them.

[H. of R.

and the gentlemen from Connecticut, (Mr. INGERSOLL) change that opinion. I cannot subscribe to the doctrine suffer me to say a word or two in reply. When this of the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. ARCHER) that there country became free and independent, this species of must be, in every State, some leading politicians, who population was found amongst us. It had been entailed control and dictate, and give tone to public sentiment. I upon us by our ancestors, and was viewed as a common believe that the People, if left untrammelled by this comevil; not confined to the locality where it was, but affect-plicated machinery of a caucus, are competent to act for ing the whole Nation. Some of the States which then themselves; but, at the same time that I entertain these possessed it have since gotten clear of it: they were a opinions, I do not proscribe others who entertain different species of property that differed from all other: they ones. But I shall not here be led into a general discuswere rational; they were human beings. In fixing the sion of this subject. But, if the object of the gentleman principle of representation, it was thought right, by the from New York be really to put down caucusing, he Framers of the Constitution, that they should at least be should remember that a caucus can only operate effiin part represented. And, accordingly, three-fifths of ciently in an extended sphere; in the general ticket systhem are to be represented; but, at the same time that tem, it can be used, and used to effect; but divide the they are to be represented, this provision is incorporated State into districts, and district caucuses cannot exist, or, into the Constitution: "Representatives and direct taxes if they do, cannot produce effect; the body upon whom shall be apportioned amongst the several States which they are intended to operate is too much circumscribed, may be included within this Union, according to their re-and too few in numbers, to apprehend any danger from spective numbers." If they are to be represented then, direct taxes are to be paid according to that representation, whenever the emergencies of the Government require it. And when the dark cloud of war hovers in your horizon; when a foreign foe invades your country; when your finances are deranged; when money, in the estimation of some the sinews of war, must be raised; when, in order to raise it, direct taxation must be resorted to; and when, sir, conventions are held, in some sections of the Union, to thwart the operations of the Government, and for purposes best known to their members; when the militia, in other sections of the Union, are withheld from the public service-do our neighbors commiserate our condition; do they sympathize with us, and say, we are oppressed with unnecessary burdens because we are required to pay taxes for this species of population No, sir, it is all right then. Do we complain, sir, that we are thus required to pay taxes for them? No, sir, we do it cheerfully, and without a murmur. I hope, therefore, that this unpleasant subject, not involved in the remotest degree, in the great questions under consideration, may be suffered to rest. I should not have noticed it, if it had not been frequently adverted to by gentlemen who have preceded me. I hope, sir, I shall be pardoned for the digression.

But, Sir, another objection, made not only by the gentleman from New York, but by others who have engag ed in this discussion, is one very important in its character, and should be maturely considered. It is, that the plan of amendment proposed, interferes with State rights, and tends to consolidation of the People of the Union. Sir, no man deprecates more than I do, any violation of rights, secured to the States by the Federal Constitution; no gentleman upon this floor will, upon all occasions, more pertinaciously guard against the yawning gulph of consolidation: and, if I should foresee or apprehend that the plan of amendment proposed, would have any such tendency, with all my convictions of its importance, I should pause and hesitate before I acted. I would in no instance, knowingly, have an agency in producing such effects. But, Sir, I can see no such danger; I can discover no such tendency; and the arguments of the gen tleman, to which I have attended with great interest, have not convinced me. Sir, I was so unfortunate as not to comprehend the conclusiveness or force of the arguments of the gentleman from New York, when he said, that the district system would melt down the States into a common mass of fragments, and consolidate the People of the Union. Sir, the district system has, to my mind, a directAnother argument of the gentleman from New York ly contrary, a diffusing tendency. Sir, the argument of is, that, in all elections, the minority have no rights, and the honorable gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. must submit; that in an election by his favorite system- MCDUFFIE) upon this part of the subject, has not been the general ticket-the minority of a State have no met in debate; it has not been approached in a fair, open, rights, and must submit; and he instances the election of and statesmanlike manner; it has been evaded; and I am a Governor of a State by the People of the State, in free to say that, to my mind, it is unanswerable. In what, which case, he says, the minority have no rights and Sir, does consolidation consist? In what does an inter must submit. Sir, the abstract proposition that a majo-ference with State rights consist? In the concentration of rity shall prevail, and a minority submit, is not contro- power in the Federal Government. In taking power verted; but the analogy of the gentleman is an unfortu- from the States, and assuming its exercise, or vesting it nate one; all reasoning from analogy is dangerous, and in the Federal Government. Are these effects produced apt to lead into error. A case more analagous to the by the plan of amendment proposed? No, Sir, the tenquestion we are now considering, would have been, that dency is directly the reverse. By this plan you propose the Governor of a State, elected by the People, does not not to take the power of electing the President from the receive the unanimous and undivided vote of every coun- States, and to vest it in the General Government, but, on ty in which he happens to receive a majority. the contrary, you propose to take the contingent power of electing the President and Vice President from Congress, and to give it to the People of the States. Are you producing consolidation, or interfering with State rights, when you do not propose to accumulate more power to yourselves, but to divest yourselves of a part of the power which you possess, and to vest it in the People of the States? Sir, when I speak of State rights, I mean, as I understand the Constitution to mean, not the rights of the Executives of the States, not the rights of the Representatives in Congress from the States, not the rights of the Legislatures of the States, but I mean the rights of the People of the States. The Executives, and Legislatures, and Representatives in Congress, of the

