invariable rule in this country, a rule never to be departed from, that there can no cause exist in which we ought to engage on the continent, without the aid and assistance of that neighbouring state. This is the test, the certain mark, by which I shall judge, that the interest of this country is not at present the object in pursuit. Is any man then wild enough to imagine, that the accession of 16,000 Hanoverian mercenaries will compensate for the loss of this natural ally? No, but it is said that this indicates such a firmness and resolution within ourselves, that it will induce them to come in. Sir, if they had any real proofs of our firmness and resolution, that the interest of this country was to be pursued, I dare say they would not long hesitate. But they look with a jealous eye upon this measure, they consider it as an argument of your weakness, because it is contrary to the genius and spirit of this country, and may therefore lessen his majesty in the affections of his people. They have for some years past looked upon a British parliament as the corrupt engine of administration, to exhaust the riches and impair the strength of this country. They have heard it talk loudly indeed of the House of Austria, when it was in your power to have raised her to that state, in which she was properly to be considered as the support of the balance of Europe, if timid neutralities had not intervened, and our naval strength had properly interposed to her assistance. They have lately looked upon this parliament, and with the joy of a natural ally they have done it, resenting your injuries, bravely withstanding the power, that you might restore the authority of your government, demanding constitutional securities, appointing a parliamentary committee for enquiry and justice. Sir, they now see that enquiry suppressed and justice disappointed. In this situation, what expectations can we form of their accession to us; talking bigly indeed of vindicating foreign rights, but so weak and impotent at home, as not to be able to recover our own privileges? But this measure is said to be undertaken in consequence of the advice of parliament. There has been great stress laid upon this. It has been loudly proclaimed from the throne, echoed back again from hence, and the whole nation is to be amused with an opinion, that upon this measure the fate of the House of Austria, the balance and liberties of Europe, the salvation of this country, depend. But was this fatal measure the recommendation of parliament, or was it the offspring of some bold enterprizing minister, hatched in the interval of parliament, under the wings of prerogative; daring to presume upon the corruption of this House as the necessary means of his administration? The object indeed might be recommended, but if any wrong measure is undertaken to attain it, that measure surely should be dropt; for it is equally culpable to pursue a good end by bad measures, as it is a bad end by those that are honest. But as to the Address, I wish gentlemen would a little consider the occasion which produced it. Sir, it proceeded from the warmth of expectation, the exultation of our hearts, immediately after and with the same breath that you established your Committee of Enquiry, and it is no forced construction to say, that it carries this testimony along with it, that national securities and granting supplies were reciprocal terms. But, Sir, I must own for my part, was the occasion never so cogent, Hanoverian auxiliaries are the last that I would vote into British pay; not upon the consideration only, that we ought otherwise to expect their assistance, and that we should rather make sure of others that might be engaged against us; but from this melancholy apprehension, that administrations will for ever have sagacity enough to find out such pretences, that it may be difficult to get rid of them again. Besides, the elector of Hanover, as elector of Hanover, is an arbitrary prince, his electoral army is the instrument of that power; as king of Great Britain, he is a restrained monarch: and though I do not suspect his majesty, and I dare say the hearts of the British soldiery are as yet free and untainted, yet I fear, that too long an intercourse may beget a dangerous familiarity, and they may hereafter become a joint instrument, under a less gracious prince, to invade our liberties. His majesty, if he was rightly informed, I dare say, would soon perceive the danger of the proposition which is now before you: but as he has every other virtue, he has undoubtedly a most passionate love for his native country, a passion, which a man of any sensation can hardly divest himself of; and, Sir, it is a passion the more easily to be flattered because it arises from virtue. I wish that those who have the honour to be of his councils, would imitate his royal example, and show a passion for their native country too; that they would faithfully stand forth and say, that as king of this country, whatever interests may in terfere with it, this country is to be his first, his principal care; that in the Act of Settlement this is an express condition. But what sluggish sensations, what foul hearts must those men have, who instead of conducting his majesty's right principles, address themselves to his passions, and misguide his prejudices? making a voluntary overture of the rights and privileges of their country, to obtain favour and secure themselves in power; misconstruing that as a secondary consideration, which in their own hearts they know to be the first. Sir, we have already lost many of those benefits and restrictions, which were obtained for us by the Revolution and the Act of Settlement. For God's sake, let us proceed no farther. But if we are thus to go on, and if, to procure the grace and favour of the crown, this is to become the flattering measure of every successive administration, this country is undone! Mr. Edmund Waller : Sir; whatever opinion we may have of what has been