STATUS OF U.S. STRATEGIC POWER

TUESDAY, APRIL 30, 1968

U.S. SENATE,

PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee (composed of Senators Stennis (chairman), Symington, Jackson, Cannon, Byrd of West Virginia, Smith, Thurmond, and Miller) met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in room 224, Old Senate Office Building, Senator John Stennis presiding.

Present: Senators Stennis, Symington, Cannon, Byrd of Virginia, Smith, Thurmond, and Miller.

Also present: Senator Curtis.

James T. Kendall, chief counsel; Ben Gilleas, director of investigations; Stuart French, Samuel R. Shaw, and Everette L. Harper of the subcommittee staff.

Senator STENNIS. I have a brief opening statement here that I will read to bring this in focus.

Today, we continue with the fifth in our series of hearings on the balance of strategic power. We are examining our strategic weapons and our missile and bomber delivery systems in order to assess their adequacy to protect our Nation from nuclear attack.

We are very much interested in the present balance of power, but equally important is the question of our planning for the future. The subcommittee recognizes that tomorrow's strategic posture is today's strategic problem since development and deployment of modern complex weapon systems requires leadtimes of several years.

That is a very true fact, but it is not recognized entirely by the Members of our body who are not on the committee.

That was apparent in the debate on the organization bill last week. Thus, we must make wise, prudent, and conservative provisions now if tomorrow's weapons are to be effective in preserving our national security. This is of particular importance in view of the recent dramatic improvements in Soviet strategic offensive and defensive forces. We have previously heard testimony from the Director of Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis. It will now be helpful to discuss the problem from the standpoint of the military services and the operating commands, and to that end we have invited our witnesses for today.

Intercontinental ballistic missiles and long-range bombers, two of the three primary strategic weapon delivery systems, are the responsibility of the Air Force and Strategic Air Command. To discuss our current posture in these areas, as well as our plans for the future, we have with us today the Secretary of the Air Force, Dr. Harold Brown; the Air Force Chief of Staff, General John P. McConnell; and the Commander in Chief of Strategic Air Command, General Joseph J. Nazzaro. I might add that we asked Dr. Brown to counsel with us on these questions not only to get the benefit of his thinking as Secretary of the Air Force, but also as one whose past service as Director of Defense Research and Engineering gives him additional impressive credentials in the field of strategic weapon systems.

We welcome you, gentlemen, and look forward to your testimony. I know it will make a significant contribution to the subcommittee's understanding of our Nation's strategic posture.

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These hearings are highly important. I know that you agree. We going to put in th the record exactly what the situation is, the good and the bad. I think even though all the Members of the Senate and the Congress won't read this testimony, the fact that some of us will know about it, and the fact that it is studied by the staff, will be highly valuable.

As I said, we have with us the Secretary of the Air Force, Dr. Harold Brown; the Air Force Chief of Staff, General John P. McConnell; and the Commander-in-Chief of Strategic Air Command, General Joseph J. Nazzaro.

All right, gentlemen. I understand that all of you have statements. I hope it is agreeable to the committee that we may take those statements without major interruptions, at least. If there are parts of them that you are willing to put in the record and read on a blue-pencil basis, that will be helpful. We will try to get the major points from the viewpoint of the subcommittee and the staff brought out, with some questions by Mr. Kendall, if that is agreeable. Then each Senator can proceed.

Senator MILLER. Will the chairman yield at that point?

I understand that Dr. Brown has blue-penciled his statement. Would it be the chairman's purpose to permit questions following his statement, and then questions following General McConnell's statement? It might be helpful to me, because I may be called up to an executive meeting of the Agriculture Committee later.

Senator STENNIS. I certainly would not exclude you from that, Senator. I will bear that in mind.

As I understand, Dr. Brown has suggested that the Chief of Staff, General McConnell, go first.

Dr. BROWN. I believe, Mr. Chairman, that would be a better

sequence.

Senator STENNIS. And then you, followed by General Nazzaro.
All right.

Senator Miller, I will just say this: Any time you feel the press of time because of your other commitment, let me know, and we will take care of it.

Senator MILLER. Yes, sir.

Senator STENNIS. All right.

General McConnell, we are especially glad to have you here, sir. I really look forward to this part of these hearings.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN P. MCCONNELL, CHIEF OF STAFF,

U.S. AIR FORCE

General MCCONNELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

With your permission, I will read the blue-line part of the statement, and I make the assumption the entire statement will be made a part of the record.

STENNIS. Mr. Reporter, you make the entire statement a

Senator part of the record.

(The statement referred to follows:)

STATEMENT BY GEN. JOHN P. MCCONNELL, CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

John Paul McConnell was born on 7 February 1908 in Booneville, Arkansas. He attended Booneville public schools and Henderson-Brown College (now Henderson State) at Arkadelphia, Arkansas, graduating in 1927 with a Bachelor of Science degree (Magna Cum Laude). Appointed to the U.S. Military Academy the following year, he graduated in June 1932 and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the Field Artillery, Regular Army. He entered Primary Flying School at Randolph Field, Texas, in July of that year and completed Advanced Flying School at Kelly Field, Texas, in October 1933. After graduation he was assigned to the 20th Pursuit Group at Barksdale Field, Louisiana. In June 1937 he moved to the 50th Observation Squadron and served with that unit at both Luke Field and Hickam Field, Hawaii. Transferred to the Training Center at Maxwell Field, Alabama, in 1939, he performed a variety of squadron and post duties.

After serving from January until May 1942 in the Office of the Chief of Air Forces, Colonel McConnell moved to Headquarters AAF Technical Training Command at Knollwood, N.C., eventually assuming duty as its Chief of Staff. In September 1943 he was named Deputy Chief of Staff, Headquarters AAF Training Command at Fort Worth, Texas. Two months later he became Chief of Staff of the China-Burma-India Air Force Training Command (provisional) at Karachi, India.

He became Senior Air Staff Officer in the Third Tactical Air Force, Comilla, India, CBI Theater of Operations, in February 1944. The next month he became Deputy Commander of the Integrated USAAF-RAF Third Tactical Air Force. From here General McConnell went to Kandy, Ceylon, to serve with the Southeast Asia Air Comamnd under Admiral Mountbatten. After the fall of Rangoon and the consequent transfer of USAAF Headquarters (India-Burma Theater) to China, General McConnell served as its Chief of Staff until inactivation of Army Air Forces in China.

In April 1946 he was selected to command the Air Division Nanking Headquarters Command, and also to act as Advisor to the Chinese Government. He returned in June 1947 to Air Force Headquarters in Washington to become Chief of the Reserve and National Guard Division of the Air Force. In May 1948 he was named Chief of the Civilian Components Group at Air Force Headquarters and in December 1948 assumed the position of Deputy Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff, USAF Reserve Forces.

In 1950 General McConnell was named Deputy Commander of the Third Air Division (England) and promoted to Major General. When that unit was elevated to the designation of Third Air Force in May 1951, General McConnell retained his position until taking command later that month of the 7th Air Division (England). On 8 April 1953 he was appointed Director of Plans, SAC Headquarters, a position he filled until November 1957, at which time he returned to Barksdale Air Force Base to head the Second Air Force. On 1 August 1961, General McConnell became Vice-Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Air Command where he remained until September 1962 when he was chosen to be Deputy Commander-in-Chief, United States European Command. He left that post in August 1964 to take over duties as Vice Chief of Staff, USAF, serving in that capacity until February 1965, at which time he was appointed Chief of Staff.

I. INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to meet with you and discuss the Air Force role in maintaining the strategic posture of the United States.

Briefly stated, our strategic objective is deterrence of aggression at any level. with emphasis on deterrence of strategic nuclear attack on the United States. Should deterrence fail, the principal objective of U.S. military strategy is to terminate hostilities with a clear advantage over any aggressor while limiting damage to the United States and its allies and to United States interests abroad. To be effective, a deterrent must be credible to the enemy and relevant to his objectives and values. This means that the United States must be known to possess a level and mix of strategic offensive and defensive forces which will assure unacceptable damage to any state or combination of states even after withstanding an attack.

Since deterrence results from an enemy's evaluation, questions arise when we attempt to translate this into specific force requirements. First, there is the question as to what levels of potential destruction an enemy would consider unacceptable. We can set goals in terms of total fatalities, urban fatalities, or industrial floor space destroyed; however, whether the prospect of such losses will keep an enemy from attacking under all circumstances is a subjective judgment which cannot be tested.

Moreover, an assessment of relative military capabilities is exceedingly complex, uncertain, and controversial. It is complex because so many variables enter into the assessment of military capabilities and because military technology is advancing so rapidly and on so many fronts. Even for the present, many of these variables are subject to wide ranges of estimates. For enemy forces there are questions as to their quality and quantity and the tactics that might be used in employing them. Even for our own forces there are variables, and we assign a range of values to survivability, reliability, accuracy, and penetration capability under various conditions of nuclear war.

To cover the range of uncertainty, U.S. strategic forces must possess such a clear margin of safety that no opponent could ever mistakenly estimate that he would succeed with a strategic attack on the U.S. This capability should be clearly obvious to the enemy.

This is why we maintain a mix of strategic offensive forces designed to operate effectively over a broad spectrum of possible contingencies. In my opinion this mix should include a combination of manned aircraft and land and sea based missiles to permit a range of options at varying attack intensities against alternative target systems. A mix such as this means that the enemy must diversify and thus dilute his defense efforts. This permits us the option of exploiting his weak areas and avoiding his strengths.