Another argument I shall briefly notice. The gentleman thinks that, by the general ticket system, his old friend in former days, the Caucus, would be much easier crushed and put down, at the centre of the State, than thirty-six caucuses scattered over thirty-six districts, in the State. Sir, upon the subject of Caucuses, I know, an honest difference of opinion exists. For myself, I have never entertained but one opinion upon this subject. I had the honor, in the Legislature of my own State, to record my vote in support of those resolutions against a caucus, which produced so much excitement, and led to so much discussion, in the public journals of the country, some two or three years ago. I have seen to reason to VOL. 105

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Amendment of the Constitution.

[MARCH 13, 1826.

stitution? and if we deem it necessary to propose amendments, and do propose them, are we violating our oaths? If, on the contrary, we deem it necessary to propose amendments, and fail or omit to do so, are we not violating our oaths?

States, are the public servants and functionaries of the People of the States, and can have no rights contradistinguished from the rights of the People of the States. Does the plan of amendment proposed, take from the large States any of their rights? No; on the contrary, it gives to the People of every portion of such States, In the conclusion of the remarks made by the honorathe power of being heard and felt in the election. It ble member from New York, (Mr. STORRS) to whom I takes from their servants in the Legislature, it is true, have had frequent occasion to refer, he appealed to the the power of suppressing the voice of the minority in the Committee in an emphatic and confident tone, to know State, by the operations of the general ticket system, if this was the propitious period to agitate this great or by the election of Electors by the Legislature, but it question. This very discussion, said he, may produce gives the power which it thus takes from their servants, mischief, unless the proposition is promptly voted down. which may be, and is often abused, not to the Federal I allude, Sir, to the speech delivered upon the floor, and Government, but to the People of those States them- not to any other which may have made its appearance, selves. Does the plan of amendment take from the and in which the gentleman may have been misundersmall States any of their rights? No; it is not conceiv- stood or misrepresented. Sir, are we to be told, at this ed that the capricious, interested, or arbitrary opinion day, that it is dangerous, or will produce mischief, for of a single member of Congress on this floor, when the the Representatives of the People openly to discuss here election devolves upon the House, constitutes a State great political questions in which the People are sensiright, by which I mean the right of the People of the bly alive; in which they feel that their rights are withState. The vote of the State may be given by the Re-held from them; and in which they feel much interest? presentative in direct opposition to the will of the Peo-I hope, sir, this discussion will go on, and that we may ple of the State; and entertaining the opinion, as some settle this great question; and that we may settle it to profess to do, that the Representative, when the elec- public satisfaction. tion comes here, is constituted an Elector, and an umpire But we are admonished by those who are opposed to by the Constitution, to act according to his own will, amendment, that we should be cautious in touching this regardless of the wishes of his constituents; and, judg-charter of our liberties-the Constitution-lest, in ating from past events, is it not most likely that the votes tempting to amend it, we should make it worse. Sir, of the small States will generally depend upon the acci- in the main, that valued instrument is without a parallel dental opinion of the Representative ? That opinion in the history of the world, and speaks its own eulogy; may, and often will, misrepresent the wishes of the but it was made by men, and man and all his works are People of the State, by giving the votes of the State imperfect. The wise framers of that instrument well against their will. This ideal and contingent right, then, knew, that, in forming a system of government under a supposed to be vested in the small States, is more in written constitution, in many of its features unlike any the name than in the substance. Does the proposed that had preceded it, in any age or in any country, that plan of amendment interfere with the two electoral difficulties, then unforeseen by them, might occur in the votes in each State, predicated upon the federative cha-future operations of the system. So sensible were they racter of the Senate, and the sovereignty of the State? that it was not the work of inspiration, but of men, that Does it take from the States the power of prescribing it might be imperfect, and fail in some of its important the qualifications of voters in each State? No; nor operations, that they wisely incorporated into it the medoes it disturb or interfere with any other of the rights thod of its own amendment. And I appeal to the historeserved to the States. Another argument was used, ry of those times, to know whether the constitution sir, if argument it may be called, by the honorable mem- would ever have been ratified by the States, if it had not ber from Massachusetts, (Mr. EVERETT) which struck been for this very article that made provision for its own my mind, on account of its novelty, with peculiar sur- amendments; if it had not been for the hope and confiprise. That honorable gentleman, with all his classical dent expectation that future amendments would be and political learning, in his zeal to oppose all amend-made? In many of the States that did ratify it, declarament to the Constitution at this time, and search out all atory amendments were recommended to be made a the possible reasons that could exist against it, insisted, part of the Constitution. Virginia, Massachusetts, New before the Committee, that any attempt to propose York, South Carolina, and some others that did ratify it, amendments to the Constitution was unconstitutional. at the time of ratification, proposed that amendments Was the gentleman serious in this peurile conception ? should be made. North Carolina, the State from which He told us we had taken an oath to support the Consti- my honorable friend before me (Mr. SAUNDERS) Comes, tution, and can we, said he, propose to amend or alter who has ably addressed the committee upon this subit without violating that oath And he amused us, too,ject, and the State of my nativity, was among the last to sir, in illustration of his views upon this part of the sub-come into the Union. She, too, paused, and hesitated, ject, with a hypothetical case, in which he figured to and doubted, but was ultimately induced, by this very us, that if he should meet my honorable friend from clause, to ratify it; and she, too, proposed amendments. South Carolina (Mr. McDUFFIE) in the gallery of the And have not salutary amendments been made to the House, and obtain his pledge to support, upon the floor, original constitution, as reported by the Convention, and a favorite measure of his which was unconstitutional, ratified by the States? At the first Congress held unwould he, (Mr MCDUFFIE) said the honorable gentle-der the Constitution, twelve additional articles were preman, do so, if, on reflection, he found it to be unconsti-posed to the States for ratification, in the manner pretutional? Sir, I will not press upon the consideration of scribed by the Constitution. Ten of them were ratified the Committee this striking illustration, as the gentle-by three-fourths of the States, and became a part of the man conceived it to be; it is perfectly within their recollection. Sir, does not that gentleman remember, that, in the 5th article of the Constitution it is, expressly provided that "the Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution." Have we not sworn to support this, as well as every other part of the Con

Constitution, and now constitute your Bill of Rights, and secure to the citizen some of his most important privileges and rights. At the third Congress held onder he Constitution, an additional article, in relation to the suability of States by the citizens of another State, or the subjects of a foreign State or Power, was submitted by the States for ratification, in the manner prescribed by

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Amendment of the Constitution.

