vice of the co-ordinate branch of the treaty-making power, and disposed of that question by abandoning 54° 40′ and accepting 49°. Upon the annexation of Texas, Mr. Douglas took ground in favor of extending and renewing the line of 36° 30′ as a settlement of the Slavery question. He succeeded. In the fierce controversies on the Oregon Territorial Bill he renewed time and again the proposition to extend the Missouri Compromise line of 36° 30' to the Pacific; his efforts proved unavailing, and that bill passed. In 1850 he had supported and defended the Fugitive Slave Law and the compromise acts of that year -defended them in the presence of an armed and hostile meeting at Chicago, and succeeded. In 1854 he had carried through successfully the Kansas-Nebraska Act, and, through violence and denunciation at home and throughout the North, had maintained with unfaltering nerve the rectitude of his conduct. In 1856 he had canvassed Illinois from one end to the other, urging the election of Mr. Buchanan upon the ground that the Democratic party and its candidates were pledged in the most solemn manner to secure to the people of the Territories the right of having slavery or not, as they of their own free action might determine. In answer to the cry that came up from every Republican orator-and in Illinois the leading men of that party from all parts of the country were on the stumpthat the government of Kansas, her officers, and Legislature, were in the hands of the "Border Ruffians," his answer was, that no matter who were placed over the people temporarily, no Constitution could be adopted nor state government erected that was not called into being by the votes of the people in ratifying that Constitution. That the ultimate power of adopting a Constitution was in the hands of the people, and could not be taken from them, was the universal answer made to the charge that under the Nebraska Act Kansas would be made a slave state in defiance of the wishes of the people. On that defense, and on that pledge made every where throughout the campaign, Illinois preserved her ancient credit, and gave her electoral vote to Mr. Buchanan.

After the inauguration of Mr. Buchanan it was deemed advisable to select as governor of Kansas some person of ability, who had also discretion to regulate that ability, and personal character entitling him to the respect of men of all parties, not only in the country generally, but particularly in Kansas.

Such a man was Robert J. Walker. When tendered the office he peremptorily declined it. It was a position in which there was little credit to be gained, and a vast amount of responsibility and vexation. Those who had previously gone there had failed, and failed most miserably; indeed, much of the trouble that had existed might have been traced to the incompetency, personal unfitness, or corruption of those who had been selected as governors. Mr. Douglas was particularly anxious for the appointment of Mr. Walker, and took an active part in inducing him to consent to go to Kansas as governor. After long and serious consideration, Mr. Walker accepted the office; in so doing, he placed a condition on file that he was to be governor with the assurance that he was to tell the people of Kansas that they should have the privilege of voting directly for or against any Constitution that might be prepared for them. He proceeded to Kansas, and in his speeches he repeated this pledge, and in so doing stated that he made it with the knowledge and approval of the President and his cabinet; and that, unless the Constitution was submitted to the people for ratification or rejection, he should endeavor to defeat it before Congress.

Mr. Douglas, in Illinois, by speeches delivered at various parts of the state, referred to Governor Walker's course as a proof that the pledges he had made during the previous year, that Mr. Buchanan would faithfully carry out the spirit of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, were about to be redeemed to their

letter.

When the convention met in Kansas, and while it was in session, it became obvious that a large portion of the people, led on by fanatical and turbulent spirits, would not participate in forming a state government. While this was to be regretted, yet no person in Illinois believed that the convention would attempt to adopt a Constitution without providing for its submission to the people. Mr. Calhoun himself was solemnly pledged, in writing, to submit the Constitution to the people. Mr. Douglas had justified the course of Governor Walker and the administration. When Congress met, in December, 1857, the President's Message indicated that, as a matter of peace, the administration would, in the event of the Lecompton Constitution being presented, urge the admission of Kansas under that Constitution.

