as a completely recommended plane to the Department of Defense, with specifications?

Dr. ENTHOVEN. Yes, Senator Symington, I believe that is correct. For several years now the Air Force and the OSD have been studying this very complex issue. We have been learning some important new things as a result of this effort. We have learned, for example, that the speed of the bomber is not a particularly important factor in the total effectiveness of the system, but that the penetration aids and the standoff missile could be very important factors. On that basis, we have developed improved penetration aids and the shortrange attack missile. I think that both Air Force and OSD thought is still evolving on the bomber question.

Senator SYMINGTON. I know the Air Force decided the AMSA should penetrate at very low altitude, and would hope that experiences with this TFX series at low altitude will help in the decision as to what a possible new big bomber should be and do.

Thank you, Mr. Counsel.

Dr. ENTHOVEN. But if I could just pick that up, I think Senator Symington made a very important point. Air Force and OSD thought on exactly what characteristics an advanced manned bomber should have is still very much in development and flux; it is not really a case of having hard, firm, opposed positions.

Mr. KENDALL. You understand on this point and at this time I am not trying to debate the merits of these matters but to understand what participation you had.

Dr. ENTHOVEN. Yes.

NIKE-X DEFENSE OF CITIES

NIKE-X defense of cities is one question into which the Secretary of Defense personally went in very great depth, and it would be difficult to summarize in any very simple way the evolution of my own thought on it relative to the Secretary's. I do not think that it would be possible to say at any time that I made a firm recommendation that was or was not accepted.

My office developed a set of calculations indicating how effective the NIKE-X defense of cities would be under various different conditions. I remember Secretary McNamara reviewing some of these calculations, saying to me one day, "Now I get these calculations from you," which by the way were developed in participation with some of the Services and with D.D.R. & E., and "I get different calculations from the Army. Now, would you please sit down with the Secretary of the Army and work through this problem and give me a memorandum showing points of agreement and disagreement. You two are good friends and respect each other. You live in the same world. You draw on the same facts. You ought to be able either to agree on the facts or, if you are making different assumptions, then identify what they are."

On the basis of that, I had a series of meetings with the Secretary of the Army. In very fruitful discussion my staff and his went through each other's calculations and identified a list of differences. Some of them were different ways of going about making the calculation. Some were different assumptions. These were then brought to our attention.

In some cases the staffs resolved the disagreements. We adopted some of their methods and they adopted some of ours as being the better way to do the calculation, until we were down to a few assumptions that seemed to be affecting the results significantly.

Then I discussed these assumptions with the Secretary of the Army, and, as I recall, we each were persuaded to accede to the other's view on some of the assumptions. Finally it came down to the single really dominant driving assumption in this whole problem of the NIKE-X defense of cities, and that is, what would the Soviet reaction be?

We found that we had somewhat different views as to the likelihood of various Soviet reactions, or the extent of the Soviet reaction, but we were able to come to agreement on a set of calculations which showed what the effectiveness of NIKE-X in defense of our cities would be under each of several different assumptions about how the war started and was fought, and under each of several different assumptions about how the Soviets reacted.

In fact, these are the calculations that Secretary McNamara presented in his posture statement, and the grandchildren of those calculations on which all parties still agree were included in my statement here.

I do not recall ever having reached the point of making a firm recommendation that was or was not bought. I certainly agree with the Secretary's decision.

FURTHER DISCUSSION OF AMSA DECISION

Mr. KENDALL. Could we go to AMSA for just a moment in order to bring this out a little more sharply? Whose paper did the Secretary of Defense act on yours or Dr. Foster's?

Dr. ENTHOVEN. If there were a question of acting on a particular paper for going into contract definition on any weapons system, it would be Dr. Foster's as the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. That is basically the picture.

Just let me add to that, on a question like that we really do not write separate papers. Dr. Foster is in charge of the development and preparation of a series of papers called development concept papers on each of the weapons systems.

