Senator STENNIS. I would not question that, and I am not questioning his sincerity or anything else. I just want to be sure we get the full facts that the money is not in the bill and it has not been in these other bills that you have mentioned that tied it down for this purpose and it did not go for that purpose. I mean, equipment for the Guard and Reserve, except to a limited degree, and that is correct, is it not? Secretary RESOR. It is correct. There is funding and has been in the fiscal year 1967 budget and the fiscal year 1968 budget sufficient to procure enough equipment to equip a whole Active and Reserve structure with the small exceptions that I mentioned to the Senator.

Senator STENNIS. Well, it had to go under your list of priorities to the Regulars.

Secretary RESOR. We do not

Senator STENNIS. Most of it.

Secretary RESOR. We do not ever intend to issue and the the Reserves do not have the capacity to take their full table of organization in equipment.

Senator STENNIS. We need not go all over that again unless you want to go back to this billion dollars that Mr. McNamara mentioned, and, as I understood, you said it was not spent for the purpose that he expressed here at that time because other priorities intervened. Secretary RESOR. I believe it was spent for what he said was the purpose, according to my understadning, namely, to equip the force as a whole.

Senator STENNIS. Force as a whole.

Secretary RESOR. Yes.

Senator STENNIS. But not the Guard, as he said here. Secretary RESOR. I would doubt that he intended-I do not have the testimony.

Senator STENNIS. I do not mean it is a matter of intent now. I do not question his intent.

Secretary RESOR. But we certainly, none of us, have ever maintained that we earmark specific equipment that we buy for the Reserves. That would give a rigidity which we think would be very unwise.

Senator STENNIS. My point is that there was no marking of this money by the Congress.

Secretary RESOR. That is right.

Senator STENNIS. Or by the Department of Defense for the Guard and most of it did go for another purpose. And we just want to get at those facts rather than just say there was money in these bills to take care of this equipment. I do not think that is a full answer to the chairman's question.

General JOHNSON. Senator Stennis, may I interrupt, please? I drew a distinction—

Senator STENNIS. Pardon me just a minute, General.

Mr. Chairman, I ask to finish with the Secretary.

Chairman RUSSELL. That is all right. I will protect the right of any witness to answer in full, but, General

Senator STENNIS. I will extend the courtesy to him. But I want to extend it to him rather than him take it.

General, if you want to comment.

General JOHNSON. I just want to recall I had drawn a distinction between procurement or acquisition and distribution. Now the money did go for the procurement. The distribution differed from the manner explained by the Secretary of Defense.

Senator STENNIS. I was not suggesting that it went for anything except legal purposes or that Mr. McNamara did not keep his word and his intentions at that time. The other things intervened later. But my point is the Guard still does not have the equipment.

Now, about these eight divisions, under your present plan and 16 separate brigades in this strength of 550,000 that you recommended last year, you stepped that up now, 12 months later, to eight divisions and 18 separate brigades, plus supporting units for a strength of 640,000. Now that is a 90,000-man increase, Mr. Secretary.

Suppose we had accepted your plan of last year and you put it into effect. According to your present estimates you would have been 90,000 men short, would you not? How do you explain that?

Secretary RESOR. Yes.

General JOHNSON. Yes.

Senator STENNIS. I am talking to the Secretary if I may, and we will come to the general.

Secretary RESOR. The structure that we are recommending now is in major units substantially the same as the structure we recommended in the earlier plan. The difference is primarily in manning level. We are now proposing that we go to an overall manning level in units that are not manned a hundred percent, an overall manning level of about 92 percent, whereas under the old plan we would have been at roughly 75 to 80 percent. It just means that if we had put into effect the old plan in the event of an all-out mobilization, you would have had to fill more people from the Reserve pool.

Now we are planning a higher manning level and may I saySenator STENNIS. Well, why?

Secretary RESOR. May I say that is because we have tried to take into consideration what we believe is the intent of Congress as expressed in the hearings and in H.R. 2. H.R. 2, as you know, suggested the 640,000 manning level and we thought that we should come forward with a plan accommodated to those views.

