Senator SALTONSTALL. May I make just one other observation in the form of a question? Do you not overlook the education of the great bulk of our American people, which is a greater education and a greater individuality than any nation on earth?

General EDSON. I do not overlook the powers of propaganda, sir. Senator ROBERTSON of Wyoming. Senator Saltonstall has brought up the British white paper: Is it not a fact that the unification or coordination of the British forces, as they existed then as three different services, the Navy, the Army, and the Royal Air Force, that coordination was forced on them by the complete lack of coordination between the Navy and the Air Force and the Army and the Air Force, that some such coordination by law was necessary?

General EDSON. I think you are probably correct, sir.

In this case, we are dividing up what we have of two services and making three services and trying to figure out some coordination for the three services.

Senator ROBERTSON of Wyoming. In the case of the British, is not their whole set-up entirely different from ours, the Navy is the number one and important service to them, and their whole strategy is based on their Navy?

General EDSON. I would like to say that that has been true up to the present. I think that a change is taking place in Great Britain, due to the development of new weapons of warfare.

Heretofore, Great Britain has been an island which could be approached only from the water. Today, the width of the channel and the size of Great Britain do not afford the protection which she had before.

I think perhaps her air defense is becoming of more importance to Great Britain. The same cannot be said about the United States, however. We still cannot be reached except across the water or through the air. Nor do I think that in the foreseeable future will there be any aircraft available to supplant the water shipping.

In other words, we took into Okinawa 277,000 troops, of which 132,000 were combat troops. We took onto Okinawa for that operation 729,305 measurement tons of equipment and supplies.

There were 37,000 tons of naval gunfire employed during that operation. More than 700,000 tons of bombs and rockets were used.

I do not believe in the foreseeable future there can be an air attack mounted which can equal this tonnage or this personnel figure, considering the distance between here and any other nation with which we might become engaged in conflict.

I think that so long as we defend the air approaches and sea approaches to this country, that we do not need to fear an attack on the ground, in the immediate future.

Senator ROBERTSON of Wyoming. I think that is all.

Senator MCCARTHY. Would you agree that history has taught us one lesson, if nothing else, and that is the creation of a National General Staff is the first long and very positive step toward absolute dictatorship?

General EDSON. I believe that history definitely proves that, sir. Senator MCCARTHY. As I understand your testimony, you are suggesting that we possibly should have an autonomous Air Force which would have control of your strategic aviation, that the Army have control of tactical aviation?

General EDSON. Close air support.

Senator MCCARTHY. Yes; and the Navy likewise have support of its own tactical aviation, is that right?

General EDSON. Yes, sir.

Senator MCCARTHY. In other words, you feel that it is absolutely necessary for a ground commander to have complete unhampered control of his close-in support?

General EDSON. If you do not do that, I believe you leave in the hands of any one service the power of veto to carry out an essential operation.

By that I mean this: In the German organization in which every. thing that fought on the land was in the Army, everything that fought in the air was in the Air Forces and everything that fought in the sea was in the Navy. The German naval campaign in this last war would have been much more successful if they could have extended their submarine bases into the Azores, or Madeira, or some place like that, but not having within themselves the troops to do it, the ground forces were able to put a veto on that very essential naval operation.

The same thing can happen between the Ground Forces and the Air, unless the Ground Forces have control of their close support aviation, which again, in my opinion, is just as much an arm of the Ground Forces as their artillery or their mechanized forces.

Senator MCCARTHY. Putting it in another fashion, I gather your thought to be this: While we attempt to separate the three forces and create three definite arms, we should be careful that we do not go too far and find ourselves in the position England was in at the beginning of the war where she could get no cooperation between the Navy and Air Force, with a tremendous amount of loss in British shipping. Am I right?

General EDSON. That is right.

Senator MCCARTHY. I assume that we all agree that the Army did a tremendously good job in landing operations. I assume we agree that the Marine Corps was supreme in its amphibious operations.

The CHAIRMAN. May I interrupt right there: When you mention the great amphibious landings, how about Normandy?

Senator MCCARTHY. Would you tell how many marines there were connected with that?

General EDSON. The number?