ENTHOVEN PREPARES DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDUMS

Mr. KENDALL. Well, for example, are the DPM's prepared in your

office?

Dr. ENTHOVEN. Yes, the draft presidential memorandums, or "DPM's" are prepared in my office.

Mr. KENDALL. And this is ultimately what the Secretary signs off on. Dr. ENTHOVEN. The R. & D. parts of them are done in collaboration with D.D.R. & E.

Mr. KENDALL. All right, go ahead.

Dr. ENTHOVEN. And here the tendency would be for the DPM to reflect R. & D. decision, although there is an interaction here because the DPM deals with what are the needs in the future, and of course the extent to which we do or do not need a new weapon system is one of the important factors governing whether we go ahead with it.

Mr. KENDALL. All right, sir.

F-12 DECISION

Dr. ENTHOVEN. On the F-12, my office did develop several alternatives for the consideration of the Secretary of Defense. I think we brought out the fact, working with D.D.R. & E. and with the Air Force, that against the currently projected Soviet bomber threat we could get more effectiveness for our money by buying a combination of the AWACS, the airborne warning and control system, and the

F-106X.

The important point that the analysis brought out is that the direction in which the important gains in the effectiveness lay was in improved radar surveillance and a better missile and fire control in the interceptor. By putting the radar in the air, for example, we would make it more survivable, and give it a better low altitude capability. I think the analyses brought out the fact that the speed of the aircraft itself was not an important factor against the current threat.

The Air Force, the Director of Research and Engineering, and I reached agreement on a joint paper, and the joint paper recommended that we go the route of the AWACS and F-106X. Beyond that, it was just a question of what the character of the R. & D. program should be for the F-12, and that would not be one that I would have particularly been deeply involved in.

The JCS recommended [deleted]. I concurred in the D.D.R. & E. recommendation and the Secretary of Defense approved it.

SHELTER PROGRAM

The JCS proposed a shelter program for protection of U.S. based military personnel and their dependents against nuclear attack. It would cost $191 million over 5 years. I proposed an alternative program based on the high return elements from the programs analyzed by the Services. At a cost of $47 million it would save nearly threefourths of the lives saved by the JCS program. The Secretary of Defense accepted this alternative. (Funding has been deferred in keeping with SEA priorities.)

ENTHOVEN AND SELIN BIOGRAPHIES

Mr. KENDALL. By the way, Doctor, I neglected to ask you to bring this. Would you furnish for the record a biographical sketch of yourself and Dr. Selin there?

Dr. ENTHOVEN. Yes.

Mr. KENDALL. With whom I have had several very pleasant conver

sations, as you probably know.

Dr. ENTHOVEN. Right.

(The material referred to is as follows:)

ALAIN C. ENTHOVEN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (SYSTEMS ANALYSIS)

Alain C. Enthoven was sworn in as Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) on September 10, 1965.

Dr. Enthoven was born in Seattle, Washington. He holds degrees from Stanford University, Oxford University, where he was a Rhodes Scholar, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

He has taught at M.I.T. and the University of Washington.

In 1965, Dr. Enthoven joined the staff of the Rand Corporation where he did research for the Air Force on strategic air operations, strategy, and weapon systems, and the economics of defense. He also has served as a Consultant to The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.

Dr. Enthoven joined the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering in 1960. He was appointed Deputy Comptroller in 1961, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in 1962.

Dr. Enthoven received the President's Award for Distinguished Federal Civilian Service from President Kennedy in 1963.

Dr. Enthoven, his wife, Rosemary, and their four children live in Alexandria, Virginia.

IVAN SELIN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (STRATEGIC PROGRAMS)

Ivan Selin was sworn in as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategic Programs) on October 16, 1967.

Dr. Selin was born in New York City, New York. He holds degrees from Yale University, and the University of Paris where he was a Fulbright Scholar. He has taught at Yale University and the University of California in Los Angeles.

