It is never granted when the party aggrieved has another adequate remedy. Secretary v. McGarrahan, 76 U. S. 9 Wall. 298 (19: 579); Ex parte Va. Comrs. 112 U. S. 177 (28: 691); Comr. of Patents v. Whiteley, 71 U. S. 4 Wall. 522 (18: 335). Neither this court, nor the circuit and district courts, nor any state court, has any power whatever to issue writs of mandamus to officers of the United States. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U. S. 1 Cranch, 137 (2: 60); McIntyre v. Wood, 11 U. S. 7 Cranch, 504 (3: 420); M'Clung v. Silliman, 19 U. S. 6 Wheat. 598 (5: 340). The only court that has that power is the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, and the power of that court can be exercised only upon such officers of the United States as have their official residence within the District, to which the jurisdiction of that court is territorially limited. Kendall v. U. 8. 87 U. S. 12 Pet. 524 (9: 1181); U. S. v. Schurz, 102 U. S. 378 (26: 167); Butterworth v. Hill, 114 U. S. 128 (29: 119). The writ would not be granted to compel the circuit or district court to proceed to a decision in a matter in which its action would be final, and from which no appeal would lie to this court. Comr. of Patents v. Whiteley, 4 Wall, 71 U. §. 522, 533, 534 (18: 335, 338); Knickerbocker Ins. Co. v. Comstock, 83 U. §. 16 Wall. 258 (21: 493). This is an appeal from the Court of Claims brought by the United States to reverse a judg ment obtained by John F. Knox, the appellee, for the sum of $196 for services as a Commissioner of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Texas. These services were the keeping of a docket and making entries therein in regard to parties brought before him charged with violations of the laws of the United States. Two objections were made in the court below, and are reproduced here, to the claimant's right to recover in the Court of Claims. The first of these is that no approval or disapproval of the claim was made by the circuit or district court. This proposition is founded on the first section of the Act of February 22, 1875 (18 U. S. Stat. at L. 333), which reads as follows: "That before any bill of costs shall be taxed by any judge or other officer, or any account payable out of the money of the United States shall be allowed by any officer of the treasury, in favor of clerks, marshals, or district attor neys, the party claiming such account shall render the same, with the vouchers and items thereof, to a United States Circuit or District Court, and, in presence of the district attorney or his sworn assistant, whose presence shall be noted on the record, prove in open court, to the satisfaction of the court, by his own oath or that of other persons having knowledge of the facts, to be attached to such account, that the When an officer of the United States refuses to perform some plain ministerial act at the in-services therein charged have been actually and stance of a party entitled to its performance, the aggrieved party will have his option to apply for a mandamus or to bring his action at law against the officer. When the officers of the United States arbitrarily refuse to take the steps enjoined upon them by law to enable the claimant to secure his money from the treasury, such a claimant, provided he has been diligent in performing all that the law requires of him, may bring his action in the court of claims, without proceeding against the officers, by mandamus or otherwise, to compel them to perform the duties imposed upon them by law. Campbell v. U. S. 107 U. S. 407 (27: 592). No power, not judicial in its character, can be conferred upon the Circuit Courts of the United States by Congress. Hayburn's Case, 2 U. S. 2 Dall. 410 (1: 436); U. S. v. Ferreira, 54 U. S. 13 How. 40 (14:42); U. S. v. Todd, 54 U. S. 13 How. 52, note (14: 47); Gordon v. U. S. 69 TJ. S. 2 Wall. 561 (17: 921); U. S. v. Jones, 119 U. S. 477 (30: 440); Ex parte Gans, 17 Fed. Rep. 471, 472, 473. Their decisions cannot be revised and corrected by a clerk in an auditor's or comptroller's office. Crescent City Live Stock Co. v. Butchers' Union, 120 U. S. 141, 157 (30: 614, 621). It was competent for the commissioner, without first presenting his claim for docket fees to the Treasury Department, to sue upon it at once in the court of claims. U. S. v. Kaufman, 96 U. S. 571 (24: 792); Clyde v. U. S. 80 U. S. 13 Wall. 38 (20: 479). necessarily performed as therein stated; and that the disbursements charged have been fully paid in lawful money; and the court shall thereupon cause to be entered of record an order approving or disapproving the account, as may be according to law and just. United [232] States Commissioners shall forward their accounts, duly verified by oath, to the district attorneys of their respective districts, by whom they shall be submitted for approval in open court, and