force is highly alert and well-protected, but also because we are deploying increasingly sophisticated warning systems. It is also clear that our remarkable new warning systems-over-the-horizon radars and [deleted]-will completely nullify any advantage of surprise that the Soviets may have thought they could acquire with FOBS.

Because of force survivability, penetration aids, our emphasis on missile reliability, and the addition of MIRV's, our strategic nuclear forces have an assured destruction capability well above the minimum levels I mentioned earlier. Even against the highest Soviet threat projected for 1972 by the national intelligence estimate, we should be able in a second strike to detonate more than [deleted] weapons over the Soviet Union and, if we chose, to destroy over [deleted] percent of the Soviet population and more than Ideleted] percent of Soviet industry. Although I doubt that a controlled retaliation could keep a nuclear war limited for very long, we possess the command, control, and communications to direct such a response. If directed to execute this mission, we have the technical capability to do so. Here we enjoy a marked advantage over the Soviets.

We also have the capability to attack Soviet strategic nuclear forces, and as part of this capability, we provide coverage of the targetable threat to Europe. If such an attack remained restricted to strategic forces, and if both sides withheld attacks on cities, we could significantly limit damage to our citizens by our current and programed strategic offensive and defensive forces and civil defense measures. However, even an attack limited to our strategic forces would probably kill more than 10 million Americans. Furthermore, we would not be able to deprive the Soviets of their residual forces, although our surviving offensive forces would probably exceed theirs by a substantial amount, measured in deliverable warheads. It is quite uncertain, in these circumstances, how a nuclear war could be ended.

As shown in the following table, we do not possess any real damage limiting capability against a Soviet attack aimed at the destruction of our major cities. Nor can we develop a meaningful damage limiting capability in the foreseeable future, since the Soviets can and would react to protect their assured destruction capability against any damage limiting program of ours. For example, even with a heavy ABM defense of U.S. cities, the Soviets could be sure of killing 100 million Americans by adding MIRV's, penetration aids, and mobile ICBM's to their strategic force.

TABLE 6.-NUMBERS KILLED IN AN ALL-OUT STRATEGIC EXCHANGE, 1976

We are able, if necessary, to execute a number of strategic options and to outperform the Soviet Union in each instance. However, we are not in a position to prevent the Soviets from assuring the destruction of many millions of American and allied citizens. Nor do I believe we can do so in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, we can prevent the Soviet Union from achieving any meaningful objectives with its own strategic forces beyond deterrence of a nuclear strike by us. Furthermore, we have maintained our research and development on advanced weapon systems at a sufficiently high level so that, given our intelligence about Soviet programs, we can modify our nuclear posture in a suitable and timely fashion, should the current competition undergo a dramatic change for the worse.

We recognize that while our resources are much greater than those of the Soviet Union, the Soviets are determined not to be outstripped significantly in the strategic nuclear competition. As far as we can judge, they have been willing to sacrifice other highly important opportunities in order to construct a force which would give them a large-scale, second-strike capability for assured destruction. We must expect them to continue this policy in the future, no matter what we do.

To summarize, let me emphasize the following points:

1. We have and we will continue to maintain an assured destruction capability against the Soviet Union.

2. For the foreseeable future, however, we cannot expect to achieve a significant damage limiting capability against large-scale Soviet nuclear attacks.

3. We have the forces and the technical capability to conduct a controlled retaliation against the Soviets, but only if they are willing to keep a nuclear war limited by avoiding attacks on our cities. If the Soviets are not willing to limit a nuclear war, buying more nuclear forces will not enable us to do so on our own.

4. We will continue to maintain strategic "nuclear superiority" over the Soviets in terms of nuclear warheads. However, based on our own experience, I doubt that we can convert nuclear superiority into any meaningful political power. This is even more valid today now that the Soviet Union also has a large and well-protected assured destruction capability.

5. Finally, if we are to fulfill our Nation's commitments and insure our national security, we cannot depend on our nuclear forces alone; we must also maintain very strong nonnuclear forces. In fact, strong conventional forces are one of the most effective barriers to a strategic nuclear war.

Mr. Chairman, that completes my prepared statement.

UNITED STATES CAN'T KNOCK SOVIETS OUT WITH FIRST STRIKE

Senator STENNIS. Well, I will tell you, it is a very illuminating statement. I think it gives us a fine starting place, although perhaps not a stopping place. Many questions are raised by the points you have made. Frankly I never have gotten beyond the thought that both sides have developed their nuclear weapons to a point where there is no complete

defense.

As I understand it, your position is that they have developed to such an extent that we do not have the capacity to knock them out with a

first strike.

Dr. ENTHOVEN. That is right, Mr. Chairman. I think that is quite clear now.

Senator STENNIS. Therefore, a first strike would not be effective from our standpoint. They would retain the capacity to hit back.

Dr. ENTHOVEN. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. The Soviets have developed an assured destruction capability.

Senator STENNIS. Well, there is a lot about this that I do not understand. Mr Kendall here and other members of the staff have worked on this a long time.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Secretary, our staff has worked on these matters, and they know what the main points are that they have in mind. Without exhausting every point, we try to open this thing up and get things out on the table somewhat for your benefit as well as ours. Then the Senators ask questions.

We will recognize Mr. Kendall, our chief counsel, at this time for the purpose of covering some of the points he has in mind, until we come to a stopping point.

All right, Mr. Kendall.