The number of marines was very limited. However, I would like to point out, sir, that the tactics and techniques which they used in that landing, were developed by the Marine Corps.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank God for the marines; let me join you in that. Senator MCCARTHY. Not only was the equipment developed by the Marine Corps, but also they did have a number of marines connected with the operations as instructors. I think luckily the Army recognized the Marine Corps had pioneered in amphibious operations.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us find out more for the record: Who developed the "duck?"

Senator MCCARTHY. Frankly, I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the General know?

General EDSON. I think the Army developed that.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I most respectfully disagree.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know who developed it. I was trying to find out.

Senator SALTONSTALL. If we are going to put this in the record, let us put it in right: Dr. Vannevar Bush and his organization did it. The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other remarks about the "duck"? Senator MCCARTHY. General, I notice in the proposed Executive order, which allegedly is for the purpose of eliminating duplication, that we have not only duplication but you might almost call it triplication, in the field of amphibious operations.

I refer to page 3 and Page 4, the amphibious operations assigned to the Army and the Marine Corps.

If this super-Secretary does the job which we are directing him to do, that is eliminate duplication, it will be his job to recommend that either the Marine or Army amphibious units be disbanded or that one swallow up the other, is that right?

General EDSON. I think that is very apt to happen.

Senator MCCARTHY. That will be the job of the super-Secretary to see that that happens, is that not correct?

General EDSON. I believe so, yes, sir.

Senator MCCARTHY. Then in view of the fact that we all recognize the Marine Corps has pioneered in amphibious operations, do you not think it might be well, not for the benefit of any particular branch of service, but for the over-all security of this country, to make sure that this unit which has pioneered and brought this particular type of operation up to date, that that job be assigned to that unit, not in some Executive order, but in the law itself?

General EDSON. I would certainly agree with you, sir.

I believe that amphibious operations has been proven an all-time specialty, that it is a specialty of the Marine Corps and has been; that by permitting it to continue as a specialized organization, we will have continued development in that specialty.

Whereas, if it goes to a force whose primary job is that of fighting large land battles in which the amphibious specialty is only 1 of 10 or 11, that that specialty is bound to suffer.

Senator MCCARTHY. If the Navy is to do its job at all, would you say it is absolutely necessary that it does have the Marine Corps to conduct the amphibious operation?

General EDSON. Definitely. Because the Navy's primary job being that of control of the sea, has to extend that control away from the shores of the United States.

Luckily, we now have in our possession, I believe, or under our control, most of the bases which we had to take step by step for use of the Navy and the Air Forces in this last war.

Much has been said that this past war has demonstrated that every war of the future will be a joint war.

I do not entirely agree with that. I think that there may well be two or three major amphibious operations, but we will not again have to take the bases to project our sea forces across the water.

Senator MCCARTHY. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions?

General Edson, we were glad to have had you down here. We have brought up a lot of points which I am sure the committee would like to consider.

I want to remind you that you stated this morning you might offer some amendments, and I will again say they will be welcomed and we will be glad to have you present them to the committee or through Senator Robertson, just as you wish.

At this point in the record I would like to place replies from the Navy and the War Departments to requests made by committee members at the previous hearings for certain information and statements from the Navy and War Departments.

First, we have two letters from Secretary Forrestal. Both are dated March 19, 1947.

We also have a letter from Secretary Forrestal, dated March 29, 1947.

A memorandum from the War Department signed by Major General Norstad dated April 2, 1947 having to do with an incident at Norfolk.

Another letter from Secretary Patterson dated April 7, furnishing information requested by Senator Byrd.

These will all be printed in full in the record at this point. (The letters are as follows:)

Hon. CHAN GURNEY,

United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Washington, March 19, 1947.

MY DEAR SENATOR: In the course of my recent testimony before your committee, Senator Tydings asked me to submit a brief written statement of my views on whether or not the Secretaries of War, Navy, and Air should attend meetings of the President's Cabinet.

You will recall that in the process of answering questions on this subject I pointed out that the subject of who shall attend Cabinet meetings is a matter which is of primary concern to the President-since those who attend Cabinet meetings do so at the President's invitation, and for the purpose of serving as his personal advisers. It is my view, therefore, that the pending legislation is properly silent on the subject in question.

Senator Tydings also requested that I state my views on attendance at Cabinet meetings in time of war. For the reasons set out above I do not feel that this is a matter which should be spelled out in the statute-and it is my belief that this should be the case both in time of war and in time of peace. Moreover, it is my view that the National Security Council-provided for by section 201 of the pending legislation--is the proper forum for the top-level wartime coordination which is, as Senator Tydings so forcefully pointed out at the hearings, absolutely indispensable to the waging of successful war.

