Sir, if you consider but a moment the purposes for which the senate was instituted, and the nature of the business which they are to transact, you will see the necessity of giving them duration. They, together with the President, are to manage all our concerns with foreign nations; they must understand all their interests and their political systems. This knowledge is not soon acquired-but a very small part is gained in the closet. Is it desirable, then, that new and unqualified members should be continually thrown into that body? When public bodies are engaged in the exercise of general powers, you cannot judge of the pro

you accommodate these different interests, which is the only way to set the government in motion, you establish a general controlling power. Thus, whatever constitutional provisions are made to the contrary, every government will be at last driven to the necessity of subjecting the partial to the universal interest. The gentlemen ought always, in their reasoning, to distinguish between the real, genuine good of a state, and the opinions and prejudices which may prevail respecting it: the latter may be opposed to the general good, and consequently ought to be sacrified; the former is so involved in it, that it never can be sacrificed. Sir, the main design of the convention, in form-priety of their conduct but from the result of ing the Senate, was to prevent fluctuations and their systems. They may be forming plans cabals. With this view, they made that body which require time and diligence to bring to - small, and to exist for a considerable period. maturity. It is necessary, therefore, that they Have they executed this design too far? The should have a considerable and fixed duration, senators are to serve six years. This is only that they may make their calculations accordtwo years longer than the senators of this ingly. If they are to be perpetually fluctuating State hold their places. One third of the mem- they can never have that responsibility which bers are to go out every two years; and in six, is so important in republican governments. In the whole body may be changed. Prior to the bodies subject to frequent changes, great politirevolution, the representatives in the several cal plans must be conducted by members in colonies were elected for different periods; for succession; a single assembly can have but a three years, for seven years, &c. Were those partial agency in them, and consequently canbodies ever considered as incapable of repre- not properly be answerable for the final event. senting the people, or as too independent of Considering the senate, therefore, with a view them? There is one circumstance which will to responsibility, duration is a very interesting have a tendency to increase the dependence of and essential quality. There is another view the senators on the States, in proportion to the in which duration in the senate appears necesduration of their appointments. As the State sary. A government, changeable in its policy, legislatures are in continual fluctuation, the must soon lose its sense of national character, senator will have more attachments to form, and forfeit the respect of foreigners. Senators and consequently a greater difficulty of main- will not be solicitous for the reputation of pubtaining his place, than one of shorter duration. lic measures in which they have had but a temHe will therefore be more cautious and indus-porary concern, and will feel lightly the burden trious to suit his conduct to the wishes of his constituents.

Sir, when you take a view of all the circumstances which have been recited, you will certainly see that the senators will constantly look up to the state governments with an eye of dependence and affection. If they are ambitious to continue in office they will make every prudent arrangement for this purpose, and whatever may be their private sentiments of politics, they will be convinced that the surest means of obtaining a re-election will be an uniform attachment to the interests of their several States.

The gentlemen, to support their amendment, have observed that the power of recall, under the old government, has never been exercised. There is no reasoning from this. The experience of a few years, under peculiar circumstances, can afford no probable security that it never will be carried into execution with unhappy effects. A seat in Congress has been less an object of ambition, and the arts of intrigue, consequently, have been less practised. Indeed, it has been difficult to find men who were willing to suffer the mortifications to which so feeble a government and so dependent a station exposed them.

of public disapprobation in proportion to the number of those who partake of the censure. Our political rivals will ever consider our mutable counsels as evidence of deficient wisdom, and will be little apprehensive of our arriving at any exalted station in the scale of power. Such are the internal and external disadvantages which would result from the principle contended for. Were it admitted, I am fully persuaded, sir, that prejudices would govern the public deliberations, and passions rage in the counsels of the union. If it were necessary, I could illustrate my subject by historical facts; I could travel through an extensive field of detail, and demonstrate that wherever the fatal principle of-the head suffering the control of the members, has operated, it has proved a fruitful source of commotions and disorder.

