Abbildungen der Seite
PDF
EPUB

two other witnesses, who swear that they examined the premises on the 1st of October, 1878, the date of Maxwell's alleged settlement, and saw no evidence of the digging or spading by Morgan.

It is difficult to define with any degree of exactitude what particular act on the part of a settler constitutes a settlement under the law. It is always desirable and expedient, of course, that the act should be notorious and significant of a purpose; but it would neither be safe nor right to reject claims in all cases because of a lack of either or both these ingredients. The case in hand is an example. The act in itself was simple. The mere turning over of a few spadefuls of earth, which had not long before been turned over, would not be calculated to attract the attention of the casual passer-by, and might escape the notice of parties on the alert for evidences of settlement. Still, if the act can be established and supplemented by a showing of good faith, it must stand as an

act of settlement.

It is very difficult in such cases as this to disprove the act of settlement by negative testimony. If the act had been notorious in its character, and the evidence of it set forth affirmatively, it would be proper and competent to show its non-performance by negative testimony.

UNITED STATES ex rel. HUBBELL US.

ILGEN.

the charges against Ilgen because of such repudiation. Neither Flanagan nor Hubbell are entitled to consideration-Flana gan because unscrupulously he induced an ignorant man to violate the law that he might acquire thereby a tract of the public. land, and Hubbell-lending himself to Flanagan's purposes-because of his at

Good Faith-Agreement.-Hubbell assailed the good faith of Ilgen, alleging that on the day of his settlement, he delivered to Flanagan a paper acknowledging that he held eighty acres of the land embraced in his filing in trust for Flanagan, and agreeing to make the conveyances necessary to perfect title thereto in Flanagan whenever by him requested. Its tempt to effect cancellation of Ilgen's entry, execution is admitted by Ilgen, but as an and thus acquire a perfected right to enter agreement intended to violate the law, it the tract under the act of May 14, 1880, could not be specifically enforced, and Flan- and be enabled, thereafter, to hold the agan had no legal right under it. It raises same in whole or in part for the benefit of only the question of Ilgen's good faith. Flanagan. SECRETARY TELLER to Commissioner McFarland, March 16, 1883.

I have considered the case of the United States ex rel. J. B. Hubbell vs. Mathew Ilgen, involving the validity of the latter's cash entries Nos. 11 and 13, embracing respectively lots 11, 12 and 13, and lot 10 of Sec. 28. Tp. 8, R. 47 E., Miles City, Montana, on appeal by Hubbell from your decision of October 6, 1882, sustaining the

entries.

The fact that eight acres of the land embraced in Ilgen's filing may have been embraced in Flanagan's location or in the agreement, does not militate against Ilgen's good faith. So slight a variation between the lines of a surveyed tract and an unsurveyed location is not singular, and under the maxim" Lex non curat de minimis," and in the absence of bad faith, the difference should not prejudice his entry.

Your decision is affirmed.

PLUMMER et al. vs. JACKMAN. Speculation.-A pre-emptor is not forbidden to settle on lands that are likely to become centres of population-or near a town or village -to what speculation the statute refers.

It appears that in February, 1878, one Flanagan; then a deputy United States Marshall, filed a "ranch declaration," or notice of claim to a described tract of unsurveyed land then within the Fort Keogh reservation. The tracts were not restored to market until March 11th following. His claim was, therefore, of no legal force. Question of Fact.-In view of the testimony, Not wishing personally to occupy the tract he induced Ilgen to go thereon.

The township plat was filed February 25, 1879.

For instance: In the case of Hull v. Hawkins, Copp's L. O., March, 1880, p. 191, it was shown affirmatively that the act of settlement consisted in placing a small wagon-load of stones on the land, and that said stones could be seen from a On April 29, 1879, Ilgen filed his preconsiderable distance; but several disinter-emption declaratary statement alleging ested parties, who made a critical examination of the premises on the next day after the alleged act of settlement, failed to discover any evidences of it, and this office held that the affirmative evidence was full of doubt, with all the possibilities in favor of the negative.

settlement April 8, 1878, and on January 12, 1881, made his cash entries jointlyafter a hearing-with one Harcum for lot 10, and singly for lots 11, 12 and 13.

