[386]

Smith v. Meyer, 25 Ark. 611.

The landlord may pursue the produce of the
rented premises, or the proceeds thereof in the
hands of parties having notice of the lien, at
any time within the six months.

Meyer v. Bloom, 87 Ark. 43; Buck v. Lee, 36
Ark. 525; Watson v. Johnson, 83 Ark. 737;
King v. Blount, 87 Ark. 115; Halliday v.
Hamilton, 78 U. S. 11 Wall. 564 (20: 215);
Chaffe v. Heyner, 81 La. Ann. 594.

Courts of justice have always expounded
and executed contracts according to the laws
of the place in which they are made; provided
that law was not repugnant to the laws or pol-
icy of their own country.

Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U. S. 13 Pet. 519 (10: 274); Story, Conf. L. § 88.

And where there is no such lien by the laws
of the State to which the property goes, liens
by the laws of the place from which the prop-ness.
erty comes will be enforced.
Whart. Confil. L. § 322.

[356]

Harris & Co., cotton brokers in the City of New | of Arkansas which is the one sought to be en-
Orleans, were the correspondents of Bryan & forced here.
Bro., and to them the latter firm transmitted
the cotton raised and purchased by them in
Arkansas.

During the pendency of this lease, to wit, on December 9, 1881, Bryan & Bro., being indebted to Harris & Co., and desiring further accommodations and advancements from them, made a deed of trust to Z. T. Carlton of the County of Chicot, in Arkansas, in which they conveyed to him, as trustee, substantially all their property in the State of Arkansas, and all the cotton or other products raised or gathered during the year 1881 on the plantations and tracts of land described, with about 250 bales of cotton, in seed lint and bales, on the Point Chicot plantation, leased from the heirs [357] of Walworth. The purpose of this conveyance was declared to be to secure the payment of a debt of $35,000, evidenced by notes of Bryan & Bro., dated at New Orleans, La., December 9, 1881, drawn to the order of J. L. Harris & Co., and payable at their office in that city; also any advance in addition to said notes which Harris & Co. might make to Bryan & Bro., with various other agreements not material to be mentioned here.

[358]

There is no question that, under the Laws of Arkansas, there existed a lien on some of the cotton transmitted by Bryan & Bro. to the defendants, Harris & Co., while that property remained in the State of Arkansas; and it is attempted to aid the argument in this case, which holds Harris & Co. liable for that lien on the cotton received by them, by the allegation that they knew that it came from the Point Chicot plantation, and knew the rent was unpaid, and, therefore, had knowledge of the existence of the lien. This knowledge, however, or even notice, is not sustained by the evidence.

The plaintiffs, in their bill, allege that Harris & Co. must have known of this lien, for two reasons: first, because they had paid the rent for two previous years to the heirs of Walworth; and second, because the lease between the heirs of Walworth and Bryan & Bro. had been in their hands for a short time, so that they must be held to have known its contents.

The bill is sworn to, and the answer is sworn to, with no waiver of an answer under oath, and according to chancery practice the answer of Joseph L. Harris, of the firm of J. L. Harris & Co., so far as it is responsive to these allegations, must be taken as evidence. In regard to the payment of the rent for the two years mentioned, he says that he simply paid it upon the order of Bryan & Bro., out of funds of theirs in his hands, as he would have paid any other order of theirs, and without any knowledge as to the nature, character or extent of the lien, or that the rent was a lien on cotton in his hands. As regards the possession of the lease referred to, he says that they (Harris & Co.) did, at one time, in the year 1880, which is over a year previous to the crop on which the lien is now claimed, have this lease in their

The bill of the complainants, except the
heirs of Walworth, consists of allegations that
Harris & Co. had undertaken that out of the
proceeds of the property conveyed by this deed
of trust to Carlton these creditors should be
paid various sums due to them. The heirs of
Walworth in addition to this set up that, by virt-
ue of the lease made between them and Bryan
& Bro., they had a lien on the cotton raised
each year on the Point Chicot plantation for
the amount of the rent, $5,500 per annum; and
further, that by virtue of the laws of Arkansas
they had the landlord's lien for rent for the
same sum on the cotton raised on the planta-possession; that it was deposited with them by
tion. They also alleged that this cotton, the
rent being unpaid, came to the hands of J.
L. Harris & Co., who disposed of it, but that
they were aware of the existence of such lien
and were bound by it.

