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Amendment of the Constitution.

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sary to the execution of the enumerated pow- | affirms, that history furnishes no instance of a ers of the General Government, are exceptions to the rule, and a confirmation of it.

The extension of the powers of the General Government, to any subject evidently within the cognizance of the States, removes one barrier against the inroads of that Government upon the sovereignty and independence of the States.

An ambition for national aggrandizement is not easily confined to prescribed limits, nor is it apt to be checked by constitutional scruples. How has it happened that a constitution framed for the territory ceded to the United States, by the treaty of 1783, has been extended to the American Archipelago, on the one hand, and to the Pacific Ocean on the other? Might it not, on the same principles, be extended to embrace the Island of Owyhee, on the one side, and St. Domingo on the other?

Sir, the intention of the framers of the constitution is further evinced by the distribution of its power among the different branches of the Executive and Legislative departments.

The President is elected for four years; is commander-in-chief of the army and navy; has the exclusive power of nominating public officers but the concurrence of the Senate is necessary to their appointment; he has the power of negotiating treaties-but the consent of two-thirds of the Senators present is necessary to their ratification; and he has a qualified negative in legislation.

relinquishment of power by an organized body of men, unless it was imposed on them by a foreign hand. A disposition to monopolize a control of this power would embarrass our negotiations; would destroy the responsibility of the Executive; would depive the country of the benefits of his wisdom and experience, and would strip the department of its most important feature.

The principal security we have for the faithful exercise of the vast powers vested in the Senate, is the personal character of its members: the body may be considered as permanent; the members share the patronage of Government, as well as contribute to confer it; they are not liable to impeachment, and their responsibility is weakened by the changeable character of the State Legislatures. They are the sole guardians of their own purity; and the only reliance of the nation against the corruption of the body, is upon the moral sense, and the sense of honor, of the individual members, and upon the disposition which their selfrespect will dictate to preserve the body from contamination, by the power of expulsion.

Constituted as the Senate now is, it is to be wished that no man should be advanced to the honor of a seat in that august assembly who is not as pure as was Aristides, as wise as Solon, and as patrotic as Regulus.

Exceptionable as the constitution of the Senate is in theory, a different organization might be The House of Representatives is elected for liable to greater practical evils. If the sole two years; has the exclusive right of originat-power over our foreign relations was vested in ing impeachments; has the exclusive power of originating revenue laws, subject to the power of the Senate to amend them as in other cases, and a co-equal power with the Senate in ordinary legislation; and has the power of electing the President in case no choice is made by the Electors, when the members vote by States, each State having one vote.

The Senate is elected for six years; has the exclusive power of trying impeachments, except in case of the impeachment of the President, when the Chief Justice is associated with them; has co-equal power with the House of Representatives in legislation, except in the origination of revenue bills; has a concurrent power with the President in the appointment of public officers; and the consent of two-thirds of the members present is necessary to the validity of a treaty.

the Executive, the shortness of his term of office, and the frequent changes of the incumbents, might lead to a changeable policy, or to a more exceptionable course of temporizing expedients.

Why was the Senate made the depository of so large a portion of the powers delegated to the General Government? Why was it put in the power of that body to control the operations of both the Executive and Legislative departments of the Government? It was, doubtless, because the members of the Senate represented the States; were chosen by them, and were responsible to them, and would be bound by this tie to defend the sovereignty and independence of the States against any plan of policy that would impair them, or, in case they should fail in their efforts to do this, would be bound to apprise the States they repreThe permanency of the Senate, and the vari-sented, of the danger with which they were ous powers, Executive, Legislative, and Judicial, vested in that body, renders it the pre- I shall now notice a few of the reasons eminent power of the constitution. The union assigned for taking the ultimate or contingent of the Senate with the Executive, in the treaty-election from the House of Representatives, making power, is calculated to give that body which have not been as fully answered as an important influence, if not the principal others. control, over our foreign relations. It is the property of every permanent body to carry its powers to their utmost extent.

Doctor Robertson, in his observations on the Reformation, in his history of Charles V.

threatened.

