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no doubt, was the expectation of a breach between the CHAPTER United States and France, which might furnish an excuse for the non-fulfillment of the treaty. The fact, in- 1797. deed, came to light some years afterward, that the Baron De Carondelet, the Spanish governor of Louisiana, had even gone so far as to dispatch one Thomas Power as a secret agent to Kentucky, to renew with the old Spanish partisans in that region the intrigue for the separation of the Western country from the Union, and its erection into an independent state, in close alliance with Spain; the late disputed territory on the east bank of the Mississippi to be divided between them. Sebastian, one of the judges of the Kentucky Court of Appeals, seems to have entered zealously into this new project, but his old coadjutors, with whom he communicated on the subject, Innis, judge of the Federal District Court, and George Nicholas, late district attorney, and at present attorney general of the state, thought it would be a very dangerous project, since the Western people, being secured by the Spanish treaty in the navigation of the Mississippi, had lost all inducement for such a movement. When testifying as to this matter some ten years afterward before a committee of the Kentucky Legislature, Innis gave as a reason why he and Nicholas had kept this intrigue to themselves, that as they were opposed to the Federal administration, and believed that the president kept a watchful eye over their actions, to have made any communication on the subject would have had the appearance of courting his favor. Moreover, they believed that the president was disposed, on the slightest pretext, to send an army into Kentucky, which they conceived would be a grievance upon the people; and as they apprehended no danger from the intrigue, that was another reason for saying nothing about it. There were,

CHAPTER doubtless, other still weightier reasons, which Innis did

X, not give unwillingness to damage the party to which

1797. they belonged by this new proof of foreign influence, attempted and exercised over some of its leaders; also the danger of provoking an investigation which might unravel former intrigues, and which certainly would cut short the payment of any further Spanish pensions-a favor enjoyed by Sebastian at least, if not by some of the others. Along with the papers transmitted to Congress in relation to the Spanish business was the copy of a letter from William Blount, late governor of the Territory south of the Ohio, and now one of the senators from Tennessee, addressed to a recently-appointed Indian agent among the Cherokees, by whom it had been communicated to the president. It appeared from this letter, as well as from information furnished by Liston, the new British minister, to whom application had been made respecting it, that Blount was engaged in an intrigue for transferring New Orleans and the neighboring districts to the British by means of a joint expedition, Britain to furnish a naval force, and a co-operating corps of backwoodsmen and Indians to be raised on the western frontier of the United States. Desperately involved in extensive land speculations in Tennessee, and wishing to relieve himself by getting up an English company for the purchase of his lands, Blount dreaded the consequences of a retransfer to the French, a military and not a commercial nation, of the outlet of the Mississippi, a transfer expected, indeed supposed by some to be already made. He conceived that it would be for the interest of the Western people, as well as for his own private benefit as a land speculator, that Louisiana should pass into the hands of the English. Relying upon his own influence with the backwoodsmen of Tennessee and the Southern Indians,

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among whom he had long acted as agent, to raise the CHAPTER necessary force, he had engaged as his chief co-operator one Chisholm, a wild backwoodsman, well acquainted 1797. with the Spanish posts, and who had conceived against the Spanish authorities, from some collisions with them, a bitter hatred and an ardent desire of revenge.

In Blount's letter, laid before Congress, he had sought to engage in his schemes the Indian agent to whom it was addressed. Upon the evidence of this letter the House voted to impeach Blount, of which they sent up notice July 7. to the Senate. The Senate thereupon required him to give security for his appearance to answer such articles as might be exhibited against him, himself in $20,000, and two sureties in $15,000 each, and the House having requested that, till the impeachment should be decided, he might be "sequestered from his seat," after hearing counsel in his behalf, the Senate proceeded to expel July 9. him, Tazewell only voting in the negative. Thereupon his two sureties, his brother, a member of the House, and Butler of the Senate, surrendered him into custody, and were discharged from their bond. But Blount was presently released on recognizing himself in $1000, with two securities in $500 each, to appear and answer to the articles, which, however, were not exhibited till the next session.

The Aurora strove anxiously to make out of this affair a case of the employment of "British gold" for the purpose of involving the United States in difficulties with Spain and France. But the scheme had originated, not with Great Britain, but with Blount and his associates, all of whom strongly sympathized with the politics of the Aurora; nor did it appear that the British minister had given to it any other countenance beyond yielding to Chisholm's earnest requests to be sent to England to

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CHAPTER for his absence. This speech was not very agreeable to the rest of the opposition, over whose heads Lyon seemed 1797. disposed to exalt himself as a special Democrat. By the Federalists it was heard with contemptuous smiles. Dana, of Connecticut, after premising that for his part he was by no means specially desirous of the gentleman's company, and his belief that the president would as readily forego it, expressed a hope that the leave asked for would be unanimously granted, which it accordingly was. Such was the first introduction to the House of one who subsequently became a political martyr, and who, during a membership of several years, often displayed a practical good sense hardly to have been expected from such a beginning.

Notwithstanding the tone of the address, the House was but slow in taking any steps of a very decided character. The news which continued to arrive from Europe was of a kind to inspire fresh alarm. The stoppage of specie payments by the Bank of England threatened destruction to the commercial and financial power of Great Britain, The mutiny at the Nore seemed to shake the very basis of British naval ascendency. Bonaparte had appeared under the walls of Vienna, and Austria had been compelled to make peace. The opposition were delighted with the opening prospect of the downfall of Great Britain; and they urged with greater zeal than ever the necessity of cautiously avoiding a rupture with France. The Federalists, on the other hand, watched the progress of events, not without alarm for their own country should England really succumb. The letters of King, American embassador at London, to his Federal friends, strongly urged the impolicy of any involvement in the European Even England herself, alarmed at the terrible military power called into existence by the ill-considered at

war.

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tempt from abroad to suppress the outbreak of Demo- CHAPTER cratic enthusiasm in France, was now seeking, with increased anxiety, to negotiate a peace.

The House, however, still adhered, though by a very small majority, to the policy set forth by the Federal leaders in the debate on the address. In a session of eight weeks, acts were passed apportioning to the states a detachment of eighty thousand militia, to be ready to march at a moment's warning; appropriating $115,000 for the further fortification of harbors; prohibiting the exportation of arms and ammunition, and encouraging their importation; authorizing the equipment of the three frigates and their employment, together with an increased number of revenue cutters, in defending the coast. Another act subjected to a fine of $10,000 and ten years' imprisonment any citizen of the United States who might be concerned in fitting out, or any way con nected with any private armed vessel intended to cruise against nations with whom the United States were at peace, or against the vessels and property of their fellowcitizens. To meet the expenses that might be incurred, a loan of $800,000 was authorized, and the revenue was re-enforced by an addition of eight cents per bushel to the duty on salt, and by stamp-duties of ten dollars on licenses to practice law in the courts of the United States, five dollars on certificates of naturalization, four dollars on letters patent of the United States, two dollars on copies of the same, and one dollar on charter parties and bottomry bonds. A motion to raise the duty on certif icates of naturalization, which stood in the bill as reported at twenty cents, to twenty dollars, brought on a lively debate as to the policy of encouraging immigration. The high duty was advocated by several Federalists as a check on the facility of acquiring the right of citizen

1797.

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