at the end of the period covered by the reorganization as I indicated earlier, there will be some changes in the SRF.

Senator STENNIS. Well, may I repeat my question to General Johnson now. It was announced to us and the public here that the Selected Reserve Force will be substantially unchanged. Now, that statement really doesn't coincide with the explanation you have just given, does it, General Johnson?

General JOHNSON. Not with regard to time frame. We intend, I might add, because of the burden that is placed on the units that are assigned to the Selected Reserve Force, to shift this responsibility after the reorganization is complete so that we can successively bring other elements of the Reserve structure to a higher state of readiness as a result of giving them higher priorities in paid drills and in some cases in manning levels.

Senator STENNIS. Well, you say now that the Selected Reserve Force will be substantially changed by this plan.

General JOHNSON. Not until after the major part of the reorganization is completed. But, in any case, we intend to maintain a Selected Reserve Force, although its composition may not remain precisely the same as it is now. In other words, the specific units that are assigned to the Selected Reserve Force may change but at the present time we intend to maintain the Selected Reserve Force at a total strength of 150,000.

Senator STENNIS. So you are going to change it after 9 months, is that what you are saying now?

General JOHNSON. We intend to keep the present Selected Reserve Force through the period of the reorganization of the remainder of the Reserve structure.

Senator STENNIS. All right. You will supply this list and these groups as I have requested, when available.

General JOHNSON. Yes, sir.

General RICH. Mr. Chairman, could I add one word?
Senator STENNIS. Certainly.

General RICH. Senator Stennis, the Selected Reserve Force contains certain service support units and they are not COSTAR, and if we were mobilized, if we mobilized SRF, that would have to be accomplished after it was mobilized, which would in turn delay its deployment time. So we wish to COSTAR the SRF which will, in turn, improve its readiness. So I think that is related to some of the units that you mentioned.

Senator STENNIS. If I may bring back into context-the chairman was away-I quoted from the statement here of the Secretary:

During the reorganization of the Selected Reserve Force the 150,000-man force with Reserve components which is in a very high state of readiness will be substantially untouched.

Well, the man who runs and reads would think that that was saying we are not going to touch it while we are reorganizing or any other time, but on analysis I find that it means to stop right there.

Well, I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. Just one or two questions. Until you get the troop list from States showing where these men are located, it would be rather difficult to answer that question categorically, wouldn't it? General RICH. The question is what, sir?

Chairman RUSSELL Until you get a troop list showing just where these men are located, you don't even know where they are now, do you, or where they will be?

General RICH. No, sir, but under the directive that was given the States for allocating the units, they must place them where the resources now are, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman RUSSELL. That means armories and things like that.
General RICH. That is correct, sir.

Chairman RuSSELL. Does the same thing hold true with respect to Reserves?

General RICH. Yes, sir. Both components will have to operate on the same base. If you are going to have a unit you have to have a place for it which is an armory, and you have to use the personal resources that are there.

Chairman RUSSELL. I assumed in all that shuffle that some of the armories would probably not be needed and you would need some new armories.

General RICH. Sir, generally speaking the Guard intends to use every armory that they have, and since they have a little less strength in the plan than they have now, there would be no additional requirements so far as people are concerned.

Now, the Guard, of course, has an annual building program which is not affected by reorganization.

General JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, it is going to take us some time to provide this list because there are going to have to be adjustments made in the location of company-sized units. We intend to the very best of our ability to provide a unit or a detachment in every community that now has a Reserve component unit provided that community has a history of supporting the unit. There will be a requirement for negotiation with States as to the precise location of each of these company or detachment size units. We expect to accomplish this not later than the 15th of August.

Chairman RUSSELL. Would you file for the record a copy of the agreement signed by the Governors in this matter? I am very interested in seeing just how much control of the State militia or National Guard within the State these Governors have made to adjust themselves to this program.

General JOHNSON. Yes.

Secretary RESOR. Yes.

Chairman RUSSELL. Do you have some kind of agreement or a contract or do you

Secretary RESOR. It usually takes the form of a letter or telegram from each Governor. We will file copies as we did the last time.

Chairman RUSSELL. Also whatever you sent them, what you requested.

(Information requested follows. Additional classified information was furnished to the committee.)

ALABAMA

MONTGOMERY, ALA.