The circuit court, after a hearing on the bill, answer, replication, and evidence, dismissed it; and from that decree, only the heirs of Wal worth take this appeal, and they only as to the question of their right to recover the rent for one year by virtue of a lien on the cotton which came to the hands of Harris & Co. from the Bryans. All the other questions, therefore, which were raised in the case, as it was originally heard and tried, are eliminated from its consideration in this court.

The lien here asserted seems to be founded upon expressions contained in the contract of lease and upon the Statute of Arkansas concerning the lien of a landlord. The only clause in the lease referring to a lien is the following: "And it is further understood that the lessor shall have his lien on the crop for the security and payment of his rent, as set forth in this lease." This reference to what is set forth in the lease means the amount of the rent and the time of its payment, and the language, that "The lessor shall have his lien on the crop," evidently refers to the lien which the statute gives. So that, after all, it is the lien given by the Statute

one Whitaker, who claimed to have an interest
in the lease, as collateral security for a loan of
$600; and that Whitaker having soon thereafter
paid the same, it was returned to him without
any further attention on their part.

This statement is confirmed by the answer,
which is also under oath, of Joel E. Bryan, the
surviving partner of Bryan & Bro., the other
brother, Lemuel, having died before the trial.
He says that L. C. Bryan & Bro. shipped of the
cotton grown on the Point Chicot plantation
in the year 1881, 467 bales, all of which was
shipped to their own account to J. L. Harris
& Co., to be by them sold as cotton factors, and
the proceeds applied to the payment of advanc-
es made to their firm by Harris & Co., and, re-
ferring evidently to the question of the lien
stated in the bill to be impressed on said cotton,
says that if it was impressed with anything be-
side the shipping brand of his firm he did not
see it; that the whole of said cotton belonged
to the firm of Bryan & Bro., taken in the reg-
ular course of business, and that the last ship-
ment, made on the 19th day of December, 1881,
was sold a few days thereafter, and an account
of sales rendered by Harris & Co.

There is no evidence from any quarter contradicting these sworn answers of J. L. Harris and Joel E. Bryan; and we therefore think that it is not established that Harris & Co. knew or had

[361]

[362]

[363]

notice of any lien in favor of the Walworth | which he sent from that State to the City of
heirs for the rent upon the cotton received by
them in the last days of these transactions.
It is also apparent, from all this testimony,
that the cotton was shipped by Bryan & Bro.
to Harris & Co., at New Orleans, as the prop-
erty of the former, and was received and for
the first time came under the control of the
latter on landing at that place; and that they re-
ceived it without any other obligation to ac-
count for the rent of the Point Chicot planta-
tion, or any other lien upon it, except such as
would arise from the fact that such a lien ex-
isted in Arkansas as between Bryan & Bro. and
the Walworth heirs.

Chicago in the State of Illinois. On the third
day of November, 1857, Bates executed and de-
livered, in the City of New York, to Van Bus-
kirk and others, a chattel mortgage on these
safes to secure an existing debt. On the 5th
day of the same month, Green, also a creditor
of Bates, sued out a writ of attachment in the
proper court of Illinois, and caused it to be
levied upon these safes in Chicago as the prop-
erty of Bates. No record had been made at
this time of the mortgage in the State of Illi-
nois, nor had the possession of the property
been delivered under it. Green recovered a
judgment in the attachment suit, and had the
safes sold in satisfaction of his debt. He was
afterwards found in New York, of which
State all three of the parties named were citi-
zens, and was there sued by Van Buskirk for
"Sec. 4453. Every landlord shall have a lien the value of the safes. Green pleaded the pro-
upon the crop grown upon the demised prem-ceedings in the Illinois Courts in bar of the ac-
ises in any year for rent that shall accrue for
such year, and such lien shall continue for six
months after such rent shall become due and
payable."

The laws of the two States differ from each other on this subject. The Statute of Arkansas is found in the Revised Statutes of that State, of 1884, in the following words:

This was in force when these transactions took place.

There are also other provisions for the enforcement of this lien, which it is not necessary to embody here.

