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these errors, we shall principally aim, in the remainder of this prefatory discourse.

1. Some people have set up an unfounded and unfortunate distinction between doing justice and doing good, by which the obligation of the one is made peremptory, and that of the other is made optional. They speak of the former as a perfect, and of the latter as an imperfect obligation. They mean by this, that it is necessary for them to be honest, but that it is a matter of free choice whether they shall be charitable. And while they not unfrequently reduce their theory to practice, it is owing, in a great measure, to the currency which the theory has obtained, that the practice of withholding kindness, even where its exercise is most urgently required, so generally prevails. We observe many persons taking great merit to themselves when they perform a benevolent action, whereas they would be ashamed to receive praise for doing what was nothing more than equitable. We sometimes see them, in a fit of resentment or of caprice, turning a deaf ear to the most imperious call of distress, without seeming to think, that, in doing so, they are violating any moral duty. And we sometimes see them habitually addicted to the pursuits of avarice, or stinted, beyond all the bounds of decency, in their usefulness and their charities to mankind, and all the while flattering themselves, that, being sober, and honest, and peaceable, and, as they imagine, pious, they have all the qualities that can be strictly demanded of them, and only want that which they are not obliged to possess.

Now, such persons we deem to be greatly mis

taken, not only in their conduct, which will be generally condemned, but also in the views from which it proceeds, or by which it is influenced, though on this point we do not expect a general coincidence of opinion. It is admitted, that there is a distinction between justice and benevolence. This distinction

holds so far, as that the claims of the former, when there is a competition, must be preferred to the claims of the latter; according to the common adage, which is at once agreeable to Scripture, and founded on right reason, that " a man should be just, before he is generous." And it also holds so far, as that, while human laws can regulate the operations of justice, it is impossible for them to extend their authority, in the same way, or in the same measure, to the exercise of benevolence. We allow the distinction to go thus far, but no farther. It is not true, that though men are expressly and absolutely bound to be just, so that no considerations can excuse them for being destitute of that attribute, they are yet at perfect liberty to be benevolent or not as they may think proper, and that they may give or withhold their aid, on what occasions, and in what degree they please. This is correct, only on the supposition that they are accountable to none but man. The moment you admit that you are subject and responsible to God-that moment you admit also, that your obligation to be just, is not one whit more clear and binding, than is your obligation to be benevolent; for both virtues are the subject of his special commandment.

In the actual display of your benevolence, indeed, a great deal must, of course, and from the

very nature of the thing, be left to your own discretion but it is a discretion, in the exercise of which you must be under the guidance of certain fixed principles, and for the use of which you must be answerable to the great Judge of the world. And, after all, with respect to this very discretion, there is not so much contrariety between justice and benevolence, as some may imagine. When claims are made upon your justice, by those to whom you are indebted, you employ your judgment and your means of research, in order to ascertain that their claims are correct and lawful; and it is only after a satisfactory determination of this point, that you proceed to give them what you have found to be strictly due. Now, we are not aware of any mighty difference in the case of claims that are made upon your benevolence. It is not required that you should fulfil these, without being previously convinced, by inquiry and prudent consideration, that they are such as are entitled to your attention. You are not only free, but it is expedient and proper for you, to see your way clearly through the impositions that may be practised upon you, and the injudicious or extravagant applications that may be addressed to your humane feelings; and then, setting these aside, you come to a discreet settlement in your minds, as to all that is needed on the one hand, and as to all that you can bestow in relief on the other. But what we maintain is this, that, having come to this discreet settlement in your own minds, it is no longer a matter of hesitation or of self-will how you shall proceed to act. The duty becomes quite plain and indisputable.

A voice

from heaven enjoins you to do good-to give as you have received to "sow bountifully that you may reap bountifully." The opportunity of obeying that voice is set before you;—the ability to obey it is conferred upon you. And though no human tribunal can call you to account for rebelling against it, yet, at the tribunal of God, you must reckon with the authority of God, for refusing to obtemper his behests, and will find, that, in his holy judgment, there was as little of the true Christian in withstanding the appeals of benevolence, as there was in resisting the demands of justice.

This is put beyond all doubt, by the instructions of that sacred volume which God has given to direct us, not how we may, but how we must act as his servants and people. In it, the duty of being benevolent is presented to us in a variety of aspects, and through the medium of many illustrations: but it is uniformly held forth in such a light, as to show us that a faithful and diligent performance of it is indispensably requisite. It is a leading commandment of the law" Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." It is a precept which runs through the whole of the Gospel, that we "be kind one to another," and "do good to all men as we have opportunity." It is made the test of our being Christ's disciples, that we have love one to another." It is the prominent lesson taught by his example, that he "went about doing good." It is the proof of our belonging to God's family, that we "love our enemies, bless them that curse us, and do good to them that hate us." And it is according as we have, or have not, "fed the hungry," and

"clothed the naked," and "visited the sick," and engaged in similar works of mercy, that we shall be sentenced at last to "depart into everlasting fire," or to inherit the kingdom" of heaven. When

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we consider these things, and all the other great and important things that are said of charity in the book of inspiration, it is but trifling with the truth to talk of any imperfection being attached to the obligation of benevolence. And it is worse than trifling with the truth, for any one who professes belief in the Bible, to neglect the cultivation of that grace, when urged to it by such high sanctions, and such powerful motives, and to shelter themselves under the vain pretext that no legal enactment can either compel them to do good to others, or define the breadth and the length of the charity which they may gratuitously show.

Now, my Christian friend, let me ask you if you have on any occasion denied assistance to the needy, when you were able to give it, merely because the rejected applicant could not get redress in a court of law or of equity? Remember, then, that though you were right in thinking that no force could be employed to extort from you what you refused to give willingly, or to give at all, and that it was wise to leave the matter in this unregulated shape, you were as unquestionably wrong in thinking, that in using your freedom as you did, you used it innocently, or used it well. You forgot that there is an authority in heaven paramount to all authority upon earth-that this authority does, both in the most peremptory and in the most tender way, enjoin you to do good as you have opportunity—that it has

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