X.

to maintain this declaration, I rely, under God, with en- CHAPTER tire confidence on the firm and enlightened support of. the national Legislature, and upon the virtue and patriot- 1797. ism of my fellow-citizens."

This declaration of fixed purpose to persevere in the policy of the late administration dashed at once the hopes of the opposition of separating the new president from the Federal party; and forthwith the Aurora, lately so full of compliments, commenced to assail him as "president by three votes."

as

The Senate found no difficulty in agreeing to an answer, which, on the whole, notwithstanding some soft sentences, was fully responsive to the speech. A motion to strike out a clause of it, declaring the Senate's perfect union with the president, was lost by the deci sive vote of eleven to sixteen. Vice-president Jefferson May 23. thus found himself obliged to put his signature to a doeument to which his own sentiments by no means corresponded. The arrival of additional senators increased the Federal majority by two or three votes. Even the wayerers in the House did not escape the influence of the president's firm and decided tone, and the answer, originally reported, echoed back the sentiments of the speech with tolerable distinctness. This, however, was a tone in which the opposition did not desire to speak; and Nicholas moved a number of amendments, of which May 22. the object was to avoid any express approval of the policy hitherto pursued by the government, or the use of any strong expressions, such as might increase the anger of the offended Directory. One of these amendments contained a suggestion that an offer should be made to place France, as to contraband and enemies' goods, upon the same ground conceded to Great Britain in the late treaty, and the expression of a hope that this offer might prove satisfactory.

CHAPTER

X.

Those same gentlemen of the opposition who, twelve months before, in arguing for the rejection of Jay's 1797. treaty, had spoken so lightly of a war with Great Britain, now seemed to be exceedingly impressed with the calamities which must attend a war with France. Sensitive as they had been to injury or insult from Great Britain, toward France they exhibited a most saint-like patience. Nicholas, so he said, felt the insult to Pinckney; but he thought it very necessary to get rid of that irritation which injury produces, and to proceed in the most calm and dispassionate manner. Indeed, he argued at length to show that the insult to Pinckney was not so great after all; that the real causes of his rejection were that his letters of credence made no special mention of the complaints recently urged by the French, and his being invested with no extraordinary powers to negotiate on that subject. "It might, perhaps, be the opinion of some that he was improperly influenced by party zeal in favor of the French-a zeal which had been blazoned forth as existing in an immoderate degree in this country. But where was the proof of this charge? For his own part, he had no intercourse with the French but of the commonest kind. On his first coming into this House the French were embroiled with all their neigh bors, who were endeavoring to tear them to pieces. Knowing what had been the situation of this country when engaged in a similar cause, he was anxious for their success. And was there not reason for anxiety when a nation, contending for the right of self-government, was thus attacked? especially since it was well known that if the powers engaged against France had proved successful, this country would have been their next object. Had they not the strongest proof, in the declaration of one of the British colonial governors, that

X

it was the intention of England to declare war against CHAPTER America, in case of the successful termination of the war against France? He would mention another reason for 1797. his sensibility in favor of the French cause, and that was because he found so much indifference to it in this part of the Union. He could not tell how it was that a disposition unfavorable to republicanism had arisen here. He shuddered for his country when he found such a disposition prevailing in any part of it; and it was to counteract this disposition that he opposed a contrary zeal, though he was not conscious of having been over-zealous."

While allowing all due weight to this defense against the charge of belonging to a French faction, we ought, at the same time, in justice to the Federalists, to recollect the grounds on which Nicholas and his friends had maintained the existence, in the United States, of an English anti-Republican faction, controlling, as they alleged, the policy of the government. The slightest display of moderation toward Great Britain had sufficed with them as foundation for the charge of being under British influence. To have opposed Madison's resolutions for discriminations against British commerce-to have been in favor of Jay's treaty, were, in their eyes, proofs entirely sufficient to establish this imputation. But if British influence could thus be proved, was not the argument equally good and ten times as strong for the existence of a French influence, especially against a man like Nicholas, who proceeded to argue, in the conclusion of his speech, in the very track of Adet and the French Directory, that, by ratifying Jay's treaty, the United States had abandoned the position of neutrality, and had given to France just cause of complaint?

In reply to Nicholas, Smith, of South Carolina, main

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CHAPTER tained "that the insult to Pinckney was plainly a studied one. The French government were resolved to use 1797, this country as an instrument for ruining the commerce of Great Britain an object on which they had set their hearts as the only means of bringing that country to terms. The French were attempting to make the same use of all the neutral nations; and this object they hoped to accomplish here as elsewhere, by establishing among us a secret predominating influence more dangerous than invasion because more insidious.

The treaty with
The Directory

Great Britain was but a mere pretext.
had been led to believe that the government and the peo-
ple of the United States were at odds, and that, could
they but succeed in overturning the existing administra-
tion, it was in their power to demand and to obtain any
terms they chose. To adopt, in this state of things, a
weak, timid, hesitating address, would strengthen this
belief, and invite to a perseverance in the present course
of insults and injuries. He valued unanimity as much
as any body. He was sensible of its peculiar importance
at the present juncture. But it might be purchased at
too dear a sacrifice, and he would rather have only a bare
majority for the address as reported, than its unanimous
adoption as it was proposed to be amended. If that was
all the gentlemen on the other side proposed doing at
this extraordinary session, the calling of Congress to-
gether would prove the most humiliating, the most ca-
lamitous measure ever adopted. Better, indeed, had the
members remained at home, and there, in secret silence,
smothered their resentments and mourned over the dis-
honor of their country, than to be thus collected from all
parts of the Union as fellow-witnesses to their own shame,
and to the indignities offered to their country, without
the power or even the spirit to resent them.

A course

X.

so pregnant with humiliation he could not regard as pos- CHAPTER sible, and he confidently hoped that as our country had always displayed her justice, so both sides of the House 1797. would unite to exhibit her as not inferior in fortitude and in firmness."

Rutledge opposed the amendments because, by undertaking to dictate the course of the new negotiation, they interfered with the rights of the executive. Griswold insisted that the substance of them was an apology for the conduct of France, and a reliance entirely on her spirit of conciliation for an adjustment of the existing differ

ences.

Baldwin was opposed entirely to these addresses at the May 23. commencement of a session, by which the House was prematurely committed to a special course of policy. He had always been in favor of addresses as ambiguous as possible, making a decent answer to the president, but not committing the House; and it was on this ground that he based his support of the amendments.

Otis (the successor of Ames, and a nephew of the famous James Otis, of the Stamp Act times) "agreed that, on ordinary occasions, such ambiguous addresses might be very proper. But this was not an ordinary case. What we now wanted was a new declaration of independence, not less endangered by the pretensions of the French Directory than it had been in former times by the pretensions of Lord North.

"The injuries we endured were atrocious-the capture of our vessels, depredations on the persons and propcrty of our citizens, indignity offered to our minister, refusal to treat further unless the complaints of the Directory, without exception and without explanation, should first be redressed-in other words, unless we would violate treaties, repeal statutes, and do what the Constitu