Subsequently Hubbell assailed the good faith of Ilgen, alleging that on the day of his settlement in violation of Section 2262 But in this case a simple act is alleged of the Revised Statutes he delivered to which does not carry with it the evidence Flanagan a paper acknowledging that he of its performance, and is almost wholly held eighty acres of the lands embraced in a matter of affirmation and denial. There- his filing in trust for Flanagan, and agreefore, before this office could reject the ing to make the conveyances necessary to affirmative evidence of the act, it would perfect title thereto in Flanagan whenever be necessary to show by some means the by him requested. Its execution is, adutter impossibility or strong improbabil-mitted by Ilgen, but, as an agreement ity of its performance; and as this has intended to violate the law, it could not be not been done, I must hold that the oath specifically enforced (Warren vs. Van of the settler has not been successfully Brunt, 19 Wall., 646), and Flanagan had impeached, and must stand. no legal right under it. It raises only the question of Ilgen's good faith. His pre-emption proof and his entry in all other respects are satisfactory.

I think it is satisfactorily shown that Morgan purchased the improvements on the land before he settled, and as his settlement antedates that of Maxwell, and as all his subsequent acts have been characterized by good faith and compliance with law, he is entitled to the land.

I therefore award the land to Morgan, and hold the D. S. of Maxwell for cancellation. (No appeal was taken from this decision.

I concur with you in the opinion that, under the testimony the land settled and filed upon by Ilgen was not in fact-with exception of about eight acres that named in Flanagan's location, nor that referred to in the agreement, and that also, soon after his failing, upon ascertaining the impropriety of such agreement, Ilgen repudiated it and denied Flanagan's claim to any portion of the land by virtue of the agreement or TWENTY-FOUR pages in this issue of the otherwise. It also satisfactorily appears LAND-OWNER. that Flanagan instigated Hubbell to make

and the burden of proof, the land in dispute is awarded to Jackman. SECRETARY TELLER to Commissioner Me Farland, May 7, 1883.

I have considered the case of John W. Plummer et al. vs. John J. Jackman, involving the S. W. of Sec. 32, Tp. 139, R. 80 W., Bismarck, Dakota Territory.

Jackman filed declaratory statement No. 179, for said quarter section, July 19, 1873, alleging settlement May 28, 1872.

Plummer filed declaratory statement No. 160, for the north half of said quarter section (with other land), June 24, 1873, alleging settlement March 28, 1873.

In May, 1875, the case of the city of Bismarck vs. Hackett et al., involving the land in question, was tried at the local office, and testimony submitted touching the respective claims of Jackman and Plummer. In that case a decision (November 13, 1875), was rendered by your office, by which the N. of said S. W. 4 was awarded to Plummer, and the S. to the City of Bismarck; and Jackman's filing was held for cancellation.

On appeal, Secretary Chandler, by decision of July 26, 1876, awarded the whole quarter section to Jackman, and directed all other filings and entries thereon to be canceled. Plummer's entry was accordingly canceled, August 4, 1876, and subsequently certain additional homestead entries thereon were also canceled.

A motion having been made for a rehearing. it was denied May 11, 1877, but Secretary Schurz by his letter of July 3, 1877, directed the local officers, when Jackman should "apply to make final proof and payment for said land to allow any testimony which may be offered which

may have a tendency to impeach his good faith in his settlement and cultivation of said tract," and to cause notice of the hearing to be given to parties claiming an interest therein.

Some subsequent proceedings were had, in consequence of a cash entry made by Jackman; but the hearing under the order of July 3, 1877, was held at Bismarck, in September, 1877, and due notice thereof given to the parties in interest, and the proceedings and testimony were returned to your office.

valuable improvements placed by Jack
man on the south half" of the tract.

