Abbildungen der Seite
PDF
EPUB

THE DECISIONS

1]

OF THE

Supreme Court of the United States,

AT

OCTOBER TERM, 1888.

[Authenticated copy of opinion record strictly followed, except as to such reference words and figures as are inclosed in brackets.]

THE OREGON RAILWAY AND NAV-a judgment, sustaining a demurrer to the IGATION COMPANY, Piff. in Err., answer and in favor of plaintiff for rent, on a contract for the lease of a railroad, owned by plaintiff, which had been leased to and used by defendant. Reversed.

v.

THE OREGONIAN RAILWAY COMPANY (Limited).

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 1–39.)

Powers of corporations-railroad company, when cannot lease its road-power not presumedarticles of association-public grants-Oregon company-power to lease road-estoppel.

1. The powers of corporations are such, and such only, as are conferred on them by the Acts of the Legislature of the several States under which they

are organized.

2. Unless specially authorized by its charter or by Act of the Legislature, a railroad company cannot, by lease or contract, turn over to another company, for a long time, its road and all its appurtenances, the use of its franchises and the exercise of its powers; nor can another railroad company, without similar authority, contract to receive and operate such road, franchises and property of such corporation.

3. Such a contract is not among the ordinary powers of a railroad company and is not to be presumed from the usual grant of powers in a rail

road charter.

4. A corporation, formed under the Laws of Oregon, cannot assume to itself powers of action by

the mere declaration in its articles of association

that it possesses them.

5. In grants by the public, nothing passes by implication. In doubtful points the construction of the grant must be against the grantee.

6. The plaintiff, the Oregonian Railway Company (Limited), organized under the Laws of Great Britain, with such aid as the Statute of Oregon gives to it in reference to business done in that State, had no power to execute the lease of its railroad to the defendant company, mentioned in the opinion.

7. The Oregon Railway and Navigation Company, the defendant in this action, organized under the Laws of the State of Oregon, had not the legal capacity and lawful power to make said lease on its part.

8. A contract by which the plaintiff demised its road, privileges and franchises for ninety-six years to the defendant does not, by its performance for three years of the term, become so far an executed contract that a party thereto is estopped to deny its validity and to refuse to continue its performance.

[No. 26.]

Reported below, 23 Fed. Rep. 232. The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. J. N. Dolph and James C. Carter, for plaintiff in error:

The plaintiff was not authorized by its foreign charter or the Laws of Oregon to enter into the contract set up in the complaint.

Pa. R. Co. v. St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co. 118 U. S. 290 (30:83); Green Bay & M. R. Co. v. Union Steamboat Co. 107 U. S. 98 (27:413); Thomas v. West Jersey R. Co. 101 U. S. 71 (25: 950); Pearce v. Madison & I. R. Co. 62 U. S. 21 How. 441 (16: 184); York & M. L. R. Co. v. Winans, 58 U. S. 17 How. 30 (15: 27); Lakin v. Willamette Valley & C. R. Co. 13 Oreg. 436; Davis v. Old Colony R. Co. 131 Mass. 258; Eastern Counties R. Co. v. Hawkes, 5 H. L. Cas. 331, 371-381; Ashbury R. C. & Iron_Co. v. Riche, L. R. 7 H. L. 653; Macgregor v. Dover & D. R. Co. 18 Q. B. 618; East Anglian R. Co. v. Eastern Counties R. Co. 11 C. B. 775; Morgan v. La. 93 U. S. 217 (23:860).

gation Company, assuming to execute for that The act of the Oregon Railway and Navicompany the contract set up in the complaint, does not estop it from showing want of power in the lessor to execute said contract.

Re Comstock, 3 Sawy. 228; Semple v. Bank of British Columbia, 5 Sawy. 88; Rochester Ins. Co. v. Martin, 13 Minn. 59; Morawetz, Priv. Corp. §§ 86, 87; Wood's Field, Corp. § 235; Green's Brice, Ultra Vires, 42; Marion Sav. Bank v. Dunkin, 54 Ala. 473; Lehman v. Warner, 61 Ala. 467; Darst v. Gale, 83 Ill. 136; Farmers & M. Bank v. Baldwin, 23 Minn. 198.

