tegrated system, if it hadn't been delayed? I am told it could be operational right now. Dr. FOSTER. I believe, Mr. Kendall, looking back that, if we had realized that the [deleted] was going to turn out to be as successful as it has beyond all of our expectations, we could have done two things. First of all, we could have planned for more [deleted]. Second, I believe we might have been willing to take the risk of some concurrency and [deleted]. However, you may recall that the [deleted] program grew from [deleted] program, and there were those who had grave doubts that technologically we were in a position to [deleted]. However, as you know, that field has progressed more rapidly than most people thought, and the [deleted] was successful in [deleted]. Now the [deleted] must do this job from [deleted] and that is a much more demanding task, but we believe that the technology is basically in hand to perform it. Mr. KENDALL. Do program [deleted] and over-the-horizon radar perform essentially the same task? Is this an either/or proposition or are they complementary systems? I don't quite understand. Dr. FOSTER. AS I view them, Mr. Kendall, they are complementary. The over-the-horizon radar is very useful to provide us early warning information that missiles have been launched. [Deleted.] The [deleted] system, [deleted] to provide additional information. It in principle can tell us the [deleted]. Mr. KENDALL. [Deleted.] Dr. FOSTER. That is correct, [deleted]. Mr. KENDALL. So you would think that eventually we would deploy both, although at this time we have decided to accelerate the OTH and not to accelerate the [deleted]. Dr. FOSTER. At this time we have decided to deploy both, and to accelerate the over-the-horizon radar program somewhat and the [deleted] to a minor degree. I believe that the technology is really pacing that program and not the dollars at the moment. R. & D. BUDGETS FOR STRATEGIC WEAPONS Mr. KENDALL. Doctor, can you tell the subcommittee what percentage of the research and development budget-you may want to furnish this for the record-what percent of the research and development budget has been devoted to R. & D. in the strategic weapons area, offensive and defensive, say, for the past 5 years? Dr. FOSTER. Certainly. Currently the strategic portion of the budget amounts to $3.5 billion requested for fiscal year 1969 out of $8 billion. (The information requested follows:) Percentage of Department of Defense R. & D. program devoted to strategic Mr. KENDALL. Are there any systems that you can phase out when OTH and [deleted] become operational, and if so, what are they? Dr. FOSTER. I would like to answer that one for the record, Mr. Kendall, if I may. (The information furnished is classified.) VALUE OF EXPLOITABLE SUPERIORITY Mr. KENDALL. Doctor, let me ask you sort of a philosophical question. I believe that we all agree that our success in the confrontation with the Soviets during the Cuban missile crisis was the result of what we might call an exploitable superiority in weapons. Since their Cuban setback, whether this was a benchmark or not, I don't know, the Soviets have accelerated their missile program, and we have more or less adopted a policy of scaling our force levels or keeping them level. To some people's minds, at least, we have even scaled our development program in reaction to the Soviet actions. Assuming that we were able to do it, would it not be more cost effective for the United States to attempt to maintain this exploitable superiority than to follow the expensive process of reacting to Soviet initiative? In other words, it seems to me that the Soviet developments have put pressure on us to spend money to react. Wouldn't it be possible and most cost effective for us to have reversed the thing and kept the pressure on them? Do you follow what I have in mind? FOSTER SAYS UNITED STATES IS NOT "REACTING" TO SOVIET ADVANCES Dr. FOSTER. Yes, I do, Mr. Kendall, and I constantly think about this particular point of view, because I don't sense that viewpoint myself. It seems to me that at the time of the Cuban crisis, the Soviets were in a worse position from the point of view of being able to damage the United States than they are today. It seems to me that the United States is in a stronger position today to attack the Soviet Union than they were then. So while we have increased our capability, I am prepared to agree that they have increased theirs even more. However, I don't feel that we are reacting to the Soviet moves. Rather I find them reacting to our moves. We have deployed a TITAN I and then subsequently a TITAN II in a hard silo. The Soviet Union has followed with the deployment of, most recently, the [deleted] which is very similar to the TITAN II [deleted]. [Deleted.] They have deployed missiles at sea, [deleted]. So in each case it seems to me the Soviet Union is following the U.S. lead and that the United States is not