SUPERIORITY NOT IMPORTANT IN ITSELF

Mr. KENDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Doctor, I want to be sure I understand you. Is the thrust-or one of the thrusts of your statements that nuclear superiority is not important in itself as long as we maintain what Dr. Foster refers to as a margin of safety and thus retain an assured destruction capability?

Dr. ENTHOVEN. Yes, Mr. Kendall. I intuitively favor having nuclear superiority, but it seems to me, after studying this problem for a number of years, that it has never been possible to develop a clear concept for translating nuclear superiority into political power or international advantage, once the other side has an assured destruction capability against us.

Mr. KENDALL. So my statement then would be essentially correct. Dr. ENTHOVEN. Yes; it is essentially correct.

ENTHOVEN'S FUNCTIONS RELATIVE TO STRATEGIC FORCES

Mr. KENDALL. I would appreciate it, Doctor, if you would take a few minutes to outline for us the functions which your office performs with respect to development of strategic forces and generally how you go about it, sir.

Dr. ENTHOVEN. First of all my job is to interrogate, to probe, to raise issues, to develop and to press alternatives for presentation to the Secretary of Defense. My job, if you like, is to help prevent the Secretary of Defense from being confronted by a single alternative or a staff solution, but my job is not to make the decisions myself. The decisions are made by the Secretary of Defense. So I do not have any decision-making power or authority. My approval is not required for any actions made anywhere in the Department, except for very minor things, like management of personnel ceilings that are controlled by my office, subject to the guidance of the Secretary of Defense.

My job is to provide an independent point of view available to the Secretary, based on an overall look at the total force structure. But, as I say, it is not to make the decisions. The Secretary of Defense himself does that.

Therefore, Mr. Kendall, I am supposed to be controversial. I am supposed to raise issues and suggest alternatives.

Occasionally I hear people say that the Secretary of Defense always buys my alternative or always buys my assumptions. I would say, first of all, that is not true. Secondly, my job is to identify alternatives and assumptions that I think are likely to be interesting to him or that he ought to be interested in, and to bring them to his attention, so that if I did not identify assumptions and alternatives that he was interested in, it would mean I was not being responsive to his interests, My basic duties are spelled out in a Department of Defense Directive, which I would like to quote briefly:

The responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis are, first, to review for the Secretary of Defense quantitative requirements including forces, weapon systems, equipment, personnel and nuclear weapons; second, to assist the Secretary in the initiation, monitoring, guiding, and reviewing of requirements studies and cost effectiveness studies; third, to encourage the use of the best analytical methods throughout the Department of Defense; and, fourth, to conduct or participate in special studies as directed by the Secretary of Defense.

I believe my primary duty is to assist the Secretary of Defense by raising and defining issues, by clarifying, evaluating, and developing alternatives, and by presenting the relevant information in a full, accurate, and meaningful way.

Few of the decisions that the Secretary must make are either simple or noncontroversial. He is constantly given conflicting views on topics of great importance; not only do the opinions of his advisors and experts frequently differ but the evidence and facts that they present are also in conflict. Under these circumstances I believe it is essential for the Secretary to have impartial staff assistance that looks at problems from his point of view rather than the view of a service secretary or a chieff of staff, just in order to give him a balance of alternatives at which to look.

That essentially summarizes the duties of my office, Mr. Kendall.

RECOMMENDATIONS GO DIRECTLY TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. KENDALL. Mr. Secretary, as I understand it from what you have said, your recommendations go directly to the Secretary of Defense. Are they the final recommendations which he receives on a particular problem?

Dr. ENTHOVEN. No, they are not the final recommendations. They are only one of a number of alternative recommendations presented to the Secretary. With respect to your first point, it is true that I make recommendations that go directly to the Secretary of Defense. However, on important issues my primary responsibility is to work with the Joint Chiefs, the service Secretaries and the Secretary's various assistants in order to prepare a joint analysis that identifies the conflicting points of view, and lays out clearly and precisely the issues, the assumptions and the alternatives involved. Thus, I do not believe it is accurate to imply that in any sense my office has the last word on any question about a major weapons system or force.

Of course the main recommendation that the Secretary receives comes directly from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to him, and this recommendation is generally the first one he considers.

When the recommendations of the services or the Joint Chiefs of Staff are sent to the Secretary, I comment on them, question them, and suggest alternatives. For example, the cost of the forces recommended by the Joint Chiefs for 1969 comes to over $100 billion. My job is to develop and propose alternatives which enable the Secretary to reduce these costs without sacrificing essential military capabilities. Then the Secretary of Defense makes his decision on the basis of all the alternatives presented to him.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would counsel yield?
Mr. KENDALL. Certainly, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. First let me say, Mr. Secretary, I am impressed with your statement.

Dr. ENTHOVEN. Thank you, sir.

ACCEPTANCE OF ENTHOVEN'S RECOMMENDATIONS

Senator SYMINGTON. And I agree with nearly all of it, with the definite exception of the conclusions incident to the last point in the last paragraph on the last page; also exception incident to confidence of our allies with respect to the nuclear umbrella.

Is there any record of the number of acceptances of your position as against the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the part of the Secretary of Defense?

Dr. ENTHOVEN. No, Senator Symington, there is not, and I think for a very good reason. It would not be appropriate that there be one. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have an independent statutory authority by which they are supposed to go on record in making formal recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. On the other hand, my job as a staff assistant is to be responsive to the Secretary of Defense. Therefore, I think it would be inappropriate if I were to go on record and make my recommendations in the same form that the Joint Chiefs do.