(See 1 Kent's Com., pp. 18, 19, 68, 69, 70; Wheaton's International Law, p. 47; 9 Cranch, 244; Ib. 191.)

In concluding our citations of these leading authorities we add the language of Chancellor Kent: "In cases where the principal jurists agree, the presumption will be very great in favor of the solidity of their maxims; and no civilized nation that does not arrogantly set all ordinary law and justice at defiance, will venture to disregard the uniform sense of established writers on international law."—(Kent's Com., pp. 18, 19.)

7. The rule of damages adopted by the Florida judges is the just and legal one in cases governed by the common or civil law, as well as in cases governed by the law of nations.

That the rule is the same in actions of tort for injuries to property, both in the United States and in England, and both in the federal and State courts. (See Conrad vs. Pacific Insurance Co., 1 Baldwin, C. C. Rep., p. 138; S. C., 6 Peters, pp. 273, 282; Sedgewick on the Measure of Damages, pp. 549, 550, 551, 517, that "interest seems to be usually given by way of damages for the detention of property;" ib., pp. 214, 498, 499, 519, 520, 548, 570, 586, 587; chap. 19, generally; Greenleaf on Evidence, vol. 2, pp. 591, 612, 282, sec. 276; Church vs. Cherryfield, 33 Maine Rep., p. 457; Soule vs. White, 14 Maine Rep., p. 436; Hammett vs. Russ, 4 Shepl., p. 171; Kennedy vs. Whitwell, 4 Pick., p. 466; Greenfield vs. Leavitt, 17 Pick., p. 3; Barry vs. Bennett, 7 Metcalf, pp. 354, 363; Boyden vs. Moore, 11 Pick, p. 363; Swift vs. Barnes, 16 Pick., p. 194; Boyd vs. Brown, 17 Pick., p. 453; 21 Pick., p. 559; 1 Metcalf, p. 172; 14 Pick., pp. 356, 361; 15 Pick., pp. 198, 206, 207, 297, 300; White vs. Webb, 15 Connect. Rep., p. 365; 19 do., 319; Wilson & Gibbs vs. Conine, 2 Johns. Rep., 282; 14 Johns. Rep., 273; ib., vol. 15, pp. 198, 206; Bissell vs. Hopkins, 4 Cowan, p. 52; 2 Hill, p. 132; Hyde vs. Stone, 7 Wend., pp. 354-5; Dillenback vs. Jerome, 7 Cowan, pp. 294, 300; Beals vs. Guerney, 8 Johns. Rep. 446; Baker vs. Wheeler, 8 Wend., 505; Hebburn vs. Sewall, 5 Harris & John., 212.

Pope vs. Campbell, Hard. p. 31; Meed vs. Phillips, Littell's Select Cases, p. 50; Outton vs. Barnes, ib. 136; 7 Monroe, 209; 3 Bibb, p. 92; 3 Littell, p. 25; 4 Dana, p. 162, Glasscock vs. Hays; Banks vs. Hatton, 1 Nott & McCord, p. 222; Talbird vs. Baynard, 2 Hill, S. Car. Rep. 599; St. John vs. O'Connell, 7 Porter, (Ala.,) Rep. p. 481; Eakins vs. The East India Company, 1 Pr. Wm's, p. 395; 2 Brown's Parl. Cases, p. 72. S. C.; 2 Eq. Cases Abr., ch. 1, p. 534; 11 Campbell, p. 477, per Lord Ellenborough.

That the rule is the same under the civil law, and that "fruits or profits were awarded in cases of wrongful taking or detention of property," as part of the damages by Justinian, liber 22; liber 17; Cod. liber 3, c. De Condit, ex. leg. ; Domat, book 3, title 5, sections 1 and 2, vol. 1, p. 406, sec. 13, pp. 407, 408, sec. 18.

