(2) To perform for the benefit of all intelligence agencies of the Federal Govment such services of common concern as can best be performed centrally or which are not the proper activity of any one intelligence agency;

(3) To conduct counterintelligence activities outside the United States;

(4) To prepare over-all strategic intelligence estimates as required by the President, the Congress, the National Security Council, or other interdepartmental agencies, in order to provide the basis for national policy decisions of a politico-military nature which transcend the exclusive competence of any one department, making full use therein of estimates prepared by the appropriate departmental intelligence agencies;

(5) To perform such other duties as the President may direct.

(d) The existing intelligence agencies of the several departments of the Federal Government-such as the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force-shall continue to have their departmental intelligence responsibilities for the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of the foreign intelligence required for the operating needs of their own and of other departments. Each of these existing departmental intelligence agencies shall also have certain national intelligence responsibilities for assisting the Central Intelligence Agency in the production of strategic and national policy intelligence estimates, in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph (c) (4) above. It is the intent of this act that the existing departmental intelligence agencies shall thus continue to be the backbone of the national intelligence system, under the managerial coordination of the Central Intelligence Agency.

(e) The Central Intelligence Agency shall advise and supply pertinent information to the appropriate agencies charged with the responsibility for domestic security, but shall have no police or law-enforcement functions and no domestic counterintelligence functions.

(f) Effective when the Director first appointed under subsection (a) has taken office

(1) The National Intelligence Authority and the Central Intelligence Group and their functions shall cease to exist;

(2) The personnel, property, records, and unexpended funds of the National Intelligence Authority and of the Central Intelligence Group shall be transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency;

(3) The functions of the National Intelligence Authority and of the Central Intelligence Group shall be transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency, provided that there be no conflict with the provisions of subparagraph (c) above, pending the full delineation of the functions of the Central Intelligence Agency in future enabling legislation.

(Thereupon, at 12 noon, the committee recessed, to reconvene Tuesday, May 6, 1947.).

UNIFICATION OF THE ARMED SERVICES

TUESDAY, MAY 6, 1947

UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, D. C.

The committee met at 10:10 a. m., pursuant to adjournment, in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator Chan Gurney (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Gurney (chairman), Robertson of Wyoming, Wilson, Saltonstall, Baldwin, Tydings, Byrd, Hill, and Maybank. Also present: Senator McCarthy.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. We will resume consideration of the unification bill known as S. 758.

I have set aside this morning time to hear from Fleet Admiral King.

We

We are glad to have the admiral with us this morning. I notice you have a prepared statement, but you may proceed in any way you would like to. We have held hearings for about 7 weeks now. would like to conclude if possible this week. We are very pleased to have you with us.

STATEMENT OF FLEET ADM. E. J. KING, UNITED STATES NAVY, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Admiral KING. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, I appear before you today to comment on S. 758-the National Security Act of 1947. The views which I express are personal to me and are the result of long familiarity with the problems which the committee has under consideration.

Throughout World War II, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the Combined (British-United States) Chiefs of Staffs, I was in the position to know at first hand the creation and the working of the military machinery wherewith the war was waged— and won.

As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and as Chief of Naval Operations (until relieved by Fleet Admiral Nimitz in December 1945) I have had direct knowledge of all that went on in regard to endeavors to integrate our own military structure. Since December 1945, I have been on duty in the office of the Secretary of the Navy and have been kept well posted in what has taken place since I left office in regard to the matters which have culminated in the bill now before this committee. I have read most of the hearings that have taken place to date.

I repeat that the views expressed in this statement are to be considered as my own personal views and not necessarily those of the Navy Department.

I am sure that all will agree that the national security is a matter that calls for straight thinking and for plain speaking. I my view, it should be emphasized that the really important part of the bill under consideration is that which deals with the National Security Council.

It is only too obvious that war affects the entire Nation-all of its people and all of its activities are involved. So, in preparation for future war or emergency, we must profit by the lessons of the past and assess the prospects of the future. It is clear that war and preparation for war is not the business of the armed services alone. All of the factors of national security, not only military but the political, diplomatic, economic, industrial, and even financial factors must be integrated. Foreign, domestic, and military policy must be integrated. It is the function of the National Security Council, provided for in the bill, to effect this essential integration.

