JCS FORCES PROPOSALS

Mr. KENDALL. Yes, sir, we will get into those I am sure.
On the last page of your statement, General, you say and I am

quoting:

A level of strategic offensive and defensive forces has been proposed that should be sufficient in size and capability to deter a deliberate enemy decision to attack and should such deterrence fail, to insure that the U.S. and its allies emerge with relative advantage irrespective of the circumstances of initiation, response, and termination.

I think the magic word in that sentence is the word "proposed." I think we would be interested to know the extent to which the forces which have been proposed have received approval by the civilian authorities. In other words, in the light of the Soviet threat, what do you and the Joint Chiefs think that we should be doing that we are not doing to provide the strategic offensive and defensive forces in the number, of the composition and with the capabilities that our national security requires.

General WHEELER. I think that I might go through this bit by bit here, because it will show the trend of thinking.

I have already stated that the Joint Chiefs have not proposed at this time an increase in the number of missile launchers. We are of the view that the multiple warheads offer us a very sizable advantage [deleted].

SRAM

However, we might start with the SRAM. This is the air-to-ground missile short range, and we propose that the B-52-G and H bomber force be equipped with SRAM's beginning in [deleted] with the objective of [deleted] these missiles for each B-52-G-H squadron, and a phaseout of [deleted]. This would take a total of [deleted] UESRAM for this B-52 force.

We went through, of course, discussions with the Secretary and with the members of his staff, so I think that I should jump over the initial position, subsequent changes, and come right down to present

status.

The present status is to defer [deleted] the JCS recommendation to equip the B-52 G/H force with [deleted] UE-SRAM. As a special force for suppressing antibomber defenses modify [deleted] UE-B52's to carry some of the previously approved SRAM at the fiscal year 1969 cost of $54 million, and a total cost of $56 million [deleted].

AMSA

The Joint Chiefs have recommended that contract definition be authorized and, dependent upon favorable review, full-scale development of the AMSA be approved in order to obtain an IOC in about fiscal year 1976. As of now, contract definition and full-scale development of the AMSA in 1969 have not been approved. Instead, further development of aircraft technology was approved as well as a program to develop bomber penetration aids.

LARGE MISSILES AND HARD SILOS

The [deleted]. This is the large missile, the heavy throw weight missile. We recommended upon completion of contract definition, and dependent upon a favorable review, approval of full-scale development of the missile element of the advanced ICBM, with the objective of an IOC in [deleted], delaying a decision on expenditures unique to a specific deployment mode until results of studies directed by OSD and studies being made by the Air Force are available, when further development can proceed in accordance with the basing mode selected.

Now, perhaps it would be of interest to the committee to know what we are talking about relative to the basing mode. There is a concept which is being pursued right now to develop a [deleted] psi hard [deleted] silo. This would be sizable enough to take this larger missile, with the greater throw weight that we are talking about.

However, it is also possible to create these silos and to retrofit the MINUTEMAN III into them. In other words, the missile could be fired from the silo. You could have the hard silo with the MINUTEMAN III. This is an alternative solution. Regarding the present status, contract definition was disapproved. Advanced development at a cost of $10 million was approved, and also, the development of the dual capable silos for the MINUTEMAN III at a cost of $40 million in fiscal year 1969. That is the reason I brought out a bit earlier, for the members of the committee, what we were talking about regarding the possibility of putting the MINUTEMAN III into this very hard silo.

POLARIS, POSEIDON, AND BALLISTIC MISSILE SHIP

The POSEIDON. We recommended complete development of the MIRVed POSEIDON missile and conversion of 31 POLARIS SSBN's to deploy as POSEIDON SSBN's; also completion of scheduled conversion to POLARIS A-3 missiles of the remaining 10 POLARIS SSBN's not included in the POSEIDON conversion program. The Secretary of Defense came down and approved the force of 31 POSEIDON SSBN's, [deleted]. The development cost in 1969 will be $329 million, and from 1969 through 1973, $4,998 million.

The Secretary of Defense posture statement also indicates that the remaining 10 POLARIS SSBN's will be converted to A-3 missiles. I might add I believe that this is now a little bit fuzzy on the remaining 10. It is not a matter at issue right now, Mr. Chairman, because there is no 1969 money involved.

Senator STENNIS. But it is contemplated?

General WHEELER. It is not certain at the present time, sir. The Joint Chiefs have made this recommendation that they should go to the A-3. I am not sure of the status of this and it is not important. It will be important next year when we appear before you again, but not this year.

We also took a look at the ballistic missile ship. It looked promising to us, and we recommended completion of concept formulation, and if this were favorable, authorize construction of one prototype, a ballistic missile ship, [deleted]. We figured we could have this available

for tests and training in fiscal year 1971, using POSEIDON SSBN support facilities. This was not approved.

I believe those are the major items, sir, in the strategic forces.

SABMIS, ABMIS, AND NIKE-X ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS

There is money in the 1969 budget for the SABMIS. This is a sea based antiballistic missile system, which looks a little promising. This is for feasibility and concept formulation studies at a cost of $6 million, and we continue to believe that this is a desirable program. It will be addressed again next year.

The same is true for ABMIS, the airborne ballistic missile system, which, however, is not as far along as the sea based, and I must say that as of right now, I would find it very hard to make a judgment as to whether this is a feasible type of operation, and one that would be reasonably cost effective as opposed to the land based and the sea based ABM.

Senator STENNIS. All right, Mr. Kendall, your time is about up. Do you have any other major points you want to bring out?

Mr. KENDALL. I just want the record to show that the NIKE-X is another thing that the Joint Chiefs recommended.

