proceed cautiously, watching their political and economic as well as technical-military trends. I will discuss the Chinese threat in some detail later.

This, in brief, is the strategic situation, and these are the objectives and directions of our strategic program. With a different interpretation of the situation, or a different set of objectives, one might have different plans. I believe our current plans are sound and closely reasoned.

R. & D. PHILOSOPHY AND GUIDELINES

Let me turn now to the R. & D. philosophy designed to meet our strategic needs.

Inadequacies in intelligence data lead to uncertainty in our estimates of the capabilities of potential adversaries. Equally important, we expect new scientific and engineering possibilities to emerge that will influence the strategic situation, occasionally in significant ways. These two forces inevitable uncertainties in intelligence, together with expected technical opportunties-convince us that R. & D. should be planned as follows.

AVOIDANCE OF TECHNOLOGICAL SURPRISE

First, to avoid technological surprise, we must carry out vigorous, broadly based research and exploratory development. We attempt to discover new ideas potentially relevant to national security. We test the feasibility of ideas at the frontier of science and technology. And we hope to anticipate the worst that potential enemies could bring against us. These activities range from laser technology to materials science, from weather modification to biophysics.

TECHNOLOGICAL OPTIONS TO MEET THREAT

Second, to get proven technological options available to meet any new threat, we carry out advanced and engineering developments. In these activities we narrow the number of approaches being considered. Our intelligence permits us to know somewhat more about the nearterm threat and thus our possible near-term needs. However, where intelligence is not so clear, we must hedge against this uncertainty so that we are prepared for even improbable events. Often we hedge in several directions corresponding to several conceivable directions of the changing threat. But the cost per program increases rapidly as we examine more exhaustively the overall feasibility of a new system. Thus we invest most heavily in those approaches thought to be both needed and feasible. These activities range from the superhard silo to advanced engines and avionics, from new penetration aids to new missiles.

OPERATIONAL SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT

Third, to be confident that we possess the needed deterrent, we perform operational systems development and deployment. We augment and improve these forces on a time scale matching our intelligence regarding actual Soviet (and Chinese) development and deployment activities. In fact, for many years we have had the necessary capabilities well before the corresponding Soviet threat actually appeared operationally. These are the most costly programs, yet our policy is to sustain a margin of safety against all actual and imminent threats. POSEIDON and SRAM are major programs in this part of the R. & D. effort today.

CENTRAL R. & D. GUIDELINES

Let's look at this whole picture another way. In the research and exploratory development programs, we are limited by our brainpower. We are exploring options in the absence of a particular established near-term enemy threat. In advanced and engineering development, we are essentially guided by a conservative interpretation of intelligence data in relation to our own leadtimes before deployment. In operational systems development, our decisions are guided by the national intelligence estimates and by comparative cost-effectiveness analysis.

The central guideline throughout the whole R. & D. planning for strategic weapons is essentially this: Consider the total range of uncertainties, and make decisions on programs to provide all reasonable hedges against possible new needs or changes in threat. We continuously make a series of calculations, starting with intelligence, to compare our own estimated leadtime with the worst case for the deployment leadtime of a potential enemy. We carry out R. & D. to provide all reasonable options. We deploy either when there is a clear, actual, or imminent threat or when we cannot insure against our uncertainty with only an R. & D. program.

UNITED STATES FOLLOWING A "LOW RISK" POLICY

In principle, this is a low risk policy in the following sense. Where threat information is adequate, we invest an amount sufficient to meet the threat. Where information is inadequate, and uncertainty high. we run some risks of overinvestment to insure that our capability will be adequate, that it is sure to fulfill our strategic objectives. The risk is not that we will be caught without adequate capability, but that we may have excess capability.

R. & D. PROGRAM MUST BE FUNDED ADEQUATELY

I believe we are fulfilling these guidelines. Yet I must emphasize that this aggressive R. & D. program cannot be successful unless it is funded adequately. Our budgets are trimmed with scrupulous attention to the coupling between technical projects and our future operational needs. Arbitrary reductions will affect our margin of safety, and changes in one area do have consequences for other areas. We should not assume otherwise.

ILLUSTRATIVE STRATEGIC PROGRAM AREAS

I will turn now to four major program areas: Offensive missiles, advanced bombers, air defense, and missile defense. Each contains some tough decisions that have been made, or will be, based upon the application of the strategic policies and R. & D. philosophy that I have just reviewed.

NEED FOR A NEW MISSILE

The first major weapon system issue I will discuss is whether we should develop a new, larger ICBM to replace or augment the present MINUTEMAN force. This discussion should illustrate how we proceed to minimize the uncertainties in the Soviet threat in designing weapon systems to meet our strategic goals.

There are two principal arguments involved in this choice. Would our missile forces continue to be able to survive an attack as Soviet technology advances? Would these surviving missiles be capable of penetrating future Soviet missile defense systems?

SURVIVABILITY OF U.S. MISSILES

Survivability is a potential problem because the Soviets have the basic knowledge to develop and deploy missiles, [deleted] having sufficient accuracy to destroy [deleted] of the present MINUTEMAN force. We have not yet seen any indication they are attempting such development. But because such a Soviet capability could reduce seriously our strategic strength, we must provide a timely response to such a possibility, as well as long-term solutions.

PENETRATION OF SOVIET DEFENSES

Penetration of future Soviet defenses becomes a possible problem because the type and level of Soviet missile defenses are unclear. We can expect [deleted] of prior knowledge before a substantial defense is deployed. Hence, we must provide a hedge with that leadtime against this possibility in addition to the threat to MINUTEMAN. We have taken five actions that give us timely options to offset these potential threats.