The fact that the National Security Council has for its members the Secretaries of War, Navy, and Air, together with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of National Defense, and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, is, to my way of thinking, a major step forward.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES FORRESTAL.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Washington, March 19, 1947.

Hon. CHAN GURNEY,

United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR GURNEY: This letter, like my earlier letter to you on the subject of attendance at Cabinet meetings, is written in response to requests made by members of your committee during Tuesday's hearings on S. 758.

You will recall that Senator Byrd asked me to submit a memorandum that would point out the provisions of S. 758 which support my statement that the bill which your committee is now considering adequately safeguards "the morale and autonomy of the Navy and its components, including particularly the Fleet Marine Forces and naval aviation."

More

The provisions on which I base this statement are to be found explicitly in sections 102 (a), 103, 106 (a), 107 (b), and 201 (a)-and are to be found implicitly throughout all the provisions that go to make up the bill in its entirety. over, my statement is borne out by the many letters and other documents which President Truman, Secretary Patterson, I, myself, and representatives of the three of us have already laid before your committee-documents, for example, such as the joint letter which Secretary Patterson and I sent to the President under date of January 16, 1947, and which the President transmitted to Congress under date of January 18.

The specific language which bears most directly on this matter is found in section 102 (a) and reads as follows:

* *
* *

*

"The Secretary of National Defense shall exercise direction, authority, and control over such departments *: Provided, That the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force, under the direction of the Secretary of National Defense, shall be administered as individual units by their respective Secretaries: And provided further, That nothing herein contained shall prevent the Secretary of any such Department from presenting to the President, after first so informing the Secretary of National Defense, any report or recommendation relating to his Department which he may deem necessary."

I think that the autonomy of the Navy is safeguarded in two ways by the language I have just quoted. In the first place, the Navy Department is to be administered as an individual unit by its own Secretary. In the second place, the Secretary of the Navy, with regard to any matter which he may deem necessary, has the right of direct access to the President.

Senator Byrd questioned whether the first of these two safeguards has any meaning, in view of the fact that the Navy Department, even though administered as an individual unit, is nevertheless under the direction of the Secretary of National Defense. I believe that some light can be shed on this aspect of the matter by a consideration of the joint letter which Secretary Patterson and I sent to the President on January 16. The bill before you represents, as you know, the recasting in statutory form of the agreements contained in the letter of January 16. In that letter, Secretary Patterson and I emphasized that each Department "shall be under a Secretary and, under the over-all direction of the Secretary of National Defense, shall be administered as an individual unit." This is substantially the same language that now appears in section 102 (a)— though the language of 102 (a), as I have already mentioned, represents a recasting of this language in statutory form. Thus, the vital word "over-all," which Secretary Patterson and I used in our letter to describe the type of direction the Secretary of National Defense would be expected to exercise, does not appear in the statute, for the very good reason that it is not what the lawyers call "a word of art." In layman's language, however, "over-all direction" continues to be the most apt description of the concept contained in the bill before you.

I will review briefly the other sections of the bill which I have mentioned as bearing explicitly on this matter. They are:

Section 103 which, by prohibiting the Secretary of National Defense from establishing a military staff, goes a long way toward assuring the morale and autonomy of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

*

Section 106 (a) which, by defining the Navy as including "the entire operating forces of the United States (including naval aviation) and * the United States Marine Corps," meets many objections that were raised when earlier bills on the subject were under discussion. In this connection, I should also like to point out that the proposed Executive order which Secretary Patterson and I attached to our letter of January 16 goes into considerable detail on the functions of naval aviation and the Marine Corps.

Section 107 (b) which, by amending section 158 of the Revised Statutes to include the Department of the Air Force, sets forth what are the executive departments of the Government. The Air Force, along with the Army and Navy Departments, are stated to be Departments, and the statutory provisions for their administration as Departments are preserved. This bill, therefore, retains the legislative existence of the Departments, differing in this major respect from the Thomas bill, S. 888. S. 888, in section 108, abolishes the two existing Departments and provides that the functions, powers and duties of the various offices of those Departments shall be vested in, and imposed upon, the Secretary of Common Defense, who may in turn delegate those functions, powers, and