This, sir, is the first fair opportunity that has been offered of deliberately correcting the errors in government. Instability has been a prominent and very defective feature in most republican systems. It is the first to be seen and the last to be lamented by a philosophical inquirer. It has operated most banefully in our infant republics. It is necessary that we apply an immediate remedy, and eradicate the poisonous principle from our government. If

this be not done, sir, we shall feel, and posterity | to banish stability from the system. The genwill be convulsed by a painful malady. tleman observes that there is a fallacy in my reasoning, and informs us that the legislatures

On the 25th, Mr. Hamilton continued his re- of the States, not the people, are to appoint the marks upon the same subject.

MR. CHAIRMAN: In debates of this kind it is extremely easy, on either side, to say a great number of plausible things. It is to be acknowledged that there is even a certain degree of truth in the reasonings on both sides. In this situation it is the province of judgment and good sense to determine their force and application, and how far the arguments advanced on one side are balanced by those on the other. The ingenious dress in which both may appear renders it a difficult task to make this decision, and the mind is frequently unable to come to a safe and solid conclusion. On the present question, some of the principles on each side are admitted, and the conclusions drawn from them denied, while other principles, with their inferences, are rejected altogether. It is the business of the committee to seek the truth in this labyrinth of argument.

senators. Does he reflect that they are the immediate agents of the people-that they are so constituted as to feel all their prejudices and passions, and to be governed, in a great degree, by their misapprehensions? Experience must have taught him the truth of this. Look through their history; what factions have arisen from the most trifling causes-what intrigues have been practised for the most illiberal purposes! Is not the State of Rhode Island at this moment struggling under difficulties and distresses, for having been led blindly by the spirit of the multitude? What is her legislature but the picture of a mob? In this State we have a senate possessed of the proper qualities of a permanent body; Virginia, Maryland, and a few other States are in the same situation; the rest are either governed by a single democratic assembly, or have a senate constituted entirely upon democratic principles. These have been, more or less, embroiled in factions, and have generally been the image and echo of the multitude. It is difficult to reason on this point without touching on certain delicate chords. I could refer you to periods and conjunctures when the people have been governed by improper passions and led by factious and designing men. I could show that the same passions have infected their representatives. Let us beware that we do not make the State legislatures a vehicle in which the evil humors may be conveyed into the national system. To prevent this, it is necessary that the Senate should be so formed as, in some measure, to check the State governments, and preclude the communication of the false impressions which they receive from the people. It has been often repeated, that the legislatures of the States can have only a partial and confined view of national affairs; that they can form no proper estimate of great objects which are not in the sphere of their interests. The observation of the gentleman, therefore, cannot take off the force of my argument.

There are two objects in forming systems of government-safety for the people and energy in the administration. When these objects are united, the certain tendency of the system will be to the public welfare. If the latter object be neglected, the people's security will be as certainly sacrificed as by disregarding the former. Good constitutions are formed upon a comparison of the liberty of the individual with the strength of government; if the tone of either be too high, the other will be weakened too much. It is the happiest possible mode of conciliating these objects, to institute one branch peculiarly endowed with sensibility, another with knowledge and firmness. Through the opposition and mutual control of these bodies, the government will reach, in its operations, the perfect balance between liberty and power. The arguments of the gentlemen chiefly apply to the former branch-the House of Representatives. If they will calmly consider the different nature of the two branches, they will see that the reasoning which justly applies to the Representative House will go to Sir, the senators will constantly be attended destroy the essential qualities of the Senate. with a reflection that their future existence is If the former is calculated perfectly upon the absolutely in the power of the States. Will principles of caution, why should you impose not this form a powerful check? It is a reflecthe same principles upon the latter, which is tion which applies closely to their feelings and designed for a different operation? Gentlemen, interests, and no candid man, who thinks dewhile they discover a laudable anxiety for the liberately, will deny that it would be alone a safety of the people, do not attend to the im- sufficient check. The legislatures are to proportant distinction I have drawn. We have it vide the mode of electing the President, and constantly held up to us, that as it is our chief must have a great influence over the electors. duty to guard against tyranny, it is our policy Indeed, they convey their influence through a to form all the branches of government for this thousand channels into the general government. purpose. Sir, it is a truth sufficiently illustrat- Gentlemen have endeavored to show that there ed by experience, that when the people act by will be no clashing of local and general intertheir representatives they are commonly irre-ests; they do not seem to have sufficiently consistible. The gentleman admits the position that stability is essential to the government, and yet enforces principles which, if true, ought

sidered the subject. We have in this State a duty of six pence per pound on salt, and it operates lightly and with advantage; but such