Hon. DANIEL J. EVANS,
Governor of Washington,

State Capitol, Olympia, Wash.:

The people of Alabama are deeply concerned as to current plans of the Department of Defense to eliminate some fifteen of our National Guard divisions. We consider this proposal ill-advised, unwise, and most poorly timed in view of present conditions throughout the world. These divisions are the prime source of our Reserve combat strength and their elimination as planned can only give comfort and assurance to our enemies. We are asking our congressional representatives to aggressively and effectively oppose such a move. Knowing the National Guard division of your State to be in similar danger of elimination and feeling you to share our view in this matter, we ask your firm opposition to the adoption of any such plan of elimination of these divisions. The support of yourself and your congressional delegation can be of extreme importance.

Sincerely,

LURLEEN B. WALLACE,

Governor of Alabama.

ALASKA

The State of Alaska generally concurs with the overall proposed reorganization plan provided the several states at the Adjutants General conference 1-3 June 1967. Due to the nation wide loss of paid drill spaces, I feel the National Guard Bureau has been as fair as possible in the troop allotment to the State of Alaska. However, I also feel that the overall reduction of the State of Alaska is too great for us to accept, particularly as it affects the HHC, 3d Bn., 297th Inf. I shall study this proposal at length, and upon my approval submit our recommendation to you in this matter.

ARIZONA

No official communication from Arizona.

ARKANSAS

STATE OF ARKANSAS,
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR,
Little Rock, June 13, 1967.

Maj. Gen. WINSTON P. WILSON,
Chief, National Guard Bureau,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR GENERAL WILSON: This is to acknowledge receipt of your telegram of June 2, 1967, to Governor Rockefeller concerning the reorganization of the reserve components. Thank you very much for giving the Governor this information.

With best regards,

Very truly yours,

CALIFORNIA

MARION B. BURTON.
Executive Secretary.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA MILITARY DEPARTMENT,

OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL.
Sacramento, June 12, 1967.

Subject: Reorganization of the California Army National Guard.
To: Chief, National Guard Bureau, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

1. Reference is made to letter, your headquarters, subject: Reorganization of Army National Guard Units, dated 1 June 1967, and to the proposed new CAL ARNG troop list distributed during the recent conference of the Adjutants General Association.

2. The proposed troop list is being studied intensively at this headquarters. Initially, we are developing individual studies of its impact on the various geographic areas, branch career opportunities, ability to perform State missions, utilization of armories, as well as the logistical support required and other important considerations. At this point I am of the opinion that the troop list is inadequate for the needs of this State and cannot be accepted.

3. The lack of career opportunities is particularly evident as regards artillery, armor, engineer, and medical officers, because of the reduction in battalion and higher headquarters in these branches. The lack of group headquarters to exercise command and control over artillery, engineer and separate armor battalions will adversely affect the readiness of these units. Another serious defficiency is the lack of sufficient truck transport required to move brigade personnel and their equipment during State emergencies. Medical units are inadequate, both from the standpoint of career incentives and in terms of providing support for ARNG forces during State emergency operations. Maintenance units appear inadequate to support the field organizational maintenance system. The signal company offered us is not a solution to our emergency communications requirements. On the other hand, we are offered more aviation maintenance companies than we need or may be able to support.

4. The preliminary conclusions serve only to underscore my previously voiced deep concern at the loss of our two divisions, particularly, the division headquarters and division base elements and my real doubts as to our ability to get by with a three brigade force.

5. It would be of considerable assistance to me in reaching a decision as to the troop list if you will advise me at an early date as to whether or not we could reasonably expect to obtain units and headquarters as follows:

CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU,
Washington, D.C.:

CONNECTICUT

Cunclas Connecticut Gov. John N. Dempsey concurs in the proposed reorganization of the Connarng as amended by allocation of signal company TOE 11-127E.

HARTFORD, CONN.

STATE OF CONNECTICUT,

MILITARY DEPARTMENT,

Hartford, May 23, 1967.

Maj. Gen. WINSTON P. WILSON,

Chief, National Guard Bureau,

Departments of the Army and Air Force,

Washington, D.C.

DEAR GENERAL WILSON: You have advised me, informally, that the proposed reorganization of the Army National Guard would probably result in Connecticut being allocated a Brigade of the 26th Division to replace our currently authorized 43d Command Headquarters (Divisional).

An analysis of this possibility prepared by our staff reveals that Connecticut would lose officer spaces and grades in such wholesale quantities that I am extremely disturbed.

A comparison of the current and proposed headquarters, by officer grade, is as follows: