CONTENTS Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff-- Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., Director of Defense Research and Engineering_ Dr. Alain C. Enthoven, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems (V) STATUS OF U.S. STRATEGIC POWER TUESDAY, APRIL 23, 1968 U.S. SENATE, PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee (composed of Senators Stennis (chairman), Symington, Jackson, Cannon, Byrd of West Virginia, Smith, Thurmond, and Miller) met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in room 224, Old Senate Office Building, Senator John Stennis, presiding. Present: Senators Stennis, Symington, Jackson, Cannon, and Miller. Senators Byrd, Jr., of Virginia, Pearson, and Curtis. Also present: James T. Kendall, chief counsel, Samuel R. Shaw, and Everette L. Harper, of the subcommittee staff. Senator STENNIS. The subcommittee will please come to order. CHAIRMAN'S OPENING STATEMENT I have a very brief statement. Without telling you-you already know-but just to remind you, this is a highly classified session. The matters gone into here will doubtless be of the highest level of classification. Senator Curtis, we are delighted to have you here, sir. Today we continue with our inquiry on the balance of strategic power and our arsenal of missiles, long-range bombers and other offensive and defensive strategic weapons and weapon delivery systems. Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is our witness today. U.S. strategic power plays a major role in preserving world peace and in protecting American security. However, as I noted in my opening statement on April 9, the rapidly growing strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union pose an increasing threat to our national security. The testimony which we received from the Director of Central Intelligence at that time did not indicate that this growth had or was about to end. Further quantitative and qualitative advances by the Soviets could well upset what has already become a precarious balance of power in the judgment of many qualified observers. I am not making a "we are about to be overwhelmed" statement at all. I believe fully in the timeliness of this inquiry, but I do not suggest that we are hopelessly behind. The direction which our strategic nuclear force planning will take in the future is of crucial importance in determining whether we will have clear and convincing strength in this area. Thus, we must take a good hard look both at what our policy and forces should be and what they will be under present planning. General Wheeler, with his wide experience and fine expertise can, and I am sure will, be of great assistance to us on the question of the proper role which U.S. strategic power should play in preserving world peace and protecting our national interests. He knows what the policies and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs have been in this field and the extent to which these policies and recommendations have been approved by the civilian authorities. We look to him for guidance from a military standpoint which the Congress should and must have. We are delighted to have you here with us. You have a statement we are going to ask you to give. Gentlemen, if it is agreeable to the subcommittee, and in order to get the main points as seen by the staff out on the table, I am going to ask that Mr. Kendall ask questions for something like 30 minutes until he comes to a proper stopping place. Then we will start with the Senators. I believe that it best utilizes a Senator's time to get things out on the table, get the issues drawn and get at least some preliminary answers from these expert witnesses. General, we are delighted to have you. When you finish your formal statement, give us just a little word about the loss of this F-111A within the last 12 hours, the third one. Will you proceed, please? STATEMENT OF GEN. EARLE G. WHEELER, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, ACCOMPANIED BY CAPT. Н. В. SWEITZER, U.S. NAVY, MILITARY ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF General WHEELER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you to discuss the posture of United States strategic forces. I will cover the subject in broad terms, examining briefly the military strategy as the Joint Chiefs of Staff develop it each year, the trends that are evident in the military capabilities of the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic, and the courses of action and options developed to counter the strategic threat to the United States. MILITARY FORCES ONE ELEMENT OF NATIONAL POWER As one element of national power, military forces are justified on the basis of their contribution to the achievement of national objectives. Our national security objective is "to preserve the United States as a free and independent nation, safeguarding its fundamental values, and to preserve its freedom to pursue its national objectives as the leading world power." From this we produce our basic military objective, to deter aggression at any level and, should deterrence fail, to terminate hostilities, in concert with our allies, under conditions of relative advantage while limiting damage to the United States and minimizing damage to the United States and allied interests. MILITARY STRATEGIC CONCEPT AND OBJECTIVES Our military strategic concept, embodying the principles of deterrence, flexible response, and collective security, is the basis from which the Joint Chiefs of Staff devise strategic force objectives. These objectives are that: The forces must be designed to operate effectively over a broad spectrum of possible conditions; They must contain a mix of strategic forces, including a combination of land- and sea-launched missiles and manned aircraft, necessary to permit a range of options; and They must contain both active and passive defenses in depth so as to protect against all elements of the threat. An examination of the threat permits determination, in large measure, of the number and quality of forces required. SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES THREAT TO UNITED STATES The most dangerous threat to the United States is posed by the growing Soviet strategic nuclear forces. Although Soviet strategic offensive forces can inflict enormous damage upon the United States in a first strike, they cannot destroy enough of the U.S. nuclear offensive and defensive forces to preclude our retaliatory destruction of the Soviet urban-industrial resources. The Soviets are continuing to build forces, however, which will increase their confidence in their retaliatory capability to assure destruction of a significant portion of U.S. industrial resources and population. At the same time, improvement of their strategic defense capability is continuing. As the Soviets improve the capability of their strategic forces, and particularly their ABM deployments, they may become increasingly confident about their ability to undertake military or diplomatic ventures inimical to our interests. If the Soviets believe that their growing strategic capabilities will deter the United States, they may be more prone to take advantage of opportunities to intervene in local conflicts and, once involved, may be less willing to withdraw. Certainly, an increased strategic capability will enhance their prestige and improve their ability to influence events in other countries. The Soviets now have the capability to conduct large-scale nuclear or conventional attack against Eurasia and they might, at some point in time, consider this posture "exploitable." DELIBERATE SOVIET STRATEGIC ATTACK BELIEVED UNLIKELY The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not consider that the deliberate initiation of a strategic attack by the Soviets is likely; however, the possibility of nuclear war through escalation or miscalculation cannot be dismissed. Further, the United States cannot safely discount the possibility that Soviet leaders might launch a preemptive strike if they consider themselves inextricably involved in a major confrontation over critical objectives. |