A similar mix of defensive forces is required. Balanced active and passive defenses in depth are necessary for protection against all elements of the threat, whether those elements are employed selectively or simultaneously. In addition, our defensive efforts complicate enemy strategic planning and make his strategic efforts more costly.

Taken together, our strategic forces must have an assured capability over the collective capability of the Soviet Union, the Chinese Communists, or any combination of hostile states.

II. THREAT

I realize that the Committee has received a number of excellent presentations on the threat. However, I would like to take a few minutes to highlight some of the more significant aspects of the Soviet strategic forces and the developing Red Chinese strategic threat.

First, there is the rapidly growing Soviet ICBM force. According to accepted estimates, Soviet operational ICBM launchers totaled some 720 in October 1967, more than double the 340 of a year earlier. By the end of 1968, the Soviets will reach approximate numerical parity with the United States in numbers of ICBM launchers. By mid-1972 it is estimated they will have between [deleted] ICBM launchers, with improvements in both accuracy and reliability.

The Soviets have been testing a Fractional Orbit Bombardment System. [Deleted.] The FOBS, which the Soviets may consider useful in a surprise nuclear strike against our bomber bases or as a penetration tactic against ABM systems, could be operational by now.

Also a threat to the U.S. is the Soviet submarine launched missile force. [Deleted.]

The threat to our allies and to U.S. interests abroad includes the Soviet medium range and intermediate range ballistic missile force of more than 700 launchers, some of which are in hardened facilities. [Deleted) thus, the total MRBM and IRBM threat is about (deleted) missiles having a range of up to about [deleted].

Soviet Long Range Aviation consists of [deleted] bombers, including [deleted] heavy BISON and BEAR aircraft and [deleted] medium bombers. The medium force includes the supersonic BLINDER B which carries a [deleted] air-tosurface missile with a [deleted] range.

[Deleted] approximately [deleted] heavy bomber aircraft are available to the Soviets for initial attack on the U.S. In addition, it is my belief that approximately [deleted] medium bombers would also be used against the U.S. in a major nuclear assault. The Soviet bomber force is an important part of the Soviet strike force, and in my judgment will continue to be in the future.

[Deleted] the Soviets are expected to achieve an initial ballistic missile defense around Moscow [deleted].

In further attempts to limit the damage that we could inflict on them, the Soviets are continuing to improve their defenses against aircraft. [Deleted.] An advanced supersonic fighter, the FOXBAT, capable of about [deleted] is expected to be operational as a [deleted]. Further improvements may be expected during the 1975 time period [deleted].

Presently deployed Soviet SAM systems are estimated to have little capability below approximately [deleted]. As long as we maintain a bomber force capable of surviving an initial attack and capable of penetrating [deleted) (as our present bomber force can), the Soviets have the requirement to develop and deploy a low altitude terminal bomber defense for their important targets. [Deleted.]

The TALLINN [deleted] system deployment continues. Intelligence estimates currently consider the [deleted] a SAM system with a significant capability against aircraft and air-to-surface missiles [deleted]. However, current evidence does not dispel entirely the possibility that the TALLINN system is being deployed to counter both aerodynamic and some ballistic missile threats. This is the sort of uncertainty I referred to earlier, and which requires that we develop forces to cover a wider range of possibilities.

The improvements in the Soviet strategic offensive and defensive forces have not been at the expense of their other forces. The Soviets have modernized their forces in Central Europe, including the provision of a formidable tactical nuclear capability. In addition, they have been gradually increasing the reach of their conventional military forces. In recent years they have developed forces which, while probably intended for the general war mission, now provide them with improved capabilities for distant limited operations.

Communist China has tested seven nuclear devices. [Deleted] of these devices. one of which yielded [deleted] megatons, were delivered by aircraft, and one was delivered by ballistic missile [deleted]. They are also pursuing a vigorous ballistic missile development program. A limited deployment of medium range ballistic missiles is expected to begin [deleted], and an ICBM system could be ready for deployment in the early 1970s.

To summarize the threat, our security is being increasingly challenged by the improving strategic forces of the Soviet Union and their associated technological programs. While this improved Soviet strategic posture is unlikely to increase their willingness to risk nuclear war with the U.S., the Soviet leaders may well take a tougher position where a direct conflict of interests develops. They may also view their improved strategic posture as reinforcing deterrence to the point that they can intervene in third areas of the world with reduced risk of U.S. opposition. The entry of Communist China into the group of nucleararmed nations further complicates the complex problem of strategic balance.

Intelligence estimates have not proven fully reliable in the past. In the future, the variations of these estimates may be even greater, because it is inherently more difficult to obtain reliable information on qualitative changes than to discern quantitative differences. When viewed in the light of the range of uncertainties in our knowledge of enemy capabilities and intentions, the growing threat emphasizes the point that we must maintain a clear margin of strategic