vehement protestations. It is a generous fault, if it be one, and certainly is preferable to the Machiavellian method of considering every man a rogue until he has proved himself to be otherwise. But we must not suffer ourselves to be hoodwinked, or allow our confidence to be abused. We have seen enough of Louis Napoleon to be aware that he cannot be trusted. His career has been tortuous and crooked, he is a practised and profound dissembler, and he has, in the Idées Napoleoniennes, written in 1839, long before he had a chance of empire, developed an aggressive policy for the guidance of France which ought surely to put us upon our guard. We have also had ample experience of the machinations of Russia, of her secresy in forming plans, her obstinacy in adhering to them, and her ingenuity in carrying them out. A separate alliance therefore between France and Russia, the two great intriguing powers of Europe, of whatever nature it may be, must necessarily cause anxiety both in Britain and in Germany. France and Russia combined would be in a position to assert, though they might not be able to achieve, both maritime and military supremacy; and we must not forget that such a combination is not a new thing. It has happened more than once already.

It is, however, by no means certain that Russia has engaged herself to France so deeply, for it is questionable whether her doing so would be a wise political step. We believe that she was deeply offended by the conduct of Austria, in not giving her active assistance during the Turkish war, an assistance which she considered herself well entitled to expect, in return for the services rendered in 1849. But great states are rarely revengeful, at least as individuals are. Accommodation is better than rupture; and there is that community of interest, of sentiment, and of political theory between the governments of Russia and Austria, which must render a permanent misunderstanding a serious calamity to both. An alliance of Russia with France, so intimate that the military force of the former should be stationed on

the frontiers of Austria for the evident purpose of favouring the designs of the latter, could not be otherwise interpreted, both here and in Germany, than as the token of a deeplaid conspiracy, and from that hour we might abandon all hope of escaping from a general conflict. For we cannot imagine such an active alliance except for aggressive purposes; neither can we suppose that Russia would interfere without being tempted by the prospect of some special advantage to herself. We should then be forced to conclude that Russia was about to recommence her attempt on Turkey under cover of the war in Italy, and that her military demonstration on the Austrian frontier was intended to prolong that war, and indirectly to aid the French arms by distracting the attention of their antagonists. It is quite possible that some such game may be played, or at least be in contemplation; and we must keep that contingency in view. In the councils of Europe at this moment there is so much moral obliquity, that we do not know in whom we can repose confidence, to whose honesty we may trust. The greed of empire, so long restrained, is now manifested and almost openly avowed by states of magnitude and power. Nation is arrayed against nation, and kingdom against kingdom, not, as of yore, for the sake of vindicating religious freedom, or of asserting claims of hereditary succession, but for a trial of brute strength, robbery being the object of one party, and dogged resistance the determination of the other.

It is of great consequence that we should not allow ourselves, through vague sympathies for what are called oppressed nationalities, or aspirations after freedom which are too often utopian in their character, to take a false view of the real position of affairs on the Continent, and the animus of the different parties. Let it be conceded that the rule of Austria is despotic-so, it may be said, is that of almost every other country. Our own tree of liberty was of slow growth. It did not start up suddenly in full luxuriance, like the gourd of Jonah-had it done so, we may fairly conclude that it soon

would have withered away. Constitutions conjured up for the nonce, like those of the Abbé Sièyes, have no real vitality. They are raised in the morning, and ere sundown they have wholly perished. So has it been with the many constitutions which distracted France has known. None of them have proved permanent; none of them have been destined to endure. Like trees which have been hastily cut down, transported to another place, and stuck in to the earth without roots, to serve as a temporary avenue for some pageant or procession, they have drooped and died, and become firewood; and now, in their place, we behold indeed a tree, but it is the rooted upas of absolutism. Some of us in this country are far too apt to take for granted that constitutional freedom is a necessary consequence of successful revolt. Alas! experience has shown us but too plainly that in the majority of cases the actual result is anarchy, and the establishment of a mob despotism infinitely more dangerous and destructive than that of a single man. These are things, however, which our enthusiasts are slow to perceive, or perceiving will not allow. They sympathise with every revolt, without inquiring whether or not the revolt has been justified by oppression on the part of the Government; and they express their abstract detestation of despotism, without reflecting that despotism is the stock best adapted to receive the graft of constitutional liberty. And never yet did the nation fit for freedom fail to attain to it, not by violent spasmodic efforts, but by that gradual spread of intelligence and irresistible power of opinion which even sceptres cannot control, and which, while it renders the freeman capable of using rightly his great privilege, inculcates that respect for law and order without which liberty is nothing but a

name.

Some of us may think it a hard thing and unjust that Austria should have rule over any part of Italy, and may find fault with the political arrangements which gave her the command of Lombardy. That point, were we to take it up, would open to us a very wide field for discussion.