In 1960, Dr. Selin joined the staff of the Rand Corporation where he did research for the Air Force on strategic operations and strategic command and control.

Dr. Selin joined the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) in 1965. He was appointed Director of the Strategic Retaliatory Division in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) in 1965.

Dr. Selin, his wife, Nina, and their two children live in Washington, D.C.

MCNAMARA'S 1962 ANN ARBOR SPEECH

Mr. KENDALL. Doctor, in his 1962 Ann Arbor speech the then Secretary of Defense McNamara, in discussing basic U.S. military strategy, made this statement:

This strength

Referring to the NATO Alliance

not only minimizes the likelihood of a major nuclear war but makes possible a strategy designed to preserve the fabric of our society if war should occur.

In the same speech he also said:

Military objectives in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the alliance should be destruction of the enemy's military forces, not of his civilian population.

That was in 1962, as you will recall.

CHANGE IN STRATEGIC POLICY

In later testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in January of 1967, Secretary McNamara said:

I think we can all agree that if they struck us first, we are going to target our weapons against their society and destroy 120 million of them.

Now, these two statements made some 5 years apart, I think you will agree, represent a rather significant change in our strategic policy, do they not?

Dr. ENTHOVEN. Yes, they reflect an adjustment to changing circumstances.

Mr. KENDALL. The clear implication of Secretary McNamara's testimony that I have read and also his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee this year is that damage limiting is not a feasible strategy, in view of the growing Soviet missile capability and

the Soviets' capability to produce additional offensive systems and defensive systems in response to our deployment of ABM's, for example. I take it from your prepared statement that you agree with that, is that right?

Dr. ENTHOVEN. Yes, I do. May I make a couple of comments on your questions at this point?

Mr. KENDALL. Certainly, at any time, sir.

TARGETING POLICY HAS NOT CHANGED

Dr. ENTHOVEN. First, I would like to emphasize that our targeting policy, as reflected in the guidance for the preparation of the targeting plan, has not changed. From 1961-62 on, the targeting plan has been based on the principle that we should have different options that target the strategic forces and cities. As U.S. and Soviet forces have changed. naturally the targets have changed.

What has changed is our appreciation of how much damage we can do by targeting strategic forces. When the Soviets depended mainly on bombers and soft missiles, their forces were quite vulnerable, and we thought we could inflict considerable damage to them. Now that they are defended mainly by ICBM's in hardened silos, and submarines, we do not believe we can accomplish as much any more.

NEW CIRCUMSTANCES BROUGHT ABOUT CHANGE IN NUCLEAR STRATEGY

Second I do agree with you that there has been a change in the nuclear strategy underlying our force planning; however, it was not a sudden change. Our policy evolved as new circumstances arose and better information became available. In 1961 and 1962, we foresaw a period of time when the Soviet forces would be considerably more vulnerable than they are today and than we foresee they will be in the future. The Secretary was talking then about a 5-year time period from 1962 to 1967 when we believed that our conventional forces in NATO were still largely inadequate. We did not have adequate alternatives to threatening the use of nuclear force. And also we foresaw a period when our ballistic missile force would increase and advance very rapidly, and the Soviet forces would be quite vulnerable. So at that time and under those circumstances, damage limiting appeared to be a potentially usable strategy.

However, as time has gone by, the Soviets have followed our lead: they have imitated us and bought their equivalent to our MINUTEMAN force 5 to 7 years after we did; and with substantial time lag. they have bought and are buying their equivalent to our POLARIS force. I believe that today we are in a very different situation from the one that we knew in the early 1960's because now and for the foreseeable future we face a diversified, well-protected, relatively invulnerable Soviet strategic force.

DISCUSSION OF TARGETING DOCTRINE

Mr. KENDALL. Over that period of years, as I understand it, the

urban industrial complex-[deleted].

Dr. ENTHOVEN. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. KENDALL. Has gone from No. 3 priority to No. 1 priority.