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FAILURE OF FAVORABLE RESPONSE TO BOMBING CESSATION PROPOSALS

Second, we have had opportunities to make clear to the North Vietnamese that we would be willing to stop the bombing without any action on their part preceding it, with no firm guarantee as to what they would do, but with just some general indication of how they would act. And the opportunities to present this proposal to them have occurred several different times in several different forms [deleted]. We have never received any indication whatsoever that they would respond favorably.

Now I want to emphasize again what I said before. This is my answer today. My answer tomorrow may be different. I think it is really the basic question we must keep in front of us all this time.

Senator PASTORE. But don't you think we might lose the chance, if we lost contact with these world leaders which can carry some prestige? Secretary MCNAMARA. No, sir; I don't believe we will have lost the chance. I think we have continuing opportunities for contact open to us.

Senator PASTORE. That is all I wanted to ask, Mr. Chairman. Chairman RUSSELL. Is there any objection to Senator Ellender pro

pounding one question?

Senator PASTORE. He can do it on my time.
Chairman RUSSELL. You have a few minutes left.

Senator ELLENDER. [Deleted.]

Secretary MCNAMARA. [Deleted.]

[Colloquy deleted.]

U.S. AIR FORCE MORALE IN VIETNAM

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Smith?

Senator SMITH. I pass at this time, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Allott?

Senator ALLOTT. Mr. Secretary, I only have a couple of questions, and these center about, partially, the discussion we had last year, and the statements you made a while ago. I don't say these in the sense of anathema in any way, but I have in my hand a letter from a pilot dated last July, just returned from Vietnam after flying 115 combat strike missions. I also have attached to this letter, which I do not intend to put into the record, a letter from him authorizing me to use this letter.

Among other things he raises the question that morale among our fliers in the Pacific is not as high as we have been led to believe. Then he goes on and says this. Here are some of the reasons:

The aviator has been made to feel that he is unsupported.

1. He has read statements by Mr. McNamara and others that there is no bomb shortage. Then the pilot has to fly his plane but he can carry no rockets or large bombs because there aren't any in WESTPAC.

Now he was flying an A-4 Skyhawk. We have been over this pretty well, particularly last spring and summer when you testified, that apparently as late as last July, the pilots were told that there were no large bombs available.

I don't know that there is any particular purpose to be served by going over this again, unless you have something you would want to comment on in addition to what you have told us, because you have told us that there were sufficient bombs.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, I would like to comment on it. I think he completely misstates the attitude of the pilots. I was out there in October. I know that wasn't their attitude then, because General Wheeler and I both talked to a number of pilots. I don't think I was there in July. I think General Wheeler may have been.

General WHEELER. Not this past July.

Secretary MCNAMARA. But in any case we were both there in October, and I am certain that wasn't the attitude then.

ADEQUACY OF SOUTHEASTERN ASIAN BOMB INVENTORIES

Second, as far as there being no bombs, no large bombs, in WESTPAC in July is concerned, it just isn't the case. I will be happy to go back and get the July inventories, if you want them. You can look at them.

The fact is that the bomb inventories are so high that we just a few days ago stopped sending all but five categories of bombs out there, unless the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific specially asked for it.

I think I read in the press of that letter at the time. I asked the Navy to look into it, not to penalize the man in any way, because I think he had left the service by then, but to find out the facts of the case. It was reported to me that they did not consider that the allegations were well founded, and I know from my own personal contact that they weren't well founded as far as the attitude of the pilots in October was concerned.

Senator ALLOTT. There is no point in my trying to argue about the bombs because there has been so much come back to us individually about the unavailability of bombs that I don't suppose we can resolve it. Secretary MCNAMARA. You can look at the bomb inventories if you want to and you can hear what General Wheeler just said and you can examine the statements of the commanders out there. They have said that at no time did bomb shortages adversely affect combat operations and I can show you the inventories. The fact is that bombs are coming out of our ears in the Pacific at the moment.