point where the railroad would cross, occupies a large space in the record; and I think Since the issue presented is mainly of unnecessary weight was given to it. The fact, I shall review to some extent the evidence as to an agreement that the testimony taken upon the issue, and con- claims so to be taken up by each of the sider its bearing on the question of Jack-parties should in fact be the common man's good faith. property of all, is indefinite, uncertain, The law upon which this issue was contradictory, and, I think, does not preframed, for the purpose of inquiring ponderate in favor of such an agreement. whether it had been violated, is presumed to be that part of Section 2262 of the Revised Statutes, which declares that the person claiming the benefit of the preAugust 27, 1879, Acting Commissioner emption laws shall, before being allowed Armstrong reported the case to this De- to enter lands, make oath (among other partment, accompanied by his opinion. things) "that he has not settled upon and He states that "the evidence is so conflict- improved such land to sell the same on ing that it is impossible to ascertain the speculation, but in good faith to approexact truth," but concludes that Jack-priate it to his own exclusive use; and man's claim was not originally made in that he has not, directly or indirectly, good faith," but was made for " specula-made any agreement or contract, in any tive purposes." He further found that way or manner, with any person whatever, Plummer had abandoned the land, and by which the title which he might acquire recommended that the entries of both from the United States, should inure in Plummer and Jackman should be canceled. whole or in part to the benefit of any perAfter the decision of July 26, 1876, son except himself.” Plummer made application for repayment of purchase money, which he subsequently withdrew; but in 1877 he renewed it. This application at the time of the decision of Jan. 16, 1882, hereafter mentioned, was still pending.

66

Whatever might be the difference of opinion upon that question, it is, I think, certain that such agreement was never in fact acted upon so far as the lands were concerned, nor was it insisted upon by any member of the party in reference to the land which each undertook to acquire; and the project, if it ever existed, may justly be regarded as having been wholly abandoned at the time each party came to take the necessary legal steps to acquire title to the land constituting his claim. As proof of this I refer briefly to a few points in the testimony.

Jackman did not go to the river at the same time with the others, but followed same weeks afterward. One Corey, who The charge that Jackman made claim to went with the party, claimed to have been the land in bad faith, and for the purpose hired by Jackman to represent him, and of speculation, rests mainly in certain to take up and hold a claim for him. He agreements, the first of which is alleged swears that Jackman told him that Richto have been made between Jackman, ards, one of the parties, would locate him Woods, Richards, Churchill and Sanburn, on a claim which he was to hold for JackMy predecessor examined the case at Moorhead, Minnesota, in March, 1872, man. Corey took up a claim and built and rendered a decision therein Jan. 16, to the effect that such parties should go upon it. When Jackman came he did not 1882, in effect affirming the decision of to a point on the Missouri River, where it take the Corey land, and never made any Acting Commissioner Armstrong as to was supposed the Northern Pacific Rail- claim to it, but took the claim now in the want of good faith on the part of Jack-road would cross the river, and there controversy. Corey, who was called by man, and holding his entry for cancella- locate claims, with the view that a town contestants, testifies that Jackman made tion, but directing Plummer's entry as to would be built at such crossing, and the north half of said tract to be rein- thereby the lands would be greatly enstated and patented, and his application hanced in value-such claims to be held for repayment to be rejected. as the common property of the parties to April 7, 1882, an application was made the agreement. The alleged agreement to my predecessor for a reconsideration was not in writing, and the testimony as of his said decision. Such application to whether it was ever made is painfully (having been found to be still pending) conflicting. was granted by me; and April 11, 1883, an oral argument upon the merits was had before me by counsel for the respective parties.

Upon this statement of the proceedings in the case it will be seen that the only issue presented and now to be determined is that which was made by the letter of Secretary Schurz of July 3, 1877, before quoted viz., whether Jackman made his "settlement and cultivation " of the tract "in good faith."

The burden of proof is upon the party alleging the agreement, and it should be made out by a fair preponderance of evidence.

claim to no other land than that still claimed by him. McKellar and Chase, who went and took up claims, representing Sanburn and Churchill, two of the original parties, abandoned their claims early in 1872. Woods, who first settled upon the land in controversy, abandoned his claim, and left the country in July, 1872, and Richards' claim proved to be upon an odd section.

It was claimed that the lands were taken up at that particular point on account of superior knowledge possessed by Jackman, that the railroad crossing would be at such point, and a town would be built there.