It is said that the election by the House of Representatives, violates the maxim which inhibits the division of power between the Executive and Legislative departments.

The election involves no exercise of Execu

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Amendment of the Constitution.

[MARCH, 1826. tive or Legislative power: it is a constituent | tion more responsible, or better informed, than act, by the delegations of the several States, the House of Representatives.

in their Federal capacities, constituting a Presi- Mr. Chairman, something has been said, in dent. It is an act in which no other depart-the course of this debate, respecting the danger ment has any participation; when the choice is made, the power ceases. The objection, therefore, does not apply to a case like this.

It is also alleged that those who vote for the successful candidate will become the partisans of his administration. In answer to this it may be observed, that the majority are under no stronger moral or political obligations to support the administration of an Executive, elected according to the forms of the constitution, than the minority. Every citizen is bound, by his allegiance, to support the constitutional measures of the Government, while they continue in force.

Sir, intimations have been suggested in this debate, favoring an opposition of the minority to constitutional authority, which I consider hostile to the very being of the Republican system.

to which our liberty is exposed, and respecting the means of preserving it. It has been the purpose of my argument to show, that the adoption of the resolutions before the committee would endanger our liberty, and that the preservation of the power, secured to the States in their political capacities by the constitution, over the election of the President and Senate, and the restriction of the operations of the General Government to its constitutional limits, are essential means of preserving it.

I will, in conclusion, make a few more particular observations respecting the principles that constitute the foundation of free States, with as much brevity and simplicity as possible, with some historical illustrations.

Civil liberty depends on the organization of society, the moral character of the people, and a free constitution. An equality of rank and The constant calumny of the motives of pub- property among the people, intelligence and lic men, not only lessens the veneration for virtue to qualify them for submission to the will them in the minds of the people, but, by the of the majority, and a constitution embracing principle of association, lessens their general es- the principles of liberty, are essential to a welltimate of character, lessens their own self-re-ordered Republic; and it will be weakened or spect, and thus removes one of the strongest guards of virtue, and lowers the standard of the public morals.

It is this trait in the moral constitution of man that gives to education its power in forming the moral character of youth; and an intelligent writer contends that, by a wise improvement of this faculty, it is in the power of the public rulers of a State to improve the moral character of the nation; that the public policy may be so modified, in relation to our moral feelings, as to render a people humane or cruel, brave or timid, high-minded or meanspirited, virtuous or vicious.

It is further alleged, that the election in the House of Representatives exposes the members to be diverted from their duty by Executive patronage.

The refutation of the leading feature of this objection, by the gentlemen who have preceded me, exempts me from the necessity of noticing it.

destroyed by such causes as are calculated to modify or change any of these elementary principles.

A free constitution ought to secure the principle of representation, periodical election, personal security, trial by jury, and a free press.

The Greeks enjoyed an equality of rank and property, and, in the early period of their history, were virtuous and intelligent; but they were ignorant of the advantages of a Representative Government, and their constitutions were extremely defective in their organization.

The contests between those among whom the different powers of government were allotted, generated factions. These made the people venal and licentious, and rendered them incapable of self-government, and the admission of Philip of Macedon to a seat in the Amphictyonic Council, put a period to their independence.

The Romans were divided into ranks. The people, in the early stages of the Republic, I should have no objection to transfer this were virtuous, but the Government was badly power to any other body, provided the federa-organized. Although the people had a share in tive principle was preserved, if I could discover the choice of their magistrates and public offithat there was any such, who would be under cers, and in making their laws, yet they never stronger obligations to consult the public inter- understood the true principles of representaests, or better qualified to promote them. tion, nor did they apply them to the case of legislation.

It is proposed to send the election back to the electoral colleges, or some other board of electors. I cannot perceive any advantage to be gained by this arrangement.

Every election, after the first, must be by States, each State giving one vote, to preserve the original compact of the constitution with the small States, and to preserve the great conservative principle of State sovereignty and independence; and there is no body of this na

After the expulsion of the kings, the principal power was lodged in the Senate, which was composed of the patricians, and became an ironhanded aristocracy.

