Idea of God

And there cometh Evening, o'er lonely meadows deserted of the herds, by trackless ways, carrying in

her golden pitcher cool draughts of peace from the ocean-calms of the west.

But where thine infinite sky spreadeth for the soul to take her flight, a stainless white radiance reigneth; wherein is neither day nor night, nor form nor colour, nor ever any word.

39

Aristotle.

See note.

There is then something which is always moved with an unceasing motion: and that motion is in a circle: and this is plain not by reasoning only but in fact: 'so that the first heaven must be eternal. There is then something [also] which moves it. But since a mover which is moved is an intermediate, there must be also some mover which is unmoved [by another]', eternal, existing as substance and actuality (or energy). Now the object whether of thought or desire causes movement in this way; it causes movement without being itself moved. And the primary objects of thought and desire are the same; for while the object of appetite is the apparently good, the primary object of rational desire. is the really good, and our desire is consequent on our opinion, rather than our opinion on our desire: for the first cause is the thinking. And the Reason (or intellect) is moved by the object of its thought: and in the classification of objects of thought substance (or Being) is primary, and of substance that which is absolute and in energy (or actuality). . . But moreover also the good and

Metaphysic

the absolutely desirable are in the same class; and that is best, always or proportionally, which is primary.

But that the Final Cause is among things unmoved is shown by logical distinction, since it is [an object which exists] for the sake of something (which desires it): and of these [two terms] the one (the object) is unmoved, while the other (which desires it) is not. The Final Cause then causes movement as beloved, and something moved by it moves all other things.

Now if something is moved it is capable of being otherwise than it is. Therefore if the first turning of the heaven be an energy (or actuality) and is so by virtue of its being set in motion [by another agency than its own], it might be otherwise, in place if not in substance. But since, on the other hand, there is some mover, itself unmoved, existing in energy, this may not be otherwise in any way. For locomotion is the primary change, and of locomotion that which is circular: and this circular motion is that which this unmoved mover

causes.

Of necessity then it is Being, and so far as of necessity, excellently, and so a Principle (or first Cause). . . From such a first cause then are suspended the Heaven and Nature. And the occupation (or living work) of this Principle is such as is the best, during a little while indeed for us, but itself is ever in this state,--which we cannot be—since its energy is also its pleasure. And therefore it is that our waking and sensation and thinking are pleasantest to us, while hopes and memories are pleasant indirectly thro' these activities.— And thought, in itself, deals with the object which is best. in itself, and the supreme with the supreme. Now it is

40

Idea of God

itself that thought (or intellect) thinks, on account of its participation in the object of thought: for it becomes its own object in the act of apprehending and thinking its objects so that thought (intellect) and the object of thought are one and the same thing. For that which is receptive of the object of thought and can apprehend substance, is thought (or intellect). But it is in energy by possessing its object, so that this (final energy of possession) rather than that (initial receptivity) is what thought seems to have divine: and the energy of intellectual speculation is what is pleasantest and best.

If then in this good estate, as we are sometimes, God is always, it is wonderful, and if more so, then still more wonderful. But God is so, and life indeed be

longs to God.
For the energy of thought is life, and
that is God's energy. We say then that God is a living
being, eternal, best: so that life and an age continuous
and eternal belong to God, for this is God.

Then Socrates said: I must tell you, Kěbes, that when I was young I had a marvellous appetite for that branch of philosophy which they call Natural Science; for I thought it must be splendid to know the causes of things, what it is that makes each thing come into being, exist, and perish: and I was always rushing into opposite extremes of opinion in speculating on such questions as these, Is the growth of animals the result of a corruption which the hot and cold principle contracts, as some have said? Is it by virtue of the blood that we think? or is it the air, or fire? or perhaps

First Cause

And then I went on

nothing of this sort? . . to examine the decay of things, and the changes which the heavens and earth undergo; until at last I came to see that I was by nature utterly incompetent for such enquiries, as I can easily convince you was the case, for under the influence of these speculations I grew wholly blind to matters which hitherto, so far at least as I could judge of myself or others of me, I had understood quite well. . . . . Then I heard someone reading out of a book of ANAXAGORAS, as he told us, and saying that Mind was the disposer and cause of all: and I was delighted with this notion of the (first) cause,indeed it gave me a sort of comfort to think that Mind was the cause of all things, and I said to myself, If this be so, if Mind is the orderer, it will have all

....

in order, and put every single thing in the place that is best for it. And arguing thus I rejoiced to think that, with respect to causation, I had found in Anaxagoras a teacher after my own heart

Ah my friend, how speedily was my glorious hope dashed, as I went on to read, and found my philosopher making no use whatever of Mind, nor of any other valid principle for the ordering of Nature, but alleging Air and Ether and Water, and many other like absurdities. He seemed to me to have fallen exactly into the predicament of a man who, maintaining generally that Mind is the cause of the actions of Socrates, should then, when he undertook to explain my conduct in detail, go on to show that I sit here because my body is made up of bones and muscles; and the bones, as he would say, are hard and have joints which divide them, and the muscles are elastic, and so on That is what he

....

4I

would say; and he would have a similar explanation
of my talking to you, which he would attribute to sound,
and air, and hearing; and he would assign ten thousand
other causes of the same sort, neglecting to mention the
true cause, which is that the Athenians have thought
fit to condemn me, and accordingly I have thought it better
and more right to remain here and undergo my sentence:
-for, by the dog, I think that these muscles and bones
of mine [if they had had any say in the matter] would
have consulted their own interest and gone off long ago to
Megara or Boeotia, if I had not thought it better and
nobler not to play truant and run away, but rather to
remain here and undergo whatever punishment the state
may inflict. To call such things as these causes is quite
absurd. If any one should care to say that unless I
had bones and muscles and the other parts of the body,
I could not do what I would, that is well enough: but
to say
that I act as I do because of them, and that this
is the way in which my mind acts, and not from choice
of the best, why, that is a very careless and idle way
of speaking.

DOTH not WISDOM cry,

and Understanding put forth her voice? . .

The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his Way, before his works of old.

I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning,

or ever the earth was.

When no depths were, I was brought forth:

when there were no fountains abounding with water.