The Oregon Railway and Navigation Company, by assuming to execute the contract set up in the complaint is not estopped to deny that the hiring of said railroad was not within the scope of its corporate powers.

Thomas v. West Jersey R. Co. 101 U. S. 71 (25: 950); Ogdensburgh & L. C. R. Co. v. Vermont & Argued April 27, 30, and May 1, 1888. De- C. R. Co. 4 Hun, 712; Middlesex R. Co. v. Bos

cided March 5, 1889.

ton & C. R. Co. 115 Mass. 347; Bradley v. Bullard, 55 Ill. 417: Bigelow, Estop. 3d ed. 466;

IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United Wood's Field Corp. 88.
Messrs. Edmund Robertson, George F.

States for the District of Oregon, to review

[2]

[3]

Edmunds and A. H. Garland, for defend- | it out. This motion was denied, but the deant in error:

The defense of ultra tires is in this case an attempt to impeach collaterally the articles of the two corporations, and is, therefore, inadmissible.

Morawetz, Corp. § 148; Dannebroge Gold Q. Min. Co. v. Allment, 26 Cal. 286; Pac. Bank v. De Ro, 37 Cal. 538; St. Louis v. Shields, 62 Mo. 247; Cincinnati, La F. & C. R. Co. v. Danville & V. R. Co. 75 Ill. 113; Farnum v. Delaware & H. Canal Co. 61 Pa. 265; Grant v. Henry Clay Coal Co. 80 Pa. 208; Truckee & T. Turnp. Co. v. Campbell, 44 Cal. 89; Cole Silver Min. Co. v. Va. & G. H. Water Co. 1 Sawy. 470; Baker v. Backus, 32 Ill. 79; Hamilton v. Carthage, 24 Ill. 22; Mendota v. Thompson, 20 Ill.

197.

A contract with a party as a corporation estops the party so contracting to deny the existence of the corporation.

Bigelow, Estop. 2d ed. 424; Hubbard v. Chap pel, 14 Ind. 601; Dutchess Cotton Manufactory v. Davis, 14 Johns. 244; Cowell v. Colorado Springs Co. 100 U. S. 55 (25: 547); St. Louis v. Shields, 62 Mo. 251; Evansville, I. & C. S. L. R. Co. v. Evansville, 15 Ind. 416; Heaston v. Cincinnati & Ft. W. R. Co. 16 Ind. 275; Brownlee v. Ohio, 1. & 1. R. Co. 18 Ind. 70; Smelser v. Wayne & U. S. L. Turnp. Co. 82 Ind. 419; Occidental Ins. Co. v. Ganzhorn, 2 Mo. App. 205; Douglas Co. v. Bolles, 94 U. S. 104 (24:46); M. E. U. Church v. Pickett, 19 N. Y. 485; Swartwout v. Michigan A. L. R. Co. 24 Mich. 396; Kennedy v. Cotton, 28 Barb. 59; Phenix Bank v. Donnell, 41 Barb. 572; Jones v. Bank of Tenn. 8 B. Mon. 123.

Admissions of the plaintiff's corporate char acter contained in the defendant's first two answers bind the defendant.

Carradine v. Carradine, 33 Miss, 698; Elwood v. Lannon, 27 Md. 200; Peckham Iron Co. v. Harper, 41 Ohio St. 100.

Mr. Justice Miller delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a writ of error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Oregon. The Oregonian Railway Company (Limited) recovered a judgment against the Oregon Rail way and Navigation Company for the sum of $68,131, on a contract for the lease of a railroad owned by the plaintiff in the suit, which had been leased to and used by the defendant. This sum was for the semi-annual payment of rent, in advance, for the half year beginning May 15, 1884.

The Oregonian Railway Company (Limited) was organized in Scotland, under what are called "The Companies' Acts," of Parliament of 1862, 1867, and 1877, and in the memorandum of association it is declared that its principal office and place of business is at Dundee. The defendant in the action, the Oregon Railway and Navigation Company, was organized under articles of incorporation, filed June 13, 1879, according to the Statutes of Oregon on that subject, and its principal office is declared in those articles to be at Portland, Oregon.