The evidence shows that the location at that time was uncertain, and that, in fact, in the summer and fall of 1872 the road was located, and partially graded, some three miles further south, but subsequently changed to its present location. Jackman when upon the stand as a witness in this controversy, as late as November, 1877, testifies that he does not believe that any one then knew where the road " was going

The testimony shows that an arrangement was made between such persons, or such persons and two or three others, to go together to make a settlement at a point upon the river, at or near which they believed the road would cross and a town be built, and they united, to some extent at least, in making up an outfit for the My predecessor, Secretary Kirkwood, long journey through, and settlement in, in his decision states that he does "not an unoccupied country. Such union, was deem it necessary to recite or sum up the however, a matter of necessity, since some very voluminous testimony touching the of the party were destitute of money to validity of Jackman's claim," but states purchase supplies, but possessed teams or his conclusion from an examination of the other property essential to the success of testimony, viz.: "That Jackman's settle- the journey and settlement, and others to cross the Missouri River." Yet it is ment was made in bad faith; in other had the necessary means for other pur- the uncontradicted testimony in the case words, he settled upon and improved the poses. It is needless to say that such a that at that time he had lived upon the land in contest, so far as he settled or im- union for mutual protection and support land in controversy some five years, havproved it at all, for the purpose of specula- is of common occurrence, and of itself af- ing no other home, and had made valuable tion, and not in good faith, to appropriate fords but slight evidence of an agreement and extensive improvements. the same to his own exclusive use." The to hold in common the lands to be taken up. decision states that such conclusion "is The testimony upon this part of the case, and upon the subject of locating at a

reached very reluctantly on account of the

Jackman testifies fully and explicitly that he took up the land for his own ex'clusive use, with the intention of making

it a permanent home, and that he has no 1873, Ed. Hackett and John W. Proctor After the said decision of January 16, other; and he denies the agreement to were pre-emptors on the northwest and 1882, to wit, on the 20th day of April, hold the lands in common. In this denial northeast quarters of section 4, Tp. 1882, a patent was issued to Plummer for he is strongly corroborated by the fact that 138 N., R. 80 W.-the whole of both the north half of said quarter section. the various claims which would have consti- of these claims being covered by the I therefore direct that the order of tuted the common property were regarded original town-site of Bismarck; that January 16, 1882, directing that Jackman's and treated by the parties themselves as in- these claims were in contest, and Hackett entry be canceled, be revoked; that a dedividual property, and no joint ownership and Proctor applied to Jackman to assist mand be made of Plummer; that he surthem in defending them, that Jackman render for cancellation the patent so issued agreed to advance money and assist them to him, in order that a patent may be in such defense, and as soon as their claims issued to Jackman for the whole of said were proved up and they were in condi- southwest quarter. In case of refusal of tion to do so, they were to pay to him said Plummer to surrender such patent, double the money he should expend in you will report such refusal to this detheir behalf; that thereupon he made an partment, in order that such further action arrangement with James J. Hill, of St. may be taken as may be deemed to be Paul, by which Jackman was to give to proper. Hill one-half of the money that he should receive from Hackett, and one-third of what he should receive from Proctor, in consideration that Hill should furnish one-half of the money he should expend in defense of such claims. It appears that one Robbins subsequently became interested with Hill in the arrangement.

was ever claimed. If all the testimony relating to the agreement were uncontradicted, it is of so indefinite and uncertain a character (if the case presented no other legal obstacle), that I do not think it would be sufficient to authorize a court of equity to partition the Jackman claim and other lands, if they had been acquired, among the parties to the alleged agreement. The fact that Jackman has lived upon the land as a home for so long a period is strongly corroborative of his own testimony that he settled upon the land for the purpose of making a home, and not "for the purpose of speculation."

TIMBER LANDS.
SPITHILL VS. GOWEN.
Act of June 3, 1878-Definition of Timber Lands.

This act contemplates only such timber
lands as are embraced in broken, rugged or
mountainous regions, where the soil, when
timber is cleared off, is unfit for cultivation.
Heavily timbered lands, where the soil is sus-
ceptible of cultivation, are not embraced
under the act of June 3, 1878.
SECRETARY TELLER to Commissioner McFar-
land, May 8, 1883.

I have considered the case of Alexander Spithill vs. John D. Gowen, involving the S. W. of Sec. 29, Tp. 31, R. 4 E., Olympia, Washington Territory, on appeal by Gowen from your decision of March 25, 1882, holding his filing for cancellation and allowing the entry of Spithill.