printed and published upon the subject now under our consideration, we must allow, that it has been of some service to us, if it were nothing else but that of having given occasion to the hon. gentleman, who made the motion, to display his eloquence; for otherwise, it seems, he was not to have indulged us any such pleasure. We should have heard nothing from him, but two bare motions for granting his majesty nearly 700,000l. in order to enable him to maintain, with the more ease, his own Hanoverian troops. But though I was pleased with the hon. gentleman's eloquence, I must confess, his argument gave me some pain. He seems to think, that our constitution was quite altered by the Revolution, and the Act of Settlement which was the consequence of it, and that we had thereby departed from our ancient maxim, That the king can do no wrong.' Whereas according to my notion of both, our constitution was not altered but restored; and consequently this fundamental maxim of our government must remain as firm and as inviolable, as ever it was under any former race of British kings. If this be so, and that it is no man who has a regard for our present royal family will deny, then no breach of condition or limitation can impeach the king's title, but may be a good reason for impeaching and punishing his ministers and advisers, as well as every one who acts by their orders against the laws of their country. Upon this maxim the freedom and stability of our government depends: upon this alone, not only the freedom of the press, but the freedom of speech in parliament, can be founded; for if the person or title of the king were to be any way affected by the wrong measures advised or pursued by his ministers, no man could find fault with their measures, without being guilty of a breach of his allegiance to his sovereign. But the constitution of our government is known to be otherwise; and therefore none of the limitations which are supposed by the common law, or expressed in any of our statutes, particularly Magna Charta, the Bill of Rights, and the Act of Settlement, are to be looked on as conditions upon which the king holds his crown, but as directions to the ministers and others employed by him in the executive part of our government, which they are not to transgress, even though they should have his express order for so doing. In this light, Sir, every man may find fault with the measures pursued by an administration, without encroaching in the least upon that allegiance which is due to his sovereign: nay, if he thinks the measures wicked or wrong, he is in duty to his sovereign, as well as his country, obliged to find fault with them, and to expose the motives upon which they were founded, or the evil consequences with which they may be attended. It is by this our constitution is secured, and the people guarded against being imposed on by the false glosses usually put by ministers upon the measures they have resolved to pursue; and it is by this our kings are secured against the fatal effects of a general discontent, by which absolute monarchs are often tumbled headlong from their throne, before they can be sensible of the evil tendency of the measures they have been advised to pursue. Therefore, if it has been of late insinuated, or if it should now be insisted on, that the interest of Great Britain has been or is now to be sacrificed to the interest of Hanover, the hon. gentleman is not to impose silence upon those that say so, by telling them they are guilty of high-treason, but by setting the argu ment in such a light as will admit of no reply, which he, with all his eloquence, will, I fear, find to be a task not easily accomplished. Nay, I believe he will not attempt it; because in so doing he would find himself obliged to argue against those who for some years have been his principal friends; and who formerly suffered for not joining so cordially in the measures against Sweden as was then expected by the court. Will any gentleman say, that the interest of Hanover had no share in the measures we took, and the war we at last declared against Sweden, soon after the accession of his late majesty to our throne? Every impartial man who knows any thing of the history of those times must grant, that the purchase of Bremen and Verden was the true cause of the rupture between Sweden and us; and the securing of that purchase was afterwards the cause of the rupture between us and the Czar. The same cause likewise gave rise to the defensive alliance between the emperor and us in the year 1716, and was originally the cause of those disputes between Spain and us, which have now produced two wars and a half (if I may so express myself) between the two kingdoms; for that in the year 1727, I can call but half a war, because it was carried on upon one side only. Whilst the imperial court but seemed to favour the pretensions of Hanover in Germany, we did every thing that court could desire; but when we found that court a little remiss with regard to those pretensions, we, all of a sudden, in the year 1721, altered our conduct, concluded a separate peace with Spain upon terms not very honourable, and from being a generous became a jealous friend of the emperor's, which united us in a close correspondence with the court of France, and at last produced the treaty of Hanover, the consequences whereof have been fatal to Europe as well as this nation. These facts could, I believe, Sir, be sufficiently proved, were we masters of all the secret negociations that have been carried on for thirty years past; and if they are true, surely it is not treason to say so. But suppose them all to be true, and clearly demonstrated, no man that understands our constitution will say, they could any way operate against his majesty, or against our present happy establishment. Such a proof would indeed fall heavy upon the ministers that advised or pursued such measures, .and the very sus picion ought to be a prevailing argument for our establishing