where there will be the most just ground of complaint, there will be less of it made, through fear. On the contrary, where the government is most free, and there is consequently less danger of punishment for seditious or treasonable practices, unprincipled demagogues, from a desire of becoming popular, will pretend public abuses where none exist, and exaggerate those which do. Not but that there are tyrannical abuses of authority in democracies and republics, as well as in monarchies; but for the most part, they excite less apprehension and alarm in popular governments; because in them the power, however it may be abused, is supposed to be limited, and the evil consequences of such abuse, are definite and circumscribed. But in monarchies, where the political power exercised by the ruler is either arbitrary, or, at least very great, the abuse of it excites alarm; because the extent of the abuse, or of the evils that may be occasioned by it, cannot be either distinctly perceived or foreseen, or precisely ascertained. It is for this reason, that, under the government of an arbitrary tyrant, there is no one but must entertain apprehensions for his own personal safety. Yet, for the most part, timid and conscientious persons, are desirous of a strong, though not of an arbitrary government. Because, from its very structure, a strong government is most likely to be permanent, and they consequently feel a greater confidence that they shall be protected from the innovations, abuses, and violence of the turbulent and disorderly. On the other hand, the unprincipled, dissolute and flagitious, always desire a weak government, in order that they may be at liberty to practise wickedness with the greater hope of impunity.

Where the form of government is strong and effective, the just and peaceable therefore, enjoy the highest degree of that rational liberty which consists in the security of their persons and property, and the quiet and undisturbed exercise of all their civil and political rights, free from the molestation of the turbulent and licentious. On the other hand, where the form of government is weak and tottering, and the rulers, from a desire of popularity, neglect a discharge of their duty, and are consequently timeserving and inefficient, the turbulent and unjust enjoy the highest degree of freedom and impunity in

their insolent practices of fraud, violence and imposition upon those, who have not the power to protect themselves, and, whom, the rulers through an apprehension of a loss of popularity, are base enough to leave unprotected. For, flagitious and disorderly persons dislike wholesome laws, because they find their freedom to commit wrongs with impunity, is restrained by them. They therefore make an outcry for liberty, and for a repeal of such laws. But laws to prevent wrong and injustice do not deprive well disposed persons of any freedom; because they would do no wrong and commit no crime, if there were no law against them. They therefore are in favor of such laws, to protect society and themselves against the lovers of such liberty. And as the good, who alone may safely be entrusted with such freedom, i. e. a state of exemption from such laws, never complain for want of it; so, those who do complain, are the very persons in whom such confidence cannot be placed.

Lastly; though it cannot be doubted, that where all the people are unanimous, they have a natural right to alter their government, whether any provision for such alteration is made in their constitution or not, because the government is intended for their benefit, and, if they had not such right, the most horrible tyranny, cruelty and oppression might be continued from generation to generation, unless there were some miraculous interposition of providence; still the wise and prudent will be very cautious how they engage in any such enterprises; some of which, seem to have been signally marked with the divine. displeasure. The reader will readily recollect that the same nation, which dethroned and beheaded Charles I, a legitimate monarch, under pretence that he had made use of an unwarrantable stretch of his regal authority, which however was not well defined, was compelled to submit to a bloody usurper and ruthless tyrant, who died peaceably in his bed. And here the sturdy republicans of parliament, who had deprived the nobles of their constitutional authority, and who made it almost a matter of conscience to withhold due reverence and respect from their lawful sovereign, were compelled by Cromwell, both a republican and a fanatic, and as bloody and ferocious as themselves, but far superior to them in ability and decision of

character, to bow their necks before him with servile fear ; yet, after all, were thrust out of parliament by him with the utmost scorn and contempt.

What massacres followed the decapitation of the mild and benevolent Louis XVI? What a succession of demons afterwards controlled the public affairs of France, who, deluding the infatuated people with the ceaseless, false and senseless outcry and jargon of liberty, equality, the rights of man, tyranny, priestcraft, aristocrat, democrat, citizen and patriot, never hesitated to violate every precept of religion, every moral duty, and every feeling of humanity, and carried their extravagance to the height of the most blasphemous impiety. Were the horrors, which thus succeeded to the overthrow of this established government, a judgment from heaven, or were they merely the natural consequences, which may always be expected to flow from the prevalence of anarchy, atheism, and unbounded licentiousness? Certainly, no tyranny can occasion such evils, as an intoxication of the intellect, arising from an influx of false principles on the subject of religion, morals and philosophy.