Senator STENNIS. Well, my point is if you dropped these men out a year ago, these sergeants and lieutenants and so forth, you would not have them now. I know General Walt's statement. He said this was not a general's war over there in Vietnam, but it is a sergeant's war and a lieutenant's war and one fought by small units and small unit commanders such as sergeants, lieutenants, and captains.

Now, I am told your plan now would eliminate up to about a third of this type of officers that are already trained and already in a position and in a slot, as you gentlemen call it, that they are trained for, and where they are at home, so to speak.

Now, what is your comment on that? Can you afford to lose them now, turn them loose now or let them get out or be denied any chance of promotion or whatever may happen to them?

Secretary RESOR. We currently have in both components combined a strength of 671,000. Our proposed plan would authorize a strength of 640,000 or a reduction of about 31,000. As I said before, we have every intention of making an opportunity for anyone who wants to stay in a Reserve unit to have such an opportunity by being assigned either to a unit replacing the one that is inactivated or as overstrength.

As I also indicate there is a turnover of about 120,000 annually in the Reserves so that we feel that these 31,000 would be only temporarily excess and could very rapidly be used to fill the normal losses in the Reserve components.

As to the question about the difference between the manning level of 550,000 and 640,000, as you can imagine, the difference between manning at 80 percent and 90 percent tends to be mostly in your lower skilled jobs and that is why the whole question of manning level is a matter of judgment and is quite debatable because there are a lot of people who feel you can always fill those lower skilled jobs from the pool. We do not lose the people by not having them in the units. If they are not in the units, they are in the pool and can be called out on mobilization.

Today we propose a manning level of 93 percent which we feel is quite conservative.

Senator STENNIS. My feeling is that you lose a lot of lieutenants and sergeants. They lose their skills, they lose their slot by running into dry pasture and will not stay around and you lose them.

I will not take too much time, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I have here now a document that came from the Army in the regular way, and it is classified. I am certainly not going to refer to any figures in it or anything in it that is actually classified. I do want to put it in the record, not the open record, but in the record of the committee and see

Chairman RUSSELL. It will stay in the committee record but cannot be published.

Senator STENNIS. Yes; unless it is declassified.
Chairman RUSSELL. Yes.

Senator STENNIS. My real request is for them to see if it cannot be declassified.

Without using any figures or anything else, I will ask you this, Mr. Secretary: If the professional military men did not warn about the loss of a lot of men that are already trained and in place and have the experience and required skills and teamwork that go to make up a real Reserve officer and Reserve man like a sergeant, did they not warn the Army very strongly about the loss of those men, weakening the whole situation?

Secretary RESOR. Perhaps you are referring to the letter from CONARC.

Senator STENNIS. Well, I am referring to the letter now; it is signed David W. Gray.

Secretary RESOR. Yes.

Senator STENNIS. Major General, Chief of Staff.

Secretary RESOR. Yes. That letter raises the question of whether there would not be an interim loss of readiness because of turbulence in the structure and, of course, that is a military question, and I would rather have General Johnson answer, but briefly let me say that we feel, as I have said in my statement and General Rich has said in his, that the amount of turbulence in the interim is entirely acceptable in view of the very significant goal that we are trying to achieve.

Today we do not have the necessary support forces to deploy the eight divisions that we have, and that the JCS say we must have, and in order to get them we have to do this reorganization, and we think it is entirely correct to accept a small interim turbulence, particularly in view of the fact that that will not be in the Selected Reserve Force units. Those forces would be substantially unchanged except for changes which would have to be made today if they were called; namely, the COSTARring of their units.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, if I may have two more minutes. General Johnson may want to respond if I may ask him.

General JOHNSON. I would only comment that the report from CONARC has some merit to it, but underlying the statement is the supposition that forces are static. Forces are not static. We have an enormous turbulence especially in the Reserve Components year after year after year just by virtue of the fact that individuals going into the U.S. Army Reserve, for example, have only 2 years of obligation after they have completed their 2 years in the Active Establishment. So that there is a turnover in any event, and we felt that in order to achieve the objective, that is, provide a comprehensive supporting package for all of our force, that this was a desirable course of action.