General WHEELER. Oh, yes; we did. We recommended the NIKE-X. There was no matter at issue this year at all, because the funding that was in the budget presented to the Congress was ample to take care of the NIKE program, and there may be an issue next year, because it will depend upon the orientation of of NIKE, that is, whether it remains the so-called SENTINEL system, which is oriented toward the Chinese threat, or whether we change its direction somewhat, Mr. Chairman, and orient it toward the Soviet threat, which of course is what the Joint Chiefs have advocated from the very beginning.

STEPPING STONE TOWARD FULL ABM

Senator STENNIS. According to the information I had, and I addressed this on the Senate floor during the debate when it was attacked and they tried to take it out of the bill, and made the statement that what you were doing now on the ABM directed against Red China could be utilized later if you decide to direct it against the Soviet threat; is that correct?

General WHEELER. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. KENDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SYMINGTON. Will the chairman yield?

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. On the floor, I opposed the ABM we planned to build. The record will show I asked: Would this be a stepping stone toward a full ABM, and the answer was "No.”

General WHEELER. I don't know how we are defining stepping stones, because certainly if you are going to develop a full ABM, there will have to be some changes in the [deleted] if you are dealing with the Soviets, particularly if the initial system is oriented toward the Chinese threat; but it is a beginning in the ABM technology and deployment which, I think, moves us toward building a heavier system to defend against the Soviet threat, Senator Symington.

Senator STENNIS. All right, now Mr. Kendall, as I say, your time is virtually up. Do you want to raise another point briefly?

F-106-X AND F-12 INTERCEPTORS

Mr. KENDALL. There are two other items that I would like to bring up that the Joint Chiefs recommended that were not approved, these being [deleted] for POLARIS A-3 and the production and deployment of [deleted] F-12 interceptors.

General WHEELER. Well, I wasn't talking in exactly the same context. As a matter of fact, I am sure that when General McConnell appears, you will want to hear him on the subject of the F-106-X and the F-12.

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

General WHEELER. It is quite true the Joint Chiefs of Staff did recommend the deployment of a small number of F-12's as a part of our CONUS air defense. This, of course, would go with the AWACS, the airborne warning and control system, also.

Senator STENNIS. It is certainly pertinent to this inquiry. We already have a record of the general proof on this matter, Mr. Kendall, in the authorization hearings. I think instead of going through it again, we could bring over the record that is already printed from these hearings. Of course, anyone who wants to question General Wheeler or General McConnell on this matter can certainly do so. General WHEELER. Yes, sir.

Senator STENNIS. All right, that brings us to a stopping place.
Mr. KENDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator STENNIS. Thank you. I think that is a good stopping place.
Senator Symington, I will call on you first.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I have no questions at this time.

Senator STENNIS. Senator Miller, are you ready with some questions at this point?

Senator MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, at the bottom of page 1 of your statement you say "to deter aggression at any level," but you didn't indicate where that aggression might occur. Are you referring to aggression against the United States or aggression against some country like Laos, or what is the breadth of that word?

General WHEELER. The breadth there, sir, is aggression against ourselves and our allies. [Deleted.]

Senator MILLER. Our treaty obligations?

General WHEELER. That is correct, sir.

DETERRENCE A STATE OF MIND

Senator MILLER. Thank you. On page 2 you say, "Our military strategic concept is the basis from which the Joint Chiefs of Staff devise strategic force objectives." But you didn't carry it any further after you outlined the strategic forces. I am wondering why there isn't something in that statement to emphasize the importance of persuading the Soviet mind, the minds of the Soviet leaders, of our willingness to use our strategic forces.

In other words, I am sure that the General well knows that no matter what power we may have, it is useless if the other side is not in fact deterred in its mind.

General WHEELER. That is correct, Senator.

Senator MILLER. And why isn't there something in this discussion of our strategic concepts here which would lay great emphasis, even some mention of that point?

General WHEELER. Well, regarding the first point made, embodying the principles of deterrence, we define deterrence later on in the same paper from which this statement is drawn, Senator, and we define deterrence as forces in being, a state of mind, an obvious willingness to use those forces, so that I think we meet your point precisely, but it is not in this little listing of things that I have here. It is embraced in the word "deterrence."

Senator MILLER. There is nothing set forth here that indicates any action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff which is calculated to provide that state of mind. I mean at least in the paper you have here. Quite apart from force levels now, isn't there some kind of action or statements and policy of the JCS to help insure that state of mind?

General WHEELER. I would say this, Senator, that the state of mind of a prospective enemy can only be created by the actions of the United States as a whole, not by any statements by the Joint Chiefs of Staff-statement by the President, actions by this country.

For example, I believe that the action that was taken at the time of the Cuban missile crisis very clearly showed a determination on the part of the United States to oppose the introduction of nuclear weapons into Cuba. Deterrence, in other words, took over, because I think the Soviets were convinced that we would use whatever force was necessary.

Senator MILLER. I thoroughly agree with you. When I was talking about statements by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I wasn't talking about the Joint Chiefs of Staff getting off a press release. I was talking about statements by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in connection with our strategy, which would emphasize the importance on the part of any of our governmental levels in their actions to be consistent with the objective of the JCS to see to it that there is that state of mind to which you referred earlier.

General WHEELER. I believe that we sort of live this, Senator, to tell you the truth. In other words, we are consulted on all of the serious and important security problems that face this nation. One of the things that we bear in mind when we take our position is the effect that any action or lack of action will have on the enemy; in other words, the state of mind of the enemy.

I believe, as apparently you do, that if the enemy ever comes to believe that we do not have the will to use our power properly to protect our interests, we might just as well not have the weapons. They are not worth it.

Senator MILLER. I am sure you believe that, and I am sure that the JCS operate that way, but when it comes to putting out a statement of strategy, I wish there was something about that included. That is just the point I wanted to make.

General WHEELER. If I had taken this whole JCS paper which I drew upon for this, you would find that this matter of will, evident