We have got [deleted] tons on the ground, and we used 56,000 tons in December, so you can see today's supply is tremendous. We have [deleted] on the way.

Senator ALLOTт. Is he talking about large ones, thousand pounders? Secretary MCNAMARA. I was looking for the inventory. I have got the worldwide inventory, but I don't happen to have the southeast Asian inventory. We have got plenty of large bombs. The requirements for these bombs float up and down. It is like the hems of women's dresses. It is a question of what is popular at the time. The 750-pound is what they wanted, particularly for B-52 operations. They wanted nothing but 750's, and I think I am right that now they want primarily 500's for 52's.

BOMBING STRIKES AT SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SITES

Senator ALLOTT. Now this second point which I would like to explore with you very quickly. A pilot has flown there and watched the construction of SAM missile sites step by step until they were fully armed and operating.

Meanwhile when it was militarily wise to strike them in the early stages he was forbidden to do so, but when it was militarily asinine to strike them after thev

were operational and heavily defended, he was then ordered to do so with very high losses.

Now I would like to ask this general question. I think Senator Byrd approached it. I have never been able to clearly define in my mind who makes the selections for targets there. You say that CINCPAC does it on certain general operation principles, and then above that it goes to the Chiefs, and above that it goes to other people, is that correct

Secretary MCNAMARA. It depends on the type of targets. Let's just take the allegation made that he wanted to strike the surface-toair missile sites while under construction, wasn't allowed to, and was then ordered to strike them when they were fully operational, at great

cost.

Now the latter is probably true, that when you strike them, it is costly, and that is a good reason not to strike them if you can avoid it. But there is no gain from striking them while they are under construction and before the equipment has been moved in. It is quite apparent that the North Vietnamese constructed far more sites than they had equipment for, and their pattern of action was to scar the earth, which is why we knew a site was being constructed, but not install at that site the radar and battery equipment. Certainly there is no sense in dropping bombs on scarred earth without equipment on it.

Senator ALLOTT. Yes, but your reconnaissance should show when that time has arrived.

Secretary MCNAMARA. And when that reconnaissance shows it, it is the only time when a strike is warranted, and therefore prior to that time, they should not be struck. After that time, my guess is most commanders would not strike them unless they were interfering with operations, because they were heavily defended, and to strike them causes losses.

WASHINGTON INFLUENCE ON SAM SITE TARGET DECISIONS

I think I am correct, Bus, in saying that at no time in July or any time in 1966 for that matter was there any prohibition on striking any SAM sites. Washington made no decision whatsoever to strike SAM sites in 1966. I think I am correct on that.

General WHEELER. That is correct. As a matter of fact we took on [deleted] of them yesterday.

Senator ALLOTT. This is in fiscal year 1967.

General WHEELER. In fiscal year 1966 the same way.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think at no time did Washington exercise control over SAM site strikes in fiscal year 1966. This is typical of the errors in that letter.

Senator ALLOTT. I have no reason to distrust the letter.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I hope you have no reason to distrust General Wheeler and me.

Senator ALLOTT. No, but here is a fellow who has been through 115 missions, mostly over North Vietnam, and he is not playing out in the backyard.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Senator Allott, I submit to you he has no way of knowing at what higher command level the decision to strike has been made or not made.

Senator ALLOTT. No, I am asking the question because of the question that is posed by his remarks.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Right. I simply tell you that as best I can remember, and apparently as best General Wheeler can remember, at no time in 1966 did authorities in Washington influence the decision to attack a SAM site.

General WHEELER. [Deleted.]

Senator ALLOTT. [Deleted.]

General WHEELER. [Deleted.]

Secretary MCNAMARA. Senator, when I said that at no time during that period to my knowledge did Washington influence the attacks on SAM sites, I don't want to imply that other target decisions weren't made in Washington during that period, because they were. But SAM's were not a category that required Washington action.

U.S. TROOP STRENGTH AND FACILITY INVESTMENT IN THAILAND

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Monroney?