Senator STENNIS. General Rich, you are familiar with the document here that I referred to.

General RICH. Yes.

Senator STENNIS. It is a proposed plan for reorganizing the Army Reserve components.

General RICH. Right, sir.

Senator STENNIS. You are familiar with that.

General RICH. Right, sir.

Senator STENNIS. You heard at least my remarks with reference to losing these experienced men and all. You agree with the sentiments of that comment, do you not, as a professional general? It is a fair question to you. If it is not, I withdraw it.

General RICH. No, sir, it is a fair question. What you are asking me is do I agree to having more ends and halfbacks and no guards and tackles, and I do not agree to that. You have to have the requisite number of guards, and tackles, and ends, and halfbacks to have a football team. We have got more halfbacks and ends and we do not have the guards and tackles, it is that simple, Mr. Chairman, Senator Stennis.

Senator STENNIS. I am not a football player, much less a star. You will have to make that clearer for me to understand it. If you are willing to answer it just on a losing football, all right.

General RICH. Mr. Stennis, we have more combat and combat support forces then we need, and we do not have enough service support forces, and that is the problem.

Senator STENNIS. What was that last?

General RICH. Service support forces, COSTAR units. When we put a unit into the field, it takes a certain number of people to put a balanced force in the field. We have more of a part of that force than we need, and we do not have enough of the other part that we need, so we are completely out of balance.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I do not believe this sentence here is classified.

General, this statement to which I refer says, "This will result"and it is referring to these loss of men and skills- "This will result in an undue loss of readiness because of the extensive requirement for unit and individual retraining and in excessive administrative and logistical difficulty and confusion."

Do you agree with that statement? Do you agree with that sentence?

General RICH. I do not agree with the degree to which it is stated. I do agree that you will lose some readiness and you will have temporary turbulence, but the end result will be worth far more than it

costs us.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I have taken so much time. When you get back to me, I do have one other question about the SRF. As I understand, the Chair does admit this in the files.

Chairman RuSSELL. In the files. As I understand, your MOS is all out of balance. You have too many combat people and not enough to see people get enough to eat and shoes; is that correct? General RICH. Yes; not enough support. Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, what is the total defense appropriation requested

for this year?

Secretary RESOR. For the Army it is $23 billion.
Senator SYMINGTON. $23 billion.

Secretary RESOR. Between $23 and $24 billion.

Senator SYMINGTON. How much of that is going to the Reserves? Secretary RESOR. We cannot say how much; we do not buy for the Reserves as such. What we do is determine our total requirement for the Active Army and the Reserves. In other words, we look to see, for example, how many rifles the 18 divisions in the Active Army need and how many the eight divisions of the Reserve need and then we put enough money in the budget to buy the assets we need to meet that requirement after taking into account our current inventory position and our current losses.

Senator SYMINGTON. What was the figure last year the Army requested?

Secretary RESOR. Approximately the same.

Senator SYMINGTON. How much of that went to the Reserves?

Secretary RESOR. I do not know. We buy for the full forces. I could give you the amount that is actually delivered into the inventory of Reserves for training purposes. Roughly, $65 million this year was delivered to improve their level of equipment on hand for training purposes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Will you for the record-will you try to find out, not on a budgeted basis but on an accounting basis, what percent of the total budget was included for the Reserves and what was included for the National Guard in those two component parts.

Secretary RESOR. Yes, I can try to do it.

(The following communication was subsequently received from the Secretary of the Army:)

Of the total Army obligations for FY 1967, excluding PEMA 5.8% was expended for the Army Reserve Components; 3.4% for the Army National Guard and 2.4% for the US Army Reserves.

Procurement of Equipment and Missiles Army obligations of $6.4 billion for FY 1967 were not included in determining the above percentages. This procurement was for both direct Army and customers, e.g., Air Force, Navy, Marines