the court shall pass upon the same in the manner aforesaid. Accounts and vouchers of clerks, marshals, and district attorneys shall be made in duplicate, to be marked respectively 'original' and 'duplicate.' And it shall be the duty of the clerk to forward the original accounts and vouchers of the officers above specified, when approved, to the proper accounting officers of the treasury, and to retain in his office the duplicates, where they shall be open to public inspection at all times. Nothing contained in this Act shall be deemed in any wise to diminish or affect the right of revision of the accounts to which this Act applies, by the accounting officers of the treasury, as exercised under the laws now in force." It will be observed that this section makes a somewhat different provision as to the course to be pursued by clerks, marshals and district attorneys who have accounts against the Government, and that which is to be taken by United States Commissioners. The former shall render their accounts, with the vouchers and items thereof, to a United States Circuit or District Court, and in open court prove them in the presence of the district attorney or his sworn assistant, whose presence shall be noted [233] [234] on the record, "and the court shall thereupon that the Treasury Department has a right to The second objection made by counsel for have first gone to the department which might Soon after the claimant took his books to Waco, and left them with the district attorney for examination. That officer thereafter returned the books to him, and informed him that the judge would not act upon the account. There is a term of the district court held at Dallas and another at Waco for the Northern District of Texas; and we take this statement of what occurred to amount to a presentation by the claimant of his account through the district attorney to the court, and an absolute refusal by the court to act upon the claim. Section 846 of the Revised Statutes declares as follows: "The accounts of district attorneys, clerks, marshals and commissioners of circuit courts shall be examined and certified by the district judge of the district for which they are appointed, before they are presented to the accounting officers of the Treasury Department for settlement. They shall then be subject to revision upon their merits by said accounting officers, as in case of other public accounts.' " The presentation, therefore, of the present case to the officers of the Government charged with the auditing of such accounts in the Treas court of claims jurisdiction, and it would have No provision is made for a refusal by the We do not know what may have been the circumstances which induced that court to decline to act upon this claim, but we are not prepared to say that such a writ is the proper remedy for the claimant to resort to here. If there were no other this might be so, but the attempt to proceed by mandamus would raise the question, always a troublesome one, whether it is a part of the judicial function to take part in auditing the accounts against the Government, or preparing them for submission to the auditing officers. But as we feel well assured that the claimant, who has done everything in his power to secure action upon his account by the district attorney and the court, and who has a just claim against the Government for services rendered under the Act of Congress, has a remedy in the Court of Claims, we do not see why he should be compelled first to resort to a writ of mandamus against the Circuit Court. This remedy, always an unusual one and out of the It is evident from the language of section ordinary course of proceeding, would be at846, and that of the Act of 1875, above cited,tended in the case before us with delay and It was decided in United States v. Wallace, 116 U. S. 398 [29:675], that a United States Commissioner who kept a docket, by direction of the court appointing him, and entered therein the proceedings in criminal cases heard and decided by him, is entitled to the same fees allowed to clerks of courts by section 828 of the Revised Statutes for the keeping of their dockets. [403] [404] embarrassment. It is not by any means so effi- We are, therefore, of opinion that the Court HARRIET BROWN, Appt., v. The Guarantee Trust and Safe Deposit Company, a Corporation of Pennsylvania, being made a defendant, the cause, upon its motion, was removed to the United States Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois, upon the ground of the diverse citizenship of the parties. Subsequently that Company filed its cross bill for a foreclosure of a mortgage held by it upon the property of the Water Works Company, and for specific performance by Harriet Brown of her contract of sale to Starr. The cross bill alleges, in substance, that by certain instruments in writing, bearing date, respectively, the 15th and 17th of June, and the 9th of October, 1880, Starr undertook with the City of Joliet to construct and maintain a system of water works for that city and its citizens, in consideration of which it agreed to grant to him and his successors certain franchises, rights and rentals connected therewith; that THE GUARANTEE TRUST AND SAFE on the 4th of October, 1880, he entered into a DEPOSIT COMPANY. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 403-416.) Multifariousness—parties in equity-different 1. In an equity suit, where the case against one of the defendants is so entire as to be incapable of being prosecuted in several suits, and another defendant is a necessary party to some portion of the case stated, the objection of multifariousness cannot prevail. 2. It is not indispensable that all the parties should have an interest in all the matters contained in the suit; it will be sufficient if each party has an interest in some material matters in the suit, and they are connected with the others. a bill. written agreement with Harriet Brown, by [405] It was also alleged, in the cross bill, that im- 3. To support the objection of multifariousness, contract had not been abandoned. Submitted April 25, 1888. Decided Nov. 19, 1888. APPEAL from a decree of the Circuit Court Statement by Mr. Justice Lamar: sion of the premises until they were delivered It is further alleged in the cross bill that im- reasonable time; that by the agreement last mentioned the company, Starr being a director and the principal manager, as well as the subcriber for all of its capital stock except $5,000, agreed to credit him forthwith with $195,000 on his subscription to its capital stock, and to deliver to him its bonds to the amount of $140,000, par value, and also to secure their payment by executing to the complainant in the cross bill a mortgage upon all the property, rights and franchises then owned, or thereafter to be acquired by it; that said bonds were accordingly delivered to Starr, and the mortgage was duly executed to the complainant in the cross bill; that after getting the bonds in his hands he forthwith placed them upon the market, and they are now held by a large number of persons and corporations; that the Water Works Company has made default in the payment of the interest coupons due on said bonds, and for more than four calendar months has continued to make default; and that, in obedience to the request made to it, according to the terms of the mortgage, by a majority in interest of the holders of bonds, the complainant in the cross bill, as trustee, files its cross bill for foreclosure. The bill still further avers that, in consequence of the assignment of Starr to the Water Works Company and the execution of said mortgage, the trustee was invested with the right, upon the payment of the purchase money due to Mrs. Brown, with interest thereon, to demand of her a specific performance of her agreement with Starr; that, as such mortgagee, the Guarantee Trust and Safe Deposit Company has always been willing to perform the agreement of Starr and to pay his vendor the residue of the purchase money due to her, with interest, on having a proper deed of conveyance, and is still ready and offers to pay the said residue; and that the Water Works Company is hopelessly insolvent, having no property, except that covered by the mortgage. The bill prays for a foreclosure and sale; that the proceeds thereof, after paying certain fees and current expenses, may be distributed in payment of said bonds and coupons; that an account may be taken of the amount due on account of the purchase [407] money due to Mrs. Brown from Starr; and that she be decreed to specifically perform her agreements to convey, so that said mortgage shall be a valid and first lien on the property. Mrs. Brown filed a demurrer to the amended cross bill, alleging specifically that the same was multifarious. This demurrer having been overruled, she thereupon answered, averring her ignorance of the contract between Starr and the city; admitting the entering into the written contract with Starr, but alleging that it was thereafter wholly and completely abandoned by him, and that neither he nor any person or corporation had ever offered or claimed the right to carry out that contract; admitting that he afterwards verbally negotiated for the purchase of a larger tract of land, but alleging that said negotiation, as a contract was void, under the Statute of Frauds; that by its terms the payment of the entire purchase price was a condition precedent to the vesting in him of any title whatever; that the possession and the improvements were made without her consent, express or implied, and with his eyes open, and that she is entitled to the whole, augmented in value as it is by the improvements; that she had made a great many efforts to secure the balance of