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ly by willing it, we can move the parts of our bo dies which were before at rest.

We find in our felves a Power to begin or for bear, continue or end feveral actions of our minds, and motions of our bodies, barely by a thought or preference of the mind. This power which the mind has thus to order the confideration of any idea, or the forbearing to consider it; or to prefer the Motion of any part of the Body to its Rest, and vice versa in any particular instance, is that we call the Will. The actual exercife of that power, is that which we call Volition or Willing:

The forbearance or performance of that Action, confequent to fuch order or command of the mind, is called Voluntary: and whatsoever Action is per formed without fuch a thought of the mind, is called Involuntary.

The Power of Perception is that we call the Understanding. Perception, which we make the Act of the Understanding, is of three forts. First, The Perception of ideas in our minds. Secondly, The Perception of the Signification of Signs. Thirdly, The Perception of the Agreement or Difagreement of any diftin&t ideas. Thefe powers of the mind, viz. of perceiving and preferring are usually called by another name; and the ordinary way of fpeaking is that the Understanding and Will are two faculties of the mind. A word proper enough, if it be used fo as not to breed any confusion in

mens thoughts, by being supposed, (as I suspect it has been) to stand for foine real Beings in the Soul that performs thofe actions of Understanding

and Volition.

From the confideration of the Extent of the power of the mind, over the actions of the man, which every one finds in himself, arise the ideas of Liberty and Necessity: so far as a man has a power to think or not to think; to move or not to move according to the preference or direction of his own mind, so far is a man free. Where-ever any performance or forbearance are not equally in a man's power; where-ever doing or not doing will not equally follow upon the preference of his mind, there he is not free, tho' perhaps the action may be voluntary. So that the idea of Liberty is the idea of a power in any agent, to do or forbear any action according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other; where either of them is not in the power of the agent to be produc'd by him, according to his volition, there he is not at liberty: that agent is under Neceffity. So that Liberty cannot be where there is no Thought, no Volition, no Will: but there may be Thought, there may be Will, there may be Volition where there is no Liberty. Thus a Tennis-ball, whether in motion by the stroke of a racket, or lying still at rest, is not by any one taken to be a fice Agent; because we conceive not

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a Tennis-ball to think, and confequently not to have Volition or Preference of Motion to Reft, or vice verfa. So a man ftriking himself or his friend by a convulfive motion of his arm, which it is not in his power by Volition or the direction of his mind, to stop or forbear; no body thinks he has in this Liberty, every one pities him as acting by Neceffity and Conftraint. Again, suppose a man be carried whilst fast asleep into a room where is a perfon he longs to fee, and be there lock'd fast in beyond his power to get out; he awakes, and is glad to fee him felf in fo defirable company, which he stays willingly in; that is, prefers his staying to going away. Is not this ftay voluntary? I think no body will doubt it, and yet being lock'd fast in, he is not at liberty to stay, he has not freedom to be gone. So that Liberty is not an idea belonging to Volition or Preferring; but to the perfon having the power of doing or forbearing to do, according as the mind fhall chufe or direct.

As it is in the motions of the body, so it is în the thoughts of our minds: where any one is fuch that we have power to take it up, or lay it by according to the Preference of the mind, there we are at liberty. A waking man is not at liberty to think or not to think, no more than he is at liberty whether his body fhall touch any other or no: but whether he will remove his contemplation from one idea to another, is many times in his

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choice. And then he is in refpect of his ideas, as much at liberty as he is in refpect of bodies he refts on. He can at pleasure remove himself from one to another but yet fome ideas to the mind, like fome motions to the body are fuch, as in certain circumftances it cannot avoid nor obtain their absence by the utmost effort it can use. Thus a man on the rack is not at liberty to lay by the idea of Pain, and entertain other contemplations.

Where-ever Thought is wholly wanting, or the power to act or forbear, according to the direction of Thought, there Neceffity takes place. This in an agent capable of Volition, when the beginning or continuation of any action is contrary to the preference of his mind, is call'd Compulfion; when the hindring or ftopping any action is contrary to his Volition, it is called Restraint. Agents that have no Thought, no Volition at all, are in every thing neceffary agents.

And thus I have in a fhort draught given a view of our original ideas, from whence all the reft are deriv'd, and of which they are made up. And which may be all reduc'd to these few primary and original ones, viz. Extenfion, Solidity, and Mobility which by our fenfes we receive from body: Thinking and the power of moving, which by reflection we receive from our minds. Existence, Duration, Number, which belong both to the one and to the other. By thefe I imagine might be

explain'd the nature of Colours, Sounds, Taftes, Smells, and all other ideas we have; if we had but faculties acute enough to perceive the several modify'd extenfions and motions of these minute bodies which produce those several sensations in us.

CHA P. XXII.

Of Mixed Modes.

M Ixed Modes are combinations of fimple ideas

of different kinds, (whereby they are diftinguifh'd from fimple modes, which consist only of fimple ideas of the fame kind, put together by the mind) as Virtue, Vice, a Lie, &c. The mind being once furnish❜d with fimple ideas, can put them together in feveral compofitions, without examining whether they exist so together in nature. And hence I think it is, that these ideas are called Notions, as if they had their original and constant exiftence more in the thoughts of men than in the reality of things: and to form fuch ideas it fufficed that the mind put the parts of them together, and that they were confiftent in the understanding, without confidering whether they had any real be-ing. There are three ways whereby we get these complex ideas of mixed Modes.

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Firft, By experience and obfervation of things.

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