USE OF ADDITIONAL AIR AND NAVAL POWER Finally I would say that I don't believe-and I want Bus to express his opinion on this, it might differ from mine-I don't believe any amount of bombing, within practical limits, of North Vietnam would have substantially reduced whatever the actual infiltration was. These would be my responses. Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I can't agree with the last part. All the first part the Secretary knows better than I. Based on what I saw out there, if we had used more of our air power and our naval power we would certainly have stopped a great deal more arms, and ammunition and people coming down the Ho ChiMinh and Sihanouk trails. Secretary MCNAMARA. Without arguing whether we should or shouldn't have bombed more, I would like Bus to express his judgment whether I will say "unlimited" bombing within practical limits would have significantly affected the BOMBING OF MORE SIGNIFICANT TARGETS Senator SYMINGTON. I am not talking about unlimited bombing. All I am talking about is bombing more significant military targets. I am not talking about unlimited bombing. Secretary MCNAMARA. I did not mean to mischaracterize it, but within practical limits I mean the same thing you are talking about, practical bombing above what we did. Would it have affected the level of infiltration in 1966 in any significant way? I don't believe so. I would like you to hear from General Wheeler. Chairman RuSSELL. Senator Symington's time has long since expired, but we will let General Wheeler respond to this. EFFECT OF BOMBING IN NORTH VIETNAM AND LAOS General WHEELER. I will say this: I don't think it would have affected the men because they can sift through on numerous trails, and they are almost impossible to stop if they have the will to keep going. I do believe, as I said yesterday, that our bombing in North Vietnam and against the infiltration routes [deleted] has reduced the level of materiel supplies which are moved from North Vietnam into South Vietnam. I cannot give you any figures on this. I also have the feeling that the reason we don't have the [deleted] combat battalions in South Vietnam that were anticipated [deleted] last year, the reason that we don't see a larger buildup of North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam, is a measure of the effectiveness of our bombing campaign to date. This is about the best I can do with that one. Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. COMMITTEE RECESS We Chairman RuSSELL. The committee will now go into recess. have some business on the floor this afternoon which would make it difficult for the committee to meet with any continuity, so we will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow, and we will be back in the New Senate Office Building. Senator THURMOND. Who will be the first Senator questioning tomorrow? Chairman RuSSELL. The first one will be Senator Jackson, and that makes two Democrats on that side, and then Senator Thurmond. (Whereupon, at 12:30p.m., Tuesday, January 24, 1967, the committee was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Wednesday, January 25, 1967.) SUPPLEMENTAL MILITARY AUTHORIZATIONS AND DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1967 WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 25, 1967 U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, AND SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, Washington, D.C. The Committee on Armed Services and the Subcommittee on the Department of Defense of the Committee on Appropriations, met in joint session at 10:05 a.m., in room 1224, New Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard B. Russell (chairman) presiding. Present: Senators Russell, Ellender, McClellan, Symington, Jackson, Ervin, Cannon, Byrd of West Virginia, Young of Ohio, Byrd of Virginia, Young of North Dakota, Thurmond, Miller, Pearson, and Dominick; also present: Senator Javits. Of the staff of the Committee on Armed Services: William H. Darden, chief of staff; T. Edward Braswell and Gordon A. Nease, professional staff members; and Charles B. Kirbow, chief clerk. Of the staff of the Committee on Appropriations: William W. Woodruff, assistant chief clerk to the committee; Francis S. Hewitt, clerk to the subcommittee; Vorley M. Rexroad, professional staff member, and Joseph L. Borda, minority counsel. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY STATEMENTS OF HON. ROBERT S. MCNAMARA, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, AND GEN. EARLE G. WHEELER, U.S. ARMY, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MEKONG DELTA OPERATION Chairman RUSSELL. The committee will come to order. Senator Jackson. Senator JACKSON. Mr. Secretary, I am a bit concerned about our moving into the delta. I guess everyone is concerned about it. [Deleted.] Secretary MCNAMARA. [Deleted.] [Colloquy deleted.] Senator JACKSON. What is your feeling about that? Secretary MCNAMARA. May I ask General Wheeler to respond, Senator Jackson? He has just returned from there and discussed this with General Westmoreland. General WHEELER. [Deleted.] Senator JACKSON. [Deleted.] The other thing that concerns me about going into the delta, and this goes to the fundamentals of the matter, is that this area involves about 38 percent of the population. General WHEELER. Roughly that. Senator JACKSON. Approximately. General WHEELER. It is a heavily populated area, although the population is concentrated within certain regions in the delta. It is not spread uniformly across the delta, as you know. Senator JACKSON. I would hope that ARVN could carry the main burden with the support that we are now giving through our advisory assistance program. [Deleted.] General WHEELER. [Deleted.] Senator JACKSON. No; it is a brigade. General WHEELER. A brigade. [Deleted.] I know that the revolutionary development pacification programs do call for extensive use of the ARVN in all of these operations, so I feel that General Westmoreland's analysis of the problem and his proposed course of action are prudent, and will be on a basis which will permit him to change the direction, the size, or the type of the operation as he goes along. ELECTRIC POWER FACILITIES IN NORTH VIETNAM Senator JACKSON. Turning to the north, what percentage of the electric power facilities have we knocked out? Secretary MCNAMARA. I think it's about [deleted] percent, Senator. Senator JACKSON. That one raid-I think you said [deleted]. Secretary MCNAMARA. That is right. Senator JACKSON. As of now, is it back in operation? Secretary MCNAMARA. No, sir; I don't believe so. Senator JACKSON. It isn't? Secretary MCNAMARA. I don't believe so. Senator JACKSON. SO currently, you would say about [deleted] percent. Secretary MCNAMARA. About [deleted] percent. Senator JACKSON. What prevents us from going after the other power facilities? Secretary MCNAMARA. [Deleted.] Senator JACKSON. But wouldn't it have a substantial indirect effect on the operations to the south? Secretary MCNAMARA. [Deleted.] Senator JACKSON. [Deleted.] It seems to me that it's going to compound their problem in the operation of their government, and it would take resources away from those they are utilizing in the south. Secretary MCNAMARA. [Deleted.] PETROLEUM IN NORTH VIETNAM STORAGE FACILITIES Senator JACKSON. Turning now to petroleum, what percentage of existing storage facilities have we knocked out? Secretary MCNAMARA. You say the existing-let me include in that all the facilities that were available at the start of the campaign, plus those that have since been added. Senator JACKSON. Right. Secretary MCNAMARA. And we have knocked out about 55 to 60 percent. There is 40 to 45 percent remaining. Senator JACKSON. And where is the 40 to 45 percent located? Secretary McNAMARA. There are a few remaining concentrations above ground, but not very many, and the rest is not so much underground, although some is, as it is scattered in small dumps above ground. Many of the dumps actually are in populated areas. The best estimate we have, and I emphasize it is only an estimate, is that they have over [deleted) days supply on hand, perhaps closer to [deleted] than [deleted] days. BACKLOG AND CONSUMPTION Senator JACKSON. That is a rather substantial backlog. Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes. The stock on hand was on the order of about [deleted] metric tons when we began a concentrated campaign at the end of June. We think we reduced it to perhaps as low as [deleted] metric tons in the 2 or 3 months after the attacks began, during which time they had not yet modified their importation techniques. But since we destroyed the docks at Haiphong and the receiving facilities, they weren't able to use the same method of unloading as they had previously. It took them 2 to 3 months to develop a new technique, and during that period of time the imports dropped very substantially, and that is why the stocks dropped as much as they did. To put the [deleted] tons that remained at the end of August into perspective, I should tell you that they consume, we think, about [deleted] tons a month. So even at the low point, they had about [deleted]. IMPORTATION BY BARGES Since that time, the stocks we believe have built back up again to something on the order of [deleted] tons today-roughly, say [deleted] days supply-and this because they have, starting in August, and increasingly since that time, unloaded into barges under the cover of darkness. [Deleted.] Senator JACKSON. They are lightering them in by barge from the tankers out in the stream. Secretary MCNAMARA. That is correct. |