The

sistency in our admitting that the equal votes
in the Senate were given to secure the rights of
the States; and, at the same time, holding up
the idea that their interests should be sacrificed
to those of the Union. But the committee cer-
tainly perceive the distinction between the
rights of the State and its interests.
rights of a State are defined by the constitution,
and cannot be invaded without a violation of it;
but the interests of a State have no connection
with the constitution, and may be in a thou-
sand instances constitutionally sacrificed. An
uniform tax is perfectly constitutional, and yet
it may operate oppressively upon certain mem-
that the State governments will be abolished.
But, sir, their existence does not depend upon
the laws of the United States. Congress can
no more abolish the State governments than
they can dissolve the Union. The whole con-
stitution is repugnant to it, and yet the gentle-
men would introduce an additional useless pro-
vision against it. It is proper that the influence
of the States should prevail to a certain extent.
But shall the individual States be the judges
how far? Shall an unlimited power be left
them to determine in their own favor? The
gentlemen go into the extreme; instead of a
wise government, they would form a fantastical
Utopia. But, sir, while they give it a plausible,
popular shape, they would render it impracti-
cable. Much has been said about factions. As
far as my observation has extended, factions in
Congress have arisen from attachment to State
prejudices. We are attempting by this consti-
tution to abolish factions, and to unite all par-
ties for the general welfare. That a man
should have the power in private life of recall-
ing his agent is proper, because, in the business
in which he is engaged, he has no other object
but to gain the approbation of his principal.
Is this the case with the senator? Is he sim-
ply the agent of the State? No; he is an agent
for the Union, and he is bound to perform ser-
vices necessary to the good of the whole,
though his State should condemn them.

a duty would be very burdensome to some of the States. If Congress should, at any time, find it convenient to impose a salt tax, would it not be opposed by the eastern States? Being themselves incapable of feeling the necessity of the measure, they could only feel its apparent injustice. Would it be wise to give the New England States a power to defeat this measure, by recalling their senators who may be engaged for it? I beg the gentlemen once more to attend to the distinction between the real and apparent interests of the States. I admit that the aggregate of individuals constitutes the government; yet every State is not the government; every petty district is not the govern-bers of the Union. The gentlemen are afraid ment. Sir, in our State legislatures, a compromise is frequently necessary between the interests of counties; the same must happen in the general government between States. In this the few must yield to the many; or, in other words, the particular must be sacrificed to the general interest. If the members of Congress are too dependent on the State legislatures, they will be eternally forming secret combinations from local views. This is reasoning from the plainest principles. Their interest is interwoven with their dependence, and they will necessarily yield to the impression of their situation. Those who have been in Congress have seen these operations. The first question has been, How will such a measure affect my constituents, and consequently, how will the part I take affect my re-election? This consideration may be, in some degree, proper; but to be dependent from day to day, and to have the idea perpetually present, would be the source of innumerable evils. Six years, sir, is a period short enough for a proper degree of dependence. Let us consider the peculiar state of this body, and see under what impressions they will act. One third of them are to go out at the end of two years, two thirds in four years, and the whole in six years. When one year is elapsed there will be a number who are to hold their places for one year, others for three, and others for five years. Thus, there will not only be a constant and frequent change of members, but there will be some whose office is near the point of expiration, and who, from this circumstance, will have a lively sense of their dependence. The biennial change of members is an excellent invention for increasing the difficulty of combination. Any scheme of usurpation will lose, every two years, a number of its oldest advocates, and their places will be supplied by an equal number of new, unaccommodating, and virtuous men. When two principles are equally important, we ought, if possible, to reconcile them, and sacrifice neither. We think that safety and permanency in this government are completely reconcilable. The State governments will have, from the causes I have described, a sufficient influence over the Senate, without the check for which the gentlemen contend.

