posing the board had such authority, the fact that they had in law
no authority does not make them personally liable.
1. RIPARIAN RIGHTS-LIMITS OF STATE AUTHORITY.-The limit of the
authority of states bordering on a navigable river is to protect their
own shores and harbors without interfering with the opposite shores
or common rights of navigation. Rutz and others v. City of St.
Louis,
344
NUISANCE.- Where such a state authorizes a structure, which,
but for such authorization, would be considered a nuisance, its own
citizens must accept the legal consequences, though not without the
recovery of damages; but it cannot pass a law to govern a state bor-
dering on the opposite shore, or its citizens, or the realty situated
therein.
Id.
3. PRACTICE-DEMURRER.-The petition alleged that the plaintiff was
the owner of real estate in Illinois, opposite the city of St. Louis, and
bordering on the Mississippi river; that said city had caused a dyke to
be built on the Missouri shore unlawfully, which dyke had caused
plaintiff's land to be washed away. Held, that the defendant could
not raise the question of the lawfulness of the dyke under the Missouri
statutes, by demurrer to the petition, but should inform the court by
answer, on trial, whether the dyke interfered with the navigability of
the river, and transcended the power of the state.
Id.
4. SAME LOCAL ACTIONS.-Held, further, that the old rule as to local
actions was not applicable to a suit of this nature.
Id.
5. RIPARIAN RIGHTS.- Each riparian owner has the right, within his ter-
ritory, to use the water as it flows - returning it to the channel of the
river for the use of those below. Mason et al. v. Cotton et al. 82
6. REMEDY FOR VIOLATION OF RIPARIAN RIGHTS.-The remedy for the
violation of the riparian rights is by action at law; and while equity
may take cognizance of the violation of these rights when conceded
and established, it will not aid one who, out of mere captiousness, re-
fuses to use water after it has been diverted from the stream by
another, if he may so use it with substantially the same results as
if obtained by continuous flow from the stream through his own
Id.
RIVER. See Bridge, 1.
RULE FEDERAL COURTS. See Equity, 2.
SALARY. See Receiver, 5.
SALE. See Receiver, 1, 2.
SENIOR LOCATION. See Mining Claim, 16.
SERVANTS. See Negligence, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.
SERVICE. See Removal, 4, 11.
SERVICES. See Receiver, 5.
SHERIFF. See Attachment, 2.
SHERIFF'S CERTIFICATE. See Foreclosure, 1.
SOLDIER IN ARMY OF U, S. See Jurisdiction, 3.
1. GENERAL SOLICITORS — INSTITUTION OF SUIT — AUTHORITY.— The
general solicitor of the plaintiff corporation, being an officer unknown
to the articles of incorporation and the by-laws, has no authority to
institute and prosecute suits without the sanction of the board of di-
rectors, and such sanction not appearing in this case, the suit was
dismissed on motion. Des Moines & Minneapolis Railroad Co. v.
Chicago & Northwestern Railroad Co.
SPECIAL CONTRACT. See Negligence, 19.
SPECIAL TRIBUNAL. See Commissioners, 2. Jurisdiction, 1, 2.
STATE COURT. See Removal, 4, 5, 7, 9, 12, 13, 15, 16.
STATUTE. See Mining Claim, 13.
1. STATUTE CONSTRUING STATUTE- WHEN VALID.-A statute con-
struing and explaining a prior statute is valid, in so far, at least, as
future transactions are concerned. Stebbins v. The Board of County
Commissioners of Pueblo County,
2. STATUTE- RAILROAD-STOCK.-A statute authorizing counties to
take stock in railroads is applicable to a railroad duly organized under
a subsequent statute.
STATUTE OF ARKANSAS. See Conditional Sales, 1, 3.
STATUTE OF COLORADO. See Mining Claim, 2.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS. See Conditional Sales, 1.
1. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION - MIS-
SOURI.-The bar of the statute of limitations (Missouri) is not re-
moved by the issuance of letters of administration upon the estate of
the deceased debtor.