The statute referred to cannot be construed to mean, that persons going to the frontiers, or along the lines of projected Hill's version of the matter substanrailways, and anticipating centres of popu- tially agrees with that of Jackman as to lation, shall not enjoy the benefits of their the arrangement to advance money; but enterprise and foresight, though they be- he testifies that Jackman said he "was to lieved that their claims would become of have half of 160 acres, and was to give great value on account of the proximity him (Hill) half of his half;" and that at to villages or cities; or that villages or a subsequent time, Jackman, in order to cities would even be built upon such make him and Robbins more secure for claims and thereby enable them ultimately further advances, stated that "there was to realize large prices for such lands. very little contest on his own claim," That is not the "speculation" that the (being the land now in question), and that statute intended to prohibit. he would put it also into the transaction and give us half of whatever he got for Gowen filed declaratory statement Janhimself or from either of the others." uary 13, 1880, alleging settlement DecemIt will be borne in mind that this trans-ber 24, 1879, and Spithill applied February action was some time after Jackman had 19, 1881, to enter the tract under the act filed his declaratory statement and made of June 3, 1878, (20 stat., 89.) settlement upon the land now in dispute. This act provides (section 1) for the It is not proved to my satisfaction that sale of lands "valuable chiefly for timber, Jackman's own claim entered at all into but unfit for cultivation," at the minimum the agreement; but conceding the trans- price of $2.50 per acre. action to have been as related by Hill, Ivided, That nothing herein contained shall do not think it can be construed into an defeat or impair any bona fide claim under agreement by Jackman to convey the any law of the United States, or authorize title of his own claim which he might re- the sale" of "the improveceive from the government, or any part of ments of any bona fide settler." Section it, to Hill. The agreement was not in 2 requires an affidavit from the applicant writing. It was at best an agreement to that the land applied for is "uninhabited," raise money for the defense of the claim. and by Section 3, publication of the apIt could not have been enforced against plication to enter the land must be made the land. for sixty days, after which the applicant is required to furnish the local officers satisfactory evidence" that the land is of the character contemplated in this act, unoccupied and without improvements," (except such as were made by or belong to the applicant) providing, also, that any person having a valid claim to any portion of the land may object to issuance of patent to the applicant, and that the merits of his objections be determined as in other land cases.

In Myers vs. Croft, (13 Wall., 291) Mr. Justice Davis, in commenting upon the causes which led Congress to pass the statute above cited, says: "It had been the well defined policy of Congress, in passing these laws, (pre-emption) not to allow their benefit to inure to the profit of land speculators; but this wise policy was often defeated. Experience had proved that designing persons, being unable to purchase valuable lands, on account of their withdrawal from sale, would procure middle-men to occupy them temporarily, with indifferent improvements, under an agreement to convey them, so soon as they were entered by virtue of their pre-emp) tion rights. When this was done and the speculation accomplished, the lands were abandoned. This was felt to be a serious evil; and Congress in the law under consideration, undertook to remedy it by requiring of the applicant for a pre-emption, before he was allowed to enter the land on which he had settled, to swear that he had not contracted it away, nor settled upon it to sell it on speculation, but in good faith to appropriate it to his own use."

I think it is quite clear under the facts in this case, that it does not fall within the class of cases prohibited by the

statute.

There is another branch to this case (upon which a large amount of testimony even more conflicting has been taken), which briefly stated is as follows: Jackman testifies that, in the fall of

In Larson vs. Weisbecker (9 Copp, 60) it was held that a mortgage given by the pre-emptor upon the land was not an alienation, nor such an agreement as was prohibited by the section of the Revised Statutes under consideration. In that case it was held that "the statute under consideration requires from a pre-emptor, in my opinion in order to the defeat of his entry a contract by force of which title to the land must vest in some other person than himself, and it must appear that such was his intention at the time of making it."

*

* *

* * *

"Pro

Spithill was thus required to show that the land was uninhabited, unoccupied and I am of the opinion that Jackman had unimproved, (except by himself) and that a legal right to the whole of said south- it was chiefly valuable for timber, and Should it however west quarter of section thirty-two, and unfit for cultivation. that it should have been awarded to him. 'appear that it is not subject to entry under

the provisions of this act, consideration of Gowen's pre-emption claim becomes immaterial in this case All timbered lands are unfit for cultivation in their natural condition; but if they may be redeemed and made susceptible of cultivation by ordinary farming process, they are not, in my opinion, within the purpose of this act, which was intended to embrace within its provisions timbered tracts only in broken, rugged or mountainous districts, with soil unfit for ordinary agricultural purposes when cleared of timber. A different construction of the act would subject to its operation immense bodies of heavily timbered land, which need only enterprise and labor for their conversion into fertile fields and flourishing towns.

cess.

