"Such occupation would be likely to offend and irritate the people, and thus provoke hostilities which might be avoided.

"It would demoralize the army, and, by dispersing it, render impracticable those regulations necessary for its subordination and good discipline.

"For the same reasons it would endanger the safety of the smaller detachments.

"I am of opinion that we should occupy only a limited number of positions in the vital parts of the country, to be selected principally with a view to revenue, consulting at the same time the security of the posts, which includes the preservation of communication between them.

"The most palpable sources of revenue are,

"Duties on imports.

"Imposts on the assaying, coining, and export of the precious metals.

"Direct taxes.

"To realizo to the fullest extent the first, wo should occupy positions commanding the internal trade of the great sea-ports. The city of Mexico bears this relation to Vera Cruz; San Luis Potosi to Tampico; Orizaba and Tehuacan to Alvarado. These cities should be held, and an open communication preserved to their respective ports.

"To command the revenue from the mines, the cities of Zacatecas, Guanaxuato, and Queretaro should bo occupied.

"Zacatecas, San Luis Potosi, Zula, and Tampico, constituting a military line, would require 8000 men, distributed as follows:

"Zacatecas and San Luis, 2500 each; Zula and Tampico, 1000 each; and 1000 movable.

"Guanaxuato and Queretaro, on line in communication with Mexico, 2500 each.

"Mexico, Puebla, Perote, Jalapa, Puente National, and Vera Cruz, 13,000, distributed as follows:

Mexico, 5000; Puebla, 2500; Perote, 800; Jalapa, 1200; Puente National, 500; Vera Cruz, 1000; movable, 2000. Total, 13,000.

"Orizaba and Tehuacan, 2000.

"The whole number of troops required under this disposition of the forces would be 28,000 men.

"The occupation of a line from Zacatecas to Tampico would render it unnecessary to hold Monterey and Saltillo, or to keep open the communication between those points and the Rio Grande.

"The above estimate does not include any forces required for the Rio Grande or Pacific frontier."

These views were plausible, popular, and demonstrative; but two causes operated to defeat their adoption. First, the jealousy of Southern expansion common to all parties in the non-slaveholding states-a jealousy tho most absurd on the part of a manufacturing and commercial people. Secondly, it had become apparent that the acquisition of territory would be followed by a demand for the exclusion of slavery therefrom; and although it was obvious that, in the course of events, a contest upon that demand was inevitable, and that it should be met at once, nevertheless, many Southern statesmen concluded that it "was better to bear the ills we have than fly to those we know not of." This jealousy and these apprehensions, encouraged by the constitutional timidity of President Polk, who was then cherishing the hope of a re-election, soon brought the war to a close, and we surrendered a conquest more glorious, more available for great national purposes, and more important to the commerce of the world than any that has been won since the days of imperial Rome.

Quitman had gone to Washington with expanded views, which are farther revealed in the extracts that follow from a letter to his former aid, Lieut. Lovell:

"Upon opening my budget to the President he immediately condemned the whole course of Gen. Scott in refusing to give me a full division, so long as I was on duty with him, and promised me for the future it should be corrected. He went so far as to say that I

might select such position in the army, consistent with my rank, as I might choose. I immediately expressed my preference for the command of the Army of Occupa pation (Gen. Taylor's district), if I might be permitted to establish my head-quarters at San Luis Potosi. This he promised, if, by the passage of the Ten Regiment Bill, that force could be strengthened by the addition of another brigade. I remained awaiting the result until the news of Trist's treaty, first received by private_intelligence, and soon afterward officially communicated, put a stop to the bill. I, of course, remained to witness the fate of the treaty in the Senate. At first it seemed to be unfavorably regarded by the Democrats, but gradually gained strength, and was ratified. Quite confident in my own mind that the inducements held out to the half-starved Mexicans of securing $15,000,000, and the possession of their capital, and their sources of revenue, will assure the acceptance of the treaty as modified by the Senate, I applied for leave to return home, and there await the course of events."

