do not deny that the course here opposed may in some cases be partially adopted with advantage. But we shall never be able, in giving formal demonstrations of God's existence, like demonstrations of mathematical problems, fully to convey the idea we wish to communicate. It is so all-glorious and lofty that it cannot be so expressed. Its right understanding requires the conceptions of the whole soul,- conceptions in forming which every faculty of the soul has rendered its aid. But we can dwell no longer on this part of the subject. C. A. BARTOL.

Men Accountable for their Faith.

AMONG the various inquiries to which the infidelity of the times has given rise there is no one more interesting than the question, how far men are accountable for their belief or unbelief; in other words, whether faith is a proper subject of legislation. Recent occurrences have brought this question, as it respects human tribunals, before the public mind, and furnished opportunities for a full and free discussion of it. The result seems to be, that, though civil governments have a right to legislate on this subject, it is seldom expedient to exercise that right; that, on the contrary, it is better to let opinions have their free course, and trust to the good sense of the community to correct whatever is false or injurious. With regard to Divine legislation the Scriptures appear to have decided this question in the affirmative. If we may trust the natural interpretation of certain texts, or indeed the whole tenor of the New Testament, mankind are considered accountable for their belief. The justice of the law by which we are made thus accountable is not generally understood. We are so accustomed to think and speak of our religious faith as something independent of our own wills, as regulated by circumstances over which we have no control, such as the natural constitution of our minds, the force of the evidence presented to us, &c., that we do not readily understand how we can be held responsible for our belief or disbelief in any doctrine. But is this idea of faith altogether correct?

From what we know of the Deity, from the character of the religion he has given us, it certainly is not supposable that he would require of us anything inconsistent with the nature and capacities we have received from him, or that he would call us to account for that which he has not placed within our control. If, therefore, as we have supposed, the Scriptures declare us to be accountable for our faith, the fact affords a strong presumption that faith is not so wholly independent of our wills as we are apt to imagine, but, on the contrary, is a thing very much within our control. And this presumption is abundantly confirmed by a careful and candid examination of our condition in relation to the truths of religion. In the following remarks we shall enter very briefly into this examination, and endeavour to show, as concisely as possible, the justice of the law which calls us to account for our religious opinions.

It cannot be denied, in the first place, that we are possessed of faculties which fit us for the investigation of truth, that we are abundantly furnished with outward aids to inquiry, means of information, and sources of evidence. If we have these materials, we have the means of forming a correct faith. These means cannot be considered in any other light than as a part of our moral furniture, as among the appointed instruments of our moral discipline. Therefore, if we are moral beings at all, if we are justly accountable for anything, we are justly accountable for the use we make of these means, and, consequently, for the faith we form by them, or for the want of faith which may arise from the neglect of them. But moral responsibility necessarily implies a control of the will over that for which we are to answer; and this condition, it is maintained by some, is not applicable to matters of opinion. They refer us to the diversities of faith which exist among men equally zealous for the truth and equally conscientious in their pursuit of it. So great a discrepancy in the results of human investigation, it is urged, is inconsistent with the doctrine that men are responsible for their faith, for it brings us to this dilemma: either we must maintain that all who dissent from the true creed, whatever that creed may be, are morally culpable, or else we must allow that moral integrity is perfectly compatible with errors in faith. In the former case, how are we to explain the fact that men of equal excellence hold very opposite opinions? and in the latter case, what becomes of our responsibility?

It will not be difficult to reconcile this objection with our doc

trine. A more accurate investigation will convince us that the fact on which the objection rests has been greatly overstated. It is not true that different minds, employing the same means with equal faithfulness and equal candour, have come to entirely opposite conclusions. This cannot be. Truth is one, and the faculties by which truth is ascertained are essentially the same-the same in kind, though not in degree in every mind; consequently, where equal advantages have been enjoyed, and where the inquiry has been equally conscientious, the result must be the same — the same in all essential points. There may be slight differences, the same truth may be stated in diverse ways, there may even be discrepancies in unessential particulars, but there must be, under the circumstances supposed, an agreement in all that is fundamental, there must be a unanimous judgment on all the grand central truths of religion. By the eternal laws of the human mind and by the unchangeable character of God it cannot be otherwise. The truth is, differences of opinion among good and thinking men are rather nominal than real. Such men differ in form and word rather than in substance. However different the language they employ in their respective confessions of faith, a minute comparison of their real opinions as to particular points in those confessions will show, in most cases, that, while their nominal creeds disagree, their inward convictions coïncide. Thus, for example, the doctrine of original sin, as it is professed by one party, sounds absurd and shocking in the ears of the opposite party. But let two honest and intelligent inquirers from these two parties meet together and question each other on this subject, and it will be found that they do not differ essentially, it will be found that what is termed total depravity, entire alienation from God, utter corruption of the heart, signifies, in the mind of him who subscribes to such language, nothing more than indifference to religion, or a strong tendency to practices at variance with the law of God; and the existence of these evils, so strongly expressed by one party, is not denied by the other. As it is with this so it is with other disputed doctrines; though expressed in different language, they amount, in the minds of good and thinking men, to nearly if not exactly the same thing. It is a fact of frequent occurrence and wellknown to everyone that individuals of different sects, who had long been accustomed to regard each other as holding the most opposite views, when an opportunity has occurred of comparing their opinions, have found to their astonishment