In the first place, we should have to consider whether by natural law or the ordinances of God it is permissible that two or more nations of distinct origin and with different languages should be subject to the sway of one ruler. Surely it is too late to agitate such a question as that, more especially as the British empire affords us many instances of a similar union. In the second place, we should have to enter thoroughly into the examination of title, which might require the production of a treatise as lengthy and intricate as Mr Carlyle's dissertation on the rise of the House of Brandenburg. We venture to think that there is no necessity whatever for going beyond the fact that Austria is in prescriptive possession of Lombardy. She received it, with the consent of all the European powers, more than forty years ago, and has since held it undisturbed, save by the treacherous attempt of the King of Sardinia subsequent to 1848. No better title could be given; and if this be admitted, and we do not see how it can be denied, surely it is great folly in any of us to call in question her rights. If a general congress cannot settle boundaries, and give a valid title to the possession of provinces, what can it effect? What is the purport of its meeting, or the use of its deliberations? Without such a

solemn settlement, bearing the character of a general European compact, there would be a perpetual contest for dominion, and the sword would never be sheathed. Do not let us undervalue or contemn these treaties, for they have been productive of vast benefits to us. They have preserved us from wholesale war for more than forty years, within which space of time more progress has been made in the arts and sciences, and more social improvements planned and executed, than men of the last generation could have imagined in their wildest dreams. They have served, at all events, to curb ambition, if they have not wholly restrained it; and even now they furnish us with a clear means of ascertaining who are the aggressors in this fresh international quarrel.

There is, we observe, a tone of poco

curantism assumed of late by some influential journals of the Liberal sort, upon which, as it is calculated to mislead, we must necessarily offer a remark. They maintain that, under no conceivable circumstances, will it be necessary for Britain to take part in the conflict-that this is merely a struggle between tyrants, which they must be left to fight out by themselves that while they exhaust themselves by war, we shall rapidly become more prosperous by peace and that we have no interest whatever in opposing any kind of change in the balance of power on the continent of Europe.

That is, no doubt, a comfortable creed; but, like most creeds composed entirely on the soothing principle of embodying our hopes and wishes only, we apprehend that it is fallacious. Nations cannot be indifferent to what is going on around them. War, like the flames on an Indian prairie, or a conflagration in a crowded city, has a tendency to spread

"Et tua res agitur, paries cum proximus

ardet."

Therefore we must take good heed lest the fire should extend beyond certain limits. So long as it is confined to one locality which is strongly fenced without, there is hope that it may exhaust its fury there without injury to the neighbouring tenements; and so long as Italy remains the sole seat of war, and no other belligerents declare themselves, this country is under no obligation to declare itself on either side. Our Ministers discharged one part of their duty, and a most important one, though it was not crowned with success, by making every effort to prevent the outbreak : another part yet remains, and that is, to use every means of persuasion and remonstrance with the undeclared powers, in order to restrain them from rushing into the fray. Blind indeed must the man be who has no perception of the danger which threatens the whole of Europe, and which can only be averted, under God's grace, by extreme caution and forbearance. There is danger in more quarters than one. The appearance of Russia acting in concert with

France, even though her operations were confined merely to marching troops to the Gallician frontier, would add greatly to the ferment in Germany, and possibly compel Prussia, who has hitherto done good service by restraining the more fiery and impatient section of the Germanic Confederation, to assume an offensive attitude, or at least to give her consent, hitherto withheld, to the stationing of a federal army of observation on the Rhine, which certainly would be followed by a similar movement on the part of France. The policy announced by Prussia is shortly this :-She declines to interfere on behalf of the Austrian non-federal dominions. She will not take the initiative, by making a demonstration on the Rhenish frontier; but at the same time, she declares, without hesitation or restraint, that she will take the field in case the territory of the Confederation should be menaced on any side whatever. It is impossible to over-estimate the value of this cautious though resolute policy on the part of Prussia at the present crisis; for the war party in Germany is very strong, and several of the states seem inclined to arm in Austria's quarrel, independent of federal considerations. The representatives of Bavaria, Hanover, Saxony, Baden, Hesse-Cassel, and Hesse-Darmstadt, have been urging the Diet to order the immediate movement of three corps-d'armée towards the Rhine; a proposition which, if agreed to, would, in our opinion, be construed by the French nation into a challenge. Besides this, there is another danger very likely to arise contingently on the success of the French and Sardinian arms. The latter could hardly effect their object of driving the Austrians out of Lombardy, without entering some part of recognised German territory. It may, indeed, be said, that as such territory will presumably be Austrian, no new complication can arise, because the belligerents continue the same; but those who argue thus know little of the spirit which animates the German Bund; for as certainly as the roll of thunder follows the flash of lightning, will Germany rise in arms so

soon as the foot of a French soldier has been planted upon any portion of her soil.