It has been remarked that there is an incon

Sir, in contending for a rotation, the gentlemen carry their zeal beyond all reasonable bounds. I am convinced that no government, founded on this feeble principle, can operate well. I believe also, that we shall be singular in this proposal. We have not felt the embarrassments resulting from rotation, that other States have; and we hardly know the strength of their objections to it. There is no probability that we shall ever persuade a majority of the States to agree to this amendment. The gentlemen deceive themselves. The amendment would defeat their own design. When a man knows he must quit his station, let his merit be what it may, he will turn his attention chiefly to his own emolument: nay, he will feel temptations, which few other situations furnish, to perpetuate his power by unconstitutional usurpations. Men will pursue their interests. It is as easy to change human

nature as to oppose the strong current of the selfish passions. A wise legislator will gently divert the channel, and direct it, if possible, to the public good.

As to corruption, sir, admitting in the President a disposition to corrupt, what are the instruments of bribery? It is said, he will have in his disposal a great number of offices. But It has been observed that it is not possible how many offices are there, for which a man there should be in a State only two men quali- | would relinquish the senatorial dignity? There fied for senators. But, sir, the question is not may be some in the judicial, and some in other whether there may be no more than two men, but principal departments. But there are few, whether, in certain emergencies, you could find whose respectability can in any measure baltwo equal to those whom the amendment would ance that of the office of senator. Men who discard. Important negotiations, or other bu-have been in the Senate once, and who have a siness to which they shall be most competent, may employ them at the moment of their removal. These things often happen. The difficulty of obtaining men capable of conducting the affairs of a nation in dangerous times, is much more serious than the gentlemen imagine.

reasonable hope of a re-election, will not be easily bought by offices. This reasoning shows that a rotation would be productive of many disadvantages-under particular circumstances it might be extremely inconvenient, if not fatal to the prosperity of our country.

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

Mr. Hamilton delivered the following speech, | State representatives. Its members are to hold on the twenty-seventh of June, 1788, in opposition to a proposed amendment of the constitution which was brought before the New York Convention, the object of which was, to materially abridge the power proposed to be conferred upon Congress, relative to imposing excise and laying direct taxes:

This is one of those subjects, Mr. Chairman, on which objections very naturally arise, and assume the most plausible shape. Its address is to the passions, and its first impressions create a prejudice, before cool examination has an opportunity for exertion. It is more easy for the human mind to calculate the evils, than the advantages of a measure; and vastly more natural to apprehend the danger than to see the necessity of giving powers to our rulers. Hence, I may justly expect that those who hear me, will place less confidence in those arguments which oppose, than in those which favor their prepossessions.

their office two years, and then return to their here they act by their immediate representaconstituents. Here, sir, the people govern: tives. You have also a Senate, constituted by your State legislatures-by men in whom you place the highest confidence, and forming another representative branch. Then, again, you have an executive magistrate, created by a form of election which merits universal admiration. In the form of this government, and in the mode of legislation, you find all the checks which the greatest politicians and the best writers have ever conceived. What more can reasonable men desire? Is there any one branch in which the whole legislative and executive powers are lodged? No. The legislative authority is lodged in three distinct branches, properly balanced: the executive authority is divided between two branches; and the judicial is still reserved for an independent body, who hold their offices during good behavior. This organization is so complex, so skilfully contrived, that it is next to impossible that an impolitic or wicked measure should pass the After all our doubts, our suspicions and spec- great scrutiny with success. Now, what do ulations, on the subject of government, we gentlemen mean by coming forward and demust return, at last, to this important truth- claiming against this government? Why do that when we have formed a constitution upon they say we ought to limit its powers, to disfree principles; when we have given a proper able it, and to destroy its capacity of blessing balance to the different branches of administra- the people? Has philosophy suggested--has tion, and fixed representation upon pure and experience taught, that such a government equal principles, we may, with safety, furnish ought not to be trusted with every thing necesit with all the powers necessary to answer, in sary for the good of society? Sir, when you the most ample manner, the purposes of gov- have divided and nicely balanced the departernment. The great desiderata are a free rep-ments of government; when you have strongly resentation, and mutual checks. When these connected the virtue of your rulers with their are obtained, all our apprehensions of the ex- interest; when, in short, you have rendered tent of powers are unjust and imaginary. What your system as perfect as human forms can be then is the structure of this constitution? One-you must place confidence; you must give branch of the legislature is to be elected by the power.