[MARCH 14, 1826

to be heeded or regarded. The resolutions adopted by left. It will be conceded, that the small States have a the Legislature of Tennessee have not yet been concurred contingent power and political force, valuable to them as in by a single State. The New York Legislature, as well members of the Confederacy, whenever the election of as that of Massachusetts, have reported against them. President devolves upon the House of Representatives; Neither South Carolina nor Georgia has taken any order and any amendment of the Constitution which takes away upon them; and if any State has, it is unknown to me. this contingent power, or renders the exercise of it less Yet, from the tenor of the remarks of some gentlemen frequent, affects the rights of those States which are who have addressed the committee, one would be led to benefited by the exercise of it. Then the question rebelieve that the People were ripe for revolt, or, to use the curs, was the election more liable to come to the House, quoted language of the gentleman from Tennessee, (Mr. previous to the amendment of 1804, than it now is? If POLK) were ready "to cry aloud, and spare not." Yet the it was, then the alteration or amendment was one detriPeople, who are able, through the Legislatures of the mental to the interests of the small States. But this is several States, to do, in effect, what we are called upon not all that amendment took from the small States an to do for them, are peaceable, quiet, contented, and satis- influence in the primary election, which they might have fied. When they are dissatisfied, I have no doubt we exercised, and which they cannot now exercise. Prior to shall hear from them, and they will be listened to. I have that amendment, the State of Rhode Island, by her vote heard of three physicians, who, by concert, met the same alone in the primary election, might have elected the Preman, at different places, within a given time, each telling sident, or might have determined which of the two canhim that he was unwell, that he was dangerously ill, and didates voted for, for the Presidency and Vice Presidency, who succeeded in persuading him, though in perfect should be the President; and in the election of 1800, if health, that he was, in fact, dangerously ill. Do gentle- the eight votes of South Carolina had been given to the men look for like success in their attempts to satisfy the federal candidates, Adams and Pinckney, (and it was supPeople their rights are sacrificed, and their liberties in posed they would have been,) Rhode Island would have danger? If they do, they will, as I apprehend, be disap-elected the President, inasmuch as Mr. Adams received pointed. There is yet left too much virtue, there is yet one more of the electoral votes of that State, than Generemaining too much intelligence. I am, Mr. Chairman, ral Pinckney. Consonant with my own views of the imalmost prepared to say, that all the amendments to the portance of this feature in the Constitution to the small Constitution, which have hitherto been made, were unne- States, and in making the amendment in 1804, they were cessary. Perhaps the 11th article, relating to the suabili- deprived of one-half of their relative force and political ty of States, was necessary; but the ten preceding ones importance, the committee will indulge me while I read are, as so many declaratory acts, a bill of rights, an enu- one or two extracts from the speech of the late Governor meration of rights reserved, but the reservation of which Griswold, of Connecticut, on the amendment of 1804: did not depend upon the enumeration of them. They are, in fact, like the propositions of my honorable friend from Massachusetts, (Mr. BAILEY) giving to Congress the pow. er to make roads, to cut and construct canals, when a large majority of this House have no doubt Congress has now this power, and when a large majority of the nation is as well satisfied as to the power of Congress, as this House is. I am not disposed to view superfluous legislation with a more favorable eye than special legislation; they are both, in my opinion, equally obnoxious; and we might as well have the Constitution altered as often as persons suppose particular evils exist under it, as to amend it for the purpose of making clear and explicit what the wisest men in the nation are now well persuaded are sufficiently plain. I come now, sir, to the amendment of the Constitution, which was made in 1804, relative to the clection of President and Vice President. This was the result of a supposed evil manifested in the election of Mr. Jefferson, in 1801. If numerous ballotings were evils, they were indeed manifested; but those kind of evils exist in all our State Legislatures, in the election of Senators to Congress, as well as in the election of other officers. Similar evils exist in all the Eastern States, where, in questions submitted to the People, majorities are necessary to a choice; but, with a full knowledge of them, and the consequent inconvenience and delay growing out of them, the People of the New England States have always submitted to them. In the Presidential election referred to, no one will contend that the People's choice was not elected by the House of Representatives, and that, if a minority President was subsequently elected, a majority President was at that period chosen. But, sir, in regarding too much the inconvenience of that election, and applying a remedy to it-an alteration of the Constitution of the United States-I am apprehensive the rights of the small States were invaded, the effects of which were not foreseen, but will hereafter be seriously felt; and that all the small States which voted for that amendment were guilty of a suicidal act; an act which divested them of one-half of their force and political power; and, adopt the proposed amendments, they will have but a very little, if any,