the purchase money due from Starr, but had been unsuccessful; that the negotiation and transaction, so far as he and those claiming under him or acting with him were concerned, had been a fraud upon her; that by reason of such failure on his part, and that of bis successors and assigns, to comply with the terms of her contract with him, it had become broken and was void; and that the amended cross bill was multifarious: and praying the same benefit of her answer as if she had specifically demurred to the bill. To this answer a replication was filed. Pursuant to a decrce of the court, on the 31st of March, 1883, upon the petition of John D. Paige, receiver, all the property and effects of the Water Works Company which it obtained from Starr, and all the rights accruing to it by virtue of the contract with Mrs. Brown, were sold, and bought by Joseph H. Foster, of Portsmouth, N. H. On June 9, 1883, a decree of foreclosure was entered upon the cross bill against the fund realized by the sale. After some other proceedings, not necessary to be stated, a further decree was entered, August 12, 1883, adjudging that there was justly due to Harriet Brown, on account of said purchase money of the premises sold to Starr, including interest, the sum of $3,964, and that her said agreement with Starr be performed and carried into execution. From this decree Mrs. Brown prayed and perfected the appeal which brings her case here. Messrs. Charles A. Dupee and Monroe L. Willard, for appellant: Where the right of a person to specific relief against another is so incumbered that he cannot assert his own right till he has got rid of that incumbrance, he cannot include the object of getting rid of the incumbrance in a suit for specific relief. If he do so his bill will be multifarious. 1 Dan. Ch. Pl. & Pr. 339; Story, Eq. Pl. § 272; Dial v. Reynolds, 96 U. S. 340 (24: 644). It is not proper in a foreclosure suit to try a claim of title paramount to that of the mort gagor. The only proper object of the suit is to bar the mortgagor and those claiming under him. Jones, Mortg. SS 1439, 1440, 1445; Chapman v. West, 17 N. Y. 125; Story, Eq. Pl. § 230. Where the purchaser has wantonly refused to pay at the time, when he had the means and could have done so, he cannot ask the court to excuse him for his willful disregard of the specified terms of his obligation, no matter how soon he may have repented of his perverseness and offered to perform. Ditto v. Harding, 73 Ill. 117. The decree is against the evidence, for the reason that no actual tender had ever been made and no facts are shown to excuse such tender or offer. Pom. Spec. Perf. §§ 326, 360, 361; Doyle v. Teas, 5 Ill. 202. Assignees for value should be subrogated to all the rights the holders of the coupons had. Ketchum v. Duncan, 96 U. S. 659 (24: 868); Bigelow, Estop. (1872) 473. [408] Adams v. Robertson, 37 Ill. 45; De Wolf v. Johnson, 23 U. S. 10 Wheat. 367 (6: 343). To a proceeding in rem, the only defenses allowed are such as payment, satisfaction, charge, release, or never a lien. Henderson v. Palmer, 71 Ill. 579; Fitzgerald v. Forristal, 48 Ill. 228; Carpenter v. Mooers, 26 Ill. 162; White v. Williams, 3 N. J. Eq. 376, 383; Troup v. Haight, 1 Hopk. 239; Petat v. Ellis, 9 Ves. 563. If the usury could be set up, the bondholders | dividuals demands which are wholly disconnected. have not the right to do it. In illustration of this, it is said if an estate be sold in lots to different persons, the purchasers could not join in exhibiting one bill against the vendor for a specific performance. Nor could the vendor file a bill for a specific performance against all the distinct, in no way connected with each other, a bill purchasers. The contracts of purchase being disfor a specific execution, whether filed by the vendor or vendees, must be limited to one contract." Campbell v. Mackay, 7 Sim. 564, and in 1 Myl. & C. "It is well remarked by Lord Cottenham, in 603, to lay down any rule applicable universally. or to say what constitutes multifariousness, as an abstract proposition, is, upon the authorities, utterly impossible.' Every case must be governed by its own circumstances; and, as these are as diversified as the names of the parties, the court Whilst parties should not be subjected to expense must exercise a sound discretion on the subject, and inconvenience, in litigating matters in which they have no interest, multiplicity of suits should be avoided by uniting in one bill all who have an though the interests may have arisen under distinct interest in the principal matter in controversy, contracts." Mr. J. L. High, for appellee: The objection of multifariousness is purely technical and is never considered with favor by courts of equity. Appellant was not only a proper but an absolutely indispensable party to the cross bill. Holman v. Bank of Norfolk, 12 Ala. 369; Cornwell v. Lee, 14 Conn. 524; Brinkerhoff v. Brown, 6 Johns. Ch. 139; Rann v. Rann, 95 Ill. 433; Brown v. Keeney Settlement Cheese A880. 