The President's Message was communicated on the 8th of December; after it was read, Mr. Douglas stated that he would take an early opportunity to express his views upon the subject of Kansas, in which he was constrained to say he differed with the President to some extent. On the next day he addressed the Senate in the speech of which some extracts are given as follows:

Mr. President,-When yesterday the President's Message was read at the clerk's desk, I heard it but imperfectly, and I was of the impression that the President of the United States had approved and endorsed the action of the Lecompton Convention in Kansas. Under that impression, I felt it my duty to state that, while I concurred in the general views of the message, yet, so far as it approved or endorsed the action of that convention, I entirely dissented from it, and would avail myself of an early opportunity to state my reasons for my dissent. Upon a more careful and critical examination of the message, I am rejoiced to find that the President of the United States has not recommended that Congress shall pass a law to receive Kansas into the Union under the Constitution formed at Lecompton. It is true that the tone of the message indicates a willingness on the part of the President to sign a bill, if we shall see proper to pass one, receiving Kansas into the Union under that Constitution. But, sir, it is a fact of great significance, and worthy of consideration, that the President has refrained from any endorsement of the convention, and from any recommendation as to the course Congress should pursue with regard to the Constitution there formed.

The message of the President has made an argument-an unanswerable argument, in my opinion-against that Constitution, which shows clearly, whether intended to arrive at the result or not, that, consistently with his views and his principles, he can not accept that Constitution. He has expressed his deep mortification and disappointment that the Constitution itself has not been submitted to the people of Kansas for their acceptance or rejection. He informs us that he has unqualifiedly expressed his opinions on that subject in his instructions to Governor Walker, assuming, as a matter of course, that the Constitution was to be submitted to the people before it could have any vitality or validity. He goes further, and tells us that the example set by Congress in the Minnesota case, by inserting a clause in the enabling act requiring the Constitution to be submitted to the people, ought to become a uniform rule, not to be departed from hereafter in any case. On these various propositions I agree entirely with the President of the United States, and I am prepared now to sustain that uniform rule which he asks us to pursue in all other cases, by taking the Minnesota provision as our example.

I rejoice, on a careful perusal of the message, to find so much less to dissent from than I was under the impression there was, from the hasty reading and imperfect hearing of the message in the first instance. In effect, he refers that document to the Congress of the United States-as the Constitution of the United States refers it-for us to decide upon it under our responsibility. It is proper that he should have thus referred it to us as a matter for Congressional action, and not as an administration or executive measure, for the reason that the Constitution of the United States says that "Congress may admit new states into the Union." Hence we find the Kansas question before us now, not as an administration measure, not as an executive measure, but as a measure coming before us for our free action, without any recommendation or interference, directly or indirectly, by the administration now in possession of the federal government. Sir, I propose to examine this ques

tion calmly and fairly, to see whether or not we can properly receive Kansas into the Union with the Constitution formed at Lecompton.

The President, after expressing his regret, and mortification, and disappointment that the Constitution had not been submitted to the people in pursuance of his instructions to Governor Walker, and in pursuance of Governor Walker's assurances to the people, says, however, that by the Kansas-Nebraska Act the Slavery question only was required to be referred to the people, and the remainder of the Constitution was not thus required to be submitted. He acknowledges that, as a general rule, on general principles, the whole Constitution should be submitted; but, according to his understanding of the organic act of Kansas, there was an imperative obligation to submit the Slavery question for their approval or disapproval, but no obligation to submit the entire Constitution. In other words, he regards the organic act, the Nebraska Bill, as having made an exception of the Slavery clause, and provided for the disposition of that question in a mode different from that in which other domestic or local, as contradistinguished from federal questions, should be decided. Sir, permit me to say, with profound respect for the President of the United States, that I conceive that on this point he has committed a fundamental error-an error which lies at the foundation of his whole argument on this matter. I can well understand how that distinguished statesman came to fall into this error. He was not in the country at the time the Nebraska Bill was passed; he was not a party to the controversy and the discussion that took place during its passage. He was then representing the honor and the dignity of the country with great wisdom and distinction at a foreign court. Thus deeply engrossed, his whole energies were absorbed in conducting great diplomatic questions, that diverted his attention from the mere Territorial questions and discussions then going on in the Senate and the House of Representatives, and before the people at home. Under these circumstances, he may well have fallen into an error, radical and fundamental as it is, in regard to the object of the Nebraska Bill and the principle asserted in it.