The testimony shows that the tract in question, with all the land in that vicinity, is heavily timbered, but does not show that it is unfit for cultivation when cleared of timber. On the contrary it is shown that neighboring lands of this same general character are cultivated with fair sucA portion of that in question, variously estimated at from ten to fifty acres, consists of a swamp of rich soil, eight or ten acres of which is now fit for pasture and hay (the balance of which may be made so by drainage,) and a lake of four acres, while the remaining portion is upon a level upland, heavily timbered, with a gravelly and somewhat sandy soil slightly mixed with clay, which, under a large preponderance of testimony, may be converted into farming lands and made fit for cultivation. Such land is not, in my opinion, subject to entry under this act, but must be appropriated under the pre-emption and other laws for the disposition of the public lands.

I reverse your decision and dismiss the application of Spithill, leaving the claim of Gowen for his final proof.

TIMBER CULTURE.

CIRCULAR.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,

GENERAL LAND OFFICE, WASHINGTON, D. C., May 9, 1883. TO REGISTERS AND RECEIVERS :

The circular of March 23, 1883, relative to fees for reducing testimony to writing. is so far modified as to exclude the collection of such fees in final timber culture and desert land entries.

N. C. MCFARLAND, Commissioner. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, May 11, 1883. Approved: H. M. TELLER, Secretary.

would not. The timber culture laws re- Section 6 of the act (13 Stat., 365,) pro-
quire the affidavit to be made before the vides for the surveying of the lands for
Register and Receiver, or a clerk of some the purpose of the grant for forty miles in
court of record or officer authorized to ad- width on both sides of the entire line
minister oaths "in the district where the" after the general route shall be fixed."
land is situated." The word district re- Section 3 grants lands to said company
fers to the land, and not to the judicial within certain limits, which have not been
district, and consequently such affidavit otherwise appropriated "at the time the
must be made in the "land district" in line of said road is definitely fixed, and a
which the land sought to be entered is sit- plat thereof filed in the office of the Com-
uated.
missioner of the General Land Office."

[See Secretary's Decision, in Corning
Tunnel vs. Slide Lode-Copp's Min. Lands
—2d Ed.
2d Ed. p. 208.-Ed.]

RAILROADS.

[ocr errors]

I think it evident that the legislature did not intend that the "general route mentioned in Section 6 and the line of said road" definitely fixed "in Section 3 should be identical. The object of the provisions of Section 6 was to reserve the land within NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILROAD. the forty-mile limits generally for the Change of Line.-The line of definite location benefit of the company. The actual grant departs from the line of general route at Gal- of land is made in Section 3; and if the latin City and unites with it again at the line of the road as definitely fixed "Little Blackfoot." Such departure would varied from the "general route so as to carry a portion of the land grant outside of the forty-mile limits on the north, as estab-place any portion of the grant outside of lished by the map of general route. the forty-mile limits, the company lost the The company, under its charter, may make this benefits of the reservation, and only took change of line after having filed its map of such lands as were not otherwise approgeneral route. As it has been the uniform practice of the de-priated "at the time " the line was defipartment to permit a change of line after nitely fixed." filing a map of general route. SECRETARY TELLER to Commissioner Mc Farland, April 26, 1883.

I have considered the matter of the filing of map, July 5, 1882, of definite location of the Northern Pacific Railroad, through the Rocky Mountain division of said road, and the effect of the line fixed by such map upon the land grant contiguous thereto.

A map of general route was accepted by the department February 21, 1872.

July 5, 1882, the said company filed its map of definite location of the road through the "Rocky Mountain Division." The line of definite location departs from the line of general route at Gallatin City and unites with it again at the" Little Blackfoot." Such departure would carry a portion of the land grant outside of the forty-mile limits on the north, as established by the map of general route.

The reason of this divergence was the discovery of a more direct and feasible route; and the effect of it is to shorten the line between the points where the lines diverge and where they again unite, some forty-three miles.

The advantage of the short line in the matter of passage and transportation is very great to the government and to the public. It also has the effect to restore to the public domain more than a million acres of land.