After many amendments to the original petition and still more numerous amended answers, the case came to a hearing before the court on a demurrer to the answer and a motion to strike

murrer was sustained; and as the pleadings were supposed to present all the issues that could arise in the case a judgment was rendered for the plaintiff, to review which this writ of error is prosecuted. 22 Fed. Rep. 245, and 23 Fed. Rep. 232.

The amended petition of the plaintiff sets out the Acts of Parliament under which it was organized as a corporation, or so much thereof as is necessary to an understanding of the questions presented by this record, and gives in full its "Memorandum of Association," and also what are called its "Articles of Association." This memorandum, after stating the name of the company as above given, and that its registered office will be situated in Scotland, proceeds to give the objects for which it is estab lished, as follows:

"

"First. The building, constructing, reconstructing, equipping, owning, operating, leasing or selling, transferring or disposing of, or purchasing or otherwise acquiring, holding, and operating, or otherwise using, working or dealing in all or any such railway or railways, railroad or railroads, in the State of Oregon and the Territory of Washington, in the United States of America, or in either of them, or between such points in said State or Territory or elsewhere in North America as may from time to time be resolved or determined upon by said company, and the carrying of passengers, goods, and minerals and all other traffic and freight on, and the doing and performing of all other acts, deeds and other operations connected with, railways and railroads in the said State and Territory, or either of them, or elsewhere in North America.

"Second. The building, constructing, equip ping, owning, and operating, or the leasing, selling, transferring, holding, or acquiring, by purchase or otherwise, and the working and using of one or more lines or portions of lines of railroad or railway, or parts thereof from (first) the City of Portland or the City of Astoria, in the State of Oregon, United States of America, or from either or both of said cities, or from some other point or place on the Willamette or Columbia Rivers, in said State of Oregon, through any part or portion of the said State of Oregon lying west or south of the Cascade range of mountains, in said State, to some point at or near, in or upon said Cascade range of mountains; (second) from thence, or from any part or portion of the western or southwestern part of said State of Oregon, to and across and to the east side of said Cascade range of mountains, through a pass in said mountains at or near that fork or branch of the Willamette River, in said State of Oregon, known as the middle fork or branch of said river, or through some other pass in said mountains, within one hundred miles north or south of said middle fork or branch of said river, where shall be found to be on actual survey the easiest and most prac ticable route across the Cascade range of mountains; (third) thence through that portion of said State of Oregon lying east of said Cascade range of mountains and on through the Territories of Washington or Idaho, or the States of Nevada and California, in the United States of America, or through all or any one or

[merged small][ocr errors]

more of said States and Territories to a connec-| the defendant a certain railway or railroad
tion with, or without making any connection owned by the plaintiff, in the State of Oregon,
with, any other railway or railways in either with its stations, depots, and other property
of said States of Oregon, California, or Nevada, connected therewith, for a term of ninety-six
or Territories of Washington or Idaho, and years from the date of the lease; and that the de-
with or without one or more branch lines (a) fendant, by the terms of said indenture, coven-
running north, south, east, or west from said anted and agreed to pay the plaintiff therefor
main line on the east side of said Cascade range the yearly rental of twenty-eight thousand
of mountains, or (b) running from said main pounds sterling, in equal half-yearly payments,
line on the west side of said Cascade range, in on the 15th of May and the 11th of November
said State of Oregon, forming a junction, or in each year in advance. It then proceeds to
one or more junctions, with said main line, at allege "that upon the execution of said indenture
one or more points, to a terminus in said portion of lease, the said defendant entered into posses-
of the State of Oregon west of said Cascade range sion of said demised property, and has continued
of mountains, or to a junction with said main in the enjoyment of the same to the present time,
line, or to a terminus or termini at one or more sea- but that on the 15th of May, 1884, the defendant,
ports on the shores of the Pacific Ocean, all as pretending that neither it nor the plaintiff was
may from time to time be determined by actual authorized or empowered by law to enter into
surveys; as also to purchase, build, construct, said indenture of lease, tendered and offered to
own, equip and operate, or to enter into agree-restore possession of said demised property to
ments to run over or to lease (1) any line or lines, plaintiff in its then condition," and, disavowing
branch or branches, of railway or railways, rail- the obligation of the lease, refused to pay any
road or railroads, that may connect with or be- further rent; wherefore the plaintiff prays
come attached to, or meet or become a part of judgment for the sum of $68,131.
the said main line or its main branch or any of
its branches herein before designated; or (2) such
other main or branch line or lines, or extensions
of any railway or railways, railroad or railroads,
made in connection with this company's main
line, or of any of its branches, or separate and
distinct therefrom, all in such manner of way or
form and on such terms as said company shall
from time to time deem advisable and for its in-
terests, and the doing and performing of all other
operations connected with said designated rail-
way or railways, railroad or railroads, or
branches thereof, or in connection with other
railways of a similar or different nature, the
doing and performing of which this said com-
pany shall at any time deem advisable and
for its interests in the carrying out of its busi-

