of the United States Legal Tender Notes," and enacts as follows: "From and after the passage of this Act it shall not be lawful for the Secretary of the Treasury or other officer under him to cancel or retire any more of the United States legal tender notes. And when any of said notes may be redeemed or be received into the Treasury under any law from any source whatever and shall belong to the United States, they shall not be retired, canceled or destroyed, but they shall be re-issued and paid out again and kept in circulation; Provided, That nothing herein shall prohibit the cancellation and destruction of mutilated notes and the issue of other notes of like denomination in their stead, as now provided by law. All Acts and parts of Acts in conflict herewith are hereby repealed. 20 Stat. at L., 87. The manifest intention of this Act is that the notes which it directs, after having been redeemed, to be re-issued and kept in circulation, shall retain their original quality of being a legal tender. The single question, therefore, to be considered, and upon the answer to which the judgment to be rendered between these parties depends, is whether notes of the United States, issued in time of war, under Acts of Congress declaring them to be a legal tender in payment of private debts, and afterwards in time of peace redeemed and paid in gold coin at the Treasury, and then re-issued under the Act of 1878, can, under the Constitution of the United States, be a legal tender in payment of such debts. Upon full consideration of the case, the court is unanimously of opinion that it cannot be distinguished in principle from the cases heretofore determined, reported under the names of the Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall., 457 [79 U. S., XX., 287]; Dooley v. Smith, 13 Wall., 604 [80 U. S., XX., 547]; R. R. Co. v. Johnson, 15 Wall., 195 [82 U. S., XXI., 178]; and Md. v. R. R. Co., 22 Wall., 105 [89 U. S., XXII., 713]; and all the Judges, except Mr. Justice Field, who adheres to the views expressed in his dissenting opinions in those cases, are of opinion that they were rightly decided. The elaborate printed briefs submitted by counsel in this case, and the opinions delivered in the Legal Tender Cases, and in the earlier case of Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall., 603 [75 U. S., XIX., 513], which those cases overruled, forcibly present the arguments on either side of the question of the power of Congress to make the notes of the United States a legal tender in payment of private debts. Without undertaking to deal with all those arguments, the court has thought it fit that the grounds of its judgment in the case at bar should be fully stated. No question of the scope and extent of the implied powers of Congress under the Constitution can be satisfactorily discussed without repeating much of the reasoning of Chief Justice Marshall in the great judgment in McCulloch v. Md., 4 Wheat., 316, by which the power of Congress to incorporate a bank was demonstrated and affirmed, notwithstanding the Constitution does not enumerate, among the powers granted, that of establishing a bank or creating a corporation. The People of the United States by the Consti sovereign powers, legislative, executive and judicial. "The government of the Union," said Chief Justice Marshall, "though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action;" and its laws, when made in pursuance of the Constitution, form the supreme law of the land." 'Among the enumerated powers of government, we find the great powers to lay and collect taxes; to borrow money; to regulate commerce; to declare and conduct a war; and to raise and support armies and navies. The sword and the purse, all the external relations, and no inconsiderable portion of the industry of the Nation, are intrusted to its government." 4 Wheat., 405, 406, 407. A constitution, establishing a frame of government, declaring fundamental principles and creating a national sovereignty and intended to endure for ages and to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs, is not to be interpreted with the strictness of a private contract. The Constitution of the United States, by apt words of designation or general description, marks the outlines of the powers granted to the National Legislature; but it does not undertake, with the precision and detail of a code of laws, to enumerate the subdivisions of those powers, or to specify all the means by which they may be carried into execution. Chief Justice Marshall, after dwelling upon this view, as required by the very nature of the Constitution, by the language in which it is framed, by the limitations upon the general powers of Congress introduced in the 9th section of the 1st article, and by the omission to use any restrictive term which might prevent its receiving a fair and just interpretation, added these emphatic words: "In considering this question, then, we must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding." 4 Wheat., 407. See, also, page 415. The breadth and comprehensiveness of the words of the Constitution are nowhere more strikingly exhibited than in regard to the powers over the subjects of revenue, finance and currency, of which there is no other express grant than may be found in these few brief clauses: "The Congress shall have power: To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States; To borrow money on the credit of the United States; To regulate commerce with foreign Nations and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes; To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures. The section which contains the grant of these and other principal legislative powers concludes by declaring that the Congress shall have power: "To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof." By the settled construction and the only rea |