2. SAME-SAME-SAME.-This rule is not modified by the fact that it
was not known that the decedent had any estate calling for adminis-
tration until after the expiration of the statutory period of limitation.
Gaines v. Hammond's Adm'r,
LITIGATION WITH THIRD PARTIES.- Such statute does not
cease to run merely because the creditor is involved in litigation with
third parties, upon which her individual right to the debt is dependent.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS—continued.
4. SAME SUCCESSIVE COVERTURES.- Such creditor cannot tack her
subsequent disabilities by successive covertures in order to prevent
the operation of the statute of limitations.
Id.
5. UNIVERSAL LEGATEE UNDER VALID WILL-EXECUTORS UNDER
VOID WILL-JUDGMENT.— Quære, whether a universal legatee un-
der a valid will has any interest in a judgment obtained by the execu-
tors of a prior void will.
Id.
6. DECEDENT'S ESTATE-ADMINISTRATION-GRANT TO REPRESENTA-
TIVES.- Quære, whether a grant by the United States to the repre-
sentatives of a decedent of a tract of land claimed by the decedent,
and taken in execution for his debts, but to which he had in fact no
legal title during his lifetime, could be treated as the individual estate
of such decedent, and subjected to administration.
Id.
7. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS - VOID SALE-PURCHASERS.— Quære,
whether, under the circumstances of this case, after the expiration of
more than half a century, lands could be recovered from purchasers
under a void sale.
8. PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS-BILL FILED IN 1848.- Held,
that it appeared from a bill filed in the court in 1848 that the plaintiff
was fully informed of all the facts which it is now averred she did not
discover until a date long subsequent.
9. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Id.
COUNTY WARRANTS.- Where a county
may be sued on its ordinary warrants and compelled by mandamus to
levy a tax to pay them, the statute of limitations begins to run against
such warrants from the date of their issue. Goldman v. Conway
County,
STATUTE OF MINNESOTA. See Foreclosure, 1. Removal, 18.
STATUTE LAW AND DECISIONS. See Fraud, 3.
ruptcy, 2, 3. Corporation, 4. Contract, 7, 8. Jurisdiction, 5.
1. CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE-MORTGAGE A DEED.- A mortgage is
a deed within the meaning of the Missouri statutes (R. S. § 699),
which provides that "a husband and wife may convey the real estate
of the wife, and the wife may relinquish her dower in the real estate
of her husband, by their joint deed." Therefore, under said provision,
a married woman may mortgage her separate property when her
husband joins with her. Parsons v. Denis and others,
359
2. PRACTICE EQUITABLE DEFENSES IN ACTIONS AT LAW.- Equita-
ble defenses are inadmissible in actions at law in United States courts.
State practice does not affect the rule.
Id.
3. SAME SETTING UP COLLUSIVE TRANSFER.- The proper way to set
up a collusive transfer, in fraud of jurisdiction, is by plea in abate-
ment, and not by answer.
STOCK. See Live Stock. Statute, 2.
STOCKHOLDERS. See Corporation, 5, 6. Bill of Review, 6, 7. Railroad,
1, 2.
SUPERINTENDENT. See Receiver, 6.
SUPERVISORS OF COUNTY. See Mandamus, 2. Reward, 1, 2.
1. TAXATION-PERSONAL PROPERTY -CHANGE OF RESIDENCE. A
statute of the state of Minnesota, in force in the year 1876, imposed
a tax upon "all personal property of persons residing "within the state,
in reference to the quantity of such property held or owned by such res-
idents on the first day of May of that year. Held, that the personal
property of one who had been a resident of the state, but who was in
itinere on the first day of May, 1876, for the purpose of making the
city of New York the place of his future residence, was subject to
taxation under the Minnesota statute. McCutchen v. Rice County,
337
2. SAME NON-RESIDENT.- In the year 1877 the statute of the state of
Minnesota was amended so as to impose a tax upon "all personal
property employed in trade or business" within the state. Held, that
personal property employed within the state for the purposes of pri-
vate banking, and for the loaning of money on bond or note and
mortgage, was employed in business within the meaning of the stat-
ute, although such business was in the process of being closed up. Id.
