have enriched his understanding by a knowlege of the world, and the theory of moral duties; he might be a compleat master of the theory of human life, and yet discover himself to be very weak in his actions. Men judge of things from their understanding; but they act from their paffions: and hence it is that many blockheads pass through life, without betraying any want of sense by their actions, while men of genius frequently betray, as much stupidity and folly by their conduct, as they display ingenuity and sagacity in their writings*. This confideration alone ought to convince modern preceptors how much they are in the wrong, in their endeavours to instill theories of morals, when they should enforce habits of action; and in striving to enforce habits of thought when they should cultivate the faculty of thinking. A man's conduct is of much more importance to society, than his mode of thinking; and it is notorious that, habit almost entirely subdues those passions, which are deaf to the loudest voice of reason,

With regard to the superior advantages which man is supposed to enjoy in his folitary or savage state, our Author very justly observes they are altogether chimerical.

It is scarcely possible (says he) to educate men more for themselves, and less for others, than are the Indians in the province of Quito, according to the description given of them by Don George Juan and Don Antonio de Ulloa, in their excellent relation. These are men in a state of nature, they live only for themselves, and are subjected only to natural wants.

They have so little ambition, that an Indian will receive, with the fame indifference, the office of alcaid, or that of a hangman. Interest has no sway over them, for they will frequently refuse to do the most trifling service for the greatest re, ward.

• The Indian, feated by his little fire-side, undisturbed, sees, his wife at work. The traveller, who has lost his way, will never be able to perfuade him to quit that posture, in order to conduct him one step. The only thing they never refuse is, to, divert themselves, but then they must have plenty of liquor. When they are drunk, they lie all together without distinction, men and women, giving themselves little concern whether they are by the side of another man's wife, or their own fifter or daughter; on these occafions every duty is forgot.

Would not one imagine that these were the men in a state of nature, mentioned in his treatise on the Inequality of Conditions? Yet these men, who have not been spoiled by civil.

• Several recent instances, indeed, might be given of men, of whom it might be justly faid, in the words of the fatirist, that they never said a foolish thing, nor ever did a wife one

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education,

education, these men formed by the hand of nature alone, by the gradual opening of their mental faculties, according to the account of our learned Spaniards, just mentioned, possess no fuperior advantages considering them merely as men. "If we look upon them, say they, as men, the extent of their understanding seems to fall short of the excellence of the foul, and their weakness is so apparent, that, in certain cases, we can scarcely have any other idea of them, than we have of the beafts

of the field."

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This depraved state of the inhabitants will probably be attributed to the badriefs of the climate, and I have not the leaft doubt, but that it may, in part, be ascribed to this cause.

It is equally unreasonable to ascribe the whole as nothing to the climate. It is only of late we have fallen into these two extremes, and the dispute is in no other respect novel, mankind being never at a loss how to judge in such matters. However, let the influence of the climate on the dispositions of the Indians of Peru be as great as it may, it will always afford a proof of the power a civil education has to correct it.

The above mentioned authors have observed, that the children of the Indians of this same province of Quito, when they are brought up in the towns, become as reasonable as other men, and appear of a nature quite different from the rest of the nation.

On the other hand, they have also remarked, that in the various and vast provinces through which they passed, the uncivilized Indians differed no ways one from the others; that those of Quito were not more ignorant and stupid than those of the Vallies, or of Lima, nor these last more intelligent than those of Chili or Arauca. Yet what a difference of climate is there amongst all these people? It is, therefore, very evident, that the want of a civil education has an equal influence on entire nations which inhabit very different climates, and that in the same-climate education has the power of civilizing those who enjoy the advantages of it, though the nation they spring from should be totally barbarous.'

We shall not trouble our Readers with any of the commonplace and hackney'd arguments, with which father Gerdil combats the minuter novelties of Mr. Rousseau's system. But we cannot pass over his remonstranice against the progress of philosophy. Roufleau had objected against public inftitutions for the purposes of education, as being of no use. These, says our Author, are diftinguished into three several departments, namely," that of letters to form the mind *, that of philosophy to forin

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**The Author should have faid the rhetorician; for how is mind distinguished from citizen and Christian? Have not each of these minds?

the

he citizen, and that of religion to form the Christian. He objects, however, to the second; and is inclined to think, that if we pretend to form citizens by philosophy alone, we shall find ourselves deceived. No. Like a true Barnabite, he will have nothing to be done without religion. His reasons are these :

* First, because philosophy is above the capacity of the mul titude. Talk philosophy to farmers and artizans, and you speak to them in an unknown language. People of business have their time too much taken up to attend wholly to philosophy, yet in these does the bulk of citizens consist. It is, therefore, neceffary to have fome other principle, besides philosophy, to form the greatest part of the citizens, and as this principle should be universal, it ought of course to form all the citizens.

Secondly, because philosophy is easily depraved in those who only skim the surface of it. This is an observation of the Lord Chancellor Bacon; found philosophy is, therefore, limited to a small number. If it is ever of use to a state, it is more likely to prove so by the good which three or four great philosophers may be able to do, than by that visible and fuperficial diffufion of philosophy, which every day gains ground, and spreads itself through every order of society.

* Of what use is it to a state, to have twenty thousand idle citizens with a superficial knowlege in astronomy? The knowlege of these people will never serve either to regulate the calendar, or to perfect the theories which may be of use to fociety. The state derives advantage from the labours of a certain number of true astronomers, the rest is all pure loss. Yet there is this difference between astronomy and philosophy; namely, that a superficial knowlege in astronomy is of no injury to him who has it; but, on the contrary, ferves to embellish his mind, and give him a taste for good things, whereas, if philofophy does no good, it scarcely ever fails doing harm.'

