interests of the city; and whenever any person shall be appointed an officer or member of said police department, or whenever any officer or member of said police department shall be suspended, removed, or expelled from his office or membership in said department, it shall be the duty of the said board of police commissioners to give a written notice, within a reasonable time, to the city clerk of said city of Bridgeport of such appointment, suspension, removal, or expulsion. The present police force of said city of Bridgeport shall hold their respective offices, unless previously suspended, removed, or expelled, until others are appointed in their stead; and every officer or member of said police department shall hold his office and membership in said department until removed or expelled by said board of police commissioners tor cause, of which said board of police commissioners shall be the sole judges. Nothing contained in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the common council of said city of Bridgeport from increasing or reducing the members of the police force of said city, or creating new offices in said police department; and in case the common council of said city shall vote to reduce the police force of said city, the board of police commissioners shall remove a sufficient number of the officers and members of said police force to conform to the vote of said common council." Laws 1887, p. 535.

Several reasons are assigned by the defendants why their motion to quash the writ should be granted, the third of which is this: "Third. Because it appears from the allegations of said application and by the charter of said city of Bridgeport, to which reference is therein made, that these respondents, police commissioners of said city of Bridgeport, are vested with the sole power of appointment and removal of officers and members of the police department of said city, and that it is their duty, whenever, in their judgment, it shall be for the best interests of said city that any officer or member of said police department shall be removed, to remove him, and that said police commissioners shall be the sole judges of the cause for which any officer or member of said department may be removed; and it appears from the allegations of said application that these respondents, police commissioners, as aforesaid, in the exercise of the judgment and discretion thus vested in them, have, after hearing said relator, together with his witnesses and counsel, removed this relator from the office of captain of police of said city, which discretion, so vested in these respondents, this relator seeks to control by said alternative writ of mandamus." The defendants insist that the board of police commissioners of the city of Bridgeport, of which they are the members, is vested with a supreme and uncontrolled discretion in the matter of removals from the police force of that city. The relator concedes that if they have such supreme

discretion their action cannot be controlled by a writ of mandamus. That such is the law would seem to be beyond controversy. It is so stated by the text writers and in the decisions of courts, so far as we are informed, with entire uniformity. Security Co. v. Fyler, 60 Conn. 448, 22 Atl. 494; State v. Staub, 61 Conn. 567, 23 Atl. 924; Freeman v. Selectmen, etc., of New Haven, 34 Conn. 406.

But the relator claims that the defendant board does not possess such supreme and uncontrolled discretion in the matter of removals. He claims that the board can remove only for "cause," and that "cause" means "sufficient cause"; and that, to warrant his removal, the cause must be something personal to himself which renders him an unsuitable person to retain the position. We cannot agree with the relator in his argument. The cases cited by his counsel, and the only ones on which they seem to rely, do not support his claim. These cases are People v. Board of Fire Com'rs, 72 N. Y. 445, and State v. McGarry, 21 Wis. 496. These cases were on charters containing quite different provisions from the charter of Bridgeport. In the first case the relator, Joseph H. Munday, was a regular clerk in the fire department in the city of New York, and had been removed from that position by the fire commissioners, without giving him any notice of the cause of his removal. The charter of that city gave the general power of removal of clerks and employés of the fire department to the board of fire commissioners. But that power was limited by declaring that it "cannot be exercised in respect to any regular clerk * * until he has been informed of the cause of the proposed removal, and has had an opportunity of making an explanation"; and it was held that the board of fire commissioners had exceeded their authority. The case from Wisconsin was this: The law of that state empowered the board of supervisors of a county to remove certain officers for "incompetency, improper conduct, or other cause satisfactory to the board." All that was decided was that "other cause" must be "other kindred cause." Ex parte Ramshay, 18 Adol. & E. (N. S.) 175, is not applicable, because in this case the defendants did give the relator notice and an opportunity to be heard, with witnesses and by counsel. Besides, we are clearly of the opinion that the legislature has given to this board of police commissioners the supreme and absolute power of removals from, as well as appointments to, the police force of the city of Bridgeport, as fully as language can be used to confer such power, and to be used at discretion. In the first place, in the section of the charter above recited, this board is given the sole power of appointment and removal of officers and members of the police force of that city; then, it is made the duty of the defendant board to supend, remove, or expel any officer or member of the police whenever, in the judgment of said

commissioners, such suspension, removal, or expulsion shall be for the best interests of the city; and, finally, that the members of the police force shall remain in office until removed or expelled by the defendant board for cause, of which cause the said board shall be the sole judges. State v. Asylum St. Bridge Commission, 63 Conn. 91, 26 Atl. 580. But the case does not require the application of any extreme or rigorous rule. It comes fairly within the very rule invoked by the relator. The statement shows that the defendant board did give notice to the relator of the charges against him, and appointed a time for him to appear and be heard. He appeared, and was heard with his witnesses and by counsel. The board after that hearing found him guilty of disobedience to his superior officer, and of such conduct as caused strife and a want of harmony among the police force, and that it was for the best interest of the city that he be removed from the office which he held. Then they did remove him. It seems to the court that they acted, not only within their authority, but with a due regard to the rights of the relator.. There is no error. The other judges concurred.

