argument of that breviate; or rather I should say, what is the real truth, that the arguments of the breviate were dictated by the notoriety of that sentiment in the people of England. My object and wish always has been to strike at the root of the evil, the American war.

If the British nation have jealousies and resentments against the House of Bourbon, yet still the first step in every case would be to rescind the American war, and not to keep it lurking in the rear, to become hereafter, in case of certain events, a reversionary war with America for unconditional terms. This reversionary war was never the object of the people of England; therefore the argument of the breviate was calculated bona fide to accomplish their views, and to discriminate the fallacious pretences of the late Adininistration from the real wishes of the country, as expressed in the circular resolutions of many counties, in the year 1780, first moved at York, on March 28th, 1780. Every other principle and every mode of conduct only imply, as you very justly express it, a secret hope that war may still produce successes, and then The designs which have been lurking under this pretext could not mean any thing else than this. Who knows but that we may still talk to America at last. The only test of clear intentions would have been this, to have cut up the American war, and all possible return to it for any cause, or under any pretext. I am confident that the sentiment of the people of England is, and always has been, to procure peace and reconciliation with America, and to vindicate the national honor in the contest with the House of Bourbon. If this intention had been pursued in a simple and direct manner, I am confident that the honor and safety of the British nation would long ago have been established in a general peace with all the belligerent Powers. These are the sentiments upon which I have always acted in those negociations, which I have had upon the subject of peace with the late Ministry; reconciliation with America, and peace with all the world, upon terms consistent with the honor and safety of my own country.

Peace must be sought in such ways as promise the greatest degree of practicability. The sentiments of individuals as philan'thropists may be overborne by the power of ancient prejudices, which too frequently prevail in the aggregates of nations. In such case, the philanthropist, who wishes the good of his own country,

and of mankind, must be the bulrush bending to the storm, and not the sturdy oak, unavailingly resisting. National prejudices are, 1 hope, generally upon the decline. Reason and humanity gain ground every day against their natural enemies, folly and injustice. The ideas of nations being natural enemies to each other are generally reprobated. But still jealousies and ancient rivalships remain, which obstruct the road to peace among men. If one belligerent nation will entertain a standing force of three or four hundred thousand fighting men, other nations must have defended frontiers and barrier towns, and the barrier, of a neighboring island, whose constitution does not allow a standing military force, must consist in a superiority at sea. It is necessary for her own defence. If all nations, by mutual consent, will reduce their offensive powers, which they only claim under the pretext of necessary defence, and bring forward the reign of the millennium; then away with your frontiers and barriers, and your Gibraltars, and the key of the Baltic, and all the hostile array of nations:

Aspera compositis nitescant sæcula bellis.

These must be the sentiments of every philanthropist in his interior thoughts. But if we are not to seek peace by some practicable method, accommodated to the remaining prejudices of the multitude, we shall not in our own time, I fear, see that happy day. If Great Britain and France are ancient rivals, then, until the reign of the millennium shall approach, arrange that rivalship upon equitable terms, as the two leading nations of Europe, set them in balance to each other; the one by land, the other by sea. Give to France her elevated rank among the nations of Europe. Give to Great Britain. the honor of her flag, and the security of her island by her wooden walls, and there would be no obstruction to general and perpetual peace. The prejudices of disrespect between nations prevail only among the inferior ranks. Believe me, for one at least, I have the highest sentiments of respect for the nation of France. I have no other sentiments of hostility but what are honorable towards them, and which, as a member of a rival State at war with them, consists in the duty of vigilance which I owe towards the honor and interests. of my own country. I am not conscious of a word or a thought, which on the point of honor I would wish to have concealed from a French Minister.

In the mode which I have proposed of unravelling the present subjects of jealousy and contest, I would make my proposals openly to France herself. Let America be free, and enjoy happiness and peace forever. If France and Great Britain have jealousies or rivalships between themselves, as European nations, I then say to France, let us settle these points between ourselves, if unfortunately we shall not be able by honorable negociation to compromise the indispensable points of national honor and safety. This would be my language to France, open and undisguised. In the mean while I desire you to observe, that it would not be with reluctance that I should offer eternal freedom, happiness, and peace to America. You know my thoughts too well to suspect that. I speak only as in a state of war, desirous to arrange the complicated interests, and to secure the respective honor of nations. My wishes are, and always have been for the peace, liberty, and safety of mankind. In the pursuit of those blessed objects, not only this country and America, but France herself and the House of Bourbon, may justly claim the conspiring exertions of every free and liberal mind, even among their temporary enemies and rivals.