His Position at home and future Views.

"I am now safely stowed in my own arm-chair in my library, quite certain that my next important movement will be to resign my sword and resume the occupations of peaceful life. I shall be well content here in my quiet nook to moor my bark. The gales of popular favor have, however, blown so strong upon me, I do not know but I may be compelled to launch out upon the tempestuous ocean of politics. If I must incur the hazard of a storm, give me a wide sea and a flowing sail. I would rather go down gloriously, engulfed by a mountain wave on the great deep, than be swamped in the surf of the sea-shore. My receptions every where have been enthusiastic in the extreme. No description reaches the reality. These manifestations are embarrassing, and I avoid them whenever it is possible. I have declined over one hundred invitations to public dinners and ceremonies."

Refutes the Charge that he was hostile to the regular Service.

"I have always received these public attentions as a tribute of respect for the gallant American army which has shed such lustre upon our arms. This reminds me that Lieut. Wilcox, whom I met in Baltimore, informed me that there was a report in circulation about Twiggs's head-quarters, Vera Cruz, that, in a speech at Charleston, I declared that I had joined the army for the express purpose of showing that volunteers were superior to regulars, and that events had proved the truth of my position. I have since learned that something of this kind is reported in the Charleston papers. I have never scen it, or I should deem it worthy of contradiction. Such a sentiment was never uttered by me. I would not state what I do not believe. In speaking of the army and its deeds I have never dissimulated, always ascribing its successes in part to the skill and gallantry of its commanders, in part to the military science diffused by the national military school, and in part to the general effects of our free institutions. A speech delivered in the open air, amid tho tunult of an immense crowd, may be easily misinterpreted; but I feel seriously concerned that any officer of the army would do me the injustice to attribute such a sentiment to me."

Not in Mr. Polk's Confidence.

"You are long since informed of the course which the War Department has thought fit to pursue in relation to the difficulties between some of the generals. Though Shields and myself were at Washington when the information came, we were not consulted. At the request of Lieut. Col. Duncan I suggested the propriety of having his trial ordered in the United States, but could not ascertain the views of the President. I have never even seen the list of brevets, or been in any way consulted in respect to them. While the President treated me with politeness (of course), I did not possess his confidence. Just as I was leaving the secretary of war apologized for not having shown me the list of brevets, but requested me to writo to him should I find any omissions.

From their great want of official candor and trust, I have troubled them with few applications."

In relation to his own case, the neglect of which subjected him to just mortification, he had addressed the secretary of war as follows:

(Unofficial.)

"U. S. Hotel, Washington, June 4th, 1848. SIR,-My departure in the morning to attend the Court of Inquiry at Frederick compels me to say in writing what I would have preferred saying in person. Both you and the President have declared that you consider me entitled to the usual mark of merit for services at Monterey. Why have I not received it? While the President doubted his authority to confer brevets on officers appointed to command the volunteers, the question might be satisfactorily answered. But since he has solved his doubts by conferring brevets on officers similarly conditioned, there is no apparent cause for the delay; and the inference will be either that I am unworthy of the distinction, or that justice is withheld from me. The omission being unexplained, he or I must suffer in history. Most likely my reputation will have to suffer his apparent judgment against my merits, though only three days ago, in the presence of the Hon. R. J. Walker, he acknowledged my right, and declared he would confer with you on the subject. I have been silent while there appeared to be a reason for the omission. I now claim it of you to present the case to the President. I submit to you whether, considering all that has occurred, and the alleged causes for which brevets have been conferred, there will not be upon my conduct at Monterey an implied censure; to repel which, and to protect my reputation hereafter, I shall be obliged to collect and preserve the evidence of the officers of the army present in those actions, that the facts of history may not be perverted.

"Whatever may be done in this case I desire may be done promptly, and before the end of the war, which now seems very near."

On the 7th of Sept. following he received his commis