The rigorous measures of that body forced the people to retire from the city to the sacred mount, and the establishment of the tribunitial authority was the condition of their return. The Tribunes had a negative upon the acts of

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the Senate; the boundary between the powers | favor of public liberty. It was the spirit of of the two bodies was indefinite, and the con- Saxon liberty which produced the representatests between them for power generated fac- tion of the people in Parliament, and procured tions and corrupted the people. War was the the great charter, trial by jury, the habeas corprincipal occupation of the citizens; agricul- pus act, a free press, and all the limitations on ture, commerce, and the arts, were the em- the royal prerogative. The same spirit has ployment of slaves. While not engaged in made great inroads on the feudal system of war, they were idle, and became venal. The landed property; has contrived means to unarmies, by being suffered to plunder the prov- fetter inheritances, and remove the restraints inces, became licentious, and the republic be- against alienation. came the spoil of ambition, a victim of faction, and a licentious soldiery. Cæsar did not aspire for the empire until the people of Rome had become incapable of self-government, and were prepared for a master.

By the feudal system, modern Europe was divided into ranks of princes and hereditary nobles, who engrossed the lands; and the common people, who were their tenants, and, until | the establishment of standing armies by Charles the Seventh, in 1448, formed the soldiery of the different States or kingdoms. The people had no share in Government. The whole powers of Government were vested in the princes and nobility.

This organization of society and Government still exists in most countries in Europe, and precludes the existence of free Government. A free constitution is incompatible with a feudal organization of society. Power will follow property where it is engrossed by a few hands, and who are fortified in its enjoyment by restraints against alienation. It is a law of our being, that men should be governed by those upon whom they are dependent for subsistence.

The forms of a free Government are of little use without the capacity to enjoy it. The establishment of such a Government on a feudal basis would be, in a great measure, useless to the people; the elections would be controlled by the king and the nobles, and every measure would be dictated by them. Such a Government would probably be an evil, by making the people the instruments of strengthening the chains that bind them to their condition.

These are the reasons why the attempts to establish free Governments in France, and elsewhere, on a feudal organization of society, have failed, and, while it continues, must fail.

These innovations in the laws of real property in England, with the immense accumulation of personal property, created by the exertions of an industrious people vigorously employed in agriculture, commerce, and manufactures, countervail, in a great degree, the influence of the feudal organization of society; and the power of the representatives of the people, over the public supplies, forms a balance to the hereditary principles of the constitution, and renders them, compared with other countries where the feudal system prevails, a free people.

An equality of rank and property, the virtue and intelligence of the people, and the freedom of their constitutions, make the United States the freest nation on earth.

The people of the several States framed the confederation to manage the affairs of peace and war, and to regulate their intercourse with other nations. In framing the present constitution of the General Government, to the powers of peace and war they added the power over commerce and taxation, and gave it a national operation.

They rely upon the State Governments for the protection of their rights against injuries without force, and upon the General Government for protection from external and internal violence.

The security of our liberties depends on the concurrent operation of the two Governments in their respective limits. The tendency of things is to give a preponderance to the General Government. The invasion of the powers of the States by the General Government, and the corruption of manners, are the principal sources of danger to public liberty. An ambitious spirit for national aggrandizement and national glory, leads to the first evil, and faction to the second.

The proper exercise of the power which the States now have by the constitution, over the election of the President and Senate, will enable them to check the inroads of the General Government on their sovereignty and independence. Public virtue and an enlightened public opinion

Before free Governments can succeed in those countries, society must be reorganized; rank must be abolished, or some means adopted to countervail its influence; the restraints against the alienation of real property must be removed, and the people admitted to an equal-only can check the progress of faction. ity of political rights, and instructed in the elements of freedom, to render them capable of self-government.

Liberty was established in England, by the Saxons, before the feudal system was introduced by William the Norman. The spirit of liberty and feudalism have been in perpetual conflict from that period to the present time, and every revolution in that country has terminated in

VOL. IX.-3

The object of the resolutions before the committee is to take from the States one of the principal means provided by the constitution for their security against the encroachments of the General Government upon the rights reserved to the States. Before the advocates of the resolutions can with any propriety ask for the surrender of the power which the States now have over the election of President, they

are bound to show that the reservation of this power is not necessary for the security of the States in any crisis that can happen in a conflict for power between the two Governments. That a surrender of the power will not augment the comparative influence of the General Government or that the State Governments are not necessary, and that a Government purely national would be a better safeguard to our liberties.