S. It was the declared intention of Congress, by the above recited acts, to carry the 9th article of the treaty into full and complete effect. (See acts passed to carry the treaty into effect; Opinion of Attorney

General Nelson, 4 vol. Attorneys General Opinions, by Farnham, pp. 286 to 294.)

9. The acts are all to be construed together as one act, in pari materia, and in subordination to the provisions of the treaty.

Dwarris on the Construction of Statutes, p. 699; Attorney General Wirt's Opinion under the Convention of St. Petersburg, old edition, 568 to 571; Lieber on Construction, 18 Am. Jurist, p. 67 to 92; 2 Story on Construction, sec. 1838, pp. 570, 571, 572; Ordinance of 1781, 5 Wheaton, App., p. 126.

For general rules of construction, see Dwarris pp. 663, 690, 691, 692, 698, 702, 703, 718, 704, 713, 755, 756, 757, 760, 759, 762, 753, 660, 765, 768, 769, 730; Pothier on Obl., part I, ch. 1, sec. 1, art. 7, rule 2.

Bend vs. Hoyt, 13 Peters, p. 263 to 273; Talbot vs. Seaman, 1 Cranch, p. 43; The Charming Betsey, 2 Cranch, p. 118; Fisher vs. Blight, 2 Cranch, p. 390; Pennington vs. Cox, 2 Cranch, p. 33; Lincoln College case, 3 Coke, 59, b.; Co. Litt., 381, a; 4 Bac. Abr. Statute (1,) plea 7, 645; Stowell vs. Zouch, Plowden, 365.

10. The acts of Congress required the Florida judges to act in the judicial character previously conferred upon them by their appointment as judges, and in that capacity to establish the claims as the treaty required.

See Treaty and Acts heretofore cited; also Act of 30th March, 1822, establishing territorial government in Florida, Stats. at Large, vol. 3, p. 656; Act of 24th September, 1789, and 2d March, 1793, 1 Stats. at Large, pp. 73, 333; Story on Const., vol. 2, sec. 1777, authorities there cited, p. 526; Ib., sec. 1627, p. 411; Constitution United States, art. 2, sec. 2; 4 Black. Com., pp. 265, 269; 9 Howard, 245; Benner vs. Porter; Treaty of 1819, 11th art; 3 Stats. at Large, p. 710; Am. Insurance Company vs. Conter, 1 Peters, p. 546, and authorities ante and post; Opinion of Attorney General Gilpin, (old,) 1361, 1362; Civil Code of Louisiana, art. 3522, note 20, p. 355; 2 Story's Com., sec. 1627, p. 411; Ib., sec. 1729, p. 487; United States vs. Nourse, 6 Peters, 470; United States vs. Vorhees, 10 Peters, p. 449 to 478; United States vs. Cox, 11 Peters, 162; United States vs. Randolph, 2 Brock., 447.

11. The duties to be performed by the judges in establishing these claims as the Treaty and Acts required, was of a strictly judicial character, and the jurisdiction of the courts, of which they were the respective judges, extended to "all cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States," which embraced this class of claims. (Acts establishing said court and authorities as cited.)

12. A proceeding by petition, as prescribed by Congress and adopted by the Florida judges in adjudicating these claims, was a proper judicial process to fulfil the treaty.-(See 6th section of the act of 23d May, 1828, 4 Statutes at Large, p. 285, by which the land claims in Florida were to be brought before the courts for adjudication by peti

tion; also, acts for the adjudication of the land claims in Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, &c. ; 2 Story's Com. on Constit., sec. 1725, p. 485; Osborn vs. The Bank of the U. S., 5 Wheaton, 747; Weston et al. vs. City Council of Charleston, 2 Peters, 464; Rhode Island vs. The State of Massachusetts, 12 Peters, 750, 751; 4 Statutes at Large, p. 165, sec. 4; 1 ib., p. 83, sec. 17; Dwarris, general rules for construing statutes, 7, 8, 10, pp. 662, 663; 3 Black. Com., ch. 17, pp. 256-57, petition of right, monstrans de troit; Staunf. P. C., ch. 15; Skinner, pp. 608, 609; Rastell Entr, p. 461; 4 Rep., p. 55; Tidd's Practice, p.; act of 3d March, 1849, for the relief of Peter Capella and others, 9 Statutes at Large, p. 788.)