"The Constitution of the United States is a compact formed by the several States, to and for the general good. It is well known to have been produced by a spirit of compromise anong the several States; that much difficulty arose in its formation; and perhaps in no one article of the Constitution could have arisen greater jealousies between the larger and smaller States, than that pointing out the mode of electing the Chief Magistrate. The larger States, as is natural to suppose, would contend for an election according to the number of inhabitants in each State, as they thereby would secure more votes; the smaller States, on the principle that it was a confederation of States, would contend for an equal vote; that is, to vote by States, and not by population or numbers. To settle the difficulty, the present article was agreed to, and thereby both of the above principles, as contended for by the larger and smaller States, adopted to a certain extent; the mode being a mixture of both principles. First, it permits the election of President to be by numbers; that is, giving each State votes in proportion to its population; whereby the larger States, considered in their corporate capacity as States, have the advantage of the smaller States, in their corporate capacity as States. But, in case of a failure of choice in the first mode, then the second, of choosing by States, is to be pursued, whereby the smaller States have an equal vote with the larger States.

"In no other place than on this floor, are the smaller States on an equal footing with the larger States, in the choice of the President of the United States.

"It follows, then, of course, that the greater the chance of bringing the States to a vote on this floor, the more advantageous it is to the smaller States; as, here, the smaller States are as powerful as the larger States. By the Constitution, as it now stands, there are two chances for a choice of President on this floor: 1st, when there are more persons than one who have a Constitutional majority of votes, and are equal in number; 2d, when there is no person who has a Constitutional majority. Only one of the above cases can happen at a time; but there is always a chance for one of the two to happen. But, by the proposed amendment, the first beforementioned

chance can never happen; it is wholly taken away, and only one possible chance of voting on this floor by States is left: for, when your ballots designate who is voted for as President, it never can happen that more persons than one can have a Constitutional majority of votes. One chance, then, of voting on this floor by States being taken away, by the proposed amendment, it follows, irresistibly, that the smaller States will be injured, and the larger States benefited. I ask, then, sir, if gentlemen representing the larger States can be sincere, when they declare that they mean not to infringe upon the rights of the smaller States as secured by this article of the Constitution, and still give their vote for the present resolution The one, in my opinion, will contradict the other.

"The present mode for bringing forward candidates for the office of President and Vice President is the least liable to call forth art, intrigue, and corruption; the uncertainty of the event, and the difficulty of making arrangements, are strong checks to the artful and designing. But, the moment the mode pointed out by this resolution is adopted, the door for intrigue and corruption is open; the candidates and their friends can calculate with certainty, and apply the means direct; the power of party, influence of office, art, cunning, intrigue, and corruption, will all be used, and used to effect, because the object is certain."

[H. of R.

shown, that the amendment of 1804 was an invasion of the rights of the small States: and if they are stripped of one right, and divested of one power after another, the time will soon arrive, when they will have nothing remaining, nothing that is worth possessing. If the fundamental principles of Government are to be changed for "light and transient causes," what guarantee have the small States, that will secure to them their equal representation in the other branch of the Legislature? Already, we are threatened with a Convention of the People, in which every part of the Constitution can be altered!