3. SAME-SAME.- In the year 1878 the statute of the state of Minnesota
was amended so as to impose a tax upon "all personal property "
within the state. Held, that the statute subjected all personal prop-
erty within the state to taxation, irrespective of its ownership.
4. TAXES ON PROPERTY IN TRANSIT THROUGH THE STATE.- A state
cannot levy a tax upon property in transit to other states or countries.
Such property has no situs in the state in the proper legal sense of
that word. Ogilvie v. Crawford County,
148
5. SAME PROPERTY IN COMMERCIAL TRANSIT.- Where a party pur-
chased corn from various parties, caused it to be removed to the rail-
way and there to be put in cribs temporarily to await transportation,
and with the purpose on his part to have it carried beyond the state:
Held, that it was in commercial transit, and not taxable by the state.
But there must be a purpose to ship immediately, or as soon as trans-
portation can be conveniently obtained, followed up by actual shipment
in a reasonable time.
Id.
6. SAME CRIBBING OF CORN.- With the qualification above stated,
the cribbing of corn may be treated as a thing done from necessity or
for convenience in the course of transportation.
TAX CERTIFICATE. See Tax Sale, 2.
TAX DEED. See Tax Sale, 2.
Vendor, 2, 3. Bonds, 3, 14, 15. Removal,
20. Constitutionality, 1, 2, 3.
1. TAX SALE-AGREEMENT AMONG BIDDERS NOT TO BID AGAINST
EACH OTHER.— An agreement among bidders at a tax sale, either
express or tacit, that they will take turns in bidding, and not bid
against each other, renders the sale and certificate thereof void.
Singer Manufacturing Company v. Israel Yarger,
583
2. TAX CERTIFICATE RIGHTS OF ASSIGNEE. It is settled as the law
of Iowa that the assignee of a tax certificate holds it subject to all the
infirmities by which it would have been affected in the hands of the
tax purchaser.
Id.
3. TAX DEED-BY WHOM ATTACKED FOR FRAUD.- While section 897
of the code of Iowa (1873) gives to the owner of the land a remedy
for fraud in the tax sale of the same, it does not deny to others a like
remedy. A remedy for fraud is allowed to the party injured by the
general principles of equity jurisprudence which prevail in the federal
courts. A mortgagee of the land may have such remedy.
TENANTS IN COMMON. See Agreement, 1, 5, 7.
TITLE. See Mining Claim, 8, 11, 12. Commissioners, 3.
tries, 1, 11. Equity, 7. Contract of Agreement, 3, 5.
Trust, 2.
1. TITLE BY LIMITATION ADVERSE POSSESSION.- If a possession of
real estate is held by mere indulgence, or by consent of the owner,
and the person in possession understands this, the possession is not
adverse and cannot ripen into a title which will defeat the right of the
legal owner. Larwell v. Stevens,
311
2. SAME EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION.- If at any time within ten years the
legal owner and the claimant by possession have had joint possession
of the premises, such a possession cannot establish a limitation against
the title of the real owner.
Id.
3. SAME INTENT TO ACQUIRE ADVERSE POSSESSION.-The intention
to acquire title by adverse possession must be entertained at the time
the ten years' limitation commences to run.
TORT. See Administrator, 1, 2. Receiver, 1.
TOP OR APEX. See Mining Location, 1. Vein, 3. Mining Claim, 16.
TRADE-MARK.
1. TRADE-MARK PATENTED ARTICLE SPECIFIC DESIGNATION.
Where a word indicates a patented machine of peculiar mechanism,
such word cannot be protected as a trade-mark upon the expiration of
the patent. Singer Manufacturing Company v. Stanage,
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