ness.

The substance of the numerous answers and amended answers is, that the defendant denies that the plaintiff has any corporate existence; avers that it had no power or authority to make the contract or lease as stated in the petition, and that the contract, although signed by the president of the defendant company, with the seal of that company attached, and the signature of the secretary, by order of its board of directors, is also without legal authority, and is not binding upon the defendant. In fact, the essence of the defense and of the whole controversy is, whether these companies had power under their organization as corporations to make the contract of lease which is the foundation of this action.

The defendant avers that it has fully paid [7] the rent due under the lease for the term end

"Third. The building, constructing, purchasing May 15,1881, from which time it disavowed ing, or otherwise acquiring, holding, equipping, the obligatory force of the contract, and offered owning and operating, or the leasing and oper- to return and deliver up to the plaintiff all the ating, or the leasing, equipping, and operating, property it held under the lease. or the selling, transferring, or otherwise disposing of, and the working and using of any other railway or railroad, or of any wharves, jetties, steamboat, or steamship, stage, or of any canals, locks, bridge, clay road, plank road, turnpike, hack, truck, or express lines, or any other line, lines, or means for the transportation of freight or passengers, or either or both, now constructed or operated in whole or in part, or which may hereafter be constructed or operated in whole or in part, in either of the said States of Oregon, California, or Nevada, or said Territories of Washington or Idaho, and that whether in connection with or separate and distinct from, and as line or means independent of said railway or railways, railroad or railroads, so to be built, constructed, purchased, owned, equipped, or operated as aforesaid by this company."

The petition also avers that the company has complied with the Statute of Oregon, which authorizes corporations of foreign countries to do business in that State upon complying with certain requirements. On this averment no issue is raised.

It also alleges that on August 1, 1881, the plaintiff, by an indenture of lease, demised to

[8]

[11]

It appears also by the pleadings, both on the [9] part of the plaintiff and defendant, that they entered into an agreement, by which the de- [10] fendant company was to continue to use the road for the time being, in order to prevent serious loss arising from the disruption of the relations of the two railroads, but that such use was not to be construed as being under the lease, nor as binding either party beyond what the law [12] would imply if this arrangement had not been made. There is also an averment in the petition [13] that the property was not in the same condition when the offer to return it was made as it was when it was received; but this is denied in the [14] answer, and as no proof was taken in regard to that fact it can make no figure in the case as presented to this court.

The two questions presented on this demurrer, and the only ones necessary to be considered, are:

First. Whether the plaintiff, the Oregonian Railway Company (Limited), organized under the Laws of Great Britain, with such aid as the [20] Statute of Oregon gives to it in reference to business done in that State, had the power to lease its railroad to the defendant company; and,

[21]

Second. Whether the Oregon Railway and Navigation Company, the defendant in the action, organized under the Laws of the State of Oregon, had the legal capacity and lawful power to make said lease on its part.

law; and it is the established doctrine of this
court, and, with some exceptions, of the States
in which that common law prevails, as well as
of Great Britain, from which it is derived, that
such a corporation can exercise no power or
Although the lease itself, which is the foun- authority which is not granted to it by the char-
dation of this action, is not found in the plead-ter under which it exists, or by some other Act
ings, nor in the record, the statements in regard
to it made by the petition, amended petition,
and answers leave no question as to its nature or
character so far as it affects the two questions
here suggested.

of the Legislature which granted that charter.
This proposition has been before this court
more than once in recent years.
It was very
fully considered in Thomas v. West Jersey Rail-
road Company, 101 U. S. 71 [25:950], which
resembled the case before us in several im-
portant features.