Sir, I have given my sentiments freely on the several topics I have mentioned. I have no interest but the welfare of my constituents, and preservation of the public liberty.

There is some reason to believe that the result of the late election has some influence on this discussion. It is always unwise to make great changes to suit a particular crisis.

It was of little consequence to the public liberty which of the candidates succeeded-they were all honorable men-but it is of vital importance to the public liberty that the States should retain all the essential powers which the constitution has provided for their security. On motion of Mr. ISACKS, the committee then rose, and having obtained leave to sit again, The House adjourned.

WEDNESDAY, March 15.

After the reading of the journal, Mr. OWEN rose, and announced to the House the death of the Honorable CHRISTOPHER RANKIN, the Representative from the State of Mississippi, in the following terms:

Mr. Speaker, the painful duty of announcing to the House the death of the distinguished Representative of the State of Mississippi, has devolved on me. I do not, I cannot attempt a panegyric on the memory of the deceased. His death is a national calamity. He was, sir, a statesman, a patriot, and an honest man: his loss to his State is irreparable; his place here cannot easily be filled. Virtuous, philanthropic, and charitable, all who knew him were his friends-enemies he had none.

Whereupon, on motion of Mr. OWEN, the House came to the following resolutions:

Resolved, unanimously, That the members of this House will testify their respect for the memory of CHRISTOPHER RANKIN, by wearing crape on the left arm for thirty days.

Resolved unanimously, That the members of this House will attend the funeral of the late CHRISTOPER RANKIN, to-morrow at 12 o'clock.

Resolved, That a Committee of Arrangement be appointed, and the Senate be notified thereof. And then the House adjourned

THURSDAY, March 16.

This day was devoted, by both Houses of Congress, to funeral solemnities, consequent on the death of Mr. RANKIN.

TUESDAY, March 21.

[MARCH, 1826.

Amendment of the Constitution.

On motion of Mr. McDUFFIE, the House again went into Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union on the resolutions heretofore submitted by him, proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Mr. ISACKS addressed the committee as follows:

Mr. Chairman: If the subject now referred to the committee were like the ordinary objects of legislation upon which we are called to act, it would long since have been exhausted; but the history of man, the nature of man, the structure of our Government, and our experience under it, furnish the sources from which this investigation must be drawn; and those sources are inexhaustible.

Before I proceed to consider the propositions comprehended in these resolutions, permit me to notice some objections which have been thrown in the way of our progress. It is objected that this is not a proper time to act upon the amendments proposing a change in the constitution, relative to the election of the President and Vice President, because we have just gotten out of that contest: two years ago we were told that that was not a proper time to act on these same amendments, because we were then upon the eve of that election; and two years hence the same objection will be repeated. May I ask, then, when will be the proper time? The answer will be, that, to such as made the objection, that time will never come

the four years between the last and the next Presidential election is just as long as it ever will be between those periodical occurrences.

It is also said, that the number of resolutions, and the various plans which have been proposed, is another objection to our proceeding in this undertaking. That circumstance may, and I fear will, occasion some difficulty, and probably the greatest which may be found, in settling down upon any given proposition; but it cer tainly does not prove that the attempt ought not seriously to be made; on the contrary, it is but another proof that the state of things requires it; that the country expects it; that the people are ripe for it; that the necessity of the case is it is, that propositions from all parts of the Unapparent, from actual experiment; and hence ion have poured in upon us, the whole of them pointing to such a change in the mode of electing these officers, as shall prevent the choice from being referred to Congress. This, I believe, is a strong feature in all the resolutions which have been submitted, except that grave resolve of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. MINER,) which, in effect, asks that the Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union shall determine that the constitution is the constitution. The gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. EVERETT,) indeed, concludes that all these propositions are only so many violations of the constitution, which we are all sworn to

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support. And the gentleman from Maine, (Mr. | tors is based on the federative, and not on the HERRICK,) who seems to have looked further into this matter, and discovered that the constitution has provided for its own amendment, and pointed out the mode, is willing that it should be so amended as to prevent amendment oftener than once in ten years.