:

Never, furely, was there any thing more absurd than the above pofitions. We know not what idea this Writer has of philosophy, or of the capacities and leisure of men of business;: but this we know, that fome of the greatest philosophers in Europe are men of the greatest business in it. We know also that business is so far from incapacitating the minds of men, that it renders them acute and discerning; while indolence too frequently leads to inattention, and sloth to stupidity. It must be owned, indeed, that, in the time of Lord Bacon, a proficiency in philosophy was not so easily attained as it is at present: but we have seen many veils of ignorance removed since his time, and God forbid it should be in the power of any Barnabite to perfuade us to spread them again, and to fit down contented in darkness. He says, three or four great philosophers may be of use to a state, but a great number of finatterers cannot. Pray, good

good Father Gerdil, who are the state? To be of use to the ftate, properly speaking, is to be useful to the individuals compofing that state. And is not every thing that contributes to the rational gratification of those individuals, of use to the state? Do they live only for the fake of their governors? Do they exist merely to eat, drink, and pay taxes for the support of the administration? Is nothing of use to a state, but what serves to aggrandize magiftrates and princes? to support them in their splendour and luxury, and to feed the fatness of a parcel of stall-fed priests, to tyrannize over the souls, as the former do over the bodies of their subjects? Is there any thing, on this fide heaven, equal to the gratification of knowing and contemplating the wisdom of God in the wonderful works of the, creation? And is this pleasure to be denied to all but a few philofophers and priests, who would become the tools of tyranny to keep the people in ignorance, and set them on a level with the brutes? May not an honest plain man be astronomer enough to enjoy this fatisfaction, this fupreme delight, without being capable of making almanacks and calculating eclipses? But the diffusion of knowlege is diametrically oppofite to the interefts of popery. The grand object of the church of Rome is to keep the laity in darkness. But what business have we to be troubled with encomiums on the utility of ignorance? or, indeed, what need have we for the assistance of popish writers, to. defend us against reputed infidels? Did the officious Tranflator* of these reflections conceive an incapacity in the writers of our own religion and country, to combat openly so doughty a champion as Rouffeau, or to produce an antidote against any latent poison that might be couched in his writings?

But after all, it does not appear that this learned Barnabite knows what philofophy is. Philosophy (fays he) is only an assemblage of different systems, the work of different brains, which perpetually contradict each other, either in their principles or their consequences. In fact, there is nothing in which philofophers agree, but in the mere term philosophy; in other respects, there are as many systems as there are heads.

• Hobbes confounds right with strength, an idea shocking in the opinion of Mr. de Montesquieu, and strongly opposed by Mr. Rousseau. Some derive the origin of politic right from pa

* We cannot help, in this place expressing our with, that English booksellers and translators would be more confcientious, and more scrupulous of disseminating, as they do, in this country, the principles of foreign popish writers, by tranflations of their works; for certainly this is a point that deferves the attention of every true friend to the freedom of the human mind, every fincere well-wisher to the protestant re. ligion.

ternal authority; others, from express, or tacit conventions. Mr. Rousseau requires, besides, that the fuffrages should be unanimous. The author of the "Effay on the Understanding" acknowledges no probity that has relation to all mankind, no moral intrinfic difference betwixt virtue and vice.

• Mr. de Montesquieu establishes this difference on instances of justice and equity anterior to all positive law. On the other hand, Mr. de Montesquieu pretends that virtue is not necessary in monarchies: Mr. de Voltaire facetioufly says, in some part of his works, that it would be too great a misfortune to the world, if he should happen to be right in this opinion; and Mr. Rousseau openly condemns it. However, Mr. de Montefquieu admits, that virtue is necessary to republics; on the contrary, the " Author of the Enquiries into the Oriental Despotifm" says, that virtue has been injurious to certain ancient republics. Mr. de Montesquieu attributes much to the climate; Mr. Helvetius will have nothing attributed to it. Bayle pretends, that society might subsist without religion; and after having abused all religions, he dishonours the Christian by presuming to affert, that true Christians are not capable of forming a state which could subsist: this paradox is refuted by Mr. de Montesquieu.

The author of the "Code of Nature" ventures to fay, that no one has hitherto understood the true principles of legiflation or morality, and establishes the community of property as the basis both of the one and the other.

Many are of opinion, that the life which children receive from their father and mother does not require any return of duty. Mr. Rousseau would not have obedience exist amongst men. One excuses suicide, another apologizes for duelling; a third represents luxury as the fource of prosperity in a state; a fourth thinks this is derived from the restraint which men are under in great monarchies. Mr. D'Alembert seems absolutely to condemn it. Some think even vices necessary to a state, and that they cause it to flourish. One exclaims against the indissolubility of the marriage knot, others, again, justify the temporary union of free parties.'

Is not this a mighty pretty picture of philofophy? Our Readers, however, will not forget that the painter is a popish priest. For our own part, we have heard of systems of philosophy, but never before heard that philofophy was a system, much less an incon fiftent farrago of different and difcordant opinions. Philofophy is the love of truth, attended with a disinterested zeal for invef tigating it, a determined resolution to embrace it wherever found, and a fincere and liberal defire for its universal propaga tion. A philofopher is not like a sectary. It is by no means neceffary that all philosophers should be of the same opinion:

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they