that there existed a very close agreement between them. So inadequate is the language of creeds to express the various shades of human opinion, so intimate is the connexion between equality of moral worth and unanimity of faith. The light of truth, like that of the sun, is one and unchangeable, it suffers no alteration or diminution from the various causes which affect our vision. But, as human observers, stationed at different points of the earth's surface and looking through a different medium, are differently affected by the same luminary, so human minds, differently educated, trained, and disciplined, have different views of the same truth. Nevertheless, in the former case it is the sun, and not a deceptive meteor, that gives its light; and even so, where the heart is pure, it is truth, and not error, that furnishes the substance of faith. Thus the objection drawn from differences of opinion is in part answered by showing that such differences, in all cases where a conscientious love of truth has accompanied the use of proper means in the investigation of truth, are nominal and not real.

But are there no real differences of opinion? Are not essentially opposite views sometimes entertained by different minds? Undoubtedly; but not under the circumstances supposed. When differences of opinion do occur where the means of investigation have been the same, they are to be ascribed to different degrees of candour and integrity in the inquirers. The error, on whichever side it lies, must be considered as wilful; the will had some influence, remote or immediate, in producing it. In some cases the influence of the will in this matter is indirect; as where a man, having been brought up with strong prejudices in favour of particular doctrines, comes to the study of religious subjects under the full influence of such prejudices, suffers them to direct his inquiries and to determine the results. Will it be said that that man is not responsible for his opinions, that he is not culpable for the errors into which he may fall, because they are the effect of education? To what purpose, then, were we endowed with a capacity for ascertaining the truth, if we are permitted to pervert it or to reject its guidance with impunity? Is not this capacity a talent given us for definite and important purposes? and will God hold him guiltless who neglects to apply it to the purposes for which it was given? Surely not. We are accountable, then, for those prejudices of which by a proper use of the powers imparted to us we might have divested ourselves. There are other cases in which the will has a more

direct and immediate agency in determining the false views we adopt. Men are often influenced in their inquiries by motives of vanity, by intellectual ambition, by pride of opinion, or by a fear of the consequences which must follow if certain doctrines be admitted, rather than by a love of the truth. Such inquirers, foreseeing that the results to which a candid investigation would probably lead them are not such as they would wish to adopt and profess, forbear to examine, or, if they have partially examined, forbear to push their inquiries, and compel their minds to adopt other views more consonant with their feelings and with their preconceived notions. We say, compel their minds to adopt these views, that is, they voluntarily accustom themselves to contemplate them as desirable objects of faith, rack their invention for arguments to support them, until, gradually, by a natural and well-known process, they begin to believe in them, and at last are fully established in their convictions. The opinions of such persons must be ascribed to a wilful rejection of the truth. They deserve the name of falsehood rather than of error. — A third case is that in which men never think of inquiring. There are some in every community who care nothing about truth, but follow with blind indifference the guidance of those among whom their lot has been cast. Notwithstanding the pursuit of truth is going on with active zeal around them, notwithstanding the sharp contests of neighbours and fellow-citizens are constantly admonishing them to search and see on which side the truth lies, they suffer themselves to be dragged along by circumstances; and wherever, in the revolution of opinions and the division of parties, they happen to fall, there they remain, in contented ignorance. So far from examining the tenets of the party to which chance has assigned them, they do not even know what those tenets are. In this case, too, as in those above stated, it cannot be denied that the will is at fault. The obligation to inquire into the truths of religion is a solemn and it is a known obligation. No one in this age and country can neglect it through ignorance of duty. They who neglect it do so wilfully, they are culpable for their neglect and responsible for the errors which may arise from it.

These three cases comprise all the differences of opinion, consequently all the aberrations from the truth, which can occur where the requisite means of information and sufficient advantages for inquiry are enjoyed. And as in all these it appears that the aberration is wilful and might be avoided