TOWN OF ANSONIA v. COOPER et al. (Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. July 9, 1894.)

SALE OF REAL PROPERTY-PRINCIPAL AND AGENT -RATIFICATION OF THE CONTRACT

WHAT CONSTITUTES.

The owner of a life interest in certain realty conveyed the fee thereof to another for a certain sum, a part of which sum the remainder-men agreed to accept for their interest in the property; and, without further consideration, all but one of them deeded their interests to the grantee in such sale. This one knew, when he accepted his share of the proceeds, of the sale, and that this was the consideration therefor. Proceedings having been established to condemn the land for school purposes, he assigned to another his share in any award that should be made. Held that, having ratified the sale, his assignee acquired no interest in the award.

Appeal from superior court, New Haven county; Prentice, Judge.

Condemnation proceedings by the town of Ansonia to acquire title to certain property for school purposes. The report of the committee appointed for that purpose was accepted, the money paid into court, and defendants Alfred Cooper, Henry G. Alling, and Elizabeth Downs were cited to interplead, to determine their respective rights thereto. Defendant Cooper disclaimed any, but, from an order sustaining a demurrer by defendant Downs to his answer and claim, defendant Alling appeals. Reversed.

V. Munger, for appellant. Allan W. Paige and George P. Carroll, for appellee Elizabeth Downs.

ANDREWS, C. J. In September, 1891, the town of Ansonia preferred its application to

the superior court, in New Haven county, for the appointment of a committee to appraise certain lands in that town, taken for the site of a schoolhouse. The application was duly served, and returned to that court. A committee was appointed, who appraised the said land at the value of $625, and made report of their doings to the court. The report was accepted, and the money paid into ccart, and is now in the hands of the clerk of the court. Since the commencement of the proceedings, other parties have been cited in, viz. Henry G. Alling and Lewis E. Cooper, of Ansonia, and Elizabeth Downs, of Huntington, each of whom claimed or appeared to have some interest in the said sum of money. The court, in its order accepting the report of the appraisers, decreed that the said Henry G. Alling, Louis E. Cooper, and Elizabeth Downs interplead with each other as to which of them is legally or equitably entitled to said sum of money. The only controversy in respect to the money is now between Elizabeth Downs, on the one side, and Henry G. Alling, on the other. Pursuant to the order of the court requiring the parties to interplead, the said Elizabeth Downs set forth her claims at large; and the said Henry G. Alling made answer thereto, and set forth his claims, and later an amended and substituted answer and claims, to which said Downs demurred. The court sustained that demurrer, and Alling has appealed.

The facts, somewhat condensed, from the record, are as follows:

Charles Cooper, the elder, was in his lifetime, and at his death, the owner in fee and in possession of the land described in the said application, and of other adjacent land, all of the value of $2,500. He was also the possessor of personal property to the value of $10,000. By his will he devised the residue of his estate, real and personal, to his wife, Elizabeth Cooper, for her life, and the remainder to his four sons, Alfred Cooper, Charles Cooper, William Cooper, and Henry Cooper, to be theirs absolutely, in equal shares. The land in question came to said Elizabeth Cooper by virtue of said will. The said Charles Cooper died about March 20, 1876. On the 31st day of July, 1880, the said Elizabeth Cooper conveyed all said lands, by a warranty deed, te Henry and Augusta Rolf, and received therefor the sum of $2,500, which was its full value, including the fee as well as the life estate. That deed was immediately put on record. The grantees entered into possession, and they and their grantees have ever since kept the possession thereof, to the time the condemnation proceedings were completed. By sundry conveyances, the title and interest conveyed by the said deed of Mrs. Elizabeth Cooper has come to, and is now vested in. Henry G. Alling, who purchased in 1886, subsequent to the agreement between the four sons of Mrs. Cooper, below stated. Mrs. Cooper died in 1885, leaving no property of her own, of any kind. Of the $2,500 which