The Revised Code of Louisiana, arts. 2705 and 2709, limits the right of pledge of the lessor of real estate to the "movable effects of the lessee, which are found on the property leased," and in the exercise of this right the lessor may seize the objects which are subject to it, before the lessee takes them away, or within fifteen days after they are taken away, if they continue to be the property of the lessee, and can be identified." By the Session Act of 1874, page 114, it is enacted as follows:

tion, but this plea was overruled. The decision
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of New
York, from which judgment Green took a writ
of error to this court. It first came under con-
sideration here on a motion to dismiss for want
of jurisdiction; but it was held that the ques-
tion of the right of Green to seize the property
under his attachment must be determined by
the Law of Illinois, where the property was
when so seized, and not by the Law of New
York, and that the court of appeals had re-
fused to give to the judgment of the Illinois
Court the full faith and credit to which it was
entitled as a judicial procceeding of the courts
of that State.

The inquiry of course involved more or less
the question of the effect of those procedings,
but as the case was only before the court on a
had to come up afterwards to be heard on its
motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, it
"Sec. 2. That when any merchant, factor, merits. On the motion the court considered
or other person has advanced money, property, very fully the much controverted principle as
or supplies on cotton, sugar, or other agricult to the extraterritorial effect of laws affecting
ural products, and the same has been con- the title or liens upon the property in one State
signed to him by ship, steamboat, vessel, rail- when that property was carried away or be-
road, or other carrier, the said agricultural came the subject of litigation in another State;
products shall be pledged to the consignee and while it was seen that in many cases it had
thereof from the time the bill of lading thereof been held that a court of one State would give
shall be put in the mail or put into the posses-effect to the law of domicil of another State, it
sion of the carrier for its transmission to the was said:
consignee."

It is not necessary to hold that the right of Harris & Co. to this cotton was vested in them on the giving of the bill of lading, or putting on board of a railroad or steamboat, but it is sufficient to hold that when they received it in New Orleans they received it under such rights and limitations as the Laws of Louisiana conferred upon them in that regard.

"But after all, this is a mere principle of
comity between the courts, which must give
way when the statutes of the country where
property is situated, or the established policy
of its laws prescribe to its courts a different
rule. The learned commentator, already re-
ferred to (Story on Conflict of Laws, § 390), in
speaking of the Law in Louisiana, which gives
paramount title to an attaching creditor over a
The question here presented of the conflict-transfer made in another State, which is the
ing rights of parties claiming property under domicil of the owner of the property, says:
the laws of two different States, each of which No one can seriously doubt that it is compe-
sustains the claims of the party residing in it, tent for any State to adopt such a rule in its
is not a new one in this court. The case of own legislation, since it has perfect jurisdic-
Green v. Van Buskirk, 72 U. S. 5 Wall. 307 tion over all property, personal as well as real,
[18: 599], seems to decide the present one by within its territorial limits. Nor can such a
the principles which it lays down and the an- rule, made for the benefit of innocent pur-
alogy of the two cases in regard to the facts. chasers and creditors, be deemed justly open
That case was twice before this court for con- to the reproach of being founded in a narrow
sideration.
or a seltish policy.' Again, he says: 'Every
nation, having a right to dispose of all the
property actually situated within it, has (as has

It appeared that Bates, a citizen of the State of New York, was the owner of certain safes,

[364]

[365]

often been said) a right to protect itself and its
citizens against the inequalities of foreign laws,
which are injurious to their interests.""

The court also cited with approval the fol-
lowing language (section 388) from the same
authority:

"The municipal laws of a country have no force beyond its territorial limits, and when another government permits these to be carried into effect within her jurisdiction, she does so upon a principle of comity. In doing so, care must be taken that no injury is inflicted upon her own citizens, otherwise justice would be sacrificed to comity. . . If a person sends his property within a jurisdiction different from that where he resides, he impliedly submits it to the rules and regulations enforced in the country where he places it." See also Olivier v. Tounes, 2 Mart. N. S. 93; 128 U. S. 489 [ante, 491]

transfer of property within its limits, and that
whoever sends property to it impliedly sub-
mits to the regulations concerning its transfer [366]
in force there, although a different rule of
resides. He has no absolute right to have the
transfer prevails in the jurisdiction where he
transfer of property, lawful in that jurisdic-
tion, respected in the courts of the State where
it is found, and it is only on a principle of
comity that it is ever allowed. But this prin-
ciple yields when the laws and policy of the
latter State conflict with those of the former."