such regulations, as may prevent the prosecution of such measures in any future time. As to the measure which is the subject of our present debate, I am vastly surprised to hear any gentleman pretend, that it will be no advantage to the electorate of Hanover. Is not the sending of near 700,000l. English money to that electorate an advantage to it? Will not the maintaining of 16,000 men, which must otherwise have been maintained by the electorate itself, be an advantage to it? But the hon. gentleman says, the paying of those troops can carry no riches into the electorate of Hanover, because the troops are marched out of it, and their whole pay to be spent in a foreign country. Nay, he goes farther and says, that our taking those troops into our pay, and obliging them to live in foreign parts, will be a loss to the electorate, because many of the officers have fortunes of their own, and will spend more than the pay received from us, which supra-expence must be drawn from, and consequently will be a loss to that electorate. Sir, if there are any officers among the Hanover troops who spend more than their pay, there are some who will not spend so much, and as those savings must remain in, or be laid out in the electorate, it is highly probable that what it gets by the latter, will more than atone for what it loses by the former. But suppose it were otherwise, will not the cloathing, levying, and recruiting these troops at our expence, be an advantage to that electorate? For the whole money upon every one of these articles will be laid out or laid up in Hanover; and the advantage it must reap this way, will, I am sure, do a great deal more than compensate any loss it may sustain by the extravagance of some of its officers. We must therefore suppose, that though this body of Hanoverian troops be to serve in a foreign country, yet a great part of what we pay for them, or to them, will be laid out in Hanover, and consequently that this measure will tend to the enriching of that electorate. But now suppose, that not one shilling of this money were to remain in, or ever to return to Hanover, would it not be an advantage to have 16,000 of its troops maintained at our charge? For no augmentation has been made upon this account to the army in Hanover. The hon. gentleman seems to lay it down as a maxim, that it can never be an advantage to any nation, to send | some of its neighbouring princes: that the 16,000 of its subjects out of the country: electorate is not of itself able to keep such If he had added the word, idle,' his an army on foot as may be necessary for maxim would then have stood in its proper guarding against this danger; and that light; and, I believe, no man will say, that therefore we, for the preservation of our it would not be an advantage to a nation to own honour, ought always to maintain a have 16,000 of its idle subjects maintained, great army in that electorate. I could either at home or abroad, at the expence farther urge, that this army would give of some neighbouring nation. I should great weight to our negociations at all the have been very far from finding fault with courts upon the continent: that it would our sending 16,000 of our soldiers to Flan- tend to encourage our friends and terrify ders, if they had been to be maintained by our enemies, fully as much as an army sent the queen of Hungary, the Dutch, or any to or kept in Flanders; and that it would other neighbouring nation, that would not be always ready and more at our comafterwards have made use of them against mand than the troops of any ally, in order ourselves. Therefore, the sending of our to be brought over, to prevent or repel any troops to Flanders, as it is at our own ex-invasion or insurrection, especially as our pence, must be a loss to us, but Hanover's sending 16,000 of its troops to Flanders must be an advantage to it, because they are to be maintained there at our expence. king has now the possession of Bremen and Verden, which shews the consequence that purchase may be of to the quiet of Great Britain, and the security of the Protestant succession. What we These and a great many other such arguments, I could make use of, for our maintaining a great body of troops in Hanover: I am far from saying they would appear conclusive to any man of an honest heart and a clear understanding; but, I am sure, they would be as conclusive as those arguments were, that were made use of for our taking or keeping the Hessian troops in our pay, in consequence of the treaty of Hanover; therefore it may be supposed, that some future parliament may agree to such a measure. are now about will be a precedent for it; and if ever we have such a parliament, I am convinced, our ministers, who generally think of nothing so much as of acquiring an interest in the closet, will not be backward in proposing it. Nay, I do not know but that in the very next session we may hear some such proposition made: before our next meeting I may prophesy, that a suspension of arms will be agreed on, and a congress appointed; it will then be urged, that we ought not to disband any of our own troops, or dismiss any of the foreign troops we have in our pay, till peace be fully restored; and if we do keep them in pay, it will, even with reason, 1 think, be said, that Hanover is as proper place for keeping them in as any other part of Europe. I shall grant, indeed, Sir, that if the Hanover troops were to have been kept in Hanover, and there maintained at our expence, it would have been a greater advantage to that electorate; and therefore our keeping, and always maintaining such a body of troops in the electorate of Hanover, may perhaps be designed to be introduced by this precedent. Our parliaments may not be as yet well enough disciplined, for approving of such a measure; but we do not know what may be brought about, by time and bad precedents. We lately maintained, for several years, 12,000 Hessians for the defence of Hanover; and now we have got into the