she received for the said land, she had expended $1,300 in her necessary support. The balance, $1,200, she had in her possession at her death. After the commencement of the condemnation proceedings, Alfred Cooper assigned to the said Elizabeth Downs all his interest in the money that might be awarded thereby. She has no other title thereto than by said assignment. Upon the decease of the said Elizabeth Cooper, it was verbally agreed by and between Alfred Cooper, Charles Cooper, William Cooper, and Henry Cooper-they being of full age, and being the only parties entitled to the property and estate devised to them under the will of the said Charles Cooper, deceased-that they would pay all the debts and funeral expenses from and out of the said $1,200, and would thereupon divide among themselves, in equal portions, the balance of said sum of $1,200, and would divide among themselves, in equal portions, the personal property owned by the said Charles Cooper at the time of his decease, and valued at the sum of $10,000, and, upon such payment and such division being made, that they would consider the amount so divided and received as a full, final, and complete distribution and settlement of any and all rights, titles, and interests, claims and demands, which they, or either of them, were entitled to receive under and by virtue of the provisions of the last will of the said Charles Cooper.

The money that was thus agreed to be divided among said parties was the property, or the proceeds of property, which was owned by the said Charles Cooper at the time of his decease; and no part thereof was the property or estate, or interest therein, of the said Elizabeth Cooper. Pursuant to their said agreement, the said Alfred Cooper, Charles Cooper, William Cooper, and Henry Cooper paid all the debts of the said Elizabeth Cooper, and all her funeral expenses, which amounted to the sum of $200; and, after making such payment, they thereupon divided among themselves, in equal portions, the sum of $1,000 in cash,-that being the balance of the money received by the said Elizabeth Cooper upon the sale of the fee of the said real estate, as above described, and which remained in her hands at the time of her decease, after paying the said debts and funeral expenses; and they also divided among themselves at said time, in equal portions, said personal property, amounting to the sum of $10,000; and each and all of said parties received said money and said personal property as and for the portion or share which they were entitled to receive under the said will of the said Charles Cooper; and all of said parties have ever since retained said money and said property, and have ever since considered the same as a full, final, and complete settlement of all rights or interests which were devised to them under the last will of the said Charles Cooper; and they especially received said sum of $1.000, in cash, in lieu and in place of the real estate,

the fee of which had been devised to them by the said Charles Cooper, but which had been sold by the said Elizabeth Cooper in the manner before described; and said parties intended, by this division of said money among themselves, to ratify and confirm the sale of said real estate by the said Elizabeth Cooper; and in pursuance of such intention and agreement the said William Cooper, Charles Cooper, and Henry Cooper have each executed and delivered to the said Henry G. Alling deeds of all their rights, titles, and interests in and to the premises herein described, without the payment of any money therefor. The said Alfred Cooper knew when he made said agreement and received said money that the amount he received under and pursuant to the said agreement was the money which the said Elizabeth Cooper received from the sale of the said real estate conveyed by her, the said Elizabeth Cooper, as aforesaid, and he had full knowledge that the said real estate had been sold and conveyed by full warranty deed, and that the said Henry G. Alling was then in the possession of said land, claiming title thereto by virtue of the deed which had been given by the said Elizabeth Cooper as aforesaid.

These facts, being admitted by the demurrer, must, for the purposes of the present discussion, be taken as proved and found by the court. Charles Cooper, William Cooper, and Henry Cooper may be laid out of the case. They have each released to Mr. Alling. The rights of Elizabeth Downs are just the same as, and no greater than, the rights of Alfred Cooper. Her assignment from him was since the commencement of the condemnation proceedings.

Before the superior court, the parties seemed to have discussed only the question of estoppel. The court, in its memorandum of decision, placed its conclusion on the ground that there was no estoppel. The briefs in this court are largely made up of the same discussion. If that was the only question in the case, we might be led to agree with the superior court. But estoppel is not the doctrine of the case. There is another ground clearly set forth in the answer of Mr. Alling, on which it seems to us the answer should have been held sufficient, and the demurrer overruled. And that ground is that Alfred Cooper has ratified the sale of his land made by his mother. The language of the answer is explicit: That Alfred Cooper and his brothers received said sum of money in lieu and in place of the real estate which had been devised to them by their father, but had been sold by their mother, and said parties intended, by the division of said money among them, to ratify and confirm the sale of said real estate by the said Elizabeth Cooper. And the said Alfred Cooper knew when he received said money that the amount which he received was the money which the said Elizabeth Cooper had received from the sale of the said real estate, and he