13. Congress cannot be presumed to have legislated for the purpose of defeating the treaty, when there has been a declared purpose to carry it into effect, and a series of acts passed for that purpose Nothing can be implied against such a series of acts of that character. (The Emily and Caroline, 9 Wheaton, 388; Vattel, book 2, chap. 17, sec. 282.)

14. The treaty binds the United States to pay the amount of the damages, so established, on cases within the provisions of the treaty. 9th article of the treaty of 1819; Opinion of Attorney General Legare; of Dec. 7, 1841, Attorneys general Op., (by Farnham,) vol. 3, p. 721; Report of Mr. Dean, from the Committee on Territories, in the Ho. Reps. in 1842; Act of 3d March, 1823, requiring the Secretary to pay the amounts of the judges' decisions, when within the treaty.

Opinion of Attorney General Legare, of 4th August, 1842, in the case of William Otis, Op. Att's General, vol. 2, p. 1520; Co. Litt., 212, b; Pinnell's case, 5 Coke, 117.

The judgment of a court of competent or peculiar jurisdiction cannot be questioned collatterally, but only by an appellate judicial tribunal.-(Gelston et. al. vs. Hoyt, 3 Wheaton, 246, and authorities genally.)

14. It was the evident intention of Congress, by the acts passed to carry the treaty into effect, to authorize and require the Secretary_of the Treasury to pay whatever the judges might lawfully decree under the said treaty.-(First and second sections act of 3d March, 1823.)

16. The acts of Congress required the Secretary of the Treasury to act in his ordinary executive character, as such Secretary, and in the capacity in which he had been previously appointed. (See acts, and 2d sec. 2d art. Constitution, and authorities ante and post.)

17. The only power of the Secretary, over the decisions reported to him by the judge, was to ascertain, from the evidence, whether the claims were within the provisions of the treaty; and if he found them to be so, to pay "the amount thereof;" and if not to reject the same for that reason.-(Acts of 3d March, 1823, and 26th June, 1834, and authorities cited to show that the acts must be construed in subordination to the treaty; Constitution U. S., art. 2, sec. 2; 2 Story on Const., sec. 1777, p. 576, and authorities there cited.)

18. The three great powers of the government-the legislative, executive and judicial-are separate, distinct, and independent of each other.-(Constitution U. S. art. 1, sec. 1; art. 2, sec. 1; art. 3, sec. 1.)

The superior courts of the Territory of Florida were, and the district courts of the United States in that State are, judicial tribunals, and as such, belong to systems derived from the Constitution of the United States; and the Secretary of the Treasury could not exercise joint jurisdiction with them, nor appellate jurisdiction over their decisions.

Constitutional courts belong to the judicial system of the United States, within the 3d article of the Constitution. Legislative courts are derived from the general powers of Congress over Territories; they are, therefore, derived from the Constitution, and are invested with all the qualifications which separate the judiciary powers from the other great powers of the government.

The jurisdiction of legislative courts "is conferred by Congress in the exercise of their general powers which that body possessess over the Territories of the United States." They are competent to receive and exercise whatever powers Congress may confer for redressing civil injuries, or restraining and punishing public wrongs; and could, therefore, exercise all the powers conferred by the acts of Congress to carry the treaty into effect.-(Am. Insurance Company, vs. Canter, 1 Peters, p. 546; Martin vs. Hunter, 1 Wheaton, p. 327 to 330; 4 art. 3 sec. Constitution U. S.; 1 art. 9th sec. Constitution U. S.; 2 art. 2 sec. Constitution U. S.; act of 1789, establishing judicial system U. S., 1 Stats. at Large, p. 73; act of 1789, establishing Treasury Department, 1 Stats. at Large, p. 65; stat. 16 Charles I., ch. 10; 1 Black. Com., p. 266 to 269; 4 Inst., p. 71; 3 Story's Com., p. 355; 9th art. treaty of 1819, last clause; acts to carry treaty into effect; opinions of the judges under the pension act of 1792, as cited; Marbury vs. Madison, I Cranch, 137.)

