ARISTOTLE

(384-322 B. C.)

HE earliest and one of the most authoritative treatises on the principles underlying the methods through which the human mind seeks fitting expression is Aristotle's "Rhetoric "rhetoric" with Aristotle meaning the whole art of persuasion. His understanding of its scope and province explains the great importance he attached to it; the care with which he studied it; the scientific accuracy with which he strove to define its canons. It seemed to him the fundamental art of civilization. In the measure in which men control each other by force, they are savages or at best barbarians. Moral force, exerting itself through persuasion, is the beginning of civilization, and the extent to which it supplants control by violence or fear is at all times the measure of the reality of any putative civilization. Aristotle, the first great scientific thinker of Europe, undertook to analyze civilization and to get at the principles of natural development. Hence he made his work on "Rhetoric" one of his masterpieces. "Poetics" it remained for many centuries as indeed it still remains of the great authorities on expression. Though the modern science of language may show that it is often erroneous in detail, its grasp of principle gives it an enduring value side by side with the greatest works of modern times. Aristotle's use of his great intellect entitles him to the profound respect of all who feel the necessity of being grateful to the benefactors of humanity. It cannot be said with assurance even at the beginning of the twentieth century that modern times have produced his equal as an independent thinker. He taught men to think, as Lord Bacon, his pupil and his peer, taught them to experiment.

With his

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He was born at Stagira, in Chalcidice, 384 B. C. In his eighteenth year he went to Athens, where he studied in the school of Plato and caught the inspiration of the great mind of the martyred Socrates. In 342 or 343 B. C. he went to Macedonia and became the tutor of Alexander the then a boy of thirteen. Returning to Athens he founded a school of philosophy in the Lyceum, and from his habit of walking with his disciples in the grove surrounding it they were first called "Peripatetics.» the death of Alexander, Aristotle was persecuted at Athens, and had escaped it is probable that he would have been put to death.

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died at Chalcis, in Euboea, in 322. He wrote on logic, metaphysics, natural history, mathematics, meteorology, ethics, and almost every other conceivable subject. His influence was chiefly responsible for the high civilization

of the

Saracens, and the first impulse towards modern times in North

Europe was largely derived from Arab translations of his works brought back to Europe, by crusaders and pilgrims returning from Palestine.

The version of his "Rhetoric" here used is the excellent one of Theodore Alois Buckley, of Christ Church, Oxford.

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SUBJECTS OF DELIBERATIVE ORATORY

IRST, then, we must ascertain what kind of good or evil it is respecting which the deliberative orator gives his advice; for we have seen that it is not about every kind, but about such as may or may not befall us. Such, however, as either has or will have an existence of necessity; such, again, as it is impossible should exist or be produced; respecting every such description [of good or evil] there never is any deliberation: neither, in fact, is there about every one even of contingent subjects; for of goods which may or may not accrue, some exist naturally, others are produced by chance, on the subject of which it is not worth while to deliberate; but evidently [he is confined to subjects] about which men resolve; of which character are all such as are of a nature to be referred to ourselves, and the first principle of whose creation is in our own power; for in deliberation we carry on our views thus far, viz., till we shall ascertain whether the achievement of the object be possible to us or not.

Now, to enumerate in accurate detail, and to divide into separate species, every subject about which men are wont to interest themselves; to enter, moreover, into minute distinctions conformable to the standard of truth to the very utmost that the subject admits it; these inquiries it is not necessary, on the present occasion to institute, by reason that they belong not to the art of rhetoric, but to some art whose province is, in a more peculiar manner, intellect, and truth; and because many speculations more than are proper to this art have already been assigned to it. For that remark is true, which I have before made; that rhetoric is made up of the science of logic, and of that branch of the science of social life which recognizes the subject of morals; and it partly resembles logic, partly the declamations of the sophists: and in exact proportion as one shall attempt to get up logic or rhetoric, not as they are general faculties, but as distinct sciences, he will unwittingly do away their nature by his encroaching, in the act of so tricking them out, upon sciences of certain definite subject-matter, and not of words alone. Let us, however, even on the present occasion, discuss such points as it is worth while to enlarge upon, and which still reserve the more full consideration for the science of social life: for nearly all the questions on which men deliberate, and on which the deliberative orator harangues, those at least of the highest concernment are in number five; and these are questions of finance, of war and peace, and again respecting the safeguard of the territory, and respecting imports and exports, and also respecting legislation. So that it will be fitting that the orator, who is about to give his advice on the subject of the finance of the state, be acquainted with its revenues, both what and how great they may be; in order that, if any branch is overlooked, it may be added to the rest; and, if any be in default, it may be augmented. Moreover, he should be acquainted with the whole expenditure of the state, that if any expense be superfluous it may be curtailed; if any too high, it may be reduced. For men become more wealthy, not only by adding to their capital stock, but by detracting from their expenses as well. These, however, are points which we must not only

learn from our own experience as individuals; but, with a view to deliberation on these subjects, one ought to be qualified by a research into the discoveries made by other people.