Well-disposed men therefore will hesitate long, before they join in any attempt to overthrow or revolutionize their government, under any pretext whatever. It is true the people may be unanimous in subverting their government, and yet afterwards, they may not be able to agree in forming a new one, and, if so, they will be in a much worse condition, than they were in, under that which they have rejected; because, to destroy is not the same as to reform. Will it not be worse than living under any regular government, to remain in a state of anarchy and confusion, until the different parties and factions, are reduced by battles, massacres and assassinations, under one; and another government is established by force or fraud, ten times more arbitrary and despotic than that which they have been induced to overturn? For, in many cases, revolutions do not result so much from a sense of intolerable oppression, as from a fondness for an idol-a golden calf-a false god—an imaginary degree of liberty, which, if it were real, the frailty, perverseness and folly of mankind, to say nothing of their wickedness, injustice and depravity, wholly disqualify them from enjoying.

CHAPTER II.

Of the Social Compact of the Citizens of the different States in the American Union, in the formation of the General Constitution, taken in connexion with the real or supposed compact of the citizens of each State, in the formation of its own Constitution or State Government.

In order to form distinct ideas on the subject of the present chapter, it will be necessary to consider the situation of the thirteen states which first adopted the general constitution, immediately previous to that important transaction. From the year A. D. 1776, when Congress declared the colonies free and independent states, the war with Great Britain was carried on under articles of confederation, the powers conferred on the Provincial Congress, by which, may be considered as constituting the first general government of these territories or provinces. The project of a union, however, seems first to have been suggested some twenty or thirty years previous, by commissioners appointed by the colonies, at the call of the crown. These commissioners met at Albany, in July, 1754, and as among them, were found such discordant materials, as Governor Hutchinson, Governor Pownall, and Dr Franklin, entertaining political opinions so very different,—it might be a matter of curiosity to examine thoroughly a plan of government which is principally ascribed to Dr Franklin, and to which, it appears, the others agreed. It must suffice however, to observe, that the general government was to unite the colonies of Massachusetts Bay, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina and South Carolina, and be administered by a President General, to be appointed by the crown; and a grand council, to be chosen by the representatives of the people of the several colonies, met in their respective assemblies. The assent of the President, who constituted the

executive, was requisite to all acts of the grand council; the members of which were to be chosen every three years. The general government was to have power to make treaties with the Indians, &c.; raise and pay soldiers, and equip vessels, &c.; to make laws, to lay and levy general duties, imposts and taxes. Each colony was to retain its own constitution, except so far as it might be altered by the act of parliament, which should establish the general constitution; that is, so far as they were inconsistent with the general constitution. Any colony however, was to be at liberty to defend itself on sudden emergencies. This project, though agreed to by Pownall and Hutchinson, was rejected in England.

To return; the government established by the articles of confederation, though it carried the country through the arduous conflict with so powerful a country as Great Britain, yet would hardly have been sufficient to do so, if the sense of common danger, as well as an enthusiastic ardor in pursuit of what they esteemed their natural rights and liberties, had not sustained the people. These powerful motives supplied what was wanting through the inefficiency of this system, and without their aid, the struggle for independence would have been weak and unsuccessful. But the hurry of arms, and the uncertainty of the final result of the conflict, rendered it impossible, while the suspense lasted, to remedy the evils and defects of this system of confederation, though they were most sensibly felt; since Congress were not able to bring into the field, or to sustain while there, so much of the strength of the country, as its extreme exigencies frequently required. The desperate struggle might not have been of so long continuance, if the provincial congress had been able to enforce its requisitions, instead of being obliged to rely on the provinces or states, for that purpose.

After the termination of the war, which was brought to a successful close in 1783, by a treaty with Great Britain, acknowledging the independence of the United States, and the bond which connected them with that country was severed, the states were left in a state of nature, and consequently were at liberty to assume whatever relations towards each other, they thought expedient, or could agree upon. It is