59 N. Y. 242. Unless the court can see that hardship and injustice have resulted from the joinder of parties, a decree should not be reversed upon this ground. two executors of the will of Daniel Clark, the In that case the bill was filed against the purchasers of various pieces of property which heirs at law of his legatee, and the several had been sold off from the estate. The relief asked was an accounting in respect to the rents Oliver v. Piatt, 44 U. S. 3 How. 333 (11:eral relief as the heir and devisee of Clark unand profits of the several parcels, and for gen622). der a different testament. Mere delay upon the part of the vendee in the payment of the purchase price will not prevent a specific performance, where the vendee is in possession with the vendor's consent, and especially where he has made valuable and permanent improvements upon the prem ises. Pom. Spec. Perf. § 404; Mason v. Wallace, 3 McLean, 148; S. C. 4 McLean, 77; All v. Johnson, 61 U. S. 20 How. 511 (15: 1005); Ewins v. Gordon, 49 N. H. 444. Possession and improvements are grounds for a specific performance, Potter v. Jacobs, 111 Mass. 32; Murphy v. Lockwood, 21 Ill. 611; Bomier v. Caldwell, 8 Mich. 463; Ewins v. Gordon, 49 N. H. 444. Where one party fails in performing the contract, the other, if he means to rescind the contract, should give a clear notice of his intention. Reynolds ▾ Nelson, 6 Madd. 18. Mr. Justice Lamar delivered the opinion of the court: It is contended by the appellant that the decree below should be reversed on the ground that the cross bill is multifarious. In Shields v. Thomas, 59 U. S. 18 How. 253 [15: 368], this objection was urged against a bill, and in considering the objection the court say: "There is perhaps no rule established for the conducting of equity pleadings, with reference to which (whilst as a rule it is universally admitted) there has existed less of certainty and uniformity in application, than has attended this relating to multifariousness. This effect, flowing, perhaps inevitably, from the variety of modes and degrees of right and interest entering into the transactions of life, seems to have led to a conclusion rendering the rule almost as much an exception as a rule; and that conclusion is that each case must be determined by its peculiar features." So in Gaines v. Chew, 43 U. S. 2 How. 619, 642 [11:402, 411], the court say: "In general terms, a bill is said to be multifarious which seeks to enforce against different in facts, the court said: Under this state of [411] "The right of the complainant, Myra, must be of Daniel Clark. sustained under the will of 1813, or as heir at law The defendants claim mediately or immediately under the will of 1811, although for distinct parcels of the property. They have a their purchases were made at different times and common source of title, but no common interest in their purchases. And the question arises, on this state of facts, whether there is misjoinder or multifariousness in the bill which makes the defendants parties" "And the main ground of the defense, the validity of the will of 1811, and the proceedings under it, is common to all the defendants. Their interests may be of greater or less only, and not in principle. There can be no doubt extent, but that constitutes a difference in degree that a bill might have been filed against each of the defendants, but the question is whether they of the purchase, including notice, may be peculiar [412] may not all be included in the same bill. The facts to each defendant; but these may be ascertained without inconvenience or expense to codefendants. In every fact which goes to impair or establish the authority of the executors, all the defendants are alike interested. In its present form the bill avoids multiplicity of suits, without subjecting the defendants to inconvenience or unreasonable expense." The case against one defendant may be so entire as to be incapable of being prosecuted in several suits; and yet some other defendant may be a necessary party to some portion only of the case stated. In the latter case the objection of multifariousness cannot be allowed to prevail. Atty-Gen. v. Poole, 4 Myl. & C. 17, 31; Turner v. Robinson, 1 Sim. & S. 313; Atty-Gen. v. Cradock, 3 Myl. & C. 85. It is not indispensable that all the parties should have an interest in all the matters contained in the suit; it will be sufficient if each party has an interest in some material matters in the suit, and they are connected with the others. Addison v. Walker, 4 Younge & Col. Exch. 442; Parr v. Atty-Gen. 8 Clark & F. 435; Worthy v. Johnson, 8 Ga. 238. To support the objection of multifariousness, because the bill contains different causes of suit against the same person, two things must |