means. I should advise the very contrary in the strong'est manner. I should say, let the overtures be made so much the more public and explicit by those who do wish for peace. It is the unfortunate state of things, which has hitherto bound the cause of France to any possible treaty with America, and which has thereby thrown a national damp upon any actual public exertions to procure a negotiation for peace with America. I have the strongest opinion, that if it were publicly known to the people of England, that a negotiation might be opened with America, upon the terms above specified, that all the Ministry together, if they were ill disposed to a man, would not venture to thwart such a measure.

But why should it be supposed, that the Ministry, to a man, are ill disposed to a peace? Suppose them to be half and half, and the public wish and voice of the people in favor of negotiation, it is evident on which side the balance would incline. But why should we seek to throw a damp prematurely upon any chance? Why presume even against any individual? I grant, that it would be a bitter trial of humility to be brought to a formal recognition of independence at the haughty command of France, and I believe every part of the nation would proceed to every extremity before, they would submit to that. But if that touchy point can be provided for, sub silentio, and if the proposed treaty with America may be carried on free from control by France, let us give the cause of peace a fair trial; at the worst we should but be where we were if we should fail. But why should we expect to fail, when the greatest rub is removed, by the liberty of entering separately into a treaty? I think it a most favorable event, leading towards peace. Give us a truce with its

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concomitants, and a little time so given for cooling will have most excellent effects on both sides. Eternal peace

and conciliation may then follow.

I send this to you by the quickest despatch, that we may bring this point to a fair issue before the meeting of Parliament. God prosper the blessed work of peace. I am ever yours most affectionately,

D. HARTLEY.

P. S. January 8th, 1782. Since writing this letter, I have seen Mr Alexander, and shall see him from time to time to communicate with him. I do not suppose I shall have an answer from Lord North till the preliminary points are so settled, as to enable him to give an answer in form. The Ministry might undoubtedly give a short negative, if they thought proper; but I do not expect that. You may be assured, that I have and shall continue to enforce every argument in the most conciliatory manner to induce a negotiation. I am very sorry for Mr A.?s confinement, on his own account, and on that of his friends, and because probably in the future state of this business his personal exertions may be very serviceable in the cause of peace. Every assistance and every exertion of mine will always be most heartily devoted to that cause. I have nothing further to add, either upon my own reflections or from my subsequent conversations with Mr Alexander, to what I have stated in the foregoing letter. If we once make a good beginning upon the plan there stated, I should hope that such a negotiation, founded on such principles, would promise fair to produce every salutary and pacific consequence in the event.

·D. H.

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REMARKS ON THE CONCILIATORY BILL,

In the title and preamble of the bill, the words Provinces of North America are used as general words, neither implying dependence or independence.

CLAUSE I. The Truce is taken from the Conciliatory

Act of 1778, and is indefinite as to the proposed duration of the truce. Under this clause it might be proposed to negotiate three points, viz. the removal of the British troops from the Thirteen Provinces of North America, and connectedly with this article, a stipulation for the security of the friends of the British government. The third article might be a stipulation, that the respective parties, during the continuance of the truce, should not either directly or indirectly give assistance to the enemies of each other.

CLAUSE II. Articles of Intercourse and Pacification. Under this clause some arrangements might be settled, for establishing a free and mutual intercourse, civil and commercial, between Great Britain and the aforesaid Provinces of North America.

CLAUSE III. Suspension of certain Acts of Parliament. By this clause a free communication may be kept open between the two countries, during the negotiation for peace, without stumbling against any claim of rights, which might draw into contest the question of dependence or independence.

CLAUSE IV. The Ratification by Parliament. The object of this clause is to consolidate peace and conciliation, step by step, as the negotiation may proceed; and to prevent, as far as possible, any return of war, after the first declaration of a truce. By the operation of this

clause, a temporary truce may be converted into a perpetual and permanent peace.

CLAUSE V. A Temporary Act. This clause, creating

a temporary act for a specific purpose of negotiation in view, is taken from the act of 1778.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO. B. FRANKLIN.

Dear Sir,

Philadelphia, January 7th, 1782.

As it does not appear improbable, that the humiliation and misfortunes of Great Britain may produce the same sentiments, which a spirit of moderation dictates to the other belligerent powers, and lead her to concur with them in their wishes for peace, it cannot be improper to acquaint you with the objects America most wishes to attain, and to furnish you with the arguments on which they found their claim to them. For such is the confidence, not only in the justice of His Most Christian Majesty, but in his friendship, that they firmly persuade themselves, that he will not only preserve for them their undoubted rights, but that he will even go so far as to procure for them those advantages they may reasonably demand, on the close of a successful war; and I am perfectly satisfied, that the loose hints that a detail of their sentiments may afford you, and our other Commissioners, will be strengthened and improved by your lights in such manner, as to come before his Majesty in the most advantageous form.

The first point of discussion will be the limits of the United States. The instructions given Mr Adams on the day of last, explain the wishes of Con

gress on that subject, nor can they admit of many doubts, except so far as they relate to our southern extent. The boundary between us and Canada being very well ascertained by grants, charters, proclamations, and other acts of government, and more particularly by the settlements of people, who are engaged in the same cause with us, and who have the same rights with the rest of the subjects of the United States.

Our western and northwestern extent will probably be contested with some warmth, and the reasoning on that subject be deduced from general principles, and from proclamations and treaties with the Indians.

The subject is undoubtedly intricate and delicate, yet, upon candid investigation, I believe it will appear, that our extension to the Mississippi is founded in justice; and that our claims are at least such as the events of the war give us a right to insist upon. Your situation, furnishing you amply with the various documents on which Great Britain founded her claim to all the country east of the Mississippi previous to the treaty of Paris, I will not trouble you with references to them, which would at any rate be imperfect, from the want which prevails here of books and papers. Taking it for granted, that the King of Great Britain was entitled to that extent of country, (which he at least cannot contravene) it only remains to examine how far he considers it as within the limits of some of the United States, because he can no more pretend to abridge those limits, than claim any other right of which the United States are in possession.

His idea of these limits is apparent from charters granted by the crown; and from recent grants made by its representatives in several of the States, it appears that they