reacting to the Soviet actions. Our current efforts to get a MIRV capability on our missiles is not reacting to a Soviet capability so much as it is moving ahead again to make sure, that whatever they do of the possible things that we imagine they might do, we will be prepared. The capability that we hope to develop in an advanced submarine missile launch system should move us out of the difficulties we could possibly be in, should the Soviets learn to counter the POLARIS-type platform. Mr. KENDALL. Excuse me, you said in your prepared statement that the development of the POSEIDON was because of our then fear that TALLINN was going to be an ABM system. That is purely a reaction. Dr. FOSTER. No, sir; I don't quite see it that way. I see it as our moving ahead to make sure that, if they make that move, we have already covered ourselves. Another way of describing it is indeed the way you have described it, that we are reacting to them, but we are not reacting to anything in fact. We are reacting to something that they might be able to do; hence, we are taking action when we have no evidence (or very little evidence) on the other side of any such action, so I don't think of our moves as being reactions in that sense. POSIBILITY OF "MUTUAL UNCONDITIONAL DETERRENCE" DISCUSSED Mr. KENDALL. I hope your view of the risk involved in the assumptions that our options will truly be viable after the Soviet qualitative or quantitative improvements became known, particularly those which might upset the balance of power, and your views on that subject are sound. I am a little bit more shaky on it than apparently you are, and you have vastly superior knowledge, of course. This is going to be my final question. I worry that if we ever approach the stage of mutual unconditional deterrence whereby neither side would dare to ever use its strategic weapons against each other's homeland under any circumstances; that if and when we get to that stage, our allies in Europe, for example, might be hostages to either Soviet conventional or nuclear attacks. If we, because of the proposition that it would bring about national suicide no matter what happened if we ourselves launched a nuclear strike, dared not unleash our forces against the Soviets, then aren't we putting our allies in a very bad situation? That is a comment. You don't have to respond unless you want to. Dr. FOSTER. Mr. Kendall, I recognize your concern. I believe that the record of the United States in coming to the aid of its friends and allies, especially in Europe, is such that, with the current forces that we have and the Soviets have and even those I can project, the Soviet Union would have little assurance that they could go into Europe without serious actions on the part of the United States. Mr. KENDALL. Secretary McNamara talked, I believe, about 80 million American casualties or more resulting from a Soviet strike. Dr. FOSTER. Yes. Mr. KENDALL. A few years from now that could easily be 160 million. So, if there would be no America left, and no Soviet Union either, which side under those circumstances could afford to initiate a strike under almost any conditions? [Deleted.] This is the hard question. Dr. FOSTER. No, sir. I see your point. The fact of the matter is, however, that we have faced these kinds of crises with the Soviets, [deleted]. Mr. KENDALL. This was at a time, as I said before, when we had an exploitable superiority which I think we both agree we don't possess today. Dr. FOSTER. Yes. Mr. KENDALL. Doctor, thank you very much. You have been very patient and very thorough as usual. Dr. FOSTER. Thank you very much. Mr. KENDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. WHO IS REACTING TO WHOM? Senator STENNIS. Yes. Dr. Foster, all these questions you have been asked, does that bring up any point that you want to develop any further, or any additions you want to make to the answers you gave? Dr. FOSTER. No sir; I haven't anything else to add. Senator STENNIS. I was impressed with what you said about who is reacting to whom. If you don't mind, go over that again. You said that your opinion was, and you are in a very strategic place, that Soviet Russia was reacting to us more than we were reacting to it. In fact, as I understood it, you said you didn't think we were the one that was reacting. Enlarge on that again by way of repetition. I would like for you to comment. I think there ought to be something further in the record about your opinion on that. Dr. FOSTER. Certainly, sir; I think the chief counsel certainly had a point when he raised the question whether or not we weren't really just reacting to the Soviet Union. Senator STENNIS. Yes, a good point to raise. Dr. FOSTER. Now most of the actions the United States takes in the area of research and development have to do with one of two types of activities. Either we see from the field of science and technology some new possibilities which we think