MIRV

MIRV. Against the possible dual threat of Soviet destruction of MINUTEMAN and of expanded Soviet missile defense, we have increased the penetration capability of both the MINUTEMAN and the sea based force by proceeding at a rapid pace to retrofit these systems with the multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV). With a large number of warheads on each missile, those that survive will be far more effective. We will have increased the number of warheads from about [deleted] at the end of this fiscal year to over [deleted] by 1976.

The MINUTEMAN force can have MIRV's introduced in [deleted]. This advanced MINUTEMAN can carry [deleted] warheads of [deleted] each or [deleted] warheads plus [deleted] decoys. Some [deleted] new MINUTEMAN III's are planned and will be deployed by the end of [deleted].

The POSEIDON missile will carry up to [deleted] warheads of [deleted] each, although we are planning only [deleted] warheads at the present time. The first POSEIDON ship will be operational in [deleted] and 31 POSEIDON ships will be operational by the end of [deleted]. The POSEIDON program was started mainly because of the uncertainty of the TALLINN threat. But the program is being continued at a rapid pace to provide safety in hedging against the following possible threats:

1. TALLINN might be converted quickly into a limited capability missile defense system.

2. The Moscow defense system might be expanded fairly rapidly to other cities.

3. A new terminal defense system could be deployed within [deleted] years years after we first know of it.

4. The MINUTEMAN force could be threatened by either rapid deployment of the current Soviet SS-9, or by MIRVing their existing missiles and improving accuracy.

ABM SYSTEMS

Defense of MINUTEMAN. One of the considerations for deploying SENTINEL was to provide for a possible heavy defense of MINUTEMAN. The SENTINEL deployment places [deleted]. This gives us the capability to rapidly add SPRINT interceptors and radars if a greater threat should appear.

Although the Soviets now only have [deleted] to destroy a MINUTEMAN silo, they could place multiple warheads on these large boosters, or improve the accuracy of, and add, their smaller ICBM's, the SS-11's.

[Deleted.] SENTINEL as now planned would save about [deleted] of these MINUTEMAN. We are reserving the option to add [deleted] SPRINT interceptors, which would save an additional [deleted] MINUTEMAN. With low-cost leadtime preparations, we can deploy SPRINT within [deleted] years of the decision to take this action.

HARDENING OF SILOS

Very Hard Silos. In a recent study of future ballistic missile systems, the concept of placing a land-based ICBM force in very hard, [deleted] silos emerged as one of the most desirable long-term solutions to the problem of survivability.

Developments of a new silo could be completed by late [deleted] and thus could provide a hedge against early Soviet accuracy achievement. Therefore, we have scheduled such a development and could exercise this hedge, if required, by either relocating or adding new MINUTEMAN III in this new silo within a period of [deleted] years. These new silos would also be capable of holding a new, much larger ICBM with a payload as high as [deleted] pounds, compared with [deleted] pounds for MINUTEMAN.

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However, hardness alone is not an adequate response to increasingly high accuracy guidance. Nor is it completely clear that placing MINUTEMAN in hardened silos is better initial hedge than the active defense of MINUTEMAN as it is presently deployed. In their first serious attempts at high accuracy, the Soviets may be able to achieve a CEP of [deleted]. The next generation missile [deleted] could achieve [deleted] accuracy: and there is no reason why [deleted] is not even

tually possible with special guidance schemes. On the other hand, defense effectiveness can be degraded by dividing a large attacking warhead into smaller warheads.

The following chart gives an indication of the relative value of these choices for increasing survivability. Note, however, that this table does not represent current Soviet capability-it shows the effectiveness of options against possible Soviet improvements which, as I said earlier, have not yet appeared. [Deleted.]

Defense of [deleted] MINUTEMAN is attractive against the early generation Soviet threat of large reentry vehicles, but is less effective against the improved capability of very small, multiple warhead threats. Use of [deleted] silos is attractive against the early-generation, low-accuracy threat but also becomes less effective with improvements in accuracy by the Soviets. Therefore, either is an acceptable hedge against the early threat, but neither necessarily is an adequate long-term solution.

DIFFERENT TERMS OF SURVIVABILITY REQUIRED

Therefore, we must combine different forms of survivability through greater hardness with active defense [deleted]. This new basing concept of hardened and defended complexes currently appears to be the best long-term way to achieve the necessary survivability of the land-based force.

UNDERWATER LONG-RANGE MISSILE SYSTEM

ULMS.-Another attractive concept is a new, very long range, submarine-based system, called the underwater long-range missile system (ULMS). This would be a new large submarine carrying missiles up to [deleted] n.m. in range, having home bases in CONUS and greatly improved anti-ASW features compared with POSEIDON. We will start initial design studies for this system in fiscal year 1969. Such a system could be available as early as [deleted] if we were to proceed with development soon.

ADVANCED INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE

New Large ICBM. - We have not undertaken the full-scale development of a large ICBM at this time, but we have made provisions for its development.

The proponents of a new ICBM argue mainly that large payloadssuch as [deleted] pounds are desirable. This certainly is an important factor because of efficiency-more payload per dollar-and the flexibility to rearrange the composition of the payload to improve its capability for penetration. On the other hand, the larger the missile, the fewer we need to provide a given total payload and consequently the more attractive these few become as targets. Because large numbers of smaller missiles make the ICBM force more survivable, and because at the present time we are not persuaded that a payload configuration would require an ICBM much larger than the improved MINUTEMAN, we do not feel justified in initiating a big development program for a large new ICBM. Rather, we are continuing the