I feel that, in the controversies and discussions that have so far taken place, the emphasis has been wrongly placed-that, so to speak, the cart has been put before the horse. In an orderly enalysis of the whole subject, it is clearly the function of the Executive to carry into effect what the Congress may decree, and this applies not only to the armed services, but, I repeat, to the whole structure of our country's readiness for war. When the structure with which we waged and won World War II is examined, we must take note of the Office of War Mobilization, the War Production Board, the War Manpower Commission, the Board of Economic Warfare, the War Shipping Administration, the Office of War Information, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, and other groups. They were, all of them, primarily nonmilitary agencies; yet they were all essential war activities. Their integration was chiefly effected by the supervision of one man the then President of the United States.

My familiarity with the matter of integration of all the factors of national security is, I think, broad enough to include the arrangements utilized by Germany, Japan, Russia, and Great Britain. It includes the recent set-up adopted by Great Britain which they term "Central Organization for Defense," which I suggest will repay close examination and thorough consideration, for it deals with security problems closely akin to our own. It embodies some ideas, particularly as to the functions of the Minister of Defense, which, I think, can profitably be weighed by us. Obviously, I do not advocate such consideration because the solution is British but because, in so serious a matter, we do well to adopt ideas that have merit, whether British or Chinese or Russian or Burmese.

As I have said, the waging of war is not merely the concern of the Army and Navy; it involves even more, perhaps, political, that is to say, diplomatic, economic, industrial, and financial factors as well.

There are three things to be done if we are to be prepared: First, to see to it that we are ready with manpower; second, to see to it that we are ready with ways and means; that is to say, munitions; third, to see to it that we are ready with the organization to wage war, that is, to apply the combination of manpower with ways and means.

The first objective, readiness of men, can, to my mind, best be attained by support of the continuation of selective service and of the institution of universal military training.

The second objective, readiness of ways and means-or munitionscan, to my mind, best be attained by support of the continuation, transposed into permanent appropriate peacetime form, of the activities of the War Production Board, the Defense Transportation Administration, the War Shipping Administration, and other like agencies. These are the proposed functions of the National Resources Board in the general field and of the Munitions Board in the military field.

The third objective, readiness to wage war, can, to my mind, best be attained by the creation of what has well been called the National Security Council. The Council should comprise all those agencies of the Government which have directly to do with the political, the military, the economic, and the industrial factors involved in the common defense.

As a result of my study of the combination of the many factors involved, and in support of the sound principle of doing first things first, I suggest that the set-up of the National Security Council include these

provisions:

(a) That the President shall be ex-officio Chairman of the Council. (b) That the President be empowered, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint one member of the Council who shall have no other duties or functions than full-time attention to the business of the Council, to be called, simply, the Deputy Chairman. (c) That the powers and functions proposed to be vested in a Secretary of National Defense shall, instead, be vested in the Council.

(d) That the agencies set up in the bill shall, all of them, become agencies of the Council.

(e) That the Council be empowered to arrive only at conclusions or recommendations which, in order to come into force and effect, shall require the approval of the President in each instance.

The key idea embodied in the foregoing suggestions is to create, in the first instance, an agency which will enable the President to perform his functions as to national security with the advice and support of those Government officers who are charged with the supervision and control of the several major factors which are directly involved in the National Security. Such an agency is eminently fitted to survey, to correlate, and to integrate all the primary factors involved in the common defense. From the deliberations and conclusions of such a group we can expect the essential action, when required, to make the common defense the integrated entity which is indispensable to our national security. We can also expect reasoned proposals for whatever further legislation may be found essential to adequate preparedness.

I anticipate that there may well be inquiry as to what is to be the status of the present-day Army Air Forces in the suggestions which I present. On that point I revert to what I said before the Senate Military Affairs Committee in October 1945:

If it should be decided by the Congress that there shall be three coordinated armed services, the matter is basically, and should be handled as, a question of dividing the War Department into two parts.