If Russia should abstain from all interference (which is not impossible, for the recent change in the Austrian ministry, by the substitution of Rechberg for Buol seems to point towards a reconciliation), we are hopeful that Germany may escape being implicated in the quarrel, at all events for the present. Whatever may be the future designs of Louis Napoleon for the extension of the French Empire, he cannot be desirous that the forces of Germany should be arrayed against him until the Italian campaign is concluded. For, despite French courage and confidence, which are always tinctured with a little of the gasconading spirit, the task which he has undertaken may not prove an easy one; nor are his chances of success, when weighed against the probability of failure, so very great as to give anything like an assurance of victory. Notwithstanding all his preparations and undoubted military force, it may yet be some time before he takes up his quarters at Milan; and even were he there, he has still to break through the strongest line of fortresses in Europe before he can call Lombardy his own. Austria has a magnificent army, well disciplined and officered; and her soldiers, in point of endurance, are second to none in Europe, though they may be deficient in the dash and rapidity of movement which is the pecu

liar characteristic of the French. Throughout the last great war the French found the Austrians to be most formidable opponents; and for their victories they were more indebted to the consummate military genius and quick tactics of the first Napoleon, than to the superiority of their men. What the military talents of the nephew may be, we cannot tell. He is said to have diligently studied the strategic art, and to have made himself a thorough master of its principles. But theory is one thing, and practice another; and we have yet to find out whether a man who has attained the age of fifty without having seen a shot fired on the field of battle, is

competent to direct extensive military operations. It is a daring attempt, which some might call presumptuous, and which, if unsuccessful, may be attended with disastrous consequences to himself. But we cannot wish that it were otherwise. It is fitting that the main disturber of the peace of Europe should go forth at the head of his armies.

So long, therefore, as Italy is the sole field of military operations, and no other states enter the arena as combatants, Britain may be able to remain a passive spectator of the strife. If France and Sardinia should be baffled in their attempt to wrest Lombardy from Austria, there is, so far as human foresight can reach, even a fair prospect that the war may not become general; and could we reckon on a cordial reconciliation between Russia and Austria, and an abandonment of her aggressive schemes in the direction of Turkey by the former power, such hopes would be materially strengthened. On the other hand, should the Austrians be driven out of Lombardy, a very serious question will be forced upon the consideration of the neutral states. Are the provinces so redeemed, or rescued, or emancipated

it is difficult in this case to find a term perfectly appropriate and descriptive of their situation--to be regarded as conquest, and as such to be appropriated or divided solely at the will of the captors? It is not likely that France and her coadjutor would broadly assert so much; for a war of liberation is something very different from a war of conquest, and implies a due regard to the wishes of the rescued people. But it is quite easy to manage things so, that an expression of opinion by a coerced or purchased junta may be made to pass for the deliberate resolution of a people; and, under bayonet rule, it is highly improbable that any would be found daring enough to gainsay the will of the liberators. Are we then prepared to allow Lombardy and Venice, as also the Duchies-for their fate is inseparable from that of the Austro-Italian provinces-to be partitioned by France and Sardinia We do not press for an immediate answer to that ques

tion-we do not think that the time for discussing it has yet arrived but we wish that the gravity of the situation, and the extent of the interests involved, should be made apparent to all. Also it must be remembered that the scheme of liberation includes the southern as well as the northern part of Italy. The Pontifical States and Naples must also be revolutionised and overrun. We have no sympathy to expend upon either the Pope or the Neapolitan tyrant, but their expulsion would leave a further tract of splendid territory to be divided. The question, when fully propounded, will be this-Shall Italy, from the Alps to Calabria, along with fair and blooming Sicily, become the appanage of the Gaul?

Firmly as we entertain the belief that the hearts of kings, as well as the destinies of nations, are in the Divine rule and governance, and are disposed and turned as seemeth best to the godly wisdom, and that mere human sagacity is unavailing to aid us in the time of perplexity, we must nevertheless remember that we are instruments in the hand of God, who has given us a rule of duty, and that we must endeavour to shape our conduct in accordance with that rule, under circumstances however trying, leaving the issue with confidence to His determination. We cannot hope to remain inactive spectators of a general war in Europe. Rashly to provoke war, or to rush into it head

long, without due cause and deliberation, would be a deep national crime; but to defend the rights of ourselves and others, when these are clearly ascertained, against unprincipled ambition and daring outrage, is a duty so manifest that none but fanatics would venture to deny it. In the midst of the general doubt and dismay which pervade Europe, arising mainly from the tortuous policy of Russia, the grasping ambition of France, and the selfish obduracy of Austria, it is cheering to know that we can reckon upon the co-operation of one great power, against whom no charge of having violated treaties, since the last general settlement, has been made. The interests of Prussia seem to be in all respects the same as ours. Liberal in her tendencies and Protestant in her faith, Prussia is our natural ally; and her influence in the councils of the Germanic Diet has been wisely and salutarily exerted. We are next to certainly assured that nothing whatever can occur to weaken this fortunate alliance, which is founded upon reciprocity of sentiment, family union, and the mutual respect of the people. And so, not confiding in our own strength, but in divine blessing, let us endeavour to fulfil our duty, and patiently expect a gracious answer to the daily prayer of the Church of England-"Give peace in our time, O Lord; because there is none other that fighteth for us, but only thou, O God."