19. Congress could not, constitutionally, confer judicial power upon the Secretary of the Treasury, as Secretary; nor could they clothe him with power, as an executive officer, to revise judicial decisions.(Authorities cited.)

20. The acts of Congress, therefore, authorized and required the exercise of all the judicial power necessary to establish the said claims, agreeably to the provision of the said treaty, by the Florida judges; and conferred no judicial power, appellate or otherwise, upon the Secretary of the Treasury.

21. Neither the stipulations of the treaty nor the acts of Congress passed to carry it into effect, will warrant the injustice of making the decisions of the judges, when against claimants, final, and of no validity when in their favorr.-(See acts, that decisions against the claimants are not to be reported to the Secretary of the Treasury.)

22. The Secretary, by paying the original value of the property, as decreed by the judges, has decided the claims to be "just and equit

able within the provisions of the treaty," and thus foreclosed that question (That the right to the interest decreed by the judges, by way of damages, for the loss of the use and fruits of the property, is a pure question of law under the treaty, to be decided by the laws and usages of nations, see the authorities cited.)

23. If the Secretary of the Treasury had authority to revise the decision of the Florida judge, made in accordance with the treaty, the acts to carry it into effect, and the law of nations; yet, as he did not allow and pay the full measure of damages so decreed in favor of the claimant, this court is bound to decree, according to the said treaty, acts, and law of nations, that the said claimant is entitled to the payment of the residue of said decree.-(See act of 24 February, 1855, organizing the Court of Claims, and authorities before cited; 2 Story, on Const.; sec. 1675, 1676, 1677, 1678, 1679. Ib. sec. 1574, p. 365, note 3.)

24. The Secretary of the Treasury, by applying the usage of the Treasury Department to these treaty cases, and by rejecting, under that usage, an essential part of the satisfaction stipulated by the treaty, and established by process of law, violated both the treaty and the express direction of the acts under which he proceeded-which acts directed him to the provisions of the treaty for his guide, and not to the usage of the Treasury Department.-(See authorities under 1st. and 2d points, also treaty and acts. Lieber on Precedents, 18 vol. American Jurist, 286 to 293; 10 Peters, 95; Ib. 153; Hob. 270; 4 Coke, 94; Bouvier's Law Dict., Title Precedent, p. 349; Title Reason, p. 408; Ib. p. 525, Title Stare Decisis; 1 Kent, 476.)

25. The usage which the Secretary applied was not applicable to this class of claims-(damages for injury to property)-if they had been domestic claims, and governed by the municipal laws and usages of the United States, instead of being international claims, governed by the law of nations..

There is no rule of the Treasury Department against the payment of interest, by way of damages, as a measure of satisfaction for injuries to property, under acts of Congress containing no express provision for its payment.

It was paid under the act of 2d July, 1836, for the relief of Mrs. O'Sullivan, upon an opinion of Attorney General Butler, under a direction in the act to pay the "actual loss."-(6 Stats. at Large, p. 697; printed Opinions of Attorneys General, old edition, p. 1115.)

It was paid in Sibald's case, under the act of 23d August, 1842, by the direction of Attorney General Nelson, under a direction in the act to ascertain "the actual damages which Charles F. Sibald has sustained and would be entitled to recover upon the principles of law, as applicable to similar cases, by reason of the interference of any agent or agents of the United States, acting under their authority, with the use, possession, or enjoyment of his lands, timber, mills, or other property in East Florida."-(6 Stats. at Large, p. 864; Ex. Doc. No.