I will now, Mr. Chairman, examine the different modes of appointing electors. "Each State shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors, equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress." This is evidently, to my mind, a State right, and cannot be altered without impairing the rights of a State. I will not say with the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. ARCHER) that no mode is best, and all are best, but the States should be judges of what is best; one may be the best at one time, and another mode at another time. I would not restrict the largest State in the Union to any particular mode, because in the largest, the will of the People must be consulted, and will, eventually, govern : nor would I do any act that would take from the larger And now, Mr. Chairman, permit me, in this stage of my States any of those powers, rights, or prerogatives, which, argument, to notice one remark of the honorable gentle-under the Constitution, they are fairly entitled to. man from Virginia, who first addressed the committee, (Mr. ARCHER) that the election of President by the House of Representatives was considered, by the framers of the Constitution, as a mere dernier resort, and one which it was calculated would seldom occur. As the Constitution stood before 1804, this House was the most probable resort of election, and the framers of the Constitution intended it should be: for more than three months and a half, out of the four the Convention were in session, they steadily and uniformly adhered to an election by Congress, and voted down every form of proposition which served to take it from Congress and give it to the People. I will not read the whole of the proceedings of the Convention of 1787, inasmuch as they have been repeatedly referred to; one or two of these extracts will suffice:

"JUNE 2.-In Committee of the Whole, Mr. WILSON, of Pennsylvania, moved to postpone Mr. RANDOLPH'S motion, in relation to the Executive, in order to take up his motion, to divide the States into districts, for the choice of electors; this motion was negatived; Yeas, Pennsylvania and Maryland, New York divided. Nays, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia.

"It was then voted, that the President should be chosen by Congress for seven years; Yeas, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia. Nays, Pennsylvania, Maryland. "JUNE 19.-The Committee of the Whole reported to the House the resolutions as agreed to-that the President should be appointed by Congress, for seven years, and be ineligible a second time.

"JULY 17.-The ninth resolution from the Committee of the Whole being under consideration, it was moved that the President should be appointed by the People, and not by Congress; Yea, Pennsylvania. Nays, 9. It was then moved that he be chosen by electors appointed by the State Legislatures; Yeas, Delaware and Maryland. Nays, 8. It was then voted, unanimously, that the President should be chosen by Congress."

I will not, Mr. Chairman, detain the committee by further reading of the proceedings of the Convention. I have gone far enough to show, that an election by the House was not to the framers of the Constitution, by any means, an unexpected event. And I think I have now

Nor

will I surrender a single right belonging to, or a single benefit conferred upon, by the Constitution of the United States, the smallest State in the Union. Many have contended that the State Legislatures have no right whatever to appoint the electors, and that the framers of the Constitution never intended, never contemplated, such an appointment, when, at the first election of President, the electors were appointed in every State in the Union, with the exception of three, by the State Legislatures. These appointments were made when the People could, and no doubt did, avail themselves of the aid, counsel, and services, of the framers of the Constitution themselves. The Federalist has been frequently resorted to, as a contemporaneous exposition of the Constitution. It has been read to warrant, to illustrate, and to enforce, every argument that has been made. To shew that the State Le. gislatures could appoint the electors, in the opinion of Mr. Madison, although this mode is not with me a favorite one, I hope to be indulged with one extract from No. 45, page 355.

"The State Governments may be regarded as constituent and essential parts of the Federal Government, whilst the latter is in no wise essential to the operation or organization of the former. Without the intervention of the State Legislatures, the President of the United States cannot be elected at all; they must, in all cases, have a great share in his appointment, and will, perhaps, in most cases, of themselves, determine it."

In many cases the State Legislatures may appoint the electors with the fullest approbation on the part of the People: in some they would be warranted in making the appointments from expediency, policy, and from necessity. Let us advert to the election of Washington to the Presidency, when there was scarcely a dissenting voice, or one raised in opposition to him. In his election, was the appointment of electors by the State Legislatures an encroachment upon the rights of the People? When Mr. Jefferson was, for the second time, a candidate for the Presidency, there was hardly an organized opposition to him, and in many States in the Union there was no oppo. sition. Under such circumstances, was the exercise of this appointing power by those State Legislatures who thought proper to exercise it, an invasion of the People's rights? There are cases, I repeat, in which the exercise of this power by the State Legislatures may be justified