Senator MONRONEY. Mr. Chairman, I just want to ask one or two questions about Thailand. We have some [deleted] airmen, did you say, that are stationed there in Thailand, and considerably more ground troops?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes. I have forgotten the exact number of airmen; 35,000 altogether. [Deleted.]

Senator MONRONEY. 35,000, and we are approaching around [deleted] dollars in investment in facilities?

INSURGENCY THREAT IN NORTHEAST THAILAND

Secretary MCNAMARA. It is over [deleted].

Senator MONRONEY. Is the threat there in northeast Thailand from the Vietcong or is it from local Communists, or what?

Secretary MCNAMARA. We are told that it is led by infiltrated Communists, from North Vietnam.

Senator MONRONEY. How many?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Well, it is probably, what would you say, Bus, less than [deleted] today?

General WHEELER. That is right. [Deleted.]

Senator MONRONEY. Are they indentifiable as combatants, or are they just suspected of being disloyal to the Thai Government?

General WHEELER. They are generally not Government oriented, and therefore they are right for indoctrination.

Senator MONRONEY. We have [deleted] there?
General WHEELER. We think about [deleted].
Senator MONRONEY. [Deleted] Vietcong?

Secretary MCNAMARA. A [deleted] of what we would call insurgents.
Senator MONRONEY. It seems to me like that is an awful high price

to pay for a [deleted] insurgents there, with 35,000 men.

Secretary MCNAMARA. The 35,000 have nothing whatsoever to do with those insurgents.

Senator MONRONEY. [Deleted.]
Secretary MCNAMARA. [Deleted.]

[Colloquy deleted.]

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Senator MONRONEY. Do you think it is likely that the Vierung operations might spread, as an organized force, or is this just indige nous rebels that we are speaking of?

Secretary McNAMARA. The Red Chinese and North Vietnamese have made very clear their intention to carry on a subversive campaign in Thailand as soon as their resources will permit it, and this is one of the great dangers of course of allowing the insurgency in South Vietnam to be successful. Very clearly they would then divert those resources away from South Vietnam and into Thailand.

Senator MONRONEY. [Deleted.]

Secretary MCNAMARA. [Deleted.] [Colloquy deleted.]

VIETCONG ATTACKS ON THAI VILLAGES

Senator MONRONEY. To date there have been no Thai villages taken over or no assumption of control by the Vietcong?

Secretary MCNAMARA. NO.

Senator MONRONEY. Of any Thai territory?

Secretary MCNAMARA. No. Occasionally they conduct an armed at

tack on a village.

Senator MONRONEY. A raid.

Secretary MCNAMARA. A raid or something of that kind.
Senator MONRONEY. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Symington?

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, with reference to some of the questions asked by Senator Allott, [deleted].

[Deleted.]

Secretary MCNAMARA. [Deleted.]
Senator SYMINGTON. [Deleted.]
General WHEELER. [Deleted.]

[Colloquy deleted.]

ABILITY OF U.S. ECONOMY TO WITHSTAND COSTS OF WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Senator SYMINGTON. We are now in a major ground war in Asia. The Defense Department apparently is optimistic about it. Others are pessimistic.

Apparently we now plan to put tens of thousands more ground troops in South Vietnam, but do not plan to relax the rules against air attacks on military targets. My question is, how long can this Nation afford to continue the gigantic financial cost incident to this major ground war in Asia, without its economy becoming nonviable?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think forever, and I say it for this reason: That there are many things, many prices we pay for the war in South Vietnam, some very heavy prices indeed, but in my opinion one of them is not strain on our economy.

Now lest that sounds completely incomprehensible to you, here is why I say it. The Defense budget in fiscal year 1967, the current year, expenditures will be on the order of $68 billion. We spent $50 billion in fiscal year 1963-I take fiscal year 1963 just because it was a reasonably typical year. Take any other year you want to and make the same analysis. But in 1963 we spent $50 billion.

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