Previous to the meeting of this Congress, a recommendation for the amendment of this instrument was expected from another quarter, which, if it had been made, would doubtless have been high authority with many who now oppose these resolutions. The President, in his letter of acceptance of the office which he now holds, expressed himself "deeply sensible to the circumstances under which it had been given." Adverting to the fact that all his predecessors had been honored with majorities of the electoral voices, in their primary colleges," he deplores the "misfortune" in which the division of sentiment had placed him, and particularly the irreconcilable fact, of one of his competitors having been "recommended by a larger minority of the primary electoral suffrages than himself." To "give an immediate opportunity to the people to form and express, with a nearer approach to unanimity, the object of their choice," it was confidently expected that the President, in his opening message to Congress, would have recommended such amend ments of the constitution that thereby the reference, so desirable, might, in future, be made, and such as would prevent either himself or his successors, from ever finding themselves under the painful necessity of accepting that "eminent charge," without the majority which he so sensibly felt his want of. But this recommendation was not made.

popular principle. My answer is, that the constitution has assimilated this power of choosing electors to the power of choosing Representatives to Congress; it has adopted the same rule with regard to the numbers of each; it has based the right of choosing Representatives most clearly on the popular principle; and it has made the other, in all its material and striking affinities, exactly like it.

In the House of Representatives, the people are represented according to their numbers; and not the States regardless of their numbers. The constitution directs that "the number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand, but each State shall have one Representative;" and the power was granted to Congress to increase, at stated periods, the number that should be entitled to this one Representative. Then, at whatever number the ratio shall be fixed, that number, as one integral, and for this purpose independent, part of the whole population, has its own and sole Representative in this House; it has the right to choose who he shall be, and the power to hold him to a strict accountability to them, for the duties which its choice imposes on him. And in this choice, and this responsibility, consists the great security which the people have upon their Representatives.

As to electors, the constitution directs that "each State shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which such State may be entitled in Congress." Now, the argument that this power of appointing electors belongs to the States, purely in their sovereign Upon that resolution which proposes so to and independent character, proves too much. amend the constitution as to prevent the elec-A State is a State, the Union over. Delaware, tion from devolving upon Congress, there is no middle ground; we must here take sides. We are not here adjusting the manner in which the people shall exercise this invaluable right, but we are deciding whether they shall enjoy it at all. Whether they shall keep it, or whether it shall be taken from them.

Tell's arrow must be true to its aim, or his child will bleed. This youthful but herculean republic must strangle the monster Patronage, or it will strangle him.

Mr. Chairman: In support of the second resolution, proposing a "uniform mode of electing by districts," I shall not spend the time of the committee in showing, that it is preferable to the practice in some States, of choosing electors by the Legislature. That practice has found so few friends here, that it can have no claims to competition.

The gentlemen who have supported, with so much zeal and ability, the propriety and essential right of a State to vote altogether according to the general ticket plan, have, with much force, and probably some effect, contended that, according to the spirit and whole frame of the constitution, the right of the States to choose elec

with its one Representative and three electors, as a State possesses all the attributes of sovereignty which belong to the State of New York, which, by the constitution, is entitled to thirtysix. The latter, then, cannot have this advantage over the former on the ground that they are both States: for, in that respect they are equal, and each would be entitled exactly to the same number. But it is upon the principle, that, in conferring the power in question, the constitution has gone beyond the corporate character of the State, and has adapted the number both of Representatives and electors, to the actual enumeration of inhabitants in each State.

So far, then, as the analogy holds good between members of the House of Representatives and electors, the argument that the right of choosing the latter is purely and entirely federative, must fall to the ground. I admit that the two electors, corresponding with the two Senators from each State, has more the semblance of the federative character, but this would only prove, that, as to electors, the representative principle was adopted in both its popular and federative features.

In this respect, however, we are not deter