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So I say again that we have two Military Establishments virtually independent of each other. If any system is better adapted to lead to lack of consistent planning, to competitive practices, to piecemeal activities, I do not know what it is.

Consider this example: Last year each of the two Departments went to Congress and asked for and obtained legislation authorizing certain strengths within its own establishment. In each case, the matter was treated as if that particular Department was the sole Department concerned in national defense; as if the other Department was nonexistent. That was true of both Departments.

The shining example of piecemeal activities, of course, is in the purse-the handling of the budget each year in the case of the two Departments. Each Department prepares its estimates of funds. needed in the next fiscal year without conformity to any comprehensive plan of national defense, and submits its estimates to the Bureau of the Budget. Cuts are made by the Bureau of the Budget, but I have never heard it claimed that either the cuts or the reduced amounts left to the two Departments were related in the slightest degree to any over-all plan for the defense of the Nation.

When the budget goes to Congress, the fiscal program of one department is sent to one subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee of each House, the fiscal program of the other to another subcommittee. In the subcommittee the programs are carefully and thoroughly scrutinized. But again the programs are reviewed independently of one another, except for minor coordination. Under our existing system that is inevitable, and it would be inevitable even if the two programs were scrutinized by the same subcommittee. I say this because the subcommittee, in its study of the budget of either department, should be able to get the benefit of the views of an official, civilian or military, charged with the responsibility of national defense as an entirety; this in order to see how the particular program fits into the over-all concept of national defense. And there is no such official under the existing two-department system, short of the President.

Every year I have been asked, when I go down to the Appropriations Committee of the House, how this program fits in with the Navy Department's program. My answer is always, "I don't know." They will say, "Does General Eisenhower know?" I say, "No; he does not know."

They say, "Hasn't he ever studied the Navy budget?"

I say, "No; it is not his duty to, and it is not my duty to." And, of course, the same thing is true of the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations. We could not possibly tell any committee of Congress how the two programs fit.

They ask if there are any overlapping items in it. I say, "I don't know, and you don't know either." And, of course, they said they didn't.

It is something like partners in a partnership going to a bank individually. One partner goes to one vice president of the bank, and the other partner goes to another vice president of the bank, each asking for loans for partnership operations. And when the vice president, who is asked to loan to Partner War Department, in our little illustration, asks him how much his partner is drawing from the same bank through another vice president, he says, "I don't know."

That example may seem rather fantastic, but that is just what goes on today.

Of course, it finally comes to the board of directors of the bank as it comes to the House and Senate, and has to be passed. But I submit to you that it gets utterly no scrutiny at that point. It can't, in the nature of things-no detailed scrutiny.

I should like also to direct attention to the duplications inherent in the present structure-duplications that will never be eliminated under the present system of independent departments. Those duplications, if continued, will render it impossible for the taxpayers to get their money's worth for what they spend on national defense.

Any military service, given a task to perform and left to its own devices, will make complete plans for the men, equipment, and supplies that it deems necessary for a complete operation. It is common knowledge that the service will build up and hold within its own control all the resources and means that it deems necessary to carry out its mission, in preference to relying on resources and means already available in another service. I can give many examples of that. It is only a natural human tendency. They want to have within their own control all of the necessary means, rather than rely upon some other service which has means already available, because they are always fearful that those means will be withdrawn from them, or that they can't control them as completely as new means and new resources set up for their own exclusive control.

That is the practice known as empire building-a practice not confined to the military services. Steady vigilance is required to keep that practice within bounds, even within the activities of a single department. It is a practical impossibility to place checks upon that practice on an interservice basis when you have two independent departments. We have our double hospital systems, our double procurement systems, our double lines of supply, our double air-transport systems, and numerous other duplications.

I don't want to exaggerate that point, because there are instances present in the military service where a service does rely upon the other service, but that practice is nothing like as prevalent as it could be and should be.

I could, of course, cite you the reliance the Navy makes on the Ordnance Department of the Army for small arms and small-arms ammunition. That is one. There are others. But they are not nearly as frequent as they could be.

I have submitted the reasons that impel me to say, from an experience that covers nearly 7 years in the War Department, that we will not have the most efficient and economical system of national defense until we adopt a unified organization of the armed forces.

Unity is the only method that will reduce to a minimum the duplications that are frequent today-the disjointed policies that are being pursued. It is the only system that will give economy. It is the only system that will produce a comprehensive plan for national defense, and will produce programs and policies to carry out such a plan on the part of the land forces, sea forces, and air forces. So I am convinced that a unified control and direction of the armed forces will be advantageous to national defense.

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I will pass now to the second issue of the two issues I outlined, as I see it, some time ago: Whether the bill will meet the need of unified control and direction, and provide a structure that is sound, efficient, and workable. I am thoroughly persuaded that it will.

The Secretary of National Defense, with the assistance of the joint agencies that will work under his direction-the War Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Munitions Board, and the Research and Development Board-will be responsible for integrating the operations of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces. His authority will be adequate. He will have power to "establish policies and programs" for the entire establishment, as well as for the departments and agencies embraced within it.

He will exercise "direction, authority, and control" over such departments and agencies. He will be responsible, so far as departmental authority goes, for the budget estimates of the departments and agencies in the National Defense Establishment. Here for the first time is an executive who will have the authority and responsibility, with the aid and advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to draw up a single, unified program of national defense, with allocation of manpower and money to the three services in conformity to the programsubject, of course, to congressional approval every year in the passing of the budget-who will be in a position to present a complete program to the appropriate committees of the Congress.

Some advocates of unification have been critical of the provision that accords departmental status to the three services; also of the provision that the three departments shall be administered as individual units; also of the right of access to the President that is afforded to the secretaries of the three branches. And I should be less than frank if I did not discuss these provisions.