It may be considered as the established doc-
trine of this court in regard to the powers of
corporations, that they are such and such The Millville and Glassboro Railroad Com-
only as are conferred upon them by the Acts pany, incorporated under the Laws of New
of the Legislatures of the several States under Jersey, entered into an agreement with Thomas
which they are organized. A corporation in and others for the lease of its railroad for twenty
this country, whatever it may have been in years. It was agreed that the company might
England at a time when the Crown exercised at any time terminate the lease and retake pos-
the right of creating such bodies, can only session of the railroad; in which case any loss
have an existence under the express law of the or damage incurred by the lessees should be
State or Sovereignty by which it is created. equitably adjusted by arbitration, and the
And these powers, where they do not relate to amount be paid by the company. This con-
municipal corporations exercising authority tract was made in 1859, and the lessees took
conferred solely for the benefit of the public, control of the property and used it until 1867,
and in some sense parts of the body politic of when they were served with a notice by the
the State, have in this country until within re- lessor terminating the lease. A suit was
cent years always been conferred by special brought to recover the damages mentioned in
Acts of the legislative body under which they the contract, which came from the Circuit
claim to exist. But the rapid growth of cor- Court of the United States for the Eastern
porations, which have come to take a part in District of Pennsylvania to this court, where
all or nearly all of the business operations of it was very elaborately argued, and received
the country, and especially in enterprises re- the earnest consideration of the court, as may
quiring large aggregations of capital and in- be perceived from the report of the case. The
dividual energy, as well as their success in opinion, which was concurred in by all the
meeting the needs of a vast number of most judges who sat in the case, contains a full re-
important commercial relations, have demand-view of the decisions of the English courts on
ed the serious attention and consideration of
law makers. And while valuable services have
been rendered to the public by this class of or-
ganizations, which have stimulated their for
mation by numerous special Acts, it came at
last to be perceived that they were attended by
many evils in their operation as well as much
good, and that the hasty manner in which they
were created by the Legislatures, sometimes
with exclusive privileges, often without due
consideration and under the influence of im-
proper motives, frequently led to bad results.
Whether it was this consideration, or mainly
the desire to fix some more uniform rule by
which the rights and powers of private cor-
porations, or those for pecuniary profit, should
come into existence, it is certain that not many
years ago State Constitutions which were
formed or remodeled came to have in them a
provision like that which is now to be found
in the Constitution of the State of Oregon, art.
XI, § 2:

[ocr errors]

Corporations may be formed under general laws, but shall not be created by special laws, except for municipal purposes. All laws passed pursuant to this section may be altered, amended, or repealed, but not so as to impair or destroy any vested corporate rights."

Outside of the powers conferred and the privileges granted to these organizations by the statutes under which they exist, they are in all the States of the Union which, like Oregon, have the common law as the foundation of their jurisprudence, governed by that common

the subject discussed, and also of previous de-
cisions of this court.

The question turned altogether upon the
power of the railroad company, under its char-
ter and the Laws of New Jersey, to make the
lease by which its road was turned over for
twenty years to the absolute control of other
parties. The right to do this was asserted un-
der the following language in the charter of
the company:

"That it shall be lawful for the said company,
at any time during the continuance of its
charter, to make contracts and engagements
with any other corporation, or with individuals,
for the transporting or conveying any kinds of
goods, produce, merchandise, freight, or pas-
sengers, and to enforce the fulfillment of such
contracts."

der any sound rule of construction to find in
But the court said that it was impossible un-
this language a permission to sell, lease, or

transfer to others the entire railroad and the
rights and franchises of the corporation.

The cases of Ashbury Railway Carriage &
Iron Company v. Riche, L. R. 7 H. L. 653, de-
cided in the House of Lords in 1875, and East
Anglian Railway Co. v. Eastern Counties Rail-
way Company, 11 C. B. 775, were also reviewed,
with several others of a similar character from

the reports of the highest courts of England, in
which, as this court said-

"The broad doctrine was established that s
contract not within the scope of the powers
conferred on the corporation cannot be made

[22]

« ZurückWeiter »