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done of the eastern part of Hispaniola. A French agent CHAPTER had been lately arrested in Kentucky, sent thither, as was believed, by Adet, to renew the former intrigue for 1797. the separation of the Western country from the American Union, and its junction with Louisiana.

The fate

of Genoa, in being compelled to relinquish her neutrality, has already been referred to. Implacable toward England, France had required Hamburg to break off all commerce with her; and the same demand had been extended to Bremen and to Denmark. Hoche's expedition against Ireland had failed; but Bonaparte was pressing hard upon the last remaining ally of Great Britain, and Austria, it was plain, would soon be forced to a peace. Discouraged by the bad success of her allies, Great Britain herself had for some time been attempting to negotiate. What might be the fate of the United States if, with a violent French faction in their own bosom, a general peace should be concluded in Europe, leaving the American difficulties with France unsettled, and the sister republic at liberty to send thither a fraternizing army under Hoche or Bonaparte?

How moderate were the views of the leading Federalists, is apparent from a letter of Hamilton to Wolcott, March 30. written some six weeks before the meeting of Congress, and very shortly after the arrival of Pinckney's dispatches: "It has been a considerable time my wish," so reads this letter, "that a commission extraordinary should be constituted to go to France. I was particularly anxious that the first measure of the new president's administration should have been that; but it has not so happened. I still continue to wish earnestly that the same measure may go into effect, and that the meeting of the Senate may be accelerated for that purpose. Without opening a new channel of negotiation, it seems to me the door of

CHAPTER accommodation is shut, and rupture will follow if not preX. vented by a general peace. Who, indeed, can be cer1797. tain that a general pacification of Europe may not leave

us alone to receive the law from France? Will it be wise to omit any thing to parry, if possible, these great risks? But the Directory have declared that they will not receive a minister till their grievances shall have been redressed, This can hardly mean more than that they will not receive a resident minister. It can not mean that they will not hear an extraordinary messenger, who may even be sent to know what will satisfy. But suppose they do. It will still be well to convince the people that the government has done all in its power, and that the Directory are unreasonable. But the enemies of the government call for the measure. To me, this is a very strong reason for pursuing it. It will meet them on their own ground, and disarm them of the plea that something has been omitted. I ought, my good friend, to apprise you, for you may learn it from no other, that a suspicion begins to dawn among the friends of the gov ernment that the actual administration (ministers) is not averse from a war with France. How very important to obviate this. As in the case of England, so now, my opinion is to exhaust the expedient of negotiation, and, at the same time, to prepare vigorously for the worst. This is sound policy. Any omission or deficiency either way will be a great error."

Wolcott, whose remonstrances, as we have seen, had contributed to prevent the institution of such a mission as Hamilton wished, was hardly ready to yield to these suggestions. He was not satisfied that the government had not already done all that the occasion justified. The demands of France required, so he thought, a surrender of national independence, not to be yielded except to the

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most extreme necessity. "The idea," so he wrote in CHAPTER reply, "of a commission consisting of Mr. Madison, or any one like him, I must own to you, is one which I can 1797. never adopt without the utmost reluctance. I have no March 31. confidence in Mr. Madison; he has been a frequenter of Adet's political parties. I have just been informed that Adet has suggested the idea of sending this gentleman. We know that the French count upon the support of a party in this country, and so shameless is the faction grown, that positive proof of a devotion to French views is with many no injury to a man's popularity. If the government suffers France to dictate what description of men shall be appointed to foreign courts, our country is undone. From that moment the confidence of all the old-fashioned, honorable, and virtuous men of the interior is irrevocably lost." "I have no objection to sending a man of neutral politics, if he is a man of sincere firmness and integrity. General Pinckney is of this description. If a commission is generally preferred, it is a point, perhaps, not to be contested; but how can the commission be composed? From what was on the point of being done, I presume Mr. Cabot can not be brought forward. If a man of his principles were to be associated with Mr. Madison, either nothing would be done, or something worse than nothing. Mr. Madison would insist upon a submission to France, or would obstruct a settlement, and throw the disgrace of failure upon the friends of government. The present is a moment of apparent tranquillity, but I conjecture it is a calm which forebodes a hurricane. The executive will either find a strong and steady gale from one point, or be assailed with a tornado which will throw every thing into confusion. I predict that no treaty, no compromise, no concession will afford security. Revenue is essential, and there will, I fear, be

CHAPTER insuperable objections started by the friends and enemies X. of government. Credit has been abused and exhausted 1797. in senseless speculations.

April 5.

"You know that I am accustomed to respect your opinions, and, at any rate, I am not so ignorant of the extent of your influence with the friends of government as not to be sensible that if you are known to favor the sending of a commission, either nothing will be done, or your opinion will prevail. In this case, what will be the objection to sending Mr. Ingersoll of this city, or some such character, to be united with General Pinckney and John Quincy Adams, or with Mr. Murray, to rendezvous at Amsterdam until the consent of France to renew negotiations can be obtained? Is a direct mission to France, of which Mr. Madison is to be a member, in your view indispensable ?

"I should be sorry if the friends of government should consider me, or any of the public officers, as desirous of producing a war with France, because I should consider this as evidence that our affairs are desperate. If the public pulse does not beat higher than that of government, all is over. So far as individual characters are affected, public opinion is of no consequence; but the public opinion in regard to measures is of the utmost consequence. There ought to be a zeal for strenuous measures, and this zeal ought to be an engine in the hands of the executive for preserving peace. I think I can assure you that the movements of our political machine can not be adjusted to a minute scale, and that if the direction is attempted to be varied, its future course will be nearly opposite to the present." This last paragraph is well worthy of notice as a remarkable specimen of political sagacity.

"I hope nothing in my last letter," wrote Hamilton

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in reply," was misunderstood. Could it be necessary, I CHAPTER would assure you that no one has a stronger conviction than myself of the purity of the motives which direct 1797. your public conduct, or of the good sense and judgment by which it is guided. If I have a fear (you will, excuse my frankness), it is lest the strength of your feelings, the companion of energy of character, should prevent that pliancy to circumstances which is sometimes indispensable.

"The situation of our country is singularly critical. There is too much reason to apprehend that the Emperor of Germany, in danger from Russia and Prussia, and perhaps from the Porte, may be compelled to yield to the views of France. England, standing alone, may be compelled to yield also. It is certain that great consternation in court and country attends the intelligence of Bonaparte's last victories. To be in rupture with France, united with England alone, or singly as is possible, would be a most unwelcome situation. Divided as we are, who can say what would be hazarded by it? In such a situation, it appears to me, we should rather err on the side of condescension than on the opposite side. We ought to do every thing to avoid rupture without unworthy sacrifices, and to keep in view, as a primary object, union at home. No measure can tend more to this than an extraordinary mission. To fulfill the ends. proposed, it is certain that it ought to embrace a character in whom France and the opposition have full reliWhat risk can attend sending Madison, if combined, as I propose, with Pinckney, or Cabot, or such a man? Pinckney is a man of honor, and loves his country. Cabot we both know. Besides, there ought to be certain leading instructions from which they may not deviate. I agree with you that we have nothing to re

ance.