method of taking Hanoverians into our pay, I can see no reason why we should not always be, from the same motives, induced to keep a body of troops in that electorate for the same purpose. To a parliament willing to be convinced, I could suggest a great many plausible reasons for our agreeing to such a measure; and such reasons as, I am sure, would in all future reigns make me a favourite at court; for I never yet read of a prince that was willing to give up the smallest territory that belonged to him. I could shew, and I think, with some reason too, that as the elector of Hanover is king of Great Bri-a tain, it would be inconsistent with our honour to allow it to be taken from him: Thus, I hope, Sir, I have shewn, that that it is almost surrounded with princes the measure now under our consideration, who keep great armies on foot: that with- must immediately contribute to the enout keeping always a very numerous stand-riching of Hanover at the expence of this ing army in that electorate, it is liable to kingdom, and may probably, in its consebe suddenly invaded and swallowed up by quences, contribute a great deal more. The next thing I am to enquire into is, | at a monstrous expence, from the Revoluhow, or what way, or if at all, this measure tion till the year 1721, when the balance can be supposed to contribute to the ho- was so equal, that but a small assistance nour, advantage, or security of this king- from the maritime powers might have dom. As to honour, I hope, we are not be- turned it to which side they pleased. come such Don Quixotes as to expose ourselves to an infinite expence and infinite danger merely for assisting a fine lady in distress. Such a behaviour might be great and heroic in a private man, but can be neither in a minister, because he neither exposes his person nor his estate in the adventure. As to advantage, I cannot say what the electorate of Hanover may have in its view, over and above the advantages I have already explained, but I am sure, this kingdom cannot so much as aim at any advantage by assisting the queen of Hungary. Our future security must therefore be the only thing we can have in view, and if this measure should appear to have a tendency towards making our future security more precarious, surely it is mad in us to put ourselves to any such expence. For making this appear, Sir, I must examine what is meant by the balance of power, how it stood by the former systems of affairs in Europe, and how it must stand, if it can stand at all, by any future system. From the accession of Charles the fifth, to the Spanish and Imperial thrones, the balance of power leaned towards the House of Austria, and therefore it was the business of this nation to side now and then with France, in order to pull down the overgrown power of the House of Austria, or at least to prevent its growing to any greater height. In Henry the 8th's reign, and his two next successors, our true interest was neglected and sometimes sacrificed; but queen Elizabeth wisely and steadily pursued it, and thereby established the balance of power; and what is most surprising, without putting the nation to any great expence, or involving it in any debt. By the emperor's being often involved in wars either with the Turks or the princes of Germany, and by the stupidity of the Spanish court, the French at last, in our Charles the 1st's reign, and during the usurpation of Cromwell, began to get the ascendant, and from that time so increased in power, that before the Revolution it was become formidable to Europe, and therefore it was our business to join with the House of Austria in pulling down the power of France, or in raising the power of that House, so as to make it near an equal match for France. This we did, and did it effectually, though we must say But how, Sir, was this equality established? Wherein did it consist? Not singly in the dominions possessed by the House of Austria, but jointly in that House's being possessed of those dominions, and at the same time in possession of the Imperial throne, with a prevailing influence upon the diet of the empire, by which she was almost sure of engaging the empire in her quarrel. This, Sir, was the system upon which the balance of power stood in the year 1721; and if we had not then begun to shake it as well as desert it, it might have stood firm upon this basis to this very day. The electoral princes of Germany were, it is true, jealous of the power of the House of Austria; but if we had stood firm, no one or more of them would have ventured to have joined with France against that House; because as long as she made no open attack upon the liberties of the empire, nor upon the properties of any of the princes thereof, she would always have had a majority of the diet in her favour. But our coolness towards that House, and our deserting her in the year 1733, gave the first blow to her power, and has now at last overturned that system, upon which the balance of Europe was established, at the expence of hundreds of millions, and many thousand lives, to this unfortunate and infatuated nation. Is it now, Sir, in our power to restore the same system? Is it in our power to restore the House of Austria to her lost dominions? Is it in our power to restore her to the imperial throne, or to that influence she formerly had upon the diet of the empire? Sir, if it were in our power, I do not believe it is in the will of our ministers to do so. To humour an infatuated and ill judging people, and to accomplish some of their own private ends, they may pretend to assist the queen of Hungary; but if they could, I do not believe they would restore the power of that House, so as to make it near equal to what it was, or in any degree a match for the kingdom of France. If they had any such view, I am sure it would be chimerical, because none will assist us, most of the princes of Germany would unite against us; nay, I do not know, if the foreign troops we have now in our pay, or the |