I am on record as having favored in the past a more centralized type of organization-a single department with three branches, but I go along wholeheartedly with the present measure, including the provisions just referred to.

In the first place, the extended discussions I have had with the Secretary of the Navy have left me with the conviction that there are substantial values in the concept of local autonomy-States' rights or home rule if you will-in the three services, and that those values are important enough to be preserved. I can think of no good reason why the Secretary of National Defense should concern himself with matters of administration that pertain to the three departments.

In the second place, the Navy had decided views as to the soundness of these reservations, and I have no hesitation in saying that it will be of lasting benefit to develop the type of organization that commands the support of Army and Navy alike. I am therefore unqualifiedly in favor of these provisions.

I will not detain you with a discussion of the other features of the bill, important as they are. Other witnesses will take them up in detail.

In conclusion, I urge that you report this measure favorably. It will give the United States an efficient organization of the armed services. It will strengthen national defense without calling for the expenditure of more funds. It is unique in that respect; the other measures to strengthen national defense all call for the spending of

more money. It will strengthen the national defense and I am confident that throughout the world it will be viewed in that light.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I believe that one statement made by you this morning makes it mandatory on the part of Congress to take care of a bill such as this during this session of Congress. That statement you made this morning was to the effect that right now there is no such plan for national defense. I quote your words there.

In your statement you stated that there can be no conformity to any comprehensive plan for national defense under the present circumstances for the simple reason, and very good reason that there is no such plan now.

Secretary PATTERSON. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Then we have the definite duty right now, in view of our large national debt, to cut out, whenever possible, all duplications. And your statement this morning tells of the duplications.

Where, in the bill, Mr. Secretary, is it spelled out in words that everyone can understand that there is the opportunity, at least, if not the definite direction, that there shall not be three sets of hospitals, three procurement systems, three quartermaster corps, if you please; three transportation lines?"

Secretary PATTERSON. If I thought for a minute that the setting up of the third department, the Department of Air, would bring a creation of an Air Quartermaster Corps and an Air Ordnance Department, and and Air Engineer Service, Corps of Engineers, or anything like that, I would never recommend this measure. But I am certain that it will not. There is no reason why it should.

You should have greater interdependence between the three services; not greater independence. They should lean on one another for what they need.

The CHAIRMAN. Under this new set-up, under this bill, will you tell us what you rely upon, so that you can say to the Congress this morning that duplications are going to be prevented?

Secretary PATTERSON. The provisions in the bill that I believe are important in that respect are those with respect to the powers of the Secretary of National Defense, appearing in section 102, and the provisions relative to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, appearing in section 111. It should be noted, I believe, that among the powers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and among their duties, it is provided that they shall prepare strategic plans and provide for the strategic direction of the military forces; and that they shall prepare joint logistic plans, and assign to the military services logistic responsibilities in accordance with such plans. Also, to review major material and personnel requirements of the military forces, in accordance with strategic and logistic plans.

The CHAIRMAN. It says, "to review." Does that mean also to direct? Secretary PATTERSON. Well, all of their work is to be under the general direction of the Secretary of National Defense, and it is so provided.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Bridges?

Senator BRIDGES. Mr. Secretary, in this bill, S. 758, before us this morning, I notice that the words "merger, unification, and integration" are left out of the preamble of the bill. Why is that?

Secretary PATTERSON. I was not in on the drafting of it, Senator, and I had no hand in the drafting of the bill. I do not know why it was done or why it was not done.

I have never been for what you call the "merger," in the sense of a free-for-all scrambling of everything. You would have nothing but chaos under such an arrangement as that, in my view.

Senator BRIDGES. What would you call this bill, then, if is not a merger?

Secretary PATTERSON. I would call it a bill for better unity and better integration. I heard the discussion here 2 days ago, which you had when the Secretary of the Navy was here testifying, as to the definitions of "integration," "unification," "coordination."

They all have shades of meaning that I am as helpless as he was to outline in detail.

Senator BRIDGES. The feeling in the country, Mr. Secretary, is that you are going to merge your armed services. The word "merger" is definitely left out of this bill, and I wondered what your conception of it was. I have elicited from you so far that you are not in favor of a merger.

Secretary PATTERSON. "Merger" is one of these headline words. The press likes to get it down to one syllable; it fits in better, you know, into the box. That is true of lots of those words that have become very current; they are due to the needs of journalism.

Senator BRIDGES. You would say it was more a matter of unification than merger? Or would you say it was, narrowly, "integration"? Secretary PATTERSON. Take your own choice.

Senator BRIDGES. But it is not merger?

Secretary PATTERSON. It is not what I call merger; no.

Senator BRIDGES. Now, Mr. Secretary, you referred here in your testimony to section 102, which interests me, for it outlines the duties of this super de luxe Secretary.

Secretary PATTERSON. He is not so "super de luxe." He has got to be a hard-working man.

Senator BRIDGES. We will call him the super-Secretary, then, and leave out the "de luxe."

I call your attention to the fact that he "shall establish policies and programs for the National Defense Establishment"; second, that he shall establish policies and programs for all Government departments and agencies within the National Defense Establishment; third, that he shall exercise direction, authority, and control over such departments and agencies; fourth, that he has authority to supervise and coordinate the preparation of budget estimates by the departments and agencies of the National Defense Establishment, which budgets must be established at such time and in such manner as he may direct; fifth, that he shall formulate and determine finally the budget estimates of the National Defense Establishment and its component parts; sixth, that he has authority to supervise and control the budget program of the whole National Defense Establishment under the applicable appropriation acts.

Now, that is tremendous authority to give to one man, Mr. Secretary. And I want to ask you two questions, mainly, on that.

Secretary PATTERSON. As to the matter of the budget, who has that authority now? It is someone in the Bureau of the Budget. I have

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