Respecting questions of war and peace, the orator must needs be acquainted with the force of the state, how great it actually is already, and how great it admits of becoming; of what description also it is already, and what additions admit of being made to it. Moreover, he should know both what wars the state has been engaged in, and how it has conducted them. This must he needs know, not in relation to his own state only, but as regards frontier states also; particularly in the case of those with whom there is a likelihood of being at war, in order that toward the more powerful, pacific measures may be held, and that in regard to the weaker, it may rest with his own state to make war or not. He should also be acquainted with the description of force which belongs to each state, whether it resemble or differ from his own; for it is possible, even in this respect, to secure an advantage to yourself, or to have one taken by the enemy. In order to all which things the orator must necessarily have considered with attention the wars, not of his own state only, but those also of others, what has been their issue; for it is natural that from similar causes similar results should accrue.

Moreover, as regards the safeguard of the territory, it should not escape his attention how that is preserved; but he must be acquainted as well with the numbers as the nature of the garrisons, and with the positions of the strongholds; this it is impossible that one not acquainted with the country should know. But known it must be, in order that, if any garrison be weak, it may be reinforced; if any be unnecessary, it may be done away, and the force may rather maintain positions strictly adapted to defense.

Again, on the subject of provision, the orator should know how great a consumption is sufficient to subsist the state, and of what kind that is which arises at home, and what is imported; and those nations whose exports there is need of, and those to whose markets he wants to import his home productions, in order that commercial treaties and agreements may be entered into with them. [All this should the orator be acquainted with], because it is absolutely necessary strictly to preserve citizens from any ground of quarrel in two of their relations, viz., in reto those physically their superiors, and those who may be serviceable in aforementioned points.

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state.

Thus much, then, it is absolutely necessary that the deliberative orator should be able to consider, in order to the security of the state; neither is an attention to legislation the least essential, for in its legislative enactments stands the safety of the And thus it becomes requisite, both that he should know how many forms of government there are, and what system of things is expedient for each; and what things, to destroy it. as well peculiar to the government, as opposite to it, have a natural tendency I talk of a government being destroyed by things peculiar to itself because, with the exception of the most excellent form of government, every other, by being relaxed or strained too much, destroys itself.

Thus a democracy, not only

when relaxed, but even when overstrained, grows weaker, and thus will at last be brought an oligarchy. Just as hookedness or flatness of the nose not only approaches mean in proportion as it relaxes from the excess, but also, when it becomes excessively hooked or flat, disposes the nostrils in such a way as no longer to resemble the nasal organ.

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It is serviceable, moreover, with a view to legislation, to apprehend not only what constitution is expedient, by deriving your view from circumstances past, but to become acquainted also with the constitution of other states, and to what kind of Constitutions what sort of measures are adapted. Thus it is plain that accounts of

travelers are of use with a view to legislation; for hence we are able to ascertain what the laws of other nations are; and with a view to debates on matters of state, the researches of those who write on human conduct are useful: all these points, however, form part, not of rhetoric, but of the science of social life.

So many, then, are the questions of highest concern touching which the deliberative orator must be in possession of propositions. We will, however, again discuss the elements out of which it is proper to exhort and dissuade, as well on these as on other questions.

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OBJECTS TO BE AIMED AT IN PUBLIC SPEAKING

EARLY every one individually, and all men in general, have some object, at which, directing every aim, they both choose and avoid; and this, to speak summarily, is happiness and its constituents. Let us, then, for the sake of getting at a received standard, ascertain what happiness, generally speaking, is; and what are its constituents; for on the subject of it, and what conduces to it, and of its opposites, exhortation or dissuasion is always conversant; and this, because we need do the things which procure it or any of its constituents, or which render it greater from having been less, and refrain from doing the things which destroy or impede it, or produce its opposites.