had full knowledge that the said real estate had been sold and conveyed by a full warranty deed. This is, then, the condition of things: Mrs. Elizabeth Cooper, without authority to do so, sold and undertook to convey land which belonged to Alfred Cooper. She received the full value of the land in money. Her grantee entered into possession of the land conveyed, and claims to have a complete title thereto. Alfred Cooper, know

ing all these facts, and intending to ratify and confirm the sale of his said land, has received that money and applied it to his own use, and still keeps it. Ratification means the adoption by a person, as binding upon himself, of an act done in such relations that he may claim it as done for his benefit, although done under such circumstances as would not bind him, except for his subsequent assent, as where an act was done by a stranger having at the time no authority to act as his agent, or by an agent not having adequate authority. The acceptance of the results of the act with an intent to ratify, and with full knowledge of all the material circumstances, is a ratification. Ratification makes the contract, in all respects, what it would have been if the requisite power had existed when it was entered into. It relates back to the execution of the contract, and renders it obligatory from the outset. The party ratifying becomes a party to the contract, and is, on the one hand, entitled to all its benefits, and, on the other, is bound by its terms. Negley v. Lindsay, 67 Pa. St. 217; Edwards v. Railroad Co., 1 Mylne & C. 650-672; And. Law Dict. in verb.; Stanton v. Railroad Co., 59 Conn. 285, 22 Atl. 300. Alfred Cooper, having ratified the sale of his land by his mother, and now, through his assignee, seeking to obtain the money in the hands of this court, is in the position of one who has verbally contracted to convey his land to another, has put that other into possession, has received his pay in full in money, and, while keeping the money, is trying to get the price of his land the second time. It needs no argument-or, rather, the statement of the case is the strongest possible argument-to show that he ought not to succeed. And, as he cannot succeed, so also his assignee, Elizabeth Downs, cannot. There is error. The demurrer should be overruled. The judgment sustaining the demurrer is reversed. The other judges concurred.

PINNEY v. JONES. (Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. July 9, 1894.)

ACTION TO FORECLOSE MORTGAGE-PAYMENT

EVIDENCE.

In an action to foreclose a mortgage, defendant claimed she had paid $1,500 on it, and gave evidence to show that she had such sum in her possession, and buried it, and that after she buried it she showed her daughter the spot in which it was buried. Held, that evidence of

what defendant told her daughter at the time, as to the money being there, and her reasons for showing her where it was, was not admissible.

Appeal from superior court, New Haven county; Prentice, Judge.

Action by Maria W. Pinney, executrix of the estate of Charles H. Pinney, deceased, against Emily Jones to foreclose a mortgage. From a decree for plaintiff, entered on the report of the state referee, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

V. Munger, for appellant. William H. Williams, for appellee.

TORRANCE, J. This is an action brought to foreclose a mortgage made to secure a note for sixteen hundred dollars by the defendant, Emily Jones, to Charles H. Pinney, now de ceased. The defendant claimed to have paid upon said note to Pinney, during his lifetime, the sum of $1,500, and whether this was true or not was the main fact in dispute between the parties. The case was tried be fore the Honorable Elisha Carpenter, as state referee. For the purpose of showing her abil ity to make such payment, the defendant offered evidence to prove, and claimed she had proved, that at the time when she bought the mortgaged premises, in March, 1892, she had in her possession the sum of $1,500, in addition to the sum of $500 which she had paid on account of said purchase; that this sum of $1,500 was in a package in her house; that she moved into the house upon the mortgaged premises in April, 1892, and two or three weeks thereafter, in the presence of her daughter Cora, who was produced as a witness, she counted said $1,500, and, after counting the same, deducted $15 therefrom, and placed the remainder in a tin box, and placed the box, with the money in it, în a jar, and sealed up the jar with putty; and that, after leaving the jar upon a shelf to dry for two or three days, she and her husband, who was produced as a witness, buried this jar in the cellar near the bottom of the stairs, covered it over, and placed a paint barrel over the spot where the jar was buried. While Mrs. Jones was upon the witness stand, her counsel offered to prove by her that, some time within two months after the money had been counted as aforesaid, Mrs. Jones requested her daughter Cora to go with her to the said place where the money was then buried, and that thereupon Cora and she went to the spot from the sitting room above; that Mrs. Jones then and there removed the paint barrel, and told Cora that the money was in a pot in the ground, and that she wanted her to know where it was, "for if she should die she wanted her to know about it." The finding states: "It was not claimed that the earth was removed from over the jar in which the money was claimed to have been placed, or that the jar or other thing, in which it is now claimed the money then was, was so exposed or attempted to be exposed to view. The