Now, sir, what was the principle enunciated by the authors and supporters of that bill when it was brought forward? Did we not come before the country and say that we repealed the Missouri restriction for the purpose of substituting and carrying out as a general rule the great principle of self-government, which left the people of each state and each Territory free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States? In support of that proposition, it was argued here, and I have argued it wherever I have spoken in various states of the Union, at home and abroad, every where I have endeavored to prove that there was no reason why an exception should be made in regard to the Slavery question. I have appealed to the people, if we did not all agree, men of all parties, that all other local and domestic questions should be submitted to the people. I said to them, "We agree that the people shall decide for themselves what kind of a judiciary system they will have; we agree that the people shall decide what kind of a school system they will establish; we agree that the people shall determine for themselves what kind of a banking system they will have, or whether they will have any banks at all; we agree that the people may decide for themselves what shall be the elective franchise in their respective states; they shall decide for themselves what shall be the rule of taxation and the principles upon which their finance shall be regulated; we agree that they may decide for themselves the relations between husband and wife, parent and child, guardian and ward; and why should we not then allow them to decide for themselves the relations between master and servant? Why make an exception of the Slavery question, by taking it out of that great rule of self-government which applies to all the

other relations of life?" The very first proposition in the Nebraska Bill was to show that the Missouri restriction, prohibiting the people from deciding the Slavery question for themselves, constituted an exception to a general rule, in violation of the principle of self-government; and hence that that exception should be repealed, and the Slavery question, like all other questions, submitted to the people, to be decided for themselves.

Sir, that was the principle on which the Nebraska Bill was defended by its friends. Instead of making the Slavery question an exception, it removed an odious exception which before existed. Its whole object was to abolish that odious exception, and make the rule general, universal in its application to all matters which were local and domestic, and not national or federal. For this reason was the language employed which the President has quoted; that the eighth section of the Missouri Act, commonly called the Missouri Compromise, was repealed, because it was repugnant to the principle of nonintervention, established by the compromise measures of 1850, "it being the true intent and meaning of this act, not to legislate slavery into any Territory or state, nor to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States." We repealed the Missouri restriction because that was confined to slavery. That was the only exception there was to the general principle of self-government. That exception was taken away for the avowed and express purpose of making the rule of self-government general and universal, so that the people should form and regulate all their domestic institutions in their own way.

Sir, what would this boasted principle of popular sovereignty have been worth if it applied only to the negro, and did not extend to the white man? Do you think we could have aroused the sympathies and the patriotism of this broad republic, and have carried the presidential election last year, in the face of a tremendous opposition, on the principle of extending the right of self-government to the Negro question, but denying it as to all the relations affecting white men? No, sir. We aroused the patriotism of the country, and carried the election in defense of that great principle which allowed all white men to form and regulate their domestic institutions to suit themselves-institutions applicable to white men as well as to black men-institutions applicable to freemen as well as to slaves-institutions concerning all the relations of life, and not the mere paltry exception of the Slavery question. Sir, I have spent too much strength and breath, and health too, to establish this great principle in the popular heart, now to see it frittered away by bringing it down to an exception that applies to the negro, and does not extend to the benefit of the white man. As I said before, I can well imagine how the distinguished and eminent patriot and statesman now at the head of the government fell into the error-for error it is, radical, fundamental— and, if persevered in, subversive of that platform upon which he was elevated to the presidency of the United States.

Then, if the President be right in saying that by the Nebraska Bill the Slavery question must be submitted to the people, it follows inevitably that every other clause of the Constitution must also be submitted to the people. The Nebraska Bill said that the people should be left "perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way"-not the Slavery question, not the Maine Liquor Law question, not the Banking question, not the School question, not the Railroad question, but "their domestic institutions," meaning each and all the questions which are local, not nationalstate, not federal. I arrive at the conclusion that the principles enunciated so boldly and enforced with so much ability by the President of the United States, require us, out of respect to him and the platform on which he was elec d, to send this whole question back to the people of Kansas, and enable