Let happiness, then, be defined to be good fortune in conjunction with virtue, — or independency of life,—or the life which is most pleasant, accompanied by security, or abundance of property and slaves, with power to preserve and augment it; for mankind allow either one or more of these things to amount nearly to happiness. If, then, happiness be such as I have described, its constituents must necessarily be: 1. noble birth, many and excellent friends, wealth, a good and numerous offspring, a good old age; and, moreover, personal excellencies, -as health, comeliness, strength, stature, ability in the games; character; 2. honor, good fortune; 3. virtue, and its constituents,-prudence, courage, justice, temperance. Thus furnished, one would be most independent, were both external and internal goods his own; for besides these there are no others. But the internal goods are mental and personal; the external, noble birth, friends, wealth, and distinction. We deem, moreover, that power and good fortune ought to be present, for thus would life be most independent.

Since the expedient is the object proposed to the deliberative orator, and as all form their conclusions, not about the end itself, but about the means conducive to that end; as, moreover, these are all things which are expedient in reference to human conduct (now everything expedient is a good), we shall have to ascertain certain elementary propositions on the subjects of the good and the expedient in general. Let good, then, be defined to be: 1. Whatever is an object of choice independently, for its own sake; 2. and for the sake of which we choose something else. 3. What everything aims at, or everything which has perception, or which has intelligence; or everything would aim at, were it possessed of intelligence. ever intelligence would award to each. 5. Whatever the intelligence conversant with every instance awards to each, that to each individual is his good. 8. That which being present, one is well disposed and independent. 7. Independency. 8. Whatever produces or preserves such advantages; 9. and that on which they are consequent. 10. Whatever, too, has a tendency to prevent or destroy their opposites. Now, things are consequent in two ways; for either they may be consequent simultaneously or subsequently. Knowledge, for instance, is a consequent on learning

4. What

subsequently; life is so on health simultaneously. Again, things are productive in three ways; first, in the way that the being healthy is productive of health; or as food is so of health; or as exercise is, because usually it does produce health.

These things being laid down, it must be, of course, that acquisitions of good, and the exemptions from evil, are good; for on the one is consequent the nonpossession of evil simultaneously; on the other, the possession of good subsequently. And the acquisition of a greater instead of a less good; of a less evil instead of a greater; for this becomes an acquisition of the one and an exemption from the other, in the ratio of the excess of the greater above the less. The virtues, also, must, of course, be a good, for in reference to them are their possessors well-disposed; they are also productive of goods, and bear on moral conduct: respecting each, however, severally what, and of what kind it is, must be distinctly treated. It must be also that pleasure is a good, for all living things naturally desire it. Thus, too, things pleasant and honorable must needs be good; for the first are productive of pleasure; while, of things honorable, some are pleasant, and the rest are by themselves objects of choice on their own account. So that to speak of them severally, it must be that the following things are good.- Happiness; for it is both an object of choice by itself, and independent, and for the sake of it we choose many things. Justice, courage, temperance, magnanimity, magnificence, and other habits of that sort; for they are excellencies of the soul;-and health and comeliness, and things of that sort, for they are excellencies of the body, and productive of many things; health, for instance, both of pleasure and of life; and it seems, on this account, to be the very best possession, because it is the cause of two things, which the generality of men value most, viz., of pleasure and life: - Wealth; because it is an excellence of possession, and productive of many things. A friend and friendship; for a friend is an object of choice independently, and productive of many advantages. Honor, character; for they are pleasant, and productive of much; and there is usually consequent on them the actual possession of the qualities, on account of which the subject is honored. Ability, in speaking and acting; for all such powers are productive of good. Again, high genius, memory, readiness in learning, quickness of thought, and all such qualities; for these faculties are productive of good; and in the same way all the arts and sciences. And life; for were no other good consequent on it, of itself it is an object of choice. And that which is just, for it is a kind of general advantage. Such, then, are the things which are good, as it were confessedly.

foes

ways,

ence

wish;

In a word, all objects of determined choice are good. And men determinately choose to do both the things which have been mentioned, and those which are evil to and good to friends; and those which are possible - these are varied in two such as may be done and such as may easily be done. Easy things are such as are done either without pain, or in a short time; for difficulty is defined in refereither to the pain, or length of time. And men choose what is done as they and they wish what either is in no respect an evil, or in a less degree than it is good. This will occur in the case of unjust action, where the punishment either escapes notice or is trifling: and such actions as are peculiar; as no one has done; or which are extraordinary, for thus is their value greater: and those things which have an adaptation to ourselves; of which kind are things belonging to us in respect of family and power. Things, too, which men consider are wanting to the completion of something else; for be they ever so trifling, they in no less degree determine putting them in execution: and things easily brought about; for they are possiinasmuch as they are easy: but things easily brought about are such as one, or many, or our equals, or our inferiors, have succeeded in. Whatever gratifies one's friends, or will be disliked by one's foes. Everything, too, which they

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