From fiscal year 1963 through fiscal year 1967 our pay increases for military and civilian personnel and for retirement benefits have added about $5 billion to the annual rate, so on a comparable basis, we would be spending $55 billion. We are actually spending $68 billion. The gross national product has gone up dramatically during that same period of time, and whereas in fiscal year 1963 we were spending 8.7 percent of our gross national product on defense, with the $68 billion we are spending about 8.9 percent. So I don't see how it can be said that the defense burden, heavy as it is, is distorting our economy. I don't think it is. That is why the price increase was as small as it was. That is why we are able to carry on these operations without materiel controls, and that is why we don't have either wage or price controls planned. ADEQUACY OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT TO DETERMINE ECONOMIC ABILITY Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, I would comment on that instead of asking my last question. I don't think the gross national product is necessarily a proper interpretation of our financial position. I am intrigued by your comment that you think we could run the cost of this war, and use your word, forever. There is an article out by Dr. Stevens, former senior economist of the Standard Oil of New Jersey, and now a professor at the University of Indiana, who points out the danger of associating what you do in the way of spending too closely with your gross national product, if at the same time you are saying this justifies your financial position. As you and I both know, what we have been doing over a long period of years now-18 now to be exact is print paper gold so as to finance not only our own war, but the possible wars of practically everybody else. I just say this: If that is going to be the argument every year you all come up here, let me make a suggestion. Foment 50 strikes. Give the workers all they ask for. Put the additional price in the cost of the ticket and the merchandise. Then your gross national product will be that much higher, so that regardless of what you spend for defense it could be a lower percentage of the gross national product. Secretary MCNAMARA. No, sir; I don't think the mathematics will show that. Senator SYMINGTON. Then we have an honest difference. Secretary MCNAMARA. I think this is a question of fact. When you have the 50 strikes, raise the price, which you certainly would, the price of defense goes up the same way, and therefore your defense costs as a percentage of your GNP remains the same as before. What I am really saying to you gentlemen is that with as serious a problem as we have in Vietnam, and God knows it is serious, it isn't the money that is worrying me. Rather, it is the men's lives that are being lost and the risks we incur as a nation that is worrying me. But as serious as it is, it is not at the moment an insuperable financial burden for us. Nor do I think that in the future a defense budget as high as 9 percent of our GNP would constitute such a burden. It was 8.9 percent in fiscal year 1962 and 8.7 in fiscal year 1963, and I think we can sustain that kind of load in the future. COMMITTEE RECESS Chairman RUSSELL. The committee will now stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. We will meet in this room. (Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., Monday, January 23, 1967, the committee was recessed until 10 a.m., Tuesday, January 24, 1967.) SUPPLEMENTAL MILITARY AUTHORIZATIONS AND DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1967 TUESDAY, JANUARY 24, 1967 U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES AND SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OF THE COMMITTEE OF APPROPRIATIONS, Washington, D.C. The Committee on Armed Services and the Subcommittee on Department of Defense of the Committee on Appropriations, met in joint session at 10:05 a.m., in room S-128, the Capitol, Hon. Richard B. Russell (chairman) presiding. Present: Senators Russell, Ellender, McClellan, Pastore, Symington, Jackson, Mansfield, Cannon, Byrd of West Virginia, Young of Ohio, McIntyre, Inouye, Brewster, Byrd, Jr., of Virginia, Young of North Dakota, Smith, Allott, Thurmond, Miller, Tower, Pearson, and Dominick. Of the staff of the Committee on Armed Services: William H. Darden, chief of staff; Gordon Nease, professional staff member; and Charles Kirbow, chief clerk. Of the staff of the Committee on Appropriations: William W. Woodruff, assistant chief clerk to the committee; Francis S. Hewitt, clerk to the subcommittee; Vorley M. Rexroad, professional staff member; and Joseph L. Borda, minority counsel. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY STATEMENTS OF HON. ROBERT S. MCNAMARA, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, AND GEN. EARLE G. WHEELER, U.S. ARMY, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MORALE, DEDICATION, AND COOPERATION IN U.S. FORCES Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Thurmond; you are recognized for questions, Senator. Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, I visited Vietnam in December and had the opportunity to go into all areas. I am very much impressed with the medical facilities, and the high morale of the troops, with the exception of some of the pilots who felt they were risking their lives on unmeaningful targets, and others who felt that we ought to be bombing more meaningful targets. I was impressed with the dedication of the officers and the enlisted men with whom I came in contact. I was impressed with the coordination of the services and the fine spirit of cooperation, and other things I could mention. BOMBING OF STRATEGIC TARGETS AND CLOSING OF SUPPLY PORTS IN NORTH VIETNAM I am concerned about winning the war more quickly, and I feel that the two probable ways of helping this would be the bombing of strategic targets in North Vietnam, and closing of the ports to enemy supplies. Therefore, my questions will be mainly directed toward the first item and then toward the second, if time permits. I will hand you the first question here so you can follow along with me. [Deleted.] Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes. Let me respond first, and then ask General Wheeler to expand upon or correct anything I say. [Deleted.] General WHEELER. [Deleted.] [Colloquy deleted.] SELECTION OF BOMBING TARGETS Senator THURMOND. The next question. Mr. Secretary, would you tell us in detail the procedures by which targets in North Vietnam are selected and approved for the U.S. aircraft to bomb, including the authority vested in this regard in General Westmoreland, the U.S. commander in the Pacific, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the President? Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes. Senator THURMOND. I am trying to find out there, of course, as you see, exactly who determines the targets to bomb, and where the responsibility lies for them. Secretary MCNAMARA. The air combat in North Vietnam is under the command of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific, and hence the basic recommendations relating to that program come from him. Before he prepares his recommendations, he obtains counsel from his key subordinate commanders, in this case General Westmoreland and the Commander of the 7th Fleet. In addition to that, he obtains the advice of his component commanders, the commanders of the Pacific Air and Naval Forces. Based upon that, and in counsel with his own staff, he prepares recommendations to the Joint Chiefs. Their recommendations are considered by the JCS with me, and to the extent that further higher level discussion of the targets is not required, the JCS are authorized to issue the commands to the Commander in Chief, Pacific, who in turn delegates the actions to his subcommanders. There are certain restrictions on the Joint Chiefs' actions and the Commander in Chief's specific actions, and they relate to the following types of target or areas: [deleted]. Chairman RusSSELL. [Deleted.] Secretary MCNAMARA. [Deleted.] [Colloquy deleted.] Secretary MCNAMARA. I will be completely frank in discussing this. Chairman RuSSELL. All right. (Off the record.) POLICY OBJECTIVES AND MILITARY TASKS IN VIETNAM Chairman RuSSELL. Senator Mansfield has certain duties as majority leader. He was here yesterday and wanted to ask some questions, but had to leave and was passed over. If there is no objection now, I will call on him. Senator MANSFIELD. Thank you, Senator. Mr. McNamara, on page 6 of your testimony yesterday, you indicated the basic tasks which flow from this war: 2. To interdict the flow of men and supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. 3. To exert pressure on the Government of North Vietnam to cease its direction and support of insurrection in South Vietnam. Am I to understand that this is a war directed not only against aggression from the North, but also is a civil war directed against insurrectionaries within South Vietnam? Secretary MCNAMARA. I think the answer is "No," Senator Mansfield. That is not what this statement was meant to say, nor is it my view of the war. Without arguing the point of the origin of the conflict, our analysis indicated to us that it would not have started, it certainly wouldn't have reached the present scale without active direction of the action in the south by the north. Captured documents, [deleted] and other sources of intelligence appear to support that conclusion. Now having said that, I want to emphasize also that the direction from the north could not possibly have succeeded in activating the support it has had in the south, unless there had been what I will call indigenous support desiring to modify by revolutionary action, the economic and political institutions of the south. Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Secretary, I understand your point of view. I don't agree with it, because, according to the Webster Dictionary, an insurrection is "a rising up against civil or political authority." It is my belief that in its beginning this was a civil war that has been added to by the infiltration of Hanoi. That cadres in very, very small extent did not start coming down until the latter part of 1964, according to information which was received from the Department of Defense and checked and rechecked and not denied. MEKONG DELTA CAMPAIGN So, to me, it is a combination of a civil war in the south and an attack by Hanoi from the north, perhaps to direct the war effort, certainly to assist and to cooperate with the Vietcong. It appears to me that on the basis of newspaper reports recently, that we are considering stepped-up activities in the Mekong Delta. In that respect, I assume that you are aware, certainly far more than I am I am no military expert-that when you go into the Mekong Delta, you are going into the most difficult part of all Vietnam, far tougher than the central highlands and far tougher than the area along the demilitarized zone, and if I may be permitted, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a few comments about the Mekong which can be refuted or confirmed. It is my understanding that down there in the delta, there are 25,000 miles of waterways and canals. The people number 7 million, clus |