people by the same people who choose your We have heard a great deal of the sword and

the parse: it is said, our liberties are in danger, if both are possessed by Congress. Let us see what is the true meaning of this maxim, which has been so much used, and so little understood. It is, that you shall not place these powers in either the legislative or executive singly: neither one nor the other shall have both; because this would destroy that division of powers, on which political liberty is founded, and would furnish one body with all the means of tyranny. But, where the purse is lodged in one branch, and the sword in another, there can be no danger. All governments have possessed these powers: they would be monsters without them, and incapable of exertion. What is your State government? Does not your legislature command what money it pleases? Does not your executive execute the laws without restraint? These distinctions between the purse and the sword have no application to the system, but only to its separate branches. Sir, when we reason about the great interests of a great people, it is high time that we dismiss our prejudices and banish declamation.

complete in its structure; give a perfect proportion and balance to its parts; and the powers you give it will never affect your security. The question, then, of the division of powers between the general and State governments, is a question of convenience: it becomes a prudential inquiry, what powers are proper to be reserved to the latter; and this immediately involves another inquiry into the proper objects of the two governments. This is the criterion by which we shall determine the just distribution of powers.

The great leading objects of the federal government, in which revenue is concerned, are to maintain domestic peace, and provide for the common defence. In these are comprehended the regulation of commerce, that is, the whole system of foreign intercourse; the support of armies and navies, and of the civil administration. It is useless to go into detail. Every one knows that the objects of the general government are numerous, extensive and important. Every one must acknowledge the necessity of giving powers, in all respects, and in every degree, equal to these objects. This principle assented to, let us inquire what are the objects of the State governments. Have they to provide against foreign invasion? Have they to maintain fleets and armies? Have they any concern in the regulation of commerce, the No. Their objects are merely civil and domestic; to support the legislative establishment, and to provide for the administration of the laws. Let any one compare the expense of supporting the civil list in a State, with the expense of providing for the defence of the Union. The difference is almost beyond calculation. The experience of Great Britain will throw some light on this subject. In that kingdom, the ordinary expenses of peace to those of war are as one to fourteen: but there they have a monarch, with his splendid court, and an enormous civil establishment, with which we have nothing in this country to compare. If, in Great Britain, the expenses of war and peace are so disproportioned, how wide will be their disparity in the United States; how infinitely wider between the general government and each individual State! Now, sir, where ought the great resources to be lodged? Every rational man will give an immediate answer. To what extent shall these resources be possessed? Reason says, as far as possible exigencies can require; that is, without limitation. A constitution cannot set bounds to a nation's wants; it ought not, therefore, to set bounds to its resources. Unexpected invasions, long and ruinous wars, may demand all the possible abilities of the country. Shall not your government have power to call these abilities into action? The contingencies of society are not reducible to calculations. They cannot be fixed or bounded, even in imagination. Will you limit the means of your defence, when you cannot ascertain the force or extent of the in

In order to induce us to consider the powers given by this constitution as dangerous-in order to render plausible an attempt to take away the life and spirit of the most important power in government, the gentleman complains that we shall not have a true and safe representation. I asked him what a safe representa-procuring alliances, or forming treaties of peace? tion was, and he has given no satisfactory answer. The assembly of New York has been mentioned as a proper standard; but, if we apply this standard to the general government, our Congress will become a mere mob, exposed to every irregular impulse, and subject to every breeze of faction. Can such a system afford security? Can you have confidence in such a body? The idea of taking the ratio of representation, in a small society, for the ratio of a great one, is a fallacy which ought to be exposed. It is impossible to ascertain to what point our representation will increase: it may vary from one, to two, three, or four hundred; it depends upon the progress of population. Suppose it to rest at two hundred; is not this number sufficient to secure it against corruption? Human nature must be a much more weak and despicable thing than I apprehend it to be, if two hundred of our fellow-citizens can be corrupted in two years. But, suppose they are corrupted; can they, in two years, accomplish their designs? Can they form a combination, and even lay a foundation for a system of tyranny, in so short a period? It is far from my intention to wound the feelings of any gentleman; but I must, in this most interesting discussion, speak of things as they are, and hold up opinions in the light in which they ought to appear: and I maintain, that all that has been said of corruption, of the purse and the sword, and of the danger of giving powers, is not supported by principle or fact: that it is mere verbiage and idle declamation. The true principle of government is this: make the system