plaintiff's counsel objected to the admission in evidence of the conversation between the said Emily Jones and her daughter Cora upon this occasion, and it was excluded; to which ruling the defendant duly excepted." Mrs. Jones thereafter upon this point testified, without objection, as follows: "Cora went with me down cellar; went down the cellar steps to the left hand of the stairs, just as you go down. I showed her the money. I took the paint barrel, and moved it around like this [illustrating], and pointed out to her where the money was concealed. Then I set the barrel back on the same spot I had removed it from. Then we went upstairs. That she, Cora, was the only person, so far as she knew, besides her husband, that ever knew or was shown where the money was." The daughter Cora also testified, without objection, to her going down in the cellar with her mother, and being shown where the money was concealed, substantially as her mother had done. The referee found that said claimed payment of $1,500 had not been made. To the report made by the referee the defendant filed a remonstrance, setting up as the ground of it the action of the referee in excluding the conversation aforesaid between Cora and her mother. He further set up therein that the plaintiff claimed that Mrs. Jones did not have said sum of $1,500 at any time after 1891, and that her entire story with reference to the pos session of said sum was false. The plaintiff demurred to the remonstrance, the court sustained the demurrer, judgment was rendered for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed.

This appeal presents but a single question, and that is whether the statement made by Mrs. Jones to her daughter was admissible. It is apparent that the defendant obtained the benefit of everything else claimed by her except this statement. She was allowed to testify fully to her acts and conduct in going into the cellar, and pointing out the place where she claimed the money was concealed, and from all this Cora understood that the money was there buried. She says, indeed, that she there showed Cora the money; but from her own testimony, and from other parts of the record, it is clear that all she meant by this was that she showed her the place where the money was concealed. Essentially then, in this view of the matter, all that was excluded was her statement of her reason for having Cora know where the money was concealed; and it is perhaps questionable whether, even on the defendant's view of the case, the exclusion of that was error (Russell v. Frisbie, 19 Conn. 205211); and, if it was, the case might perhaps be disposed of on the ground that the error did not harm the defendant. But, as we think the evidence was rightly excluded, we prefer to rest the decision upon that ground, rather than upon the one suggested. As we have said, what was done in the cellar was,

without objection, fully testified to by both Mrs. Jones and Cora. What was said was excluded; and that was, in substance, a statement by Mrs. Jones that the money was buried there in a jar, and that she wanted to have Cora know, for a reason then stated, where it lay. The defendant strenuously insisted that this statement characterized the act of Mrs. Jones in going to the cellar, and doing what she did there, and was admissible in corroboration of her claim to the possession of the money, and as part of the res gestae; and in support of these claims she relies mainly upon the case of Card v. Foot, 56 Conn. 369, 15 Atl. 371. The general rule is that a party cannot give in evidence his own declarations in his own favor, made in the absence of the other party; but there is one well-recognized exception to this rule, where such declaration is part of what, for want of a better name, is called the "res gestae." Kilburn v. Bennett, 3 Metc. (Mass.) 199; Stirling v. Buckingham, 46 Conn. 461. The nature and limits of this exception are tolerably well defined, although the application of the rule embodied in the exception, in particular cases, is sometimes attended with difficulty. That rule is thus stated in Starkie on Evidence (10th Ed., 466-687): "In the first place, an entry or declaration accompanying an act seems, on principles already announced, to be admissible evidence in all cases where a question arises as to the nature or quality of that act. Indeed, whenever an entry or declaration reflects light upon, or qualifies, an act which is relevant to the matter in issue, and is evidence in itself, it becomes admissible as part of the res gestae, if it be contemporaneous with the act." According to this writer, before a written declaration made by a party in his own favor can be admissible as part of the res gestae, the act which it characterizes, and of which it forms a part, must be itself admissible in evidence in the case; and so are the authorities. "Where an act done is evidence per se, a declaration accompanying that act may well be evidence, if it reflects light upon or qualifies the act. But I am not aware of any case where the act done is, in its own nature, irrelevant to the issue, and where the declaration per se is inadmissible, in which it has been held that the union of the two has rendered them admissible." Coltman, J., in Wright v. Tatham, 7 Adol. & E. 361; Hotel Co. v Manning, 1 Ir. R. Com. Law, 125. "Res gestae are the circumstances, facts, and declarations which grow out of the main fact, are contemporaneous with it, and serve to illustrate its character." Stirling v. Buckingham, 46 Conn. 461. "When the act of a party may be given in evidence, his declarations, made at the time, and calculated to elucidate and explain the character and quality of the act, and so connected with it as to constitute one transaction, and so as to derive credit from the act itself, are admissible in evidence. There