I am, &c.,

D. HARTLEY.

Breviate mentioned in the preceding Letter.

February 7th, 1782.-It is stated that America is disposed to enter into a negociation of peace with Great Britain, without requiring any formal recognition of independence; always understood that they are to act in conjunction with their allies, conformable to treaties.

It is therefore recommended to give for reply, that the Ministers of Great Britain are likewise disposed to enter into a negociation for peace, and that they are ready to open a general treaty for that purpose.

If the British Ministers should see any objection to a general treaty, but should still be disposed to enter into a separate treaty with America, it is then recommended to them to offer such terms to America as shall induce her to apply to her allies for their consent, that she should be permitted to enter into a separate treaty with Great Britain. The condition of which being the consent of allies, no proposition of any breach of faith can be understood to be required by them, by the requisition of a separate treaty.

The British Ministers are free to make any propositions to America which they may think proper, provided they be not dishonorable in themselves, which, in the present case, is barred by the supposition of consent being obtained. In this case, therefore, if they should be inclined to offer a separate treaty, it is recommended to them to offer such terms to America as should induce her to be desirous of closing with the proposal of a separate treaty, on the grounds of national security and interests, and likewise such as may constitute to them a case of reason and justice, upon which they may make requisition to their allies for their consent. It is suggested, that the offer to America of a truce of sufficient length, together with the removal of the British troops, would be equivalent to that case, which is provided for in the treaty of February 6th, 1778, between America and France, viz: tacit independence; and the declared ends of that alliance being accomplished, it would not be reasonable that America should be dragged on by their allies in a war, the continuance of which, between France and Great Britain, could only be caused by separate European jealousies and resentments (if, unfortunately for the public peace, any such should arise) between themselves, independent and unconnected with the American cause. It is to be presumed that France would not, in point of honor to her allies, refuse her consent so requested, as any rivalship or punctilios between her and Great Britain, as European nations, (principles which too frequently disturb the peace of mankind,) could not be considered as casus fœderis of the American alliance; and their pride as a belligerent Power would not permit them to claim the assistance of America as necessary to their support, thereby proclaiming their nation unequal to the contest in case of a continuance of a war with Great Britain, after the settlement and pacification with America. Their consent, therefore, is to be presumed. But if they should demur on this point, if Great Britain should be disposed to concede tacit independence to America by a long truce, and the removal of the troops, and if the obstruction should evidently occur on the part of France, under any equivocal or captious construction of a defensive treaty of alliance between America and France, Great Britain would from thenceforward stand upon advantage ground, either in any negociation with America, or in the continuance of a war including America, but not arising from any further resentments

of Great Britain towards America, but imposed reluctantly upon both parties by the conduct of the Court of France.

These thoughts are not suggested with any view of giving any preference in favor of a separate treaty above a general treaty, or above any plans of separate but concomitant treaties, like the treaties of Munster and Osnaburg, but only to draw out the line of negociating a separate treaty, in case the British Ministry should think it necessary to adhere to that mode. But in all cases it should seem indispensable to express some disposition, on the part of Great Britain, to adopt either one mode or the other. An absolute refusal to treat at all, must necessarily drive America into the closest connexion with France, and all other foreign hostile Powers, who would take that advantage for making every possible stipulation to the future disadvantage of British interests, and above all things would probably stipulate that America should never make peace with Great Britain, without the most formal and explicit recognition of their independence, absolute and unlimited.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO B. FRANKLIN.

Philadelphia, May 22d, 1782.

Dear Sir,

I expected to have written you a long letter, more particularly as it is some time since you have received any information from this country, the enemy having effectually blocked up our ports for some months past; but I find myself so extremely hurried, that I have hardly leisure to write this, the vessel by which it is to be sent going sooner than I apprehended.

You will receive herewith a letter to his Most Christian Majesty, which you will present, and a copy, which you will be pleased to deliver to the Count de Vergennes. This I believe is the usual form. You will also receive in the enclosed papers an account of the marks of respect with which the annunciation of the birth of the Dauphin was received. These are of some importance at a time when Great Britain is endeavoring to represent us as weary of the alliance, and anxiously wishing to return to our connexion with them. It is probable that the late changes in the British Adminis