DE COSTER AND FLEMINGTON. Timber Culture Affidavit-How made when a The length of the short line is one huncounty embraces lands in two land districts. dred and fifty-four miles. Since the filing COMM'R MCFARLAND to De Coster Flemington, of the map July 5th last, the grading of Ellendale, Dak., April 30, 1883. (S. W. Š.) this part of the road has been completed, You state that your county-Dickey-bridges and culverts built, and other work embraces land in both the Fargo and done at an expense of some two millions Aberdeen land districts, and ask if a tim- of dollars. ber culture affidavit made before a proper officer at Ellendale would be good in either district.

In reply, I have to advise you that it

The question presented is, whether the company, under its charter was authorized to make this change of line after having filed its map of general route.

66

When we consider the great length of the road to be built, the uninhabited and almost unknown country through which it was to be constructed, and especially the great difficulty of ascertaining the most eligible route through the mountainous portion of the line, it can hardly be sup posed that Congress contemplated that the "general route" should necessarily be the unvaried line of actual construction. It is evident that the most feasible route through the Rocky Mountain division in question could be ascertained only by maintaining for a long time surveyors and engineers in the field, and after close examination by explorers and repeated surveys of various possible ways. Such extended and deliberate work could not have been contemplated in the establishment of the general route.

It has been the uniform practice of this Department to permit a change of line after filing a map of general route.

Such permission was given in the case of the Union Pacific upon a divergence of fifty miles, and the land grant was adjusted to the line so changed. It was allowed in the case of the road now in question, upon a change of route in Minnesota, by my predecessor, Secretary Cox, who directed the grant to be adjusted accordingly. And in the matter of the branch in Washington Territory, the company filed a map of amended line in 1876, varying from the line of general route some one hundred miles; and my predecessor, Secretary Chandler, approved of the amended line, and gave directions for the withdrawal of the lands along the route as amended, and for the restoration of those along the abandoned route. And such, I think, has been the uniform practice of the department.

In 1880 my predecessor, Secretary Schurz, submitted certain questions to the

Attorney General in the matter of the Iowa and grant, involving the propositionl of the construction of the road upon a line different from that of definite location, and the effect of such a change upon the land grant. The Attorney General held that the grant should be adjusted according to the line of definite location, and that if a different road was constructed than that definitely located, the State would not be entitled to the benefit of the lands.

The opinion considered the question of the authority of this department to permit a change in the line as definitely located. And upon this subject I quote from the opinion (16 Atty.-Gen'l. Opin., 457) as follows:

a number of questions arising upon an filed in the General Land Office a map
application of the New Orleans Pacific designating the general route of a road
Railway Company for certain lands claimed projected thereby from Shreveport, by
under the land grant made to the New way of Alexandria to Baton Rouge, and
Orleans, Baton Rouge and Vicksburg thereupon a withdrawal of the public lands
Railroad Company, by the act of Congress along the same was ordered, which became
of March 3, 1871, chapter 122.
effective in December following.

The land grant mentioned is contained in the twenty-second section of that act, which provides :

That the said company shall construct the line of its road between the city of New Orleans and the city of Baton Rouge on the east side of the Mississippi River, to the corporate limits of the said city of Baton Rouge, or adjacent thereto."

Subsequently by an act of the legislature of Louisiana, passed December 11, 1872, the same company was given "full power "That the New Orleans, Baton Rouge and authority to commence the construcand Vicksburg Railroad Company, char- tion of their road in the city of New Ortered by the State of Louisiana, shall have leans or Shreveport, or at any intermediate the right to connect, by the most eligible point or points on their line of road, as may route, to be selected by said company, best suit the convenience of said company with the said Texas Pacific Railroad at its and facilitate the speedy construction of a eastern terminus, and shall have the right continuous line from the city of New Or"The question whether the road con- of way through the public land to the leans to the city of Shreveport, or perfect structed is or is not the road as definitely same extent granted hereby to the said railroad communication with the Texas located is a question for the Interior De- Texas Pacific Railroad Company; and Pacific Railroad, or any other railroad in partment to determine, in this as in other in aid of its construction from New Northwestern Louisiana, at or near the cases, and one which must be largely Orleans to Baton Rouge, thence by Louisiana State line: Provided, however, within the discretion of the Secretary. the way of Alexandria, in said State, to Some deflections must in many cases be connect with the said Texas Pacific Railexpected from the line of the road as defi- road Company at its eastern terminus, nitely located; but it is for the depart- there is hereby granted to said company ment to determine whether or not these its successors and assigns, the same nummake of it a different road, or whether ber of alternate sections of public lands there is substantial compliance with the per mile, in the State of Louisiana, as are line of definite location. In the exercise by this act granted in the State of Califorof this discretion it is impossible to lay nia to said Texas Pacific Railroad Comdown any legal rules which could govern pany; and said lands shall be withdrawn in all cases. Deflections which in certain from market, selected, and patents is cases might be held not to change the sued therefor, and opened for settlement character of the road as definitely located, and pre-emption, upon the same terms and might do so in others. I would suggest in the same manner and time as is prothat if the deflections be in their character vided for and required from said Texas immaterial if they were made for the pur- Pacific Railroad Company, within said pose of avoiding, engineering obstacles State of California: Provided, That said which could not otherwise be avoided company shall complete the whole of said without exaggerated expense, or to remedy road within five years from the passage of defects in the original location-such de- this act." flections would not destroy the identity The eastern terminus of the Texas Paof the road constructed with the road of cific Railroad, as fixed by the same act, definite location. Upon the whole matter was a point at or near Marshall, Tex. it will be the duty of the Secretary of the The New Orleans, Baton Rouge and Interior to decide whether the road con- Vicksburg Railroad Company was incorstructed is the road as definitely located." porated by an act of the legislature of If the Department has such discretion Louisiana passed December 30, 1869, even after a road is definitely located, it would seem that there ought not to be any question about the power to authorize a change in construction of the road different from that indicated by the map of general route.

In the meantime by the act of Congress of May 2, 1872, chapter 132, the Texas and Pacific Railway Company (formerly styled the Texas Pacific Railroad Company) was "authorized and required to construct, maintain, control, and operate a road between Marshall, Texas, and Shreveport, Louisiana, or control and operate any existing road between said points, of the same gauge as the Texas and Pacific Railroad." The same act further provided that "all roads terminating at Shreveport shall have the right to make the same running connections, and shall be entitled to the same privileges, for the transaction of business in connection with the said Texas and Pacific Railway, as are granted to roads intersecting therewith."

On February 13, 1873, a second map was filed in the General Land Office by the New Orleans, Baton Rouge and Vickswhich authorized it to construct and burg Railroad Company, designating the operate a railroad "from any point on the general route of a road projected thereby line of the New Orleans, Jackson and from New Orleans to Baton Rouge, and a Great Northern Railroad, within the parish withdrawal of the public lands along the of Livingston, running from thence to any same was ordered, which took effect in point on the boundary line dividing the April, 1873. The route between those States of Louisiana and Mississippi," the places, thus designated, lies on the east route here indicated lying east of the Mis- side of the Mississippi River. That comsissippi river. It was also authorized to pany has not constructed any part. of its construct and operate a branch railroad road, either on the route between New from its main line (above described) to Orleans and Baton Rouge, or on the the city of Baton Rouge; and for the pur- route between the latter place and Shrevepose of connecting its railroad with the rail- port; nor, indeed, has there been a defiroads of other companies, etc., it was fur- nite location of its road anywhere between thermore authorized "to construct, main- the points mentioned. Nothing beyond NEW ORLEANS, BATON ROUGE AND VICKS- tain, and use, by running thereon its en- the designation of the general route thereof appears.

I have therefore approved and herewith transmit the map of July 5, 1882. You will cause a withdrawal to be made to conform to the new line as definitely located and designated by such map, and restore the lands lying outside of the limits of the new route, and in all respects adjust the grant to the new line.

BURG RAILROAD COMPANY.

Present Grant-Assignment.-How the grant to
this railroad is affected by the assignment to
the New Orleans Pacific Railway Company.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, D. C., June 13, 1882.
By a letter dated the 5th of January
last, your predecessor submitted to me

gines and cars, such branch railroads and
tracks as it may find necessary and ex-
pedient to own and use;" and such branch
railroads were, for all the purposes of the
act, to be deemed and taken to constitute
a part of the main line of its railroad within
the State of Louisiana.

On November 11, 1871, that company

Pursuant to a resolution of its board of directors, adopted December 29, 1880, all the right, title, and interest of that company in and to the aforesaid grant of public lands made by the act of March 3, 1871, were deeded by it to the New Orleans Pacific Railway Company. This ac

« ZurückWeiter »