The principle here asserted, which is clearly
applicable to the case before us, is supported by
reference to authorities in those opinions which
we think are conclusive. At all events, the
cases themselves are conclusive upon this
court, and upon the rights of the parties to
The decree of the Circuit Court dismissing
the bill is, therefore, affirmed.

this suit.

When the case of Green v. Van Buskirk
again came before this court on its merits, 74
U. S. 7 Wall. 139 [19: 109], Mr. Justice Davis,
in delivering the opinion, said, in reference to THE
this question of the conflict of rights under the
laws of different States, which were themselves
in conflict:

"It is a vexed question on which learned
courts have differed; but after all there is no
absolute right to have such transfer respected;
and it is only on a principle of comity that it
is ever allowed. And this principle of comity
always yields when the laws and policy of the
State where the property is located has pre-
scribed a different rule of transfer with that of
the State where the owner lives."

The same principle is reasserted in Hervey v. R. 1. Locomotive Works, 93 U. S. 664 [23: 1003]. That was a case where the Rhode Island company had delivered to Conant & Co., who were contractors on a railroad in Illinois, a locomotive engine, under an instrument in writing which this court construed to be a lease. By the Laws of Illinois, to which this engine was carried, such lease or title, whatever it may have been, which the locomotive company insisted that they had retained in the property, was of no avail as against subsequent creditors when the property was found in that State, unless it was properly recorded there. No such record being made of the instrument under which Conant & Co. held it, the engine was seized by attachment against that firm and sold to Hervey, the plaintiff in error in this court. In the following language, taken from the opinion in that case, the doctrine is reiterated that the question must be determined by the Laws of Illinois where the property was found and sold, and not by the Laws of Rhode Island where the lease or instrument of conveyance was made:

"It was decided by this court in Green v. Van Buskirk, 72 U. S. 5 Wall. 307 [18: 599], 74 U. S. 7 Wall, 139 [19: 109], that the liability of property to be sold under legal process, issuing from the courts of the State where it is situated, must be determined by the law there, rather than that of the jurisdiction where the owner lives. These decisions rest on the ground that every State has the right to regulate the

MORLEY SEWING MACHINE
COMPANY ET AL., Appts.,

V.

CHARLES B. LANCASTER.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 263-290.)

Original inventor-patent for machine and
process-when machine is an infringement-
liberal construction-known equivalent.

1. Where an invention is one of a primary character, and the mechanical functions performed by the machine are, as a whole, entirely new, all subsequent machines which employ substantially the same means to accomplish the same result are infringements, although the subsequent machine may contain improvements in its separate mechan

isms.

2. The doctrine thus applicable to a machine patent is of a kindred character with that applied, in this country and in England, to a patent for a process.

3. Where one was the first inventor of an automat-
ic button-sewing machine and received a patent
therefor, another machine is an infringement in
which the sets of mechanisms of the prior machine
ally considered, is a proper equivalent for the cor-
are combined, provided each mechanism, individu-
responding mechanism in the prior machine; and
it makes no difference that the infringing machine
is more simple and the mechanism is different in
mechanical construction so long as it performs the
same function as the prior machine and in substan-
tially the same way, and produces the same result,
4. In determining whether the means employed
in the infringing machine are substantially the
same means as those employed in the patented ma-
chine, the patent should receive a liberal construc-
tion, where the patentee was the pioneer in the
construction of such a machine.

5. The meaning of the term "known equivalent"
in reference to a pioneer machine is, a known de-
vice, used as a substitute, and which effects the
same result.
[No. 165.]
Argued Jan. 11, 1889. Decided Feb. 4, 1889.

APPEAL from a decree of the Circuit Court
of the United States for the District of
Massachusetts, in dismissing a suit in equity
for the infringement of letters patent for an
improvement in machines for sewing buttons
on fabrics. Reversed.

Reported below, 23 Fed. Rep. 344.

[263]