we ought to exploit, or we see threats on the horizon, possible threats, usually not something the enemy has done but something we have thought ourselves that he might do, we must therefore be prepared for. These are the two forces that tend to drive our research and development activities. Now let me give you a few examples. We saw the Soviet Union testing medium range ballistic missiles in Europe, and we concluded that the United States might come under attack by missiles from the Soviet Union, intercontinental ballistic missiles. We didn't have enough detail to know of their plans, so we had to assume that they were going to build intercontinental ballistic missiles and therefore we were behind, and this was the so-called missile gap. Now they weren't building ICBMs at that time. Senator STENNIS. They weren't? Dr. FOSTER. They were not, but we reacted. At that time we were also concerned about the possibility of going to very high nuclear yields, and so we looked into the possibility of 100 and [deleted] megaton warheads. Finally this country decided, actually on two separate occasions, not to pursue that development. The Soviets, however, subsequently faced that kind of a decision themselves and went further. They actually tested a device that could have been pushed to a yield of about 100 megatons, [deleted]. We also looked into the possibility of an orbital weapon, and studied it for several years. I remember Mr. McNamara's advising the Congress of that kind of threat we might face, long before we knew of any such activity in the Soviet Union. We ourselves decided that this did not look like an attractive military weapon, at least it did not hold any greater attraction than our ICBMs. And, therefore, we dropped it, but subsequently noticed that the Soviets did some experimental testing. They may even plan deployment of such an item. I wouldn't say that in these cases the United States was reacting to anything that the Soviets had done. There is another list that runs as follows: The Soviets have deployed some ICBMs in hardened silos. The best example is the [deleted]. A number of years ago, much earlier than the Soviets, the United States deployed in hardened silos some liquid-fueled, storable missiles having high payloads, quite comparable to the Soviet [deleted]. Looking at it that way, the Soviets were reacting to the U.S. deployment. Recently the Soviets have deployed a smaller missile [deleted], but that is 7 years after the MINUTEMAN was first deployed. The Soviets very recently have shown a submarine [deleted] but again about 7 years later. They have not yet shown, as far as I know, the possibility of [deleted]. They have, however, deployed a ballistic missile defense system, and deployed it before the United States; and the system they have deployed is very similar to the system that the United States decided not to deploy in the period of 1958 to 1961. But the system they have deployed is far inferior to the system we plan to deploy. I think, Mr. Chairman, that the Soviets have progressed remarkably rapidly in the last decade. They have tended to make smaller alterations in their systems, making minor improvements while they develop the longer range approach both in the land- and sea-based systems. I think the United States has more confidence in its ability to engineer from scratch a whole new system on which it can depend. I believe that is simply a mark of the superiority we have in planning and instrumentation, manufacture, quality control, and so on. NUMBER AND VARIETY OF U.S. WEAPONS SYSTEMS Senator STENNIS. You have covered it well. I want to comment a little further and see what your your respo response is. I marvel at how many weapons we have, how many different kinds of planes we have, how many different missile types we have, and how many new starts we have. Compared with Russia, don't we have many more weapons systems than they have? We have our interceptors, our fighters, our bombers and our fighter bombers. Every special requirement has to have a different system. When we get down to adding up what they are going to cost, $1 billion, $2 billion, $4 billion, it makes me dizzy. We have may more systems than they have, don't we, or do we? Dr. FOSTER. No, sir; it is not that clear. At the present time, as Senator Symington has remarked, they are testing a number of new prototypes in the fighter field. They are testing a number of new [deleted] systems. They have a number of new submarines and [deleted.] My general impression is that each country has performed those developments that it really felt were necessary in its own interests, and neither one is, overall, very different from the other in this regard. Senator STENNIS. Well, I was wasn't trying to put blame anywhere. It just seems to me that we may